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Indian  Fights  &  Fighters 


THE    LAST    OF    CUSTER 
Drawing  by  E.  L.  Blumenschein 


AMERICAN    FIGHTS    AND    FIGHTERS   SERIES 


Indian  Fights  and 


Fighters 


THE   SOLDIER   AND   THE   SIOUX 
BY 

CYRUS  TOWNSEND  BRADY,  LL.D. 

Author  of  "Colonial,"  "  Border,"  and  "  Revolutionary" 
Fights  and  Fighters 


Illustrated  with  Original  Drawings  by 
Remington,     Schreyvogel,    Blumenschein,    Crawford,    Elwell, 

Deming,  and  Zogbaum, 

With  Maps,  Photographs,  and  Sketches  from  life  from  original 

Sources,  many  of  which  are  now  published 

For  the  first  time 

NEW    YORK 

McCLURE,  PHILLIPS    &    CO. 
MCMIV 


Copyright,  1904,  by 

McCLURE,  PHILLIPS  &  CO. 

Published,  December,  1904,  N 


Copyright,  1904,  by  The  Pearson  Publishing  Company 


To  that  most  eminent  and  useful 

CHURCHMAN  AND  CITIZEN 

OZI   WILLIAM  WHITAKER,  D.D.,  LL.D. 
Of 


Whom  I  admire  as  a  CLERIC,  respect  as  a 
MAN,  and  love  as  a  FRIEND 

3  Dedicate 

q/"  the  West 


He  served  so  well 


PREFACE 


T 


PREFACE 


"^HE  writing  of  history  requires  three  operations : 
(I)  The  collection  of  facts;  (II)  The  classifica- 
tion and  arrangement  of  facts;  (III)  The 
presentation  and  discussion  of  facts.  I  have 
collected  the  facts  related  in  this  book  from  every  source 
open  to  me.  These  sources  may  be  divided  into  two 
groups:  (i)  Published  and  (2)  unpublished,  matter. 
The  published  matter  includes  (a)  official  records; 
(b)  books,  and  (c)  magazine  or  other  ephemeral  articles. 
The  unpublished  matter  includes  (a)  letters  and  (b) 
verbal  communications. 

I  have  made  use  of  all  these  sources  of  information  in 
gathering  the  facts.  A  list  of  some  of  the  printed  au- 
thorities consulted  follows  this  preface.  In  addition 
thereto,  I  beg  to  acknowledge  written  communications 
from  the  following  American  Army  officers,  all  now  on 
the  retired  list  except  Colonels  Godfrey  and  Brainard 
and  Captain  Livermore: — Lieutenant-General  Nelson  A. 
Miles;  Major-General  Robert  P.  Hughes;  Brigadier- 
Generals  Henry  B.  Carrington,  George  A.  Forsyth, 
Louis  H.  Carpenter,  Anson  Mills,  Charles  A.  Woodruff 
and  Theo.  F.  Rodenbough;  Colonel  Edward  E.  S.  God- 
frey, commanding  the  Ninth  Cavalry;  Colonel  David 
L.  Brainard,  Commissary  of  Subsistence;  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  Samuel  M.  Horton;  Captains  Henry  R.  Lemly, 


Preface 

Francis  M.  Gibson,  Nathan  S.  Jarvis,  George  E.  Albee 
and  R.  L.  Livermore,  Tenth  Cavalry;  and  the  following 
civilians  :  President  E.  Benjamin  Andrews  ;  Doctors 
T.  E.  Oertel  and  D.  D.  Thompson  ;  Messrs.  W.  Kent 
Thomas,  Sigmund  Schlesinger,  Edward  Esmonde, 
Phineas  Towne,  W.  R.  E.  Collins,  Hugh  M.  Johnson, 
Herbert  Myrick,  R.  J.  Smyth,  William  E.  Morris, 
Nicholas  E.  Boyd,  Theo.  W.  Goldin  and  Arthur  Chap- 
man ;  Mrs.  Guy  V.  Henry  and- Mrs.  James  Powell. 

In  addition  to  these  letters  I  have  gathered  much 
information  in  conversation  with  officers  and  others, 
not  only  recently  but  during  many  years  spent  in  the 
West,  where  I  was  a  frequent  guest  at  army  posts,  in 
frontier  towns,  and  at  some  of  the  Indian  reservations. 
I  knew  many  of  the  participants  in  the  stirring  inci- 
dents and  heard  the  fascinating  stories  from  their  own 
lips. 

The  chapters  of  the  Fort  Phil  Kearney  series  have 
been  read  and  corrected  as  to  matters  of  fact  by  General 
Carrington  and  Colonel  Horton;  those  referring  to  the 
defense  of  Beecher's  Island,  by  General  Forsyth;  those 
describing  the  relief  of  Forsyth  and  the  fight  on  the 
Beaver,  by  General  Carpenter;  those  relating  to  the 
Little  Big  Horn  campaign,  by  General  Woodruff"  and 
Colonel  Godfrey,  and  the  account  of  the  affair  at  Slim 
Buttes  and  the  death  of  American  Horse,  by  General 
Mills.  All  of  these  gentlemen  gave  me  interesting  de- 
tails, anecdotes,  etc.,  besides  answering  all  my  inquiries. 
Several  of  them  put  their  private  papers  at  my  disposal. 
To  Colonel  Godfrey  I  am  especially  indebted  for  much 
interesting  matter  on  the  Little  Big  Horn  campaign, 
and  to  Captain  Gibson  for  the  use  of  his  unprinted  ac- 
count of  the  Battle  of  the  Washita.  The  Office  of  the 
Secretary  of  War  has  been  most  kind  in  answering  ques- 


Preface 

tions  and  furnishing  information  not  otherwise  procur- 
able. Mr.  W.  H.  Holmes,  Chief  of  the  Bureau  of  Am- 
erican Ethnology,  Smithsonian  Institution,  has  decided 
all  questions  as  to  the  proper  spelling  of  Indian  names,* 
and  has  given  me  the  Indian  equivalents  of  the  names 
of  prominent  chiefs,  as  Crazy  Horse,  Sitting  Bull,  etc. 

Several  of  the  papers  following  are  original  contri- 
butions especially  prepared  for  this  book.  The  authors 
of  these  papers  are  indicated  hereafter.  For  all  ex- 
pressions of  opinion,  for  all  comments,  notes  and  in- 
ferences, not  specifically  attributed  to  somebody  else, 
I  alone  am  responsible. 

To  all  who  have  aided  me  to  make  this  series  author- 
itative and  definitive,  my  most  grateful  thanks  are  here- 
by heartily  expressed. 

I  trust  that  in  thus  striving  to  preserve  the  records  of 
those  stirring  times  I  have  done  history  and  posterity 
a  service.  The  majority  of  those  who  fought  on  the 
plains  have  passed  away.  Many  of  the  surviving  par- 
ticipants in  the  adventures  described  are  growing  old. 
In  a  short  time  it  would  have  been  impossible  to  have 
secured  the  information  here  presented  unless  some 
one  else  had  gone  about  it  as  I  have. 

With  intervals  devoted  to  other  duties,  I  have  been 
over  a  year  and  a  half  engaged  in  this  congenial  task. 
I  have  written  literally  hundreds  of  letters,  to  learn,  or 
to  verify,  a  fact,  an  incident,  or  a  conclusion.  It  is  in- 
teresting to  call  attention  to  the  fact  that  information 
has  been  freely  and  generously  given  to  me  from  every 
source  whence  I  have  asked  it  save  three,  one  of  which 
is  noted  in  the  appendix. 

The  series  of  historical  books  of  which  this  forms  the 

*  Almost  every  author  has  a  different  way  of  spelling  the  names  of  the  sub-tribes  of 
the  Siouan  family. 


Preface 

fourth  seems  to  have  won  a  permanent  place  for  itself. 
The  number  of  copies  which  found  a  welcome  last  year 
was  greater  than  the  number  of  the  year  before,  al- 
though there  was  no  new  volume  issued  last  fall  to  call 
renewed  attention  to  the  series.  These  books  are  gen- 
erally spoken  of  by  the  title  of  the  first  published, 
"American  Fights  and  Fighters."  It  has  been  deemed 
proper,  therefore,  to  adopt  that  name,  which  is  suffi- 
ciently explicit  and  descriptive,  as  the  generic  name  of 
the  series.  Hereafter  all  the  books  that  have  appeared, 
and  those  that  are  yet  to  appear  in  this  series,  will  bear 
that  general  name,  with  the  addition  of  a  distinctive  sub- 
title in  each  instance.  The  covers  of  the  earlier  books, 
accordingly,  have  been  changed  to  read  as  follows: 

1.  American  Fights  and  Fighters,  Colo- 

nial. 

2.  American  Fights  and  Fighters,  Revo- 

lutionary— 1812. 

3.  American  Fights  and  Fighters,  Border. 

As  I  have  stated,  it  is  my  hope  to  continue  this  series 
of  books  until  I  have  covered  all  the  wars  that  have  been 
fought  upon  the  American  Continent  since  Columbus's 
day. 

So  far  as  the  American  people  are  concerned — 
save  in  the  case  of  the  Mexican  War  —  their  struggles 
have  generally  been  to  establish  a  broader,  nobler  con- 
ception of  human  freedom.  I  would  not  have  any  one 
gather  from  this  that  our  dealings  with  the  Indian  in- 
variably have  been  characterized  by  that  honesty  and 
honor  which  should  be  at  the  base  of  every  national  un- 
dertaking—  far  from  it!  In  this  book,  without  growing 
sentimental,  I  have  endeavored  to  be  fair  to  the  Indians; 


Preface 

as  in  previous  books,  I  have  tried  to  deal  justly  by  any 
and  every  enemy.*  To  be  honest  and  to  be  fair  —  these 
things  are  of  prime  importance  in  writing  history  and  in 
living  life. 

I  am  now  at  work  on  two  other  volumes,  a  book  on 
"South  American  Fights  and  Fighters"  and  a  second 
volume  of  "Indian  Fights  and  Fighters."  In  this  pro- 
posed Indian  book  I  shall  take  up  the  further  struggles  of 
the  United  States  with  the  Indians  of  the  Northwest, 
notably  Chief  Joseph's  splendid  migration  with  his  Nez- 
Perces,  the  dash  of  the  Cheyennes  for  freedom,  Captain 
Jack  and  the  Modoc  War,  the  Ute  War,  the  last  out- 
break of  the  Sioux,  and  various  other  affairs  in  the 
Northwest.  Thereafter  I  contemplate  a  third  book 
dealing  with  Arizona  and  the  Apache. 

I  take  this  opportunity  of  asking  every  individual, 
soldier  or  civilian,  who  participated  in  any  of  these  cam- 
paigns or  battles,  who  has  any  material  bearing  upon 
them,  and  who  is  willing  to  allow  me  to  look  over  it, 
kindly  to  send  it  to  me  in  care  of  the  publishers  of  this 
book,  as  soon  as  possible,  as  I  expect  to  issue  the  next 
volume  of  the  series  next  fall.  Any  such  material  will 
be  carefully  preserved  and  returned  by  express  in  good 

*For  instance:  —  Every  time  a  body  of  troops  engages  in  a  fight  with  Indians  and 
the  troops  are  outnumbered,  or  caught  at  a  disadvantage,  and  the  battle  is  continued 
until  the  troops  are  slaughtered,  such  an  affair  is  popularly  called  a  "massacre  ";  as 
"The  Fetterman  Massacre,"  "The  Custer  Massacre."  I  believe  this  to  be  an  unwar- 
ranted use  of  the  term.  Fetterman  and  Custer  attacked  the  Indians  and  fought  des- 
perately until  they  and  their  men  were  all  killed.  I  call  that  a  "  battle  "  not  a  "mas- 
sacre." When  an  Indian  war  party  raided  a  settlement  or  overwhelmed  a  train,  or  mur- 
dered children  and  women,  that,  I  think, was  a  "massacre";  but  these  two  instances 
were  not.  Consequently,  I  have  carefully  refrained  from  making  use  of  that  term  in  this 
book,  except  where  it  is  justifiable.  The  reader  may  not  agree  with  me  in  this  position, 
but  I  would  like  to  ask  if  any  one  ever  heard  of  the  "Massacre  of  Thermopylae  "  ?  The 
Greeks  fought  there  until  all,  save  one,  were  killed.  The  results  there  were  exactly 
those  of  the  Fetterman  affair  and  the  battle  of  the  Little  Big  Horn,  but  I  have  yet  to 
read  in  history  that  the  Persians  "massacred"  the  Greeks  in  that  famous  pass.  What 
is  sauce  for  the  Persians  is  sauce  for  the  Red  Men  as  well. 


Preface 

order,  and  due  credit  —  also  a  copy  of  the  book!  —  will 
be  given  for  any  which  may  be  of  use  to  me  in  the 
next  book,  as  in  this  one. 

It  is  getting  late,  as  I  said,  to  write  the  history  of  some 
of  these  things,  and  I  am  actuated  by  an  earnest  desire 
to  preserve  the  records  before  it  is  too  late.  Who  will 
help  me  ?  Since  I  began  writing  history  I  have  learned 
to  disregard  no  authority,  however  humble,  and  to 
neglect  no  source  of  information,  however  obscure  it 
may  appear  to  a  casual  inspection.  Therefore  send  me 
what  you  have  or  can  prepare,  and  allow  me  to  judge  of 
its  value. 

American  people  are  usually  more  familiar  with  the 
story  of  other  peoples  than  with  their  own  history.  How 
often  have  I  heard  the  charge  made  that  there  is  noth- 
ing romantic  or  interesting  in  American  history.  I  do 
not  see  how  any  one  could  read  even  the  chapter  head- 
ings of  a  book  like  this  and  say  a  thing  like  that.  Where 
are  there  more  splendid  stories  of  dauntless  heroism,  of 
subtle  strategy,  of  brilliant  tactics,  of  fierce  fighting, 
than  are  contained  in  these  pages  ?  I  may  have  told 
them  indifferently  and  may  be  the  subject  of  just  criti- 
cism therefor,  but  the  stories  at  least  are  there.  They 
speak  for  themselves.  I  could  not  spoil  them  if  I  tried. 
The  facts  ring  like  a  trumpet-call  to  American  manhood, 
be  it  white,  or  red,  or  black. 

CYRUS  TOWNS  END  BRADY. 
Brooklyn,  N.  Y., 

August  I,  1904. 


CONTENTS 

t 


PART  I 
PROTECTING  THE  FRONTIER 

CHAPTER  PAGE 

I.  THE  POWDER  RIVER  EXPEDITION          ....      3 

II.  THE  TRAGEDY  OF  FORT  PHIL  KEARNEY      .        .        .19 

III.  THE   THIRTY-TWO  AGAINST  THE    THREE    THOUSAND    40 

IV.  PERSONAL  REMINISCENCES  OF  FORT  PHIL  KEARNEY  AND 

THE  WAGON-BOX  FIGHT 59 

V.     FORSYTH  AND  THE  ROUGH  RlDERS  OF  '68     .        .        .    J2 
VI.    THE  JOURNEY  OF  THE  SCOUTS  AND  THE  RESCUE  OF 

FORSYTH     .        .        ...        .        .        .        .        -97 

VII.     A   SCOUT'S   STORY   OF   THE    DEFENSE    OF    BEECHER'S 

ISLAND 113 

VIII.     CARPENTER   AND    His    BRUNETTES.     THE    FIGHT  ON 

BEAVER  CREEK  .        .        .        .        .        .        .  123 

IX.  A  FURTHER  DISCUSSION  OF  THE  BEAVER  CREEK  AFFAIR  136 

X.  THE  BATTLE  OF  THE  WASHITA 146 

XI.  CARR  AND  TALL  BULL  AT  SUMMIT  SPRINGS    .        .        .  170 


Contents 

PART  II 
THE  WAR  WITH  THE  SIOUX 

CHAPTER  PAGE 

I.  WITH  CROOK'S  ADVANCE  .  183 

II.  EX-TROOPER  TOWNE  ON  THE  ROSEBUD  FIGHT     .        .  203 

III.  THE  GRIEVANCE  OF  RAIN-IN-THE-FACE       .        .        .  209 

IV.  THE  LITTLE  BIG  HORN  CAMPAIGN      ....  216 
V.  THE  LAST  OF  CUSTER    . 237 

VI.  ONE  OF  THE  LAST  MEN  TO  SEE  CUSTER  ALIVE     .        .  263 

VII.  THE  PERSONAL  STORY  OF  RAIN-IN-THE-FACE      .        .  279 

VIII.  Two  INTERESTING  AFFAIRS 293 

IX.  THE  FIRST  SUCCESS 304 

X.  A  DECISIVE  BLOW 312 

XI.  MILES'  GREAT  CAMPAIGNING 319 

XII.  WHAT  THEY  ARE  THERE  FOR  —  A  SKETCH  OF  GEN- 
ERAL GUY  V.  HENRY,  A  TYPICAL  AMERICAN  SOLDIER  339 


APPENDICES 

APPENDIX  A — BEING  A  FURTHER  DISCUSSION  OF  GENERAL 

CUSTER'S  COURSE  IN  THE  LITTLE  BIG  HORN  CAMPAIGN  359 

APPENDIX  B — FURTHER  LIGHT  ON  THE  CONDUCT  OF  MAJOR 

RENO 398 

INDEX      .        .        .       ,  ' 407 


LIST  OF  ILLUSTRATIONS 


DRAWINGS 


FACING 
PAGE 


THE  LAST  OF  CUSTER Frontispiece 

LIEUTENANT  GRUMMOND  SACRIFICING  HIMSELF  TO  COVER  THE 

RETREAT 36 

CHARGE  OF  RED  CLOUD  ON  THE  CORRAL  AT  PINEY  ISLAND  .  50 
"BOOTS  AND  SADDLES:"  A  START  IN  THE  EARLY  MORNING  .  60 

ROMAN  NOSE  LEADING  THE  CHARGE  AGAINST  FORSYTH'S  DE- 
VOTED BAND 86 

"SIMULTANEOUSLY    WITH    THEIR    ARRIVAL  A  RATTLESNAKE 

MADE  His  APPEARANCE" 98 

THE  CRUCIAL  MOMENT  ON  BEECHER'S  ISLAND  .        .        .116 

THE  CHIEF  MEDICINE  MAN  AT  BEAVER  CREEK  .  .  .  132 
THE  DIFFICULT  TASK  OF  THE  HORSE-HOLDERS  IN  ACTION  .  .  194 
THE  CAPTURE  OF  RAIN-!N-THE-FACE  .  .  .  .  214 

RAIN-!N-THE-FACE 280 

CHIEF  Two  MOON  OF  THE  NORTHERN  CHEYENNES  .  .  .  300 
MACKENZIE'S  MEN  IN  DULL  KNIFE'S  VILLAGE  ....  316 


List  of  Illustrations 


PHOTOGRAPHS 


PAGE 

GROUP  OF  FAMOUS  WAR  CHIEFS 10 

CROW  KING,   RED  CLOUD,  AMERICAN    HORSE,  GALL 

THE  FORT  PHIL  KEARNEY  FIGHTERS 20 

CAPT.  W.  J.  FETTERMAN,  LIEUT.  G.  W.  GRUMMOND,  CAPT.  FREDK.   H.   BROWN 
CAPT.  JAMES  POWELL 

BEECHER'S  ISLAND  FIGHTERS 72 

CAPT.   LOUIS   H.  CARPENTER,  MAJ.   GEORGE  A.  FORSYTH,  LIEUT.  FREDK. 
H.   BEECHER,   SCOUT  JACK   STILLWELL 

BEECHER'S  ISLAND  FIELD 80 

SOME  OFFICERS  OF  THE  SEVENTH  CAVALRY  IN  THE  WASHITA 

EXPEDITION 156 

MAJ.  JOEL  H.  ELLIOTT,  CAPT.  JAMES  M.  BELL,  CAPT.  LOUIS    McL.    HAMILTON 
CAPT.  J.  W.  BENTEEN 

GROUP  OF  DISTINGUISHED  GENERAL  OFFICERS  ....  174 

GEN.  GEORGE  CROOK,  GEN.  ELWELL  S.  OTIS,  GEN.  EUGENE  A.  CARR 
GEN.  HENRY  B.  CARRINGTON 

GEN.  GEORGE  ARMSTRONG  CUSTER 220 

SOME  OF  CUSTER'S  OFFICERS 238 

CAPT.  MYLES  MOYLAN,  LIEUT.  E.  A.  SMITH,  MAJ.   MARCUS  A.   RENO 
CAPT.   EDWARD   S.  GODFREY 

SOME  OF  CUSTER'S  TROOP  COMMANDERS     .....  248 

CAPT.  THOMAS  W.  CUSTER,  CAPT.  GEORGE  W.  YATES,  LIEUT.  JAMES  CALHOUN 
CAPT.  MILES  W.  KEOGH 

OFFICERS  OF  THE  SEVENTH  CAVALRY  ....  258 

LIEUT.  H.  M.   HARRINGTON,  LIEUT.  J.  E.  PORTER,  LIEUT.  W.  VAN  W.   RILEY 

ADJ.  W.  W.  COOK,  LIEUT.  J.   STURGIS,  LIEUT.  J.  J.    CRITTENDEN 

LIEUT.   DONALD    McINTOSH,  LIEUT.   BENJ.   HODGSON 

SITTING  BULL 268 

SOME  FAMOUS  INDIAN  FIGHTERS 326 

GEN.  JOHN  GIBBON,  GEN.  WESLEY  MERRITT,  GEN.  NELSON  A.  MILES 
GEN.  ALFRED   H.  TERRY 

GROUP  OF  DISTINGUISHED  INDIAN  FIGHTERS     ....  340 

COL.   RANALD  S.   MACKENZIE,  CAPT.  ANSON  MILLS,  GEN.  GUY  V.  HENRY 

w.  f.  CODY  (BUFFALO  BILL) 


MAPS  AND  PLANS 


PAGE 

FORT  PHIL  KEARNEY 16 

THE  FETTERMAN  MASSACRE 27 

STOCKADE  AT  FORT  PHIL  KEARNEY 33 

THE  WAGON-BOX  CORRAL  ON  PINEY  ISLAND  .  .  .  -45 
PLAN  OF  MAGAZINE  AT  FORT  PHIL  KEARNEY  .  .  .  .63 
MAP  OF  FORSYTH'S  DEFENSE  OF  BEECHER'S  ISLAND  .  .  -79 

MAP  OF  MARCHES  TO  RELIEVE  COLONEL  FORSYTH  AND  TO  ES- 
CORT GENERAL  CARR 103 

POSITIONS  OF  WAGONS  AND  SOLDIERS  IN  BEAVER  CREEK  FIGHT  130 

BATTLE  OF  THE  ROSEBUD 197 

MAP  OF  CUSTER'S  DEFEAT  ON  THE  LITTLE  BIG  HORN     .        .  230 

MAP  ILLUSTRATING  THE  ROUTE  OF  THE  THREE  BATTALIONS  AT 
THE  LITTLE  BIG  HORN 234 

PLAN  OF  RENO'S  DEFENSE  ON  THE  BLUFF 247 

KEY  TO  MAP  OF  CUSTER  BATTLE-FIELD 287 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 

I.  The  official  reports  of  the  Secretary  of  War,  with  accompany- 
ing documents,  very  kindly  lent  to  me  by  the  United  States 
Government. 

II.  Different  numbers  of  the  following  magazines  and  journals: 
Harper's  Weekly;  The  Century;  Scribner's  Monthly;  The 
Chatauquan;  McClure's  Magazine;  Outdoor  Life;  Journal 
of  the  United  States  Cavalry  Association;  Journal  of  the 
Military  Service  Institution. 

III.  Files    of  various    contemporary    newspapers,    notably    the 

Chicago  Times  and  the  New  York  Herald. 

IV.  Various  General  Histories. 

V.     AB-SA-RA-KA,  by  General  and  Mrs.  Henry  B.  Carrington, 

U.  S.  A.     J.  B.  Lippincott  Co.     Philadelphia.     1890. 
VI.    ADVENTURES  OF  BUFFALO  BILL,  By  Col.  William  F.  Cody. 

Harper  &  Brothers.     New  York.     1904. 

VII.    ARMY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES,  THE,  by  Gen.  Theo.  F. 
Rodenbough,  U.  S.  A.,  and  Maj.  Wm.  L.  Haskin,  U.  S.  A. 
Maynard,  Merrill    &  Co.     New  York.     1896. 
VIII.     ARMY  SACRIFICES,  by  Col.  James  B.  Fry,  U.  S.  A.     D.  Van 

Nostrand.     New  York.     1879. 
IX.     BOOTS  AND  SADDLES,  by  Elizabeth  B.  Custer.     Harper  & 

Brothers.     New  York.     1902. 
X.     CAMPAIGNING    WITH    CROOK,    by   Captain   Charles  King, 

U.  S.  A.     Harper  &  Brothers.     New  York.     1902. 
XL    CAMPAIGNS  OF  GENERAL  CUSTER  IN  THE  NORTHWEST,  by 
Judson  Eliott  Walker.  Jenkins    &  Thomas.  New  York. 
1881. 

XII.     DEEDS  OF  VALOR,  Compiled  by  W.  F.  Beyer  and  O.  F.  Key- 
del.     Perrien-Keydel  Co.     Detroit,  Mich.     1901. 
XIII.     FOLLOWING  THE  GUIDON,  by  Elizabeth  B.  Custer.     Harper 
&  Brothers.     New  York.     1901. 


Bibliography 


XIV.    LIFE  OF  GENERAL  G.  A.  CUSTER,  by  Captain  Frederick 

Whittaker.     Sheldon  &  Co.     New  York.     1876. 
XV.    MY  LIFE  ON  THE  PLAINS,  OR  PERSONAL  EXPERIENCES  WITH 

INDIANS,  by  General  G.  A.  Custer,  U.  S.  A.     Sheldon  & 

Co.     New  York.     1876. 
XVI.     ON  THE  BORDER  WITH  CROOK,  by  Captain  John  G.  Bourke, 

U.S.A.     Charles  Scribner's  Sons.     New  York.     1892. 
XVII.     OUR  WILD  INDIANS,  by  Col.  Richard  I.  Dodge,  U.  S.  A. 

A.  D.  Worthington  &  Co.     Hartford.     1890. 
XVIII.    PERSONAL  RECOLLECTIONS  OF  GENERAL  NELSON  A.  MILES. 

The  Werner  Co.     Chicago.     1897. 
XIX.    SABRE  AND   BAYONET,   by  Gen.   Theo.   F.   Rodenbough, 

U.S.A.     G.  W.  Dillingham  Co.     New  York.     1897. 
XX.     STORY  OF  THE  SOLDIER,  THE,  by  General  George  A.  For- 

syth,  U.  S.  A.     D.  Appleton  &  Co.     New  York.     rooo. 
XXI.    STORY  OF  THE  WILD  WEST  AND  CAMP  FIRE  CHATS,  by  W.  F. 

Cody.     (Buffalo  Bill.)     Historical  Publishing  Co.     Phil- 
adelphia.    1888. 
XXII.    TENTING  ON  THE  PLAINS,  by  Elizabeth  B.  Custer.    Harper 

&  Brothers.     New  York.     1895. 

XXIII.  THRILLING  DAYS  IN  ARMY  LIFE,  by  Gen.  George  A.  For- 

syth,  U.  S.  A.     Harper  &  Brothers.     New  York.     1902. 

XXIV.  TWENTY  YEARS  AMONG  OUR  HOSTILE  INDIANS,  by  J.  Lee 

Humfreville  (late   Captain    of  United    States    Cavalry). 
Hunter    &  Co.     New  York.     1903. 

XXV.    UNITED  STATES  IN  OUR  OWN  TIME,  THE,  by  E.  Benjamin 
Andrews.     Charles  Scribner's  Sons.     New  York.     1903. 
XXVI.    WAR  PATH  AND  BIVOUAC,  by  John  F.  Finerty.    M.  A.  Don- 
ohue  &  Co.     Chicago.     1890. 


RETURN  TO 
ft*  H.  SCHILLER 

Jt7  FIFTH  ST.  COR.    f 


PART  I 

Protecting  the  Frontier 


CHAPTER   ONE 

The  Powder  River  Expedition 

I.  The  Field  and  the  Fighters 

SINCE  the  United  States  began  to  be  there  never 
was  such  a  post  as  Fort  Philip  Kearney,  common- 
ly called  Fort  Phil  Kearney.*  From  its  establish- 
ment, in   1866,  to   its  abandonment,   some  two 
years  later,  it  was  practically  in  a  state  of  siege.     I  do 
not  mean  that  it  was  beleaguered  by  the  Indians  in  any 
formal,    persistent    investment,    but    it    was    so    con- 
stantly and  so  closely  observed  by  war  parties,  hidden 
in  the  adjacent  woods  and  the  mountain   passes,  that 
there  was  little  safety  outside  its  stockade  for  anything 
less  than  a  company  of  infantry  or  a  troop  of  cavalry; 
and  not  always,  as  we  shall  see,  for  those. 

Rarely  in  the  history  of  the  Indian  wars  of  the  United 
States  have  the  Indians,  no  matter  how  preponderant 
in  force,  conducted  a  regular  siege,  Pontiac's  investment 
of  Detroit  being  almost  unique  in  that  particular.  But 
they  literally  surrounded  Fort  Phil  Kearney  at  all  times. 
Nothing  escaped  their  observation,  and  no  opportunity 
to  harass  and  to  cut  off  detached  parties  of  the  garrison, 
to  stampede  the  herds,  or  to  attack  the  wagon  trains, 

*  Although  the  general  for  whom  this  fort  was  named  spelled  his  name  Kearny, 
the  name  of  the  fort  is  written  as  above  in  all  official  documents  I  have  examined. 


4  Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

was  allowed  to  pass  by.  Not  a  stick  of  timber  could 
be  cut,  not  an  acre  of  grass  mowed,  except  under  heavy 
guard.  Herds  of  beef  cattle,  the  horses  for  the  cavalry 
and  mounted  infantry,  the  mules  for  the  supply  wagons, 
could  not  graze,  even  under  the  walls  of  the  fort,  with- 
out protection.  The  country  teemed  with  game. 
Hunting  parties  were  absolutely  forbidden.  To  take  a 
stroll  outside  the  stockade  on  a  summer  evening  was  to 
invite  death,  or  worse  if  the  stroller  happened  to  be  a 
woman.  There  was  no  certainty  about  the  attacks,  ex- 
cept an  assurance  that  one  was  always  due  at  any  given 
moment.  As  old  James  Bridger,  a  veteran  plainsman 
and  fur  trader,  a  scout  whose  fame  is  scarcely  less  than 
that  of  Kit  Carson,  and  the  confidential  companion  ad- 
viser of  Carrington  in  1866,  was  wont  to  say  to  him: 
"  Whar  you  don't  see  no  Injuns  thar  they're  sartin  to  be 
thickest." 

Taking  at  random  two  average  months  in  the  two 
different  years  during  which  the  post  was  maintained, 
one  in  the  summer,  another  in  the  fall,  I  find  that  there 
were  fifteen  separate  and  distinct  attacks  in  one  and 
twenty  in  the  other.  In  many  of  these,  in  most,  in  fact, 
one  or  more  men  were  killed  and  a  greater  number 
wounded.  Not  a  wagon  train  bound  for  Montana 
could  pass  up  the  Bozeman  trail,  which  ran  under  the 
walls  of  the  fort,  and  for  the  protection  of  which  it  had 
been  established,  without  being  attacked  again  and 
again.  Only  the  most  watchful  prudence,  the  most 
skilful  management,  and  the  most  determined  valor, 
prevented  the  annihilation  of  successive  parties  of  emi- 
grants seeking  the  new  and  inviting  land. 

The  war  with  the  Indians  was  about  the  ownership  of 
territory,  as  most  of  our  Indian  wars  have  been.  In- 
deed, that  statement  is  true  of  most  of  the  wars  of  the 


The  Powder  River  Expedition         5 

world.  The  strong  have  ever  sought  to  take  from  the 
weak.  The  westward-moving  tide  of  civilization  had  at 
last  pressed  back  from  the  Missouri  and  the  Mississippi 
the  Sioux  and  their  allies,  the  Cheyennes,  the  largest 
and  most  famous  of  the  several  great  groups  of  Indians 
who  have  disputed  the  advance  of  the  white  man  since 
the  days  of  Columbus,  saving  perhaps  the  Creeks  and 
the  Iroquois. 

The  vast  expanse  of  territory  west  of  the  hundredth 
meridian,  extending  from  the  Red  River  to  the  British 
Columbia  boundary  line,  was  at  the  time  practically  de- 
void of  white  settlements,  except  at  Denver  and  Salt 
Lake,  until  the  Montana  towns  were  reached  in  the 
northwest.*  It  is  a  great  sweep  of  land  which  com- 
prises every  variety  of  climate  and  soil.  The  huge  Big 
Horn  Mountains  severed  that  immense  domain.  The 
Sweet  Water  Country  and  all  east  of  the  Wind  River 
Range,  including  South  Pass  and  the  region  west  of  the 
great  bend  of  the  North  Platte,  had  its  prairies  and  fer- 
tile valleys.  Just  north  of  the  Big  Horn  Mountain 
Range,  which  took  in  the  territory  which  formed  the 
most  direct  route  to  Central  Montana,  and  the  occupa- 
tion of  which  was  the  real  objective  of  Carrington's 
expedition  in  the  spring  of  1866,  was  the  most  precious 
section,  controlled  by  tribes  jealous  of  any  intrusion  by 
the  whites. 

All  along  the  Yellowstone  and  its  tributaries,  in  spite 
of  the  frequent  "Mauvaises  Terres,"  or  "bad  lands," 
of  apparent  volcanic  origin,  the  whole  country  was 
threaded  with  clear  streams  from  the  Big  Horn  Range. 
The  valleys  of  these  were  luxuriant  in  their  natural 
products  and  their  promise.  Enormous  herds  of  buffalo 

*  The  country  is  roughly  comprehended  by  the  boundary  lines  between  which 
Mountain  Standard,  or  io5th  meridian,  Time,  prevails. 


6  Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

roamed  the  plains,  affording  the  Indian  nearly  every- 
thing required  for  his  support.  The  mountains  abound- 
ed with  bear,  deer  and  other  game  in  great  variety. 
The  many  rivers  which  traversed  the  territory  teemed 
with  fish,  the  valleys  which  they  watered  were  abun- 
dantly fertile  for  the  growing  of  the  few  crops  which  the 
Indian  found  necessary  for  his  support.  The  land  was 
desirable  naturally  and  attracted  the  attention  of  the 
settlers. 

It  cannot  be  gainsaid  that  the  Indians  enjoyed  a  quasi- 
legal  title  to  this  land.  But  if  a  comparatively  small 
group  of  nomadic  and  savage  tribes  insists  upon  re- 
serving a  great  body  of  land  for  a  mere  hunting  ground, 
using  as  a  game  preserve  that  which,  in  a  civilized  re- 
gion, would  easily  support  a  great  agricultural  and  ur- 
ban population  of  industrious  citizens  seeking  relief 
from  the  crowded  and  confined  conditions  of  older  com- 
munities, what  are  you  going  to  do  about  it  ?  Expe- 
rience has  shown  that  in  spite  of  treaties,  purchases  and 
other  peaceful  means  of  obtaining  it,  there  is  always 
bound  to  be  a  contest  about  that  land.  The  rights  of 
savagery  have  been  compelled  to  yield  to  the  demands 
of  civilization,  ethics  to  the  contrary  notwithstanding. 
And  it  will  always  be  so,  sad  though  it  may  seem  to 
many. 

The  close  of  the  Civil  War  threw  many  soldiers  out 
of  employment.  After  four  years  of  active  cam- 
paigning they  could  not  settle  down  to  the  humdrum  life 
of  village  and  country  again.  With  a  natural  spirit  of 
restlessness  they  gathered  their  families,  loaded  their 
few  household  belongings  into  wagons,  and  in  parties 
of  varying  sizes  made  their  way  westward.  Railroads 
began  to  push  iron  feelers  across  the  territory.  Engi- 
neers and  road  builders,  as  well  as  emigrants,  demanded 


The  Powder  River  Expedition         7 

the  protection  of  the  government.  At  first  most  of  the 
settlers  merely  wished  to  pass  through  the  country  and 
settle  in  the  fair  lands  upon  the  other  side,  but  the  fer- 
tility and  beauty  that  met  their  eyes  on  every  hand 
irresistibly  invited  settlement  on  the  journey. 

At  that  time  there  were  four  great  routes  of  transcon- 
tinental travel  in  use:  southward  over  the  famous  Santa 
Fe  trail;  westward  over  the  Kansas  trail  to  Denver; 
westward  on  the  Oregon  trail  through  Nebraska  and 
Salt  Lake  City  to  California  and  Oregon;  northwestward 
on  the  Bozeman  trail  through  Wyoming  to  Montana. 
The  Union  Pacific  road  was  building  along  the  Oregon 
trail,  the  Kansas  Pacific  along  the  Kansas  trail  to 
Denver,  while  the  great  Santa  Fe  system  was  not  yet 
dreamed  of. 

The  railroads  being  in  operation  for  short  distances, 
the  only  method  of  transportation  was  in  the  huge 
Conestoga  wagon,  or  prairie  schooner  which,  with  its 
canvas  top  raking  upward  fore  and  aft  over  a  capacious 
wagon  box,  looked  not  unlike  the  hull  of  the  boat  from 
which  it  took  its  name.  These  wagons  were  drawn  by 
four  or  six  mules  —  sometimes  by  oxen,  known  as  "  bull 
teams"-  — and,  stores  there  being  none,  carried  every- 
thing that  a  settler  was  apt  to  need  in  the  new  land, 
including  the  indispensable  wife  and  children. 

I  am  concerned  in  this  article  only  with  the  Bozeman 
or  Montana  trail. 

Early  in  1866  Government  Commissioners  at  Fort 
Laramie,  Nebraska,  were  negotiating  a  treaty  with  the 
Sioux  and  Northern  Cheyennes  to  secure  the  right  of 
way  for  emigrants  through  that  territory  which,  by  the 
Harney-Sanborne  treaty,  had  been  conceded  to  them  in 
1865.  Red  Cloud,  an  Oglala  Sioux,  the  foremost  of 
the  young  warriors,  led  the  objectors  to  the  treaty,  even 


V 


8  Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

to  the  point  of  fighting,  and  opposed  the  more  conserv- 
ative chiefs  who  deprecated  war  as  eventually  fatal  to 
all  their  territorial  claims.  During  this  council,  to  an- 
ticipate later  events,  Carrington,  then  approaching  with 
troops,  arrived  in  advance,  dismounted,  and  was  intro- 
duced to  the  members  of  the  council.  Red  Cloud,  no- 
ticing his  shoulder  straps,  hotly  denounced  him  as  the 
"White  Eagle"  who  had  come  to  steal  the  road  before 
the  Indian  said  yes  or  no.  In  full  view  of  the  mass  of 
Indians  who  occupied  the  parade  ground  he  sprang 
from  the  platform  under  the  shelter  of  pine  boughs, 
struck  his  tepees  and  went  on  the  warpath.  A  telegram 
by  Carrington  advising  suspension  of  his  march  until 
the  council  came  to  some  agreement  was  negatived, 
and  although  Sunday  he  pushed  forward  nine  miles 
beyond  the  fort  before  sunset. 

One  stipulation  upon  which  the  United  States  in- 
sisted was  the  establishment  of  military  posts  to  guard 
the  trail,  without  which  it  was  felt  the  treaty  would 
.  amount  to  nothing.  The  Brule  Sioux,  under  the  lead 
of  Spotted  Tail,  Standing  Elk  and  others,  favored  the 
concession,  and  ever  after  remained  faithful  to  the 
whites.  The  older  chiefs  of  other  Sioux  bands,  in  spite 
of  Red  Cloud's  defection  and  departure,  remained  in 
council  for  some  days  and,  although  sullen  in  manner 
and  noisy  in  protests,  finally  accepted  valuable  gifts  and 
indemnities  and  so  far  satisfied  the  Commission  that 
they  despatched  special  messengers  to  notify  the  Dis- 
trict Commander  that  "satisfactory  treaties  had  been 
made  with  the  tribes  represented  at  Laramie  and  that 
its  route  was  safe."  Emigrant  trains  were  also  pushed 
forward  with  their  assurance  that  an  ample  force  of 
regulars  had  gone  up  the  country  to  ensure  their  safety. 
The  sequel  will  appear  later. 


The  Powder  River  Expedition         9 

II.    General   Carrington's   Romantic  Expedition 

Pursuant  to  the  plan,  Brigadier-General  Henry  B. 
Carrington,  Colonel  of  the  Eighteenth  Regular  Infan- 
try,  was  ordered  with  the  second  battalion  of  his  regi- 
ment, about  to  become  the  Twenty-seventh  Regular 
Infantry,  to  establish,  organize  and  take  command  of 
what  was  known  as  the  Mountain  District.  The  Moun- 
tain District  at  that  time  had  but  one  post  in  it,  Fort 
Reno,  one  hundred  and  sixty  miles  trom  Fort  Laramie. 
Carrington  was  directed  to  march  to  Fort  Reno,  move  it 
forty  miles  westward,  garrison  it,  and  then,  with  the  bal- 
ance of  his  command,  establish  another  post  on  the 
Bozeman  trail,  between  the  Big  Horn  Mountains  and 
the  Powder  River,  so  as  to  command  that  valley  much 
frequented  by  Indians;  and,  lastly,  to  establish  two  other 
posts,  one  on  the  Big  Horn,  the  other  on  the  Yellow- 
stone, for  the  further  protection  of  the  trail. 

General  Carrington  was  a  graduate  of  Yale  College. 
He  had  been  a  teacher,  an  engineer  and  scientist,  a 
lawyer  and  man  of  affairs,  a  student  of  military  matters 
as  well  as  Adjutant-General  of  Ohio  for  several  years 
prior  to  the  outbreak  of  the  Civil  War.  At  the  begin- 
ning of  that  struggle  he  promptly  moved  one  battery 
and  several  regiments  of  Ohio  Militia  into  West  Vir- 
ginia to  take  part  in  the  Battle  of  Phillipi  before  the 
State  Volunteers  could  be  mustered  into  the  United 
States  service.  Without  his  solicitation,  on  May  I4th, 
1 86 1,  he  had  been  appointed  Colonel  of  the  Eighteenth 
United  States  Infantry,  promoted  Brigadier-General 
November  ZQth,  1863,  and  had  rendered  valuable  and 
important  services  during  the  war.  He  was  a  high- 
minded  Christian  gentleman,  a  soldier  of  large  expey 


io          Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

rience  and  proven  courage,  an  administrator  of  vigor 
and  capacity,  and,  as  his  subsequent  career  has  shown, 
a  man  of  fine  literary  talents.*  No  better  choice  could 
have  been  made  for  the  expedition. 

After  many  delays,  due  principally  to  difficulties  in 
securing  transportation,  a  little  army  of  seven  hundred 
men,  accompanied  by  four  pieces  of  artillery,  two  hun- 
dred and  twenty-six  wagons,  and  a  few  ambulances  con- 
taining the  wives  and  children  of  several  of  the  officers, 
set  forth  from  old  Fort  Kearney,  Nebraska,  on  the  iQth 
of  May,  1866.  About  two  hundred  of  the  men  were 
veterans,  the  rest  raw  recruits.  They  were  armed  with 
old-fashioned  Springfield,  muzzle-loading  muskets,  save 
a  few  who  had  the  new  Spencer  breech-loading  carbine, 
a  weapon  of  rather  short  trajectory,  but  a  great  im- 
provement on  the  old  army  musket  from  the  rapidity 
of  fire  which  it  permitted.  A  portion  of  the  command 
was  mounted  from  the  discarded  horses  of  a  cavalry 
regiment  going  east  to  be  mustered  out.  They  were  not 
trained  horsemen,  however,  and  at  first  were  rather  in- 
different mounted  infantrymen. 

Among  the  soldiers  were  artificers  and  mechanics  of 
every  description.  The  government  had  provided  ap- 
pliances needed  for  building  forts,  including  tools,  doors, 
sash,  glass,  nails,  stoves,  steel,  iron,  mowers,  reapers, 
scythes,  and  two  steam  sawmills.  The  officers  were  in 
the  main  a  fine  body  of  men,  most  of  whom  had  learned 
their  soldiering  in  the  Civil  War. 

It  seems  incredible  to  think  that  women  should  ac- 
company such  an  expedition,  but  no  grave  anticipations 

*  Among  his  literary  works  he  is  best  known  for  his  "Washington,  the  Soldier,"  and 
his  "Battles  of  the  American  Revolution,"  which  is  the  standard  work  of  the  kind.  In 
a  personal  interview  he  told  me  he  read  some  portion  of  the  Bible  in  the  original  Greek 
and  Hebrew  every  day  for  years.  Not  many  army  officers  can  say  that,  and  very  few 
civilians,  either. 


CROW  KING 
RED   CLOUD 


AMERICAN    HORSE* 
GALL 


GROUP   OF   FAMOUS   WAR   CHIEFS 

*  Killed  at  Slim  Buttcs 


The  Powder  River  Expedition       n 

of  trouble  with  the  Indians  were  felt  by  any  persons  in 
authority  at  that  time.  The  Sioux  and  Cheyennes  had 
consented  to  the  opening  of  the  road,  and  though  they 
demurred  to  the  forts,  they  had  not  absolutely  refused 
the  treaty  when  the  government  insisted  upon  it. 
The  expedition  was  not  conceived  or  planned  for  war. 
It  was  supposed  to  be  a  peaceable  expedition.  In  fact, 
General  Sherman,  who  visited  Fort  Kearney  before  the 
troops  began  to  march,  personally  advised  the  ladies  to 
accompany  the  expedition  as  very  attractive  in  its  ob- 
ject and  wholly  peaceful.  Had  the  authorities  known 
what  was  to  happen,  a  force  three  times  as  great  would 
scarcely  have  been  thought  adequate  for  the  purpose. 
But  even  had  there  been  a  full  knowledge  of  the  dan- 
gers incurred,  the  army  women  would  have  gone  with 
their  husbands. 

History  records  no  greater  instances  of  romantic  devo- 
tion than  those  exhibited  by  the  army  wife.  She  stands 
peculiar  among  American  women  to-day  in  that  partic- 
ular. The  army  woman  in  a  hostile  country  risked 
much  more  than  the  men.  Her  fate  when  captured  was 
terrible  beyond  description  —  one  long  agony  of  horror 
and  shame  until  death  put  an  end  to  it.  I  have  talked 
with  army  officers  of  large  experience  and  have  read 
what  others  have  said,  and  the  universal  testimony  is 
that  no  woman  who  was  ever  captured  by  the  plains 
Indians  west  of  the  Missouri  was  spared.  It  was  com- 
monly agreed  among  the  officers  and  men  of  regiments 
accompanied  by  women  —  and  fully  understood  by  the 
women  as  well  —  that  in  the  last  extremity  the  women 
were  to  be  shot  by  their  own  friends,  rather  than  to  be 
allowed  to  fall  into  the  hands  of  the  savages;  but  no  such 
apprehension  attended  this  march. 

The  army  woman's  knowledge  of  the  peril  in  the 


12          Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

usual  border  warfare  was  not  an  imaginary  one,  either. 
As  we  may  read  in  letters  and  books  written  by  army 
wives,  it  was  brought  home  to  them  directly  again  and 
again.  After  every  campaign  poor,  wretched  women 
of  stranded  and  robbed  emigrant  trains  or  devastated 
settlements  were  brought  into  the  various  camps,  to 
whom  these  army  women  ministered  with  loving  care, 
and  from  whom  they  heard  frightful  and  sickening  de- 
tails that  froze  the  blood;  yet  the  army  wife  herself  never 
faltered  in  her  devotion,  never  failed  in  her  willingness 
to  follow  wherever  her  husband  was  sent.  And,  save 
for  the  actual  campaigning  in  the  field,  the  army  wife 
was  everywhere  —  sometimes  there,  too. 

In  this  particular  expedition  there  were  several  little 
children,  from  some  of  whom  I  have  gleaned  details  and 
happenings.  One  of  these  lads,  while  at  Fort  Kearney 
before  the  march,  became  so  expert  with  the  bow  and 
arrow  in  target  shooting  with  young  Pawnee  Indians 
near  the  fort,  that  he  challenged  General  Sherman  to 
shoot  over  the  flagstaff.  The  youngster  accomplished 
it  by  lying  upon  his  back  with  feet  braced  against  the 
bow,  and  the  general  squarely  withdrew  from  the  con- 
test, declining  to  follow  the  boy's  ingenious  artifice. 

The  march  was  necessarily  a  slow  one  and  the  dis- 
tance great  —  some  six  hundred  miles  —  so  that  it  was 
not  until  the  twenty-eighth  of  June  they  reached  Fort 
Reno.  There  they  were  menaced  by  the  Indians  for 
the  first  time  and  every  endeavor  was  made  to  stampede 
their  herds.  The  officers  and  men  were  fast  becoming 
undeceived  as  to  the  character  of  their  expedition.  To 
abandon  Fort  Reno,  or  to  remove  it,  was  not  prac- 
ticable. Carrington  ordered  it  re-stockaded  and  put  in 
thorough  repair,  garrisoned  it  from  his  command,  and 
with  the  balance,  something  over  five  hundred,  ad- 


The  Powder  River  Expedition       13 

vanced  farther  into  the  unknown  land  on  the  Qth  of 
July.  On  the  I3th  of  July,  1866,  he  established  his 
camp  on  the  banks  of  the  Big  Piney  Creek,  an  affluent  of 
the  Powder  River,  about  four  miles  from  the  superb  Big  4~\ 
Horn  Range,  with  snow-capped  Cloud  Peak  towering 
nine  thousand  feet  into  the  heavens,  close  at  hand.  A 
few  days  later,  on  a  little,  flower-decked,  grass-covered 
plateau,  bare  of  trees,  which  fortunately  happened  to  be 
just  the  size  to  contain  the  fort  he  proposed  to  erect,  and 
which  sloped  abruptly  away  in  every  direction,  forming 
a  natural  glacis,  he  began  building  the  stockade. 

III.  The  Outpost  of  Civilization 

The  plateau  lay  between  two  branches  of  the  Piney. 
To  the  eastward  of  the  smaller  branch  rose  a  high  hill 
called  Pilot  Hill.  West  of  it  was  another  ridge  which 
they  named  Sullivant  Hills.  Southwest  of  Sullivant 
Hills  was  a  high  ridge  called  Lodge  Trail  Ridge,  the 
main  branch  of  the  Piney  Creek  flowing  between  them, 
so  that  the  water  supply  was  at  the  eastern  or  "Water 
Gate"  of  the  fort.  The  Bozeman  trail  passed  west- 
ward, under  Pilot  Hill  in  front  of  the  fort,  crossing  the 
Big  Piney  as  it  neared  Sullivant  Hills,  and  then,  circling 
around  Lodge  Trail  Ridge  for  easier  ascent,  advanced 
northward,  twice  crossing  Peno  Creek  and  its  branches, 
before  that  stream  joined  Goose  Creek,  a  tributary  to 
Tongue  River,  one  of  the  chief  forks  of  the  Yellowstone. 
The  first  branch  of  the  Peno  was  five  miles  from  the  fort, 
and  the  second  twelve  miles  farther,  where  the  garrison 
had  to  cut  hay,  but  the  branch  nearer  the  fort  was  es- 
pecially associated  with  the  events  of  December  2ist,  as 
well  as  with  the  fight  of  the  sixth  of  the  same  month. 

The  spot  was  delightful.     Adjacent  to  the  fort  were 


14          Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

broad  stretches  of  fertile,  brilliantly  flowered,  grassy, 
river  and  mountain  creek  valleys.  The  mountains  and 
hills  were  covered  with  pines.  Game  there  was  in 
plenty;  water  was  clear  and  abundant.  Wood,  while 
not  immediately  at  hand,  else  the  place  would  not  have 
been  practicable  of  defense  without  tremendous  labor 
in  clearing  it,  was  conveniently  adjacent. 

General  Carrington  marked  out  the  walls  of  the  fort, 
after  a  survey  of  the  surrounding  country  as  far  as 
Tongue  River,  set  up  his  sawmills,  one  of  them  of  forty 
horse-power,  capable  of  cutting  logs  thirty  inches  in 
diameter,  established  a  logging  camp  on  Piney  Island, 
seven  miles  distant,with  no  intervening  hills  to  surmount, 
which  made  transportation  easy,  and  began  the  erection 
of  the  fort.  Picket  posts  were  established  upon  Pilot 
and  Sullivant  Hills,  which  overlooked  approaches  both 
from  the  east  and  the  road  to  the  mountains.  Three 
times  Indians  attempted  to  dislodge  these  pickets,  once 
at  night;  but  case-shot  exploding  over  them,  and  each 
time  causing  loss  of  men  or  ponies,  ended  similar  visita- 
tions. 

The  most  careful  watchfulness  was  necessary  at  all 
hours  of  the  day  and  night.  The  wood  trains  to  fetch 
logs  to  the  sawmills  went  out  heavily  guarded.  There 
was  fighting  all  the  time.  Casualties  among  the  men 
A^  were  by  no  means  rare.  At  first  it  was  difficult  to  keep 
men  within  the  limits  of  the  camp;  but  stragglers  who 
failed  to  return,  and  some  who  had  been  cut  off,  scalped 
and  left  for  dead,  but  who  had  crawled  back  to  die, 
convinced  every  one  of  the  wisdom  of  the  commanding 
officer's  repeated  orders  and  cautions.* 

*  Just  when  the  alarms  were  most  frequent  a  messenger  came  to  the  headquarters, 
announcing  that  a  train  en  route  from  Fort  Laramie,  with  special  messengers  from  that 
post,  was  corralled  by  Indians,  and  demanded  immediate  help.  An  entire  company  of 
infantry  in  wagons,  with  a  mountain  howitzer  and  several  rounds  of  grape-shot,  was 


The  Powder  River  Expedition       15 

To  chronicle  the  constant  succession  of  petty  skir- 
mishes would  be  wearisome;  yet  they  often  resulted  in 
torture  and  loss  of  life  on  the  part  of  the  soldiers,  al- 
though the  Indians  in  most  instances  suffered  the  more 
severely.  One  single  incident  may  be  taken  as  illus- 
trative of  the  life  of  the  garrison. 

One  afternoon,  early  in  October,  the  picket  reported 
that  the  wood  train  was  attacked  to  the  west,  and  shortly 
after  signalled  the  approach  of  a  small  party  of  soldiers 
from  the  east.  Detachments  were  sent  from  the  post  in 
both  directions.  It  proved  to  be  not  a  reinforcement 
of  troops  or  ammunition  supplies,  but  two  ambulances 
with  two  contract  surgeons  and  an  escort  of  eight  men, 
besides  Bailey,  the  guide,  and  Lieutenant  Grummond, 
who  had  just  been  appointed  to  the  Eighteenth  Infantry, 
and  his  young  bride.  As  they  approached  the  main 
gate,  accompanied  by  the  mounted  men  who  had  been 
sent  out  to  meet  them,  they  were  halted  to  give  passage 
to  an  army  wagon  from  the  opposite  direction.  It  was 
escorted  by  a  guard  from  a  wood  train,  and  brought  in 
the  scalped,  naked,  dead  body  of  one  of  their  comrades, 
a  strange  welcome,  indeed,  to  the  young  wife,  who,  upon 
leaving  Laramie,  had  been  assured  of  a  beautiful  ride 
through  fertile  valleys  without  danger,  and  sadder  yet 
in  its  sequel  two  months  later. 

Meanwhile  the  work  of  erecting  the  fort  was  contin- 
ued. It  was  a  rectangle,  six  hundred  by  eight  hundred 
feet,  inclosed  by  a  formidable  stockade  of  heavy  pine 
logs  standing  eight  feet  high,  with  a  continuous  ban- 
quette, and  flaring  loopholes  at  every  fourth  log.  There  ^ 

hastened  to  their  relief.  It  proved  to  be  a  train  with  mail  from  the  Laramie  Com- 
mission announcing  the  consummation  of  a  "satisfactory  treaty  of  peace  with  all  the 
Indians  of  the  Northwest,"  and  assuring  the  District  Commander  of  the  fact.  The 
messenger  was  brought  in  in  safety,  and  peace  lasted  until  his  message  was  delivered. 
So  much  was  gained  —  that  the  messenger  did  not  lose  his  scalp  en  route. 


16          Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 


The  Powder  River  Expedition       17 

were  enfilading  blockhouses  on  the  diagonal  corners, 
with  portholes  for  the  cannon,  and  quarters  for  officers 
and  men,  with  other  necessary  buildings.  The  com- 
manding officer's  quarters  was  a  two-story  building  of 
framed  lumber,  surmounted  by  a  watch-tower.  The 
officers'  and  men's  quarters  were  built  of  logs.  The 
warehouses,  four  in  number,  eighty  feet  by  twenty-four, 
were  framed. 

East  of  the  fort  proper  was  a  corral  of  slightly  less 
area,  surrounded  by  a  rough  palisade  of  cottonwood 
logs,  which  inclosed  the  wood  train,  hay,  and  mis- 
cellaneous supplies.  Everything  —  stockade,  houses, 
stables,  in  all  their  details,  blacksmith  shops,  teamsters' 
quarters,  and  so  on  —  was  planned  by  Carrington 
himself.* 

The  main  fort  inclosed  a  handsome  parade  ground, 
in  the  center  of  which  arose  the  tall  flagstaff  planned 
and  erected  by  a  ship  carpenter  in  the  regiment.  From 
it,  on  the  3ist  of  October,  with  great  ceremony  and 
much  rejoicing,  the  first  garrison  flag  that  ever  floated 
over  the  land  was  unfurled.  The  work  was  by  no  means 
completed  as  it  appears  on  the  map,  but  it  was  inclosed, 
and  there  were  enough  buildings  ready  to  house  the 
actual  garrison  present,  although  the  fort  was  planned 
for  a  thousand  men,  repeatedly  promised  but  not  fur- 
nished, while  all  the  time  both  cavalry  and  the  First  Bat- 
talion of  the  Eighteenth  were  held  within  the  peaceful 
limits  of  Fort  Laramie's  control. 

Early  in  August  Captain  Kinney,  with  two  compan- 
ions, had  been  sent  ninety  miles  to  the  northward  to 
establish  the  second  post  on  the  Big  Horn,  which  was 
called  Fort  C.  F.  Smith,  and  was  very  much  smaller  and 

*  General  W.  B.  Hazen,  upon  inspection  of  this  post's  stockade,  pronounced  it  "the 
best  he  had  ever  seen,except  one  built  by  the  Hudson  BayCompany,in  British  America." 


1 8          Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

less  important  than  Fort  Phil  Kearney.  The  third  pro- 
jected post  was  not  established.  There  were  not  enough 
men  to  garrison  the  three  already  in  the  field,  much  less 
to  build  a  fourth 


CHAPTER   TWO 

The  Tragedy  of  Fort  Phil  Kearney 

I.  How  the  Fighting  Began 


f  : ;  ""AO  summarize  the  first  six  months  of  fighting, 
from  the  first  of  August  to  the  close  of  the 
I*  year,  the  Indians  killed  one  hundred  and  fifty- 
M  four  persons,  including  soldiers  and  citizens, 
wounded  twenty  more,  and  captured  nearly  seven 
hundred  animals  — cattle,  mules,  and  horses.  There 
were  fifty-one  demonstrations  in  force  in  front  of  the  fort, 
and  they  attacked  every  train  that  passed  over  the  trail. 
As  the  fort  was  still  far  from  completion,  the  logging 
operations  were  continued  until  mid-winter.  On  every 
day  the  weather  permitted,  a  heavily  guarded  train  of 
wood-cutters  was  sent  down  to  Piney  Island,  or  to  the 
heavier  timber  beyond,  where  a  blockhouse  protected 
the  choppers.  This  train  was  frequently  attacked. 
Eternal  vigilance  was  the  price  of  life.  Scarcely  a  day 
passed  without  the  lookout  on  Pilot  Hill  signalling 
Indians  approaching,  or  the  lookout  on  Sullivant  Hills 
reporting  that  the  wood  train  was  corralled  and  attacked. 
On  such  occasions  a  strong  detachment  would  be  mount- 
ed and  sent  out  to  drive  away  the  Indians  and  bring  in 
the  wood  train  —  an  operation  which  was  invariably 
successful,  although  sometimes  attended  with  loss. 

^9 


2o          Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

Hostile  demonstrations  were  met  by  prompt  forays 
or  pursuits,  as  circumstances  permitted;  and  on  one 
occasion  the  general  pursued  a  band  that  ran  off  a  herd 
nearly  to  Tongue  River;  but  flashing  mirrors  betrayed 
Indian  attempts  to  gain  his  rear,  and  a  return  was 
ordered,  abandoning  the  stolen  stock. 

One  expedition  is  characteristic  of  many.  On  the 
afternoon  of  December  6th  the  lookout  on  Sullivant 
Hills  signalled  that  the  wood  train  was  attacked,  and 
Captain  (Brevet-Lieutenant-Colonel)  Fetterman,  the 
senior  captain  present,  was  detailed  with  a  squad  of 
forty  mounted  men,  including  fifteen  cavalrymen  under 
Lieutenants  Bingham  and  Grummond,  with  Sergeant 
Bowers  of  the  infantry,  a  veteran  of  the  Civil  War,  to 
relieve  the  wood  train  and  drive  the  Indians  toward  the 
Peno  Valley,  while  Carrington  himself,  with  about  a 
score  of  mounted  infantrymen,  would  sweep  around  the 
north  side  of  Lodge  Trail  Ridge  and  intercept  them. 

The  Indians  gave  way  before  Fetterman's  advance, 
hoping  to  lure  the  troops  into  an  ambush,  but  at  a  fa- 
vorable spot  they  made  a  stand.  The  fighting  there  was 
so  fierce  that  the  cavalry,  which  by  a  singular  circum- 
x )  stance  was  without  its  officers,  gave  way  and  retreated 
headlong  across  the  valley  toward  the  ridge.  The 
mounted  infantry  stood  its  ground,  and  under  Fetter- 
man's intrepid  leadership  was  making  a  brave  fight 
against  overwhelming  odds,  the  number  of  Indians 
present  being  estimated  at  more  than  three  hundred.  It 
would  have  gone  hard  with  them,  however,  had  not 
Carrington  and  the  first  six  of  his  detachment  sud- 
denly swept  around  a  small  hill  or  divide  and  taken  the 
Indians  in  reverse.  The  general  had  been  forced  to 
advance  under  fire,  and  meeting  the  fugitive  cavalry, 
ordered  them  to  fall  in  behind  his  own  detachment. 


CAPT.   W.  J.   FETTERMAN 
LIEUT.  G.  W.  GRUMMOND  ; 


CAPT.  FREDK.   H.    BROWN  * 
CAPT.  JAMES    POWELL 

THE    FORT    PHIL    KEARNEY    FIGHTERS 

For  portrait  of  General  Carrington,  see   illustration    opposite  page 
*  Killed  on  Lodge  Trail  Ridge 


The  Tragedy  of  Fort  Phil  Kearney    21 

He  was  filled  with  anxiety  as  to  the  course  of  the  fight 
on  the  other  side  of  the  ridge. 

Carrington,  in  his  official  report,*  says :  "  But  six  men  turned  the 
point  with  me,  one  a  young  bugler  of  the  Second  Cavalry,  who  told  me 
that  Lieutenant  Bingham  had  gone  down  the  road  around  the  hill  to 
my  right.  This  seemed  impossible,  as  he  belonged  to  Fetterman's 
command.  I  sounded  the  recall  on  his  report,  but  in  vain.  One  of 
my  men  fell  and  his  horse  on  him.  The  principal  chief  operating 
during  the  day  attempted  to  secure  his  scalp,  but  dismounting,  with 
one  man  to  hold  the  horses  and  reserving  fire,  I  succeeded  in  saving  the 
man  and  holding  the  position  until  joined  by  Fetterman  twenty  min- 
utes later.  The  cavalry  that  had  abandoned  him  had  not  followed 
me,  though  the  distance  was  short;  but  the  Indians,  circling  round  and 
yelling,  nearly  one  hundred  in  number,  with  one  saddle  emptied  by  a 
single  shot  fired  by  myself,  did  not  venture  to  close  in." 

The  rear  detachment  and  Fetterman  soon  joined, 
and  by  the  efforts  of  the  combined  parties  the  Indians 
were  compelled  to  flight.  It  was  a  close  call  for  all,  but 
Lieutenants  Grummond  and  Bingham  were  yet  unac- 
counted for.  Search  was  instantly  made  for  these  two 
officers  and  the  infantry  sergeant,  who  had  become 
separated  from  their  command  while  chasing  some  scat- 
tered Indians.  One  of  the  officers,  Lieutenant  Bing- 
ham, was  dead.  Lieutenant  Grummond,  after  a  hand- 
to-hand  fight,  was  closely  pressed  by  mounted  Indians 
and  was  barely  rescued.  Sergeant  Bowers  had  been 
fearfully  wounded  and  scalped,  although  he  was  still 
alive,  but  died  immediately.^  He  had  killed  three  In- 
dians before  he  had  been  overborne.  The  cavalrymen, 
mostly  recruits,  were  deeply  ashamed  of  their  defection, 
which  was  partly  due  to  the  incaution  of  their  officers  in 

*  Published  by  the  United  States  Senate  in  1887. 

t  At  the  burial  of  Sergeant  Bowers,  Captain  Brown,  who  had  known  him  during  the 
Civil  War,  pinned  his  Army  of  the  Cumberland  badge  upon  his  breast,  and  this  was 
found  when  the  remains  were  reinterred  in  1878. 


22          Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

leaving  them  to  pursue  a  few  Indians,  and  they  were 
burning  with  a  desire  to  retrieve  their  reputation,  which 
they  bravely  did  with  their  lives  some  two  weeks  later. 

The  casualties  in  the  little  command  were  two  killed, 
five  wounded.  A  messenger  was  sent  to  the  fort  for  an 
ambulance,  and  the  command  retired  in  good  order 
without  further  sight  of  the  Indians.  Lieutenant  Bing- 
ham  was  not  the  first  officer  killed;  for,  five  months  be- 
fore, Lieutenant  Daniels,  riding  ahead  of  a  small  party 
of  soldiers  escorting  several  officers  and  the  wife  of 
Lieutenant  Wands  from  Fort  Laramie,  had  been  killed 
in  full  view  of  the  party.  He  had  been  horribly  tor- 
tured with  a  stake  before  he  died,  and  the  savages  put 
on  his  clothing  and  danced  on  the  prairie  just  out  of 
range,  in  front  of  the  party,  which  was  too  small  to  do 
more  than  stand  on  the  defensive.  Lieutenant  Grum- 
mond's  wife  was  in  the  fort  during  the  fighting  on  the 
sixth  of  December,  and  her  joy  at  her  husband's  safe 
return  can  be  imagined. 

On  the  eighth  of  December  President  Andrew  John- 
son congratulated  Congress  that  treaties  had  been  made 
at  Fort  Laramie,  and  that  all  was  peace  in  the  Northwest ! 

On  the  iQth  of  December,  in  this  peaceful  territory, 
the  wood  train  was  again  attacked  in  force.  Carring- 
ton  promptly  sent  out  a  detachment  under  Captain 
Powell  with  instructions  to  relieve  the  wood  train,  give 

O 

it  his  support,  and  return  with  it,  but  not  to  pursue 
threatening  Indians,  for  experience  had  shown  that 
the  Indians  were  constantly  increasing  in  numbers  and 
growing  bolder  with  every  attack.  Powell  efficiently 
performed  his  task.  The  Indians  were  driven  off",  and, 
although  he  was  tempted  to  pursue  them,  he  was  too 
good  a  soldier  to  disobey  orders,  so  he  led  his  men  back 
in  safety  to  the  fort. 


The  Tragedy  of  Fort  Phil  Kearney    23 

By  this  time  all  warehouses  were  finished,  and  it  was 
estimated  that  one  large  wood  train  would  supply  logs 
enough  for  the  completion  of  the  hospital,  which  alone 
needed  attention. 

Impressed  by  Powell's  report,  Carrington  himself  ac- 
companied the  augmented  train  on  the  2Oth,  built  a 
bridge  across  to  Piney  Island  to  facilitate  quick  haul- 
ing, and  returned  to  the  fort  to  make  ready  for  one  more 
trip  only.  No  Indians  appeared  in  sight  on  that  date. 
Already  several  hundred  large  logs  had  been  collected 
for  winter's  firewood,  besides  the  slabs  saved  at  the 
sawmill. 

It  cannot  be  denied  that  there  was  much  dissatisfac- 
tion among  some  of  the  officers  at  Carrington's  prudent 
policy.  They  had  the  popular  idea  that  one  white  man, 
especially  if  he  were  a  soldier,  was  good  for  a  dozen 
Indians;  and  although  fifteen  hundred  lodges  of  In- 
dians were  known  to  be  encamped  on  the  Powder  River, 
and  there  were  probably  between  five  and  six  thousand 
braves  in  the  vicinity,  they  were  constantly  suggesting 
expeditions  of  all  sorts  with  their  scanty  force.  Some 
of  them,  including  Fetterman  and  Brown,  "offered  with 
eighty  men  to  ride  through  the  whole  Sioux  Nation!" 
While  the  mettle  of  the  Sioux  Nation  had  not  yet  been 
fairly  tried  by  these  men,  Carrington  was  wise  enough 
to  perceive  that  such  folly  meant  inevitable  destruction, 
and  his  consent  was  sternly  refused. 

The  total  force  available  at  the  fort,  including  pris- 
oners, teamsters,  citizens  and  employees,  was  about 
three  hundred  and  fifty  —  barely  enough  to  hold  the 
fort,  should  the  Indians  make  an  attack  upon  it.  Be- 
sides which,  details  were  constantly  needed  to  carry 
despatches,  to  deliver  the  mail,  to  get  supplies,  to  succor 
emigrant  trains,  and  so  on.  The  force  was  woefully  in- 


24          Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

adequate,  and  the  number  of  officers  had  been  depleted 
by  detachment  and  other  causes  until  there  .were  but 
six  left. 

Ammunition  was  running  low.  There  were  at  one 
time  only  forty  rounds  per  man  available.  Repeated 
requests  and  appeals,  both  by  letter  and  telegram,  for 
reinforcements  and  supplies,  and  especially  for  mod- 
ern and  serviceable  weapons,  had  met  with  little  con- 
sideration. The  officials  in  the  far  East  hugged  their 
treaty,  and  refused  to  believe  that  a  state  of  war  existed; 
and,  if  it  did  exist,  were  disposed  to  censure  the  com- 
manding officer  for  provoking  it.  In  several  instances 
presents  given  in  the  treaty  at  Fort  Laramie  were  found 
on  the  persons  of  visiting  Indians,  and  one  captured 
Indian  pony  was  heavily  loaded  with  original  packages 
of  those  presents. 

Carrington  had  done  nothing  to  provoke  war,  but  had 
simply  carried  out  General  Sherman's  written  instruc- 
tions, sent  him  as  late  as  August,  to  "avoid  a  general 
war,  until  the  army  could  be  reorganized  and  increased; 
but  he  defended  himself  and  command  stoutly  when 
attacked.  Some  of  the  officers,  therefore,  covertly  sneer- 
ing at  the  caution  of  the  commander,  were  burning 
for  an  opportunity  to  distinguish  themselves  on  this 
account,  and  had  practically  determined  to  make  or 
take  one  at  the  first  chance.  Fetterman  and  Brown, 
unfortunately,  were  the  chief  of  these  malcontents. 

II.  The  Annihilation  of  Fetterman's  Command 

On  the  2 1st  of  December,  the  ground  being  free  from 
snow,  the  air  clear  and  cold,  the  lookout  on  Sullivant 
Hills  signalled  about  eleven  o'clock  in  the  morning  that 
the  wood  train  had  been  corralled,  and  was  again  at- 


The  Tragedy  of  Fort  Phil  Kearney    25 

tacked  in  force  about  a  mile  and  a  half  from  the  fort. 
A  relief  party  of  forty-nine  men  from  the  Eighteenth 
Infantry,  with  twenty-seven  troopers  from  the  Second 
Cavalry,  a  detachment  from  which,  nearly  all  recruits 
and  chiefly  armed  with  muskets  as  their  carbines  had 
not  reached  Laramie,  had  joined  the  post  some  months 
before,  was  at  once  ordered  out. 

The  command  was  first  given  to  Captain  Powell, 
with  Lieutenant  Grummond  in  charge  of  the  cavalry. 
Grummond  had  a  wife  in  delicate  health  at  the  post, 
and  he  was  cautioned  by  the  officers  to  take  care  not 
to  be  led  into  a  trap,  although  his  experience  on  the  6th, 
when  he  had  so  narrowly  escaped  death,  was,  it  would 
seem,  the  best  warning  he  could  have  had.  This  body- 
of  men  was  the  best  armed  party  at  the  post,  a  few  of 
those  designated  carrying  the  Spencer  repeating  car- 
bines. Each  company  had  been  directed  to  keep  forty 
rounds  per  man  on  hand  for  immediate  use  in  any 
emergency,  besides  extra  boxes  always  kept  in  com- 
pany quarters.  The  men  had  been  exercised  in  firing 
recently  and  some  of  the  ammunition  had  been  ex- 
pended, although  they  still  had  an  abundant  supply  for 
the  purposes  of  the  expedition.  Carrington  personally 
inspected  the  men  before  they  left,  and  rejected  those 
who  were  not  amply  provided. 

The  situation  of  the  wood  train  was  critical,  and  the 
party  was  assembled  with  the  greatest  despatch.  Just 
as  they  were  about  to  start,  Captain  Fetterman,  who 
had  had  less  experience  in  the  country  and  in  Indian 
fighting  than  the  other  officers,  for  he  had  joined  the 
regiment  some  time  after  the  fort  had  been  built  and 
expected  assignment  to  command  Fort  C.  F.  Smith, 
begged  for  the  command  of  the  expedition,  pleading  his 
senior  captaincy  as  justification  for  his  request.  Car- 


26          Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

rington  reluctantly  acceded  to  his  plea,  which  indeed  he 
could  scarcely  have  refused,  and  placed  him  in  charge, 
giving  him  strict  and  positive  instructions  to  "relieve 
the  wood  train,  drive  back  the  Indians,  but  on  no  ac- 
count to  pursue  the  Indians  beyond  Lodge  Trail  Ridge  " 
and  that  so  soon  as  he  had  performed  this  duty  he  was 
to  return  immediately  to  the  fort. 

Captain  Fetterman,  as  has  been  said,  had  frequently 
expressed  his  contempt  for  the  Indians,  although  his 
fight  on  December  6th  had  slightly  modified  his  opin- 
ions. Carrington,  knowing  his  views,  was  particular 
and  specific  in  his  orders.  So  necessary  did  he  think 
the  caution  that  he  repeated  it  to  Lieutenant  Grum- 
mond,  who,  with  the  cavalry,  followed  the  infantry  out 
of  the  gate,  the  infantry,  having  less  preparation  to  make, 
getting  away  first.  These  orders  were  delivered  in  a 
loud  voice  and  were  audible  to  many  persons  — women, 
officers,  and  men  in  the  fort.  The  general  went  so  far 

*  O 

as  to  hasten  to  the  gate  after  the  cavalry  had  left  the 
fort,  and  from  the  sentry  platform  or  banquette  over- 
looking it,  called  out  after  them  again,  emphatically 
directing  them  "on  no  account  to  pursue  the  Indians 
across  Lodge  Trail  Ridge." 

The  duty  devolved  upon  Captain  Fetterman  was  ex- 
actly that  which  Captain  Powell  had  performed  so  sat- 
isfactorily a  few  days  before.  With  Captain  Fetterman 
went  Captain  Brown,  with  two  citizens,  frontiersmen 
and  hunters,  as  volunteers.  These  two  civilians, 
Wheatley  and  Fisher,  were  both  armed  with  the  new 
breech-loading  rapid-fire  Henry  rifle,  with  which  they 
were  anxious  to  experiment  on  the  hostiles.  Wheatley 
left  a  wife  and  children  in  the  fort. 

Captain  Frederick  Brown,  a  veteran  of  the  Civil  War, 
had  just  been  promoted,  had  received  orders  detaching 


The  Tragedy  of  Fort  Phil  Kearney    27 


28          Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

him  from  the  command,  and  was  simply  waiting  a  fa- 
vorable opportunity  to  leave.  He  was  a  man  of  the  most 
undaunted  courage.  His  position  as  quartermaster 
had  kept  him  on  the  watch  for  Indians  all  the  time,  and 
he  announced  on  the  day  before  the  battle  that  he  "  must 
have  one  chance  at  the  Indians  before  he  left."  It  is 
believed,  however,  that  his  impetuous  counsel,  due  to 
his  good  luck  in  many  a  brush  with  assailing  parties, 
which  he  had  several  times  pursued  almost  alone, 
largely  precipitated  the  final  disaster. 

The  total  force,  therefore,  including  officers  and  citi- 
,  -  zens,  under  Fetterman's  command,  was  eighty-one— just 
the  number  with  which  he  had  agreed  to  ride  through 
the  whole  Sioux  Nation.  No  one  in  the  command  seems 
to  have  had  the  least  idea  that  any  force  of  Indians, 
however  great,  could  overcome  it. 

Captain  Fetterman,  instead  of  leading  his  men  direct 
to  the  wood  train  on  the  south  side  of  Sullivant  Hills, 
double-quicked  toward  the  Peno  Valley  on  to  the  north 
side.  Perhaps  he  hoped  that  he  could  take  the  Indians 
in  reverse  and  exterminate  them  between  his  own  troops 
and  the  guard  of  the  wood  train — which  all  told  com- 
prised some  ninety  men — when  he  rounded  the  western 
end  of  the  hills.  This  movement  was  noticed  from  the 
fort;  but,  as  it  involved  no  disobedience  of  orders,  and 
as  it  might  be  considered  a  good  tactical  manoeuver,  no 
apprehension  was  felt  on  account  of  it. 

The  Indians  surrounding  the  wood  train  were  well 
served  by  their  scouts,  and  when  they  found  that  Fet- 
terman's force  was  advancing  on  the  other  side  of  the 
hill,  they  immediately  withdrew  from  the  wood  train, 
which  presently  broke  corral  and  made  its  way  to  the 
Piney,  some  seven  miles  northwest  of  the  fort,  unmo- 
lested. As  Fetterman's  troops  disappeared  down  the 


The  Tragedy  of  Fort  Phil  Kearney    29 

valley,  a  number  of  Indians  were  observed  along  the 
Piney  in  front  of  the  fort.  A  spherical  case-shot  from  a 
howitzer  in  the  fort  exploded  in  their  midst,  and  they 
vanished.  The  Indians  were  much  afraid  of  the  "gun 
that  shoots  twice,"  as  they  called  it. 

At  that  time  it  was  discovered  that  no  doctor  had  gone 
with  the  relieving  party,  so  Acting-Assistant  Surgeon 
Hines,  with  an  escort  of  four  men,  was  sent  out  with 
orders  to  join  Fetterman.  The  doctor  hastened  away, 
but  returned  soon  after  with  the  information  that  the 
wood  train  had  gone  on,  and  that  when  he  attempted  to 
cross  the  valley  of  the  Peno  to  join  Fetterman's  men  he 
found  it  full  of  Indians,  who  were  swarming  about 
Lodge  Trail  Ridge,  and  that  no  sign  of  Fetterman  was 
observed.  Despite  his  orders,  he  must  have  gone  over 
the  ridge. 

The  alarm  caused  in  the  fort  by  this  news  was  deep- 
ened by  the  sound  of  firing  at  twelve  o'clock.  Six  shots 
in  rapid  succession  were  counted,  and  immediately  after 
heavy  firing  was  heard  from  over  Lodge  Trail  Ridge, 
five  miles  away,  which  continued  with  such  fierceness 
as  to  indicate  a  pitched  battle.  Carrington  instantly 
despatched  Captain  Ten  Eyck  with  the  rest  of  the  infan- 
try, in  all  about  fifty-four  men,  directing  him  to  join 
Fetterman's  command,  then  return  with  them  to  the 
fort.  The  men  went  forward  on  the  run.  A  little  later 
forty  additional  men  were  sent  after  Ten  Eyck.  Car- 
rington at  once  surmised  that  Fetterman  had  disobeyed 
orders,  either  wittingly  or  carried  away  by  the  ardor  of 
the  pursuit,  and  was  now  heavily  engaged  with  the  In- 
dians on  the  far  side  of  the  ridge. 

Counting  Fetterman's  detachment,  the  guards  of  the 
wood  train,  and  Ten  Eyck's  detachments,  the  garrison 
of  the  fort  was  now  reduced  to  a  very  small  number. 


30          Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

The  place,  with  its  considerable  extent,  might  now  be 
attacked  at  any  time.  Carrington  at  once  released  all 
prisoners  from  the  guard-house,  armed  the  quarter- 
master's employees,  the  citizens,  and  mustered  alto- 
gether a  force  of  only  one  hundred  and  nineteen  men 
to  defend  the  post.*  Although  every  preparation  for 
a  desperate  defense  had  been  made,  there  were  not 
enough  men  to  man  the  walls. 

The  general  and  his  remaining  officers  then  repaired 
to  the  observatory  tower,  field  glasses  in  hand,  and  in 
apprehension  of  what  fearful  catastrophe  they  scarcely 
allowed  themselves  to  imagine.  The  women  and  chil- 
dren, especially  those  who  had  husbands  and  fathers 
with  the  first  detachment,  were  almost  crazed  with 
terror. 

Presently  Sample,  the  general's  own  orderly,  who  had 
been  sent  with  Ten  Eyck,  was  seen  galloping  furiously 
down  the  opposite  hill.  He  had  the  best  horse  in  the 
command  (one  of  the  general's),  and  he  covered  the  dis- 
tance between  Lodge  Trail  Ridge  and  the  fort  with 
amazing  swiftness.  He  dashed  up  to  headquarters  with 
a  message  from  Ten  Eyck,  stating  that  "the  valley  on 
the  other  side  of  the  ridge  is  filled  with  Indians,  who  are 
threatening  him.  The  firing  has  stopped.  He  sees  no 
sign  of  Captain  Fetterman's  command.  He  wants  a 
howitzer  sent  out  to  him." 

*  PHIL  KEARNEY  GARRISON, 

at  date  of  massacre,  from  "Post  Returns": — 

Wood  Party,  besides  teamsters 55  men 

Fetterman's  Party  (two  citizens) 8 1      " 

Ten  Eyck's  Party  (relieving) 94     " 

Helpless  in  hospital 7      " 

Roll-call,  of  present,  all  told 119      " 

Total  officers  and  men 356  men 

Ninety  rifles  worn  out  by  use  on  horseback.  Citizen  employees  used  their  private 
arms. 

Information  furnished  by  General  H.  B.  Carrington, 


The  Tragedy  of  Fort  Phil  Kearney    3 1 

The  following  note  was  sent  to  Captain  Ten  Eyck : 

"  Forty  well-armed  men,  with  three  thousand  rounds, 
ambulances,  stores,  etc.,  left  before  your  courier  came 
in.  You  must  unite  with  Fetterman.  Fire  slowly,  and 
keep  men  in  hand.  You  would  have  saved  two  miles 
toward  the  scene  of  action  if  you  had  taken  Lodge 
Trail  Ridge.  I  order  the  wood  train  in,  which  will  give 
fifty  men  to  spare." 

No  gun  could  be  sent  him.  Since  all  the  horses  were 
already  in  the  field,  it  would  have  required  men  to  haul 
it.  No  more  could  be  spared,  and  not  a  man  with  him 
could  cut  a  fuse  or  handle  the  piece  anyway.  The  guns 
were  especially  needed  at  the  fort  to  protect  women  and 
children. 

Late  in  the  afternoon  Ten  Eyck's  party  returned  to 
the  fort  with  terrible  tidings  of  appalling  disaster.  In 
the  wagons  with  his  command  were  the  bodies  of  forty- 
nine  of  Fetterman's  men;  the  remaining  thirty-two  were 
not  at  that  time  accounted  for.  Ten  Eyck  very  prop- 
erly stood  upon  the  defensive  on  the  hill  and  refused  to 
go  down  into  the  valley  in  spite  of  the  insults  and  shouts 
of  the  Indians,  who  numbered  upward  of  two  thousand 
warriors,  until  they  finally  withdrew.  After  waiting  a 
sufficient  time,  he  marched  carefully  and  cautiously 
toward  Peno  Valley  and  to  the  bare  lower  ridge  over 
which  the  road  ran. 

There  he  came  across  evidences  of  a  great  battle.  On 
the  end  of  the  ridge,  nearest  the  fort,  in  a  space  about 
six  feet  square,  inclosed  by  some  huge  rocks,  making  a 
sort  of  a  rough  shelter,  he  found  the  bodies  of  the  forty- 
nine  men  whom  he  had  brought  back.  After  their 
ammunition  had  been  spent,  they  had  been  stripped, 
shot  full  of  arrows,  hacked  to  pieces,  scalped,  and  muti- 
lated in  a  horrible  manner.  There  were  no  evidences 


32          Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

of  a  very  severe  struggle  right  there.  Few  cartridge 
shells  lay  on  the  ground.  Of  these  men,  only  four  be- 
sides the  two  officers  had  been  killed  by  bullets.  The 
rest  had  been  killed  by  arrows,  hatchets,  or  spears. 
They  had  evidently  been  tortured  to  death. 

Brown  and  Fetterman  were  found  lying  side  by  side, 
each  with  a  bullet  wound  in  the  left  temple.  Their 
heads  were  burned  and  filled  with  powder  around  the 
wounds.  Seeing  that  all  was  lost,  they  had  evidently 
stood  face  to  face,  and  each  had  shot  the  other  dead  with 
his  revolver.  They  had  both  sworn  to  die  rather  than 
be  taken  alive  by  the  Indians,  and  in  the  last  extremity 
they  had  carried  out  their  vows.  Lieutenant  Grum- 
mond,  who  had  so  narrowly  escaped  on  the  6th  of  De- 
cember, was  not  yet  accounted  for,  but  there  was  little 
hope  that  he  had  escaped  again. 

III.  Carrington's  Stern  Resolution 

The  night  was  one  of  wild  anxiety.  Nearly  one- 
fourth  of  the  efficient  force  of  the  fort  had  been  wiped 
out.  Mirror  signals  were  flashed  from  the  hills  during 
the  day,  and  fires  here  and  there  in  the  night  indicated 
that  the  savages  had  not  left  the  vicinity.  The  guards 
were  doubled,  every  man  slept  with  his  clothing  on,  his 
weapons  close  at  hand.  In  every  barrack  a  non-com- 
missioned officer  and  two  men  kept  watch  throughout 
the  night.  Carrington  and  the  remaining  officers  did 
not  sleep  at  all.  They  fully  expected  the  fort  to  be  at- 
tacked. The  state  of  the  women  and  children  can  be 
imagined,  although  all  gossip  and  rumor  were  expressly 
prohibited  by  the  commander. 

The  next  day  was  bitterly  cold.  The  sky  was  over- 
cast and  lowering,  with  indications  of  a  tremendous 


The  Tragedy  of  Fort  Phil  Kearney    33 


amp  eot  3f eet  i/n  grave  L . 
We-hewn  ,t&  touch  iTi^/nion- 
3ontVnuous  Banquette. 
larm<j  toop-Koie5.f(n  rifle. 

Vo*\«  (c95lh«*»\  12  »vl 


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' 


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NOTE 


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34          Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

storm.  The  Indians  were  not  accustomed  to  active 
operations  under  such  conditions,  and  there  was  no 
sign  of  them  about.  Carrington  determined  to  go  out 
to  ascertain  the  fate  of  his  missing  men.  Although  all 
the  remaining  officers  assembled  at  his  quarters  advised 
him  not  to  undertake  it,  lest  the  savages,  flushed  with 
victory,  should  attempt  another  attack,  Carrington 
quietly  excused  his  officers,  told  the  adjutant  to  remain 
with  him,  and  the  bugle  instantly  disclosed  his  purpose 
in  spite  of  dissenting  protests.  He  rightly  judged  that 
the  moral  effect  of  the  battle  would  be  greatly  enhanced, 
in  the  eyes  of  the  Indians,  if  the  bodies  were  not  recov- 
ered. Besides,  to  set  at  rest  all  doubts  it  was  necessary 
to  determine  the  fate  of  the  balance  of  his  command. 
His  own  wife,  as  appears  from  her  narrative,*  approved 
his  action  and  nerved  herself  to  meet  the  possible  fate 
involved,  while  Mrs.  Grummond  was  the  chief  protest- 
ant  that,  as  her  husband  was  undoubtedly  dead,  there 
should  be  no  similar  disaster  invited  by  another  expe- 
dition. 

In  the  afternoon,  with  a  heavily  armed  force  of  eighty 
men,  Carrington  went  in  person  to  the  scene  of  battle. 
The  following  order  was  left  with  the  officer  of  the  day: 
"Fire  the  usual  sunset  gun,  running  a  white  lamp  to 
masthead.  If  the  Indians  appear  fire  three  guns  from 
the  twelve-pounder  at  minute  intervals,  and,  later,  sub- 
stitute a  red  lantern  for  the  white."  Pickets  were  left 
on  two  commanding  ridges,  as  signal  observers,  as  the 
command  moved  forward.  The  women  and  children 
were  placed  in  the  magazine,  a  building  well  adapted 

*  "  AB-S A-RA-KA,  Land  of  Massacre,' '  by  Mrs.  Carrington,  of  which  Oliver  Wendell 
Holmes  wrote  to  General  Carrington  as  follows:  "What  an  interesting  record  is  that 
of  Mrs.  Carrington  !  I  cannot  read  such  a  story  of  devotion  and  endurance  in  the 
midst  of  privations  and  danger,  without  feeling  how  little  most  of  us  know  of  what  life 
can  be  when  all  the  human  energies  are  called  out  by  great  enterprises  and  emergencies." 

r 


The  Tragedy  of  Fort  Phil  Kearney    35 

for  defense,  which  had  been  stocked  with  water, 
crackers,  etc.,  for  an  emergency,  with  an  officer 
pledged  not  to  allow  the  women  to  be  taken  alive,  if 
the  General  did  not  return  and  the  Indians  overcame 
the  stockade. 

Passing  the  place  where  the  greatest  slaughter  had 
occurred,  the  men  marched  cautiously  along  the  trail. 
Bodies  were  strung  along  the  road  clear  to  the  western 
end  farthest  from  the  fort.  Here  they  found  Lieuten- 
ant Grummond.  There  were  evidences  of  a  desperate 
struggle  about  his  body.  Behind  a  little  pile  of  rock, 
making  a  natural  fortification,  were  the  two  civilians 
who  had  been  armed  with  the  modern  Henry  rifle.  By 
the  side  of  one  fifty  shells  were  counted,  and  nearly  as 
many  by  the  side  of  the  other  brave  frontiersman.  Be- 
hind such  cover  as  they  could  obtain  nearby  lay  the 
bodies  of  the  oldest  and  most  experienced  soldiers  in 
Fetterman's  command. 

In  front  of  them  they  found  no  less  than  sixty  great 
gouts  of  blood  on  the  ground  and  grass,  and  a  number 
of  dead  ponies,  showing  where  the  bullets  of  the  de- 
fenders had  reached  their  marks,*  and  in  every  direc- 
tion were  signs  of  the  fiercest  kind  of  hand-to-hand 
fighting.  Ghastly  and  mutilated  remains,  stripped 
naked,  shot  full  of  arrows — Wheatley  with  no  less 
than  one  hundred  and  five  in  him,  scalped,  lay  before 
them. 

Brown  rode  to  the  death  of  both  a  little  Indian 
"calico"  pony  which  he  had  given  to  the  general's 
boys  when  they  started  from  Fort  Leavenworth,  in 
November,  1865,  and  the  body  of  the  horse  was  found 
in  the  low  ground  at  the  west  slope  of  the  ridge,  show- 

*  The  Indians,  where  possible,  remove  the  bodies  of  their  slain.  They  did  dur- 
ing this  campaign,  as  few  dead  Indians  ever  came  into  possession  of  the  troops. 


36          Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

ing  that  the  fight  began  there,  before  they  could  reach 
high  ground.*  At  ten  o'clock  at  night,  on  the  return, 
the  white  lamp  at  masthead  told  its  welcome  story  of  a 
garrison  still  intact. 

Fetterman  had  disobeyed  orders.  Whether  deliber- 
ately or  not,  cannot  be  told.  He  had  relieved  the  wood 
train,  and  instead  of  returning  to  the  post,  had  pursued 
the  Indians  over  the  ridge  into  Peno  Valley,  then  along 
the  trail,  and  into  a  cunningly  contrived  ambush.  His 
men  had  evidently  fought  on  the  road  until  their  ammu- 
nition gave  out,  and  then  had  either  been  ordered  to  re- 
treat to  the  fort,  or  had  retreated  of  their  own  motion  — 
probably  the  latter.  All  the  dead  cavalry  horses'  heads 
were  turned  toward  the  fort,  by  the  way.  Fetterman 
and  Brown,  men  of  unquestioned  courage,  must  have 
been  swept  along  with  their  flying  men.  There  may 
have  been  a  little  reserve  on  the  rocks  on  which  they 
hoped  to  rally  their  disorganized,  panic-stricken  troops, 
fleeing  before  a  horde  of  yelling,  blood-intoxicated  war- 
riors. I  imagine  them  vainly  protesting,  imploring, 
begging  their  men  to  make  a  stand.  I  feel  sure  they 
fought  until  the  last.  But  these  are  only  surmises; 
what  really  happened,  God  alone  knows. 

The  judgment  of  the  veteran  soldiers  and  the  fron- 
tiersmen, who  knew  that  to  retreat  was  to  be  annihilat- 
ed, had  caused  a  few  to  hold  their  ground  and  fight  until 
they  were  without  ammunition;  then  with  gun-stocks, 
swords,  bayonets,  whatever  came  to  hand,  they  battled 
until  they  were  cut  down.  Grummond  had  stayed 
with  them,  perhaps  honorably  sacrificing  himself  in  a 

*  Once,  while  loading  the  bodies  in  the  wagons,  a  nervous  sergeant  mistook  one  of 
the  pickets  for  Indians  in  the  rear,  and  gave  the  alarm.  His  detail  was  sharply 
ordered  by  the  general  to  "leave  their  ammunition  and  get  back  to  the  fort  as  best 
they  could,  if  they  were  afraid;  for  no  armed  man  would  be  allowed  to  leave  until  the 
last  body  was  rescued." 


The  Tragedy  of  Fort  Phil  Kearney    37 

vain  endeavor  to  cover  the  retreat  of  the  rest  of  his 
command.     The  Indian  loss  was  very  heavy,  but  could      / 
not  exactly  be  determined. 

IV.  The  Reward  of  a  Brave  Soldier 

Such  was  the  melancholy  fate  of  Fetterman  and  his 
men.  The  post  was  isolated,  the  weather  frightful.  A 
courier  was  at  once  despatched  to  Fort  Laramie,  but 
such  means  of  communication  was  necessarily  slow,  and 
it  was  not  until  Christmas  morning  that  the  world  was 
apprised  of  the  fatal  story.  In  spite  of  the  reports  that 
had  been  made  and  fatuously  believed,  that  peace  had 
obtained  in  that  land,  it  was  now  known  that  war  was 
everywhere  prevalent.  The  shock  of  horror  with 
which  the  terrible  news  was  received  was  greater  even 
than  that  attendant  upon  the  story  of  the  disastrous  bat- 
tle of  the  Little  Big  Horn,  ten  years  later.  People  had 
got  used  to  such  things  then;  this  news  came  like  a  bolt 
from  the  blue. 

Although  Carrington  had  conducted  himself  in  every 
way  as  a  brave,  prudent,  skilful,  capable  soldier,  al- 
though his  services  merited  reward,  not  censure,  and 
demanded  praise,  not  blame,  the  people  and  the  au- 
thorities required  a  scapegoat.  He  was  instantly  re-  ^ 
lieved  from  command  by  General  Cooke,  upon  a  private 
telegram  from  Laramie,  never  published,  before  the 
receipt  of  his  own  official  report,  and  was  ordered  to 
change  his  regimental  headquarters  to  the  little  frontier 
post  at  Fort  Caspar,  where  two  companies  of  his  first 
battalion,  just  become  the  new  Eighteenth,  were  sta- 
tioned, while  four  companies  of  the  same  battalion, 
under  his  lieutenant-colonel,  were  ordered  to  the  relief 
of  Fort  Phil  Kearney. 


\ 


38          Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

The  weather  had  become  severe  and  the  snow  was 
banked  to  the  top  of  the  stockade.  The  mercury  was 
in  the  bulb.  Guards  were  changed  half-hourly.  Men 
and  women  dressed  in  furs  made  from  wolfskins  tak- 
en from  the  hundreds  of  wolves  which  infested  the 
outside  butcher-field  at  night,  and  which  were  poisoned 
by  the  men  for  their  fur.  Upon  the  day  fixed  precisely 
for  the  march,  as  the  new  arrivals  needed  every  roof 
during  a  snow-storm  which  soon  became  a  blizzard, 
Carrington,  his  wife  and  children,  his  staff  and  their 
families,  including  Mrs.  Grummond,  escorting  the  re- 
mains of  her  husband  to  Tennessee,  and  the  regimental 
band,  with  its  women  and  children,  began  that  Febru- 
ary "  change  of  headquarters."  They  narrowly  escaped 
freezing  to  death.  More  than  one-half  of  the  sixty- 
five  in  the  party  were  frosted,  and  three  amputations, 
with  one  death,  were  the  immediate  result  of  the  foolish 
and  cruel  order. 

It  was  not  until  some  time  after  that  a  mixed  com- 
mission of  soldiers  and  civilians,  which  thoroughly  in- 
vestigated Carrington's  conduct,  having  before  them  all 
his  books  and  records  from  the  inception  of  the  ex- 
pedition until  its  tragic  close,  acquitted  him  of  all  blame 
of  any  sort,  and  awarded  him  due  praise  for  his  suc- 
cessful conduct  of  the  whole  campaign.  His  course  was 
also  the  subject  of  inquiry  before  a  purely  military  court, 
all  of  them  his  juniors  in  rank,  which  also  reported 
favorably.  General  Sherman  expressly  stated  that 
"Colonel  Carrington's  report,  to  his  personal  knowledge, 
was  fully  sustained,"  but  by  some  unaccountable  over- 
sight or  intent,  the  report  was  suppressed  and  never 
published,  thereby  doing  lasting  injustice  to  a  brave 
and  faithful  soldier. 

At  the  same  time  the  government  established  the  sub- 


The  Tragedy  of  Fort  Phil  Kearney    39 

post  between  Laramie  and  Fort  Reno,  so  earnestly  rec- 
ommended by  Carrington,  in  October,  calling  it  Fort 
Fetterman,  in  honor  of  the  unfortunate  officer  who  fell  '^SK 
in  battle  on  the  2 1st  of  December. 

Perhaps  it  ill  becomes  us  to  censure  the  dead,  but  the 
whole  unfortunate  affair  arose  from  a  direct  disobe- 
dience of  orders  on  the  part  of  Fetterman  and  his  men. 
They  paid  the  penalty  for  their  lapse  with  their  lives; 
and  so  far,  at  least,  they  made  what  atonement  they 
could.  A  year  later  opportunity  was  given  the  sol- 
diers at  Phil  Kearney  to  exact  a  dreadful  revenge  from 
Red  Cloud  and  his  Sioux  for  the  slaughter  of  their  brave 
comrades. 


CHAPTER   THREE 

The  Thirty-two  Against  the  Three 
Thousand 

I.  The  Improvised  Corral  on  Piney  Island 

RED  CLOUD,  who  had  been  one  of  the  sub- 
chiefs  of  the  Sioux,  gained   so  much  prestige 
by  the  defeat   and   slaughter  of  Fetterman's 
men  that  he  became  at  once  the  leading  war 
chief  of  the  nation.*   The  angry  braves,  flushed  with  con- 
quest and  eager  for  blood,  hastened  to  enroll  themselves 
by  thousands  in  his  band. 

Fort  Phil  Kearney  had  been  in  a  state  of  siege  before : 
it  was  more  closely  invested  now  than  ever.  Contrary 
to  their  usual  avoidance  of  the  war-path  in  cold  weather, 
throughout  the  long  and  bitter  winter  there  was  no  in- 
termittence  to  the  watchfulness  of  the  Indians.  The 

*  Mahapiya-luta,  Red  Cloud,  was  one  of  the  most  famous  of  the  great  Sioux  Nation. 
He  was  a  fierce  and  ruthless  warrior,  but  withal  a  man  of  his  word.  After  the  abandon- 
ment of  Fort  Phil  Kearney  he  participated  in  no  important  actions  with  the  soldiers, 
although  he  was  elected  head  chief  of  the  Sioux.  In  the  war  of  1876  his  camp  was 
surprised  by  General  Mackenzie  before  he  had  an  opportunity  to  go  on  the  war-path. 
His  men  were  disarmed,  and  with  him  were  detained  in  the  reservation.  It  was  a 
fortunate  thing  for  the  army. 

Recently  the  old  chief  was  asked  to  tell  the  story  of  his  most  thrilling  adventure.  It 
was  a  tale  of  one  man  against  seven,  and  the  old  man's  dim  eyes  grew  bright  and  his 
wrinkled  face  lighted  up  with  a  strange  light  as  he  told  it.  A  well-known  warrior  was 
jealous  of  Red  Cloud,  and,  together  with  six  of  his  followers,  waylaid  the  young  brave  in 
a  lonely  spot. 

Two  of  them  were  armed  with  rifles,  the  rest  carried  only  bows  and  arrows,  while 

40 


Thirty-two  Against  Three  Thousand  41 

garrison  was  constantly  in  arms.  Attacks  of  all  sorts 
were  made  with  increasing  frequency.  The  letters  from 
the  soldiers  which  got  through  to  the  East  adequately 
describe  their  sense  of  the  dire  peril  which  menaced 
them.  "This  may  be  my  last  letter"  is  a  frequent 
phrase.  Travel  on  the  trail  was  abandoned.  As  soon 
as  possible  in  the  spring,  reinforcements  were  hurried 
up  and  the  fort  was  completed,  but  the  same  state  of 
affairs  continued  right  along  without  intermission. 

With  the  advance  of  summer  Red  Cloud  gathered  his 
warriors  and  determined  upon  a  direct  attack  upon  the 
fort  itself.  He  was  tired  of  skirmishing,  stampeding 
stock,  cutting  off  stragglers,  etc.  He  wanted  war,  real 
war,  and  he  got  it!  If,  or  when,  he  captured  the  fort, 
he  would  advance  upon  the  other  two  forts  in  succes- 
sion and  so  clear  the  country,  once  and  for  all,  of  the 
detested  invaders,  whose  soldierly  qualities  he  seems  to 
have  held  in  contempt.  For  the  campaign  he  proposed 
he  assembled  no  fewer  than  three  thousand  warriors, 
the  flower  of  the  Sioux  Nation.  Probably  half  of  them 
were  armed  with  firearms,  Winchester  rifles,  Spencer 
repeating  carbines,  or  old  army  muskets,  including 
those  that  had  been  captured  from  Fetterman's  party. 
Under  cover  of  frequent  skirmishes,  which  prevented 
much  scouting  on  the  part  of  the  troops,  Red  Cloud 
gathered  his  warriors  undiscovered  and  unmolested, 

Red  Cloud  had  a  Winchester.  At  the  first  fire  Red  Cloud  fell  with  a  bullet  in  his  thigh, 
but  from  where  he  lay  he  contrived  to  kill  every  one  of  his  assailants. 

The  skill  and  courage  he  displayed  on  that  occasion  won  for  him  many  admiring  fol- 
lowers, and  as  war  after  war  with  the  whites  broke  out  and  he  won  fresh  laurels  his  fol- 
lowers increased  in  numbers.  He  joined  the  various  secret  societies,  passed  through  the 
terrible  agony  of  the  sun  dance,  and  when,  in  1866,  the  chiefs  of  the  tribe  signed  a  "peace 
paper,"  he  stood  out  for  and  declared  war.  The  fighting  men  flocked  to  his  standard, 
and  when  the  awful  massacre  in  which  he  played  so  conspicuous  a  part  occurred,  he  was 
proclaimed  Chief  of  all  the  Sioux. 

All  the  prestige  he  lost  at  Piney  Island  he  regained  upon  the  abandonment  of 
the  forts  by  the  government,  a  most  impolitic  and.  unfortunate  move. 


42          Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

and  prepared  to  attack  about  the  first  of  August, 
1867. 

The  limits  of  the  military  reservation  had  been  fixed 
at  Washington  —  without  adequate  knowledge  of  the 
ground  and  in  disregard  of  General  Carrington's  re- 
quest and  protests  —  so  as  to  exclude  the  timber  land  of 
Piney  Island,  from  which  the  post  had  been  built,  and 
from  which  the  nearest  and  most  available  wood  supply 
must  be  obtained.  The  post  had  been  completed,  but 
immense  supplies  of  wood  would  be  required  for  fuel 
during  the  long  and  severe  winter.  This  was  to  be  cut 
and  delivered  at  the  fort  by  a  civilian  outfit  which  had 
entered  upon  a  contract  with  the  government  for  the 
purpose.  One  of  the  stipulations  of  the  contract  was 
that  the  woodmen  should  be  guarded  and  protected  by 
the  soldiers. 

Wood-cutting  began  on  the  3ist  of  July,  1867,  and 
Captain  and  Brevet-Major  James  Powell,  commanding 
"C"  Company,  of  the  twenty-seventh  Infantry,  which 
was  formerly  a  battalion  of  the  Eighteenth  a  part  of 
the  command  which  had  built  the  fort,  and  to  which 
Fetterman  and  his  men  had  belonged,  was  detailed  with 
his  company  to  guard  the  contractor's  party.  Captain 
Powell  had  enlisted  in  the  army  in  1848  as  a  private 
soldier.  The  Civil  War  had  given  him  a  commission 
in  the  regular  service,  and  in  its  course  he  had  been  twice 
brevetted  for  conspicuous  gallantry,  once  at  Chicka- 
mauga  and  the  second  time  during  the  Atlanta  campaign, 
in  which  he  had  been  desperately  wounded.  He  had  had 
some  experience  in  Indian  fighting  before  and  since  he 
came  to  the  post,  and  had  distinguished  himself  in  sev- 
eral skirmishes,  notably  in  the  relief  of  the  wood  train, 
a  few  days  before  Fetterman's  rashness  and  disobedi- 
ence precipitated  the  awful  disaster. 


Thirty-two  Against  Three  Thousand  43 

Arriving  at  Piney  Island,  some  seven  miles  from  the 
post,  Powell  found  that  the  contractor  had  divided  his 
men  into  two  parties.  One  had  its  headquarters  on  a 
bare,  treeless,  and  comparatively  level  plain,  perhaps 
one  thousand  yards  across,  which  was  surrounded  by 
low  hills  backed  by  mountains  farther  away.  This  was 
an  admirable  place  to  graze  the  herds  of  mules  required 
to  haul  the  wagons.  As  will  be  seen,  it  could  also 
be  turned  into  a  highly  defensive  position.  The  other 
camp  was  in  the  thick  of  the  pine  wood,  about  a  mile 
away  across  the  creek,  at  the  foot  of  the  mountain.  This 
division  of  labor  necessitated  a  division  of  force,  which 
was  a  misfortune,  but  which  could  not  be  avoided. 

Powell  sent  twelve  men  under  a  noncommissioned 
officer  to  guard  the  camp  in  the  wood,  and  detailed  thir- 
teen men  with  another  noncommissioned  officer  to  es- 
cort the  wood  trains  to  and  from  the  fort.  With  the 
remaining  twenty-six  men  and  his  lieutenant,  John  C. 
Jenness,  he  established  headquarters  on  the  plain  in  the 
open. 

The  wagons  used  by  the  wood-cutters  were  furnished 
by  the  quartermaster's  department.  In  transporting 
the  cordwood,  the  woodmen  made  use  of  the  running 
gears  only,  the  wagon  bodies  having  been  deposited  in 
the  clearing.  In  order  to  preserve  their  contents  and  to 
afford  as  much  protection  as  possible  to  their  occupants 
in  case  of  Indian  attacks,  the  quartermaster's  depart- 
ment was  in  the  habit  of  lining  the  wagon  beds  with 
boiler  iron;  and,  to  give  their  occupants  an  opportunity 
to  fight  from  concealment,  loopholes  were  cut  in  the 
sides.  Almost  every  authority  who  has  written  of  the 
fight  has  concluded  that  the  particular  wagon  beds  in 
question  were  so  lined.  This  is  a  mistaken  though 
natural  conclusion.  In  a  letter  to  an  old  comrade  who 


44          Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

wrote  an  account  of  the  subsequent  action,*  Powell 
makes  no  mention  of  any  iron  lining,  and  it  is  certain 
that  the  wagons  were  not  lined,  but  were  just  the  ordi- 
nary wooden  wagon  beds."}" 

There  were  fourteen  of  these  wagon  bodies.  Powell 
arranged  them  in  the  form  of  a  wide  oval.  At  the  high- 
est point  of  the  plain,  which  happened  to  be  in  the  cen- 
ter, this  corral  was  made.  The  wagon  beds  were  deep, 
and  afforded  ample  concealment  for  any  one  lying  in 
them.  I  sometimes  wonder  why  Powell  did  not  stand 
these  beds  on  their  sides  instead  of  their  bottoms,  mak- 
ing a  higher  and  stouter  inclosure,  the  bottoms  being 
heavier  than  the  sides;  but  it  is  clear  that  he  did  not. 
There  were  plenty  of  tools,  including  a  number  of  au- 
gers, in  the  camp,  and  with  these  Powell's  men  made  a 
number  of  loopholes  about  a  foot  from  the  ground,  in 
the  outward  sides  of  the  wagons. 

At  the  ends  of  the  oval,  where  the  configuration  of  the 
ground  made  it  most  vulnerable  for  attack,  especially 
by  mounted  men,  two  wagons  complete  —  that  is,  with 
bodies  and  running  gears  —  were  placed  a  short  dis- 
tance from  the  little  corral.  This  would  break  the  force 
of  a  charge,  and  the  defenders  could  fire  at  the  attacking 
party  underneath  the  bodies  and  through  the  wheels. 
The  spaces  between  the  wagon  bodies  were  filled  with 
logs  and  sacks  of  grain,  backed  by  everything  available 
that  would  turn  a  bullet.  The  supplies  for  the  soldiers 
and  wood  party  were  contained  in  this  corral. 

Instead  of  the  old  Springfield  muzzle-loading  musket, 
with  which  the  troops  mainly  had  been  armed  up  to  this 

*  General  Rodenbough,  in  "Sabre  and  Bayonet." 

•)•  This  statement  is  corroborated  by  private  letter  from  a  veteran  soldier  in  the 
United  States  Army,  who  is  one  of  the  few  survivors  of  the  battle.  Surgeon  Horton,  who 
was  at  the  post  from  its  establishment  until  it  was  abandoned,  also  says  that  the  wagon 
beds  were  of  ordinary  boards,  without  lining  or  other  protection. 


Thirty-two  Against  Three  Thousand  45 

time,  Powell's  men  were  provided  with  the  new  Allen 
modification  of  the  Springfield  breech-loading  rifle.     He 


The  Wagon-Box  Corral  on  Piney  Island 

had  enough  rifles  for  his  men  and  for  all  the  civilian 
employees,  and  a  large  number  of  new  Colt  revolvers, 


46          Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

with  plenty  of  ammunition  for  all.  The  new  rifle  had 
never  been  used  by  the  troops  in  combat  with  the  In- 
dians, and  the  latter  were  entirely  ignorant  of  its  tre- 
mendous range  and  power  and  the  wonderful  rapidity 
of  fire  which  it  permitted.  They  learned  much  about  it 
in  the  next  day  or  two,  however.  A  quantity  of  cloth- 
ing and  blankets  was  issued  to  the  troops  at  the  fort  on 
the  first  of  August,  and  supplies  for  Powell's  men  were 
sent  down  to  him. 

II.  The  Wild  Charge  of  the  Sioux 

Having  matured  his  plans,  Red  Cloud  determined  to 
begin  his  attack  on  Fort  Phil  Kearney  by  annihilat- 
ing the  little  detachment  guarding  the  train.*  Parties 
of  Indians  had  been  observed  in  the  vicinity  for  several 
days,  but  no  attack  had  been  made  since  Powell's  ar- 
rival until  the  second  of  August,  when,  about  nine 
o'clock  in  the  morning,f  a  party  of  some  two  hundred 
Indians  endeavored  to  stampede  the  herd  of  mules. 
The  herders,  who  were  all  armed,  stood  their  ground 
and  succeeded  for  the  time  being  in  beating  back  the 
attack.  While  they  were  hotly  engaged  with  the  dis- 
mounted force,  sixty  mounted  Indians  succeeded  in 
getting  into  the  herd  and  running  it  off.  At  the  same 
time  five  hundred  other  Indians  attacked  the  wood  train 
at  the  other  camp. 

The  affair  was  not  quite  a  surprise,  for  the  approach 
of  the  Indians  had  been  detected  and  signalled  from  the 
corral  on  the  island  a  few  moments  before.  In  the  face 

*  On  the  same  day  an  attack  was  made  in  force  on  Fort  C.  F.  Smith,  on  the 
Big  Horn. 

t  Powell's  official  report  says  nine,  although  a  private  letter  written  some  time  later 
makes  the  hour  seven.  It  isn't  material,  anyway:  there  was  ample'time  for  all  the  fight- 
ing both  sides  cared  for  before  the  day  was  ended. 


Thirty-two  Against  Three  Thousand  47 

of  so  overwhelming  a  force  the  soldiers  and  civilians 
at  the  wood  train  immediately  retreated,  abandoning  the 
train  and  the  camp.  Here  four  of  the  lumbermen  were 
killed.  The  retreat,  however,  was  an  orderly  one, 
and  they  kept  back  the  Indians  by  a  well-directed 
fire. 

Meanwhile  the  herders,  seeing  the  stampede  of  the 
mules,  made  an  effort  to  join  the  party  retreating  from 
the  wood  train.  The  Indians  endeavored  to  inter- 
cept them  and  cut  them  off.  Powell,  however,  with  a 
portion  of  his  force,  leaving  the  post  in  command  of 
Lieutenant  Jenness,  immediately  dashed  across  the 
prairie  and  attacked  the  savages  in  the  rear.  They 
turned  at  once,  abandoning  the  pursuit  of  the  herders, 
and  fell  upon  Powell,  who  in  his  turn  retreated  without 
loss  to  the  corral.  His  prompt  and  bold  sortie  had 
saved  the  herders,  for  they  wrere  enabled  to  effect  a  junc- 
tion with  the  retreating  train  men  and  their  guards  and 
the  soldiers  and  civilians,  and  eventually  gained  the  fort, 
although  not  without  hard  fighting  and  some  loss. 
One  thing  that  helped  them  to  get  away  from  the  In- 
dians was  that  the  savages  stopped  to  pillage  the  camp 
and  burn  it  and  the  train.  Another  thing  was  the  pres- 
ence of  Powell's  command,  which  they  could  not  leave 
in  the  rear.  After  driving  away  the  others  and  com- 
pleting the  destruction  of  the  camp,  they  turned  their 
attention  to  Powell's  corral. 

Some  of  the  clothing  that  had  been  received  the  day 
before  had  not  been  unpacked  or  distributed,  so  it  was 
used  to  strengthen  the  weak  places  in  the  corral.  Pow- 
ell's men  lay  down  in  the  wagon  beds  before  the  loop- 
holes; blankets  were  thrown  over  the  tops  of  the  beds 
to  screen  the.  defenders  from  observation  and  in  the 
hope  of  perhaps  saving  them  from  the  ill  effects  of  the 


48          Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

plunging  arrow  fire,  and   everything  was  got  reac 
Everybody  had  plenty  of  ammunition. 

Some  of  the  men  who  were  not  good  shots  were  to 
off  to  do  nothing  but  load  rifles,  of  which  there  were  s 
many  that  each  man  had  two  or  three  beside  him,  on 
man  making  use  of  no  less  than  eight.     Four  civilian 
succeeded  in  joining  the  party  in  the  corral  —  a  welcom 
addition,  indeed,  bringing  the  total  number  up  to  thirty- 
two  officers  and  men.     Among  this  quartet  was  an  old 
frontiersman  who  had  spent  most  of  his  life  hunting  in 
the  Indian  country,  and  who  had  been  in  innumerable 
fights,  renowned  for  his  expertness  in  the  use  of  the 
rifle  —  a  dead-shot.     This  was  the  man  to  whom  the 
eight  guns  were  allotted.     Powell,  rifle  in  hand,  sta- 
tioned himself  at  one  end  of  the  corral;  Jenness,  similar- 
ly armed,  was  posted  at  the  other,  each  officer  watch- 
ing one  of  the  openings  covered  by  the  complete  wagons, 
which  were  loaded  with  supplies  so  they  could  not  be 
run  off  easily  by  hand. 

While  all  these  preparations  were  being  rapidly  made, 
although  without  confusion  or  alarm,  the  surrounding 
country  was  filling  with  a  countless  multitude  of  In- 
dians. It  was  impossible  at  the  time  to  estimate  the 
number  of  them,  although  it  was  ascertained  that  more 
than  three  thousand  warriors  were  present  and  engaged. 
Red  Cloud  himself  was  in  command,  and  with  him  were 
the  great  chiefs  of  the  great  tribes  of  the  Sioux,  who  were 
all  represented  —  Unkpapas,  Miniconjous,  Oglalas, 
Brules,  and  Sans  Arcs,  besides  hundreds  of  Chey- 
ennes. 

So  confident  of  success  were  they  that,  contrary  to 
their  ordinary  practices,  they  had  brought  with  them 
their  women  and  children  to  assist  in  carrying  back  the 
plunder.  These,  massed  out  of  range  on  the  farthest 


Thirty-two  Against  Three  Thousand  49 

Is,  constituted  an  audience  for  the  terrible  drama 
out    to    be  played    in    the    amphitheater    beneath 
'em. 

• 

We  can  well  imagine  the  thoughts  of  that  little  band 
;w  thirty-two,  surrounded  by  a  force  that  outnumbered 
iem  one  hundred  to  one.  Their  minds  must  have 
one  back  to  that  winter  day,  some  seven  months  before, 
•vhen  twice  their  number  had  gone  down  to  defeat  and 
destruction  under  the  attack  of  two-thirds  of  their 
present  foemen.  It  is  probable  that  not  one  of  them 
ever  expected  to  escape  alive.  The  chances  that  they 
could  successfully  withstand  an  attack  from  so  over- 
welming  a  number  of  foes  of  such  extraordinary  bravery 
were  of  the  smallest.  But  not  a  man  flinched,  not  a 
man  faltered.  They  looked  to  their  weapons,  settled 
themselves  comfortably  in  the  wagon  beds,  thought  of 
Fetterman  and  their  comrades,  and  prayed  that  the  at- 
tack might  begin  and  begin  at  once.  There  were  no 
heroics,  no  speeches  made.  Powell  quietly  remarked 
that  they  had  to  fight  for  their  lives  now,  which  was 
patent  to  all;  and  he  directed  that  no  man,  for  any  rea- 
son, should  open  fire  until  he  gave  the  order. 

Some  little  time  was  spent  by  the  Indians  in  making 
preparations,  and  then  a  force  of  about  five  hundred  In- 
dians, magnificently  mounted  on  the  best  war  ponies 
and  armed  with  rifles,  carbines,  or  muskets,  detached 
themselves  from  the  main  body  and  started  toward  the 
little  corral  lying  like  a  black  dot  on  the  open  plain. 
They  intended  to  ride  over  the  soldiers  and  end  the 
battle  with  one  swift  blow.  Slowly  at  first,  but  gradu- 
ally increasing  their  pace  until  their  ponies  were  on  a 
dead  run,  they  dashed  gallantly  toward  the  corral,  while 
the  main  body  of  the  savages,  at  some  distance  in 
their  rear,  prepared  to  take  advantage  of  any  opening 


5O          Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

that  might  be  made  in  the  defenses.  It  was  a  brilliant 
charge,  splendidly  delivered. 

Such  was  the  discipline  of  Powell's  men  that  not  a 
shot  was  fired  as  the  Indians,  yelling  and  whooping 
madly,  came  rushing  on.  There  was  something  terri- 
bly ominous  about  the  absolute  silence  of  that  little  for- 
tification. The  galloping  men  were  within  one  hun- 
dred yards  now,  now  fifty.  At  that  instant  Powell 
spoke  to  his  men.  The  inclosure  was  sheeted  with 
flame.  Out  of  the  smoke  and  fire  a  rain  of  bullets  was 
poured  upon  the  astonished  savages.  The  firing  was  not 
as  usual — one  volley,  then  another,  and  then  silence; 
but  it  was  a  steady,  persistent,  continued  stream,  which 
mowed  them  down  in  scores.  The  advance  was  thrown 
into  confusion,  checked  but  not  halted,  its  impetus 
being  too  great;  and  then  the  force  divided  and  swept 
around  the  corral,  looking  for  a  weak  spot  for  a  possible 
entrance.  At  the  same  moment  a  furious  fire  was 
poured  into  it  by  the  warriors,  whose  position  on  their 
horses'  backs  gave  them  sufficient  elevation  to  enable 
them  to  fire  over  the  wagon  beds  upon  the  garrison. 
Then  they  circled  about  the  corral  in  a  mad  gallop,  seek- 
ing some  undefended  point  upon  which  to  concentrate 
and  break  through,  but  in  vain.  The  little  inclosure  was 
literally  ringed  in  fire.  Nothing  could  stand  against  it. 
So  close  were  they  that  one  bullet  sometimes  pierced  two 
Indians.* 

Having  lost  terribly,  and  having  failed  to  make  any 

*  "I  know  that  my  husband  never  expected  to  come  out  of  that  fight  alive.  He  has 
told  me  that  during  the  fight  the  Indians  came  up  so  close  to  the  corral,  that  one  shot 
would  pass  through  the  Indian  in  advance  and  kill  or  wound  the  one  behind.  My 
husband  claimed  the  honor  of  killing  Red  Cloud's  nephew."  —  Letter  from  Mrs.  Annie 
Powell  to  me.  Surgeon  Horton  states  that  the  men  told  him  on  their  return  to  the 
fort  that  the  Indians  were  crowded  so  closely  together  that  the  conical  bullets  from 
their  muskets  killed  four  or  five  Indians  in  line  behind  one  another.  The  Indians 
came  up  in  solid  masses  on  every  side. 


O      e 

u    s 


Thirty-two  Against  Three  Thousand  51 

impression  whatever,  the  Indians  broke  and  gave  way. 
They  rushed  pell-mell  from  the  spot  in  frantic  confu- 
sion till  they  got  out  of  range  of  the  deadly  storm  that 
swept  the  plain.  All  around  the  corral  lay  dead  and 
dying  Indians,  mingled  with  killed  and  wounded  horses 
kicking  and  screaming  with  pain,  the  Indians  stoically 
enduring  all  their  sufferings  and  making  no  outcry.  In 
front  of  the  corral,  where  the  first  force  of  the  charge  had 
been  spent,  horses  and  men  were  stretched  out  as  if  they 
had  been  cut  down  by  a  gigantic  mowing-machine.  The 
defenders  of  the  corral  had  suffered  in  their  turn.  Lieu- 
tenant Jenness,  brave  and  earnest  in  defense,  had  ex- 
posed himself  to  give  a  necessary  command  and  had  re- 
ceived a  bullet  in  his  brain.  One  of  the  private  soldiers 
had  been  killed  and  two  severely  wounded.  The  thirty- 
two  had  been  reduced  to  twenty-eight.  At  that  rate, 
since  there  were  so  few  to  suffer,  the  end  appeared  inev- 
itable. The  spirit  of  the  little  band,  however,  remained 
undaunted.  Fortunately  for  them,  the  Indians  had  met 
with  so  terrible  a  repulse  that  all  they  thought  of  for  the 
time  being  was  to  get  out  of  range.  The  vicinity  of  the 
corral  was  thus  at  once  abandoned. 

III.  Red  Cloud's  Baptism  of  Fire 

Red  Cloud  determined,  after  consultation  with  the 
other  chiefs,  upon  another  plan  which  gave  greater 
promise  of  success.  Seven  hundred  Indians,  armed  with 
rifles  or  muskets  and  followed  by  a  number  carrying 
bows  and  arrows,  were  told  off  to  prepare  themselves  as 
a  skirmishing  party.  Their  preparations  were  simple, 
and  consisted  of  denuding  themselves  of  every  vestige 
of  clothing,  including  their  war  shirts  and  war  bonnets. 
These  men  were  directed  to  creep  forward,  taking  ad- 


52          Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

vantage  of  every  depression,  ravine,  or  other  cover,  until 
they  were  within  range  of  the  corral,  which  they  were  to 
overwhelm  by  gun  and  arrow  fire.  Supporting  them, 
and  intended  to  constitute  the  main  attack,  were  the 
whole  remaining  body  of  the  Indians,  numbering  up- 
ward of  two  thousand  warriors. 

With  the  wonderful  skill  of  which  they  were  masters, 
the  skirmishing  party  approached  near  to  the  corral 
and  began  to  fire  upon  it.  Here  and  there,  when  a  sav- 
age incautiously  exposed  himself,  he  was  shot  by  one  of 
the  defenders;  but  in  the  main  the  people  of  the  corral 
kept  silent  under  this  terrible  fusillade  of  bullets  and 
arrows.  The  tops  of  the  wagon  sides  were  literally 
torn  to  pieces;  the  heavy  blankets  were  filled  with  ar- 
rows which,  falling  from  a  distance,  did  no  damage. 
The  fire  of  the  Indians  was  rapid  and  continuous. 
The  bullets  crashed  into  the  wood  just  over  the  heads  of 
the  prostrate  men,  sounding  like  cracking  thunder;  yet 
not  one  man  in  the  wagon  beds  was  hurt.  Arguing, 
perhaps  from  the  silence  in  the  corral,  that  the  defend- 
ers had  been  overwhelmed  and  that  the  time  for  the 
grand  attack  had  arrived,  signal  was  given  for  the  main 
body  of  the  Indians  to  charge. 

They  were  led  by  the  nephew  of  Red  Cloud,  a  superb 
young  chieftain,  who  was  ambitious  of  succeeding  in  due 
course  to  the  leadership  now  held  by  his  uncle.  Chant- 
ing their  fierce  war  songs,  they  came,  on  arranged  in  a 
great  semicircle.  Splendid,  stalwart  braves,  the  flower 
of  the  nation,  they  were  magnificently  arrayed  in  all 
the  varied  and  highly-colored  fighting  panoply  of  the 
Sioux.  Great  war  bonnets  streamed  from  the  heads  of 
the  chiefs,  many  of  whom  wore  gorgeous  war  shirts;  the 
painted  bodies  of  others  made  dashes  of  rich  color 
against  the  green  grass  of  the  clearing  and  the  dark 


Thirty-two  Against  Three  Thousand  53 

pines  of  the  hills  and  mountains  behind.  Most  of  them 
carried  on  their  left  arms  painted  targets  or  shields  of 
buffalo  hide,  stout  enough  to  turn  a  musket  shot  unless 
fairly  hit. 

Under  a  fire  of  redoubled  intensity  from  their  skir- 
mishers they  broke  into  a  charge.  Again  they  advanced 
in  the  face  of  a  terrible  silence.  Again  at  the  appointed 
moment  the  order  rang  out.  Again  the  fearful  dis- 
charge swept  them  away  in  scores.  Powell's  own  rifle 
brought  down  the  dauntless  young  chief  in  the  lead. 
Others  sprang  to  the  fore  when  he  fell  and  gallantly  led 
on  their  men.  Undaunted,  they  came  on  and  on,  in  spite 
of  a  slaughter  such  as  no  living  Indian  had  experienced 
or  heard  of.  The  Indians  could  account  for  the  con- 
tinuous fire  only  by  supposing  that  the  corral  contained 
a  greater  number  of  defenders  than  its  area  would  indi- 
cate it  capable  of  receiving.  So,  in  the  hope  that  the 
infernal  fire  would  slacken,  they  pressed  home  the  attack 
until  they  were  almost  at  the  wagon  beds.  Back  on  the 
hills  Red  Cloud  and  the  veteran  chiefs,  with  the  women 
and  children,  watched  the  progress  of  the  battle  with 
eager  intensity  and  marked  with  painful  apprehension 
the  slaughter  of  their  bold  warriors. 

The  situation  was  terribly  critical.  If  they  came  on 
a  few  feet  farther  the  rifles  would  be  useless,  and  the 
little  party  of  twenty-eight  would  have  to  fight  hand-to- 
hand  without  reloading.  In  that  event  the  end  would 
be  certain;  but  just  before  the  Indians  reached  the  cor- 
ral, they  broke  and  gave  way.  So  close  had  they  come 
that  some  of  the  troopers  in  their  excitement  actually 
rose  to  their  knees  and  threw  the  augers  with  which  the 
loopholes  had  been  made,  and  other  missiles,  in  the  faces 
of  the  Indians.  Others,  however,  kept  up  the  fire,  which 
was  indeed  more  than  mortal  humanity  could  stand. 


54          Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

What  relief  filled  the  minds  of  the  defenders,  when 
they  saw  the  great  force  which  had  come  on  so  gallantly 
reeling  back  over  the  plains  in  frantic  desire  to  get  to 
cover,  can  easily  be  imagined.  Yet  such  was  the  cour- 
age, the  desperation  of  these  Indians,  in  spite  of  repulse 
after  repulse  and  a  slaughter  awful  to  contemplate,  that 
they  made  no  less  than  six  several  and  distinct  charges 
in  three  hours  upon  that  devoted  band.  After  the  first 
attack  made  by  the  men  on  horseback,  not  a  single 
casualty  occurred  among  the  defenders  of  the  corral. 
It  was  afternoon  before  the  Sioux  got  enough. 

The  Indians  could  not  account  for  this  sustained  and 
frightful  fire  which  came  from  the  little  fort,  except  by 
attributing  it  to  magic.  "The  white  man  must  have 
made  bad  medicine,"  they  said  afterwards,  before  they 
learned  the  secret  of  the  long-range,  breech-loading  fire- 
arm, "to  make  the  guns  fire  themselves  without  stop- 
ping." Indeed,  such  had  been  the  rapidity  of  the  fire 
that  many  of  the  gun-barrels  became  so  hot  that  they 
were  rendered  useless.  To  this  day  the  Indians  refer 
to  that  battle  as  "the  bad  medicine  fight  of  the  white 
man." 

The  ground  around  the  corral  was  ringed  with  In- 
dian slain.  They  were  piled  up  in  heaps  closer  by,  and 
scattered  all  over  the  grass  farther  away.  Nothing  is 
more  disgraceful  in  the  eyes  of  an  Indian  chieftain  or 
his  men  than  to  permit  the  dead  bodies  of  those  killed 
in  action  to  fall  into  the  hands  of  the  enemy.  Red  Cloud 
recognizing  the  complete  frustration  of  his  hopes  of 
overwhelming  Fort  Phil  Kearney  and  sweeping  the  in- 
vaders out  of  the  land  at  that  time,  now  only  wished  to 
get  his  dead  away  and  retreat.  In  order  to  do  so  he 
threw  forward  his  skirmishers  again,  who  once  more 
poured  a  heavy  fire  on  the  corral. 


Thirty-two  Against  Three  Thousand  55 

This  seemed  to  Powell  and  his  exhausted  men  the 
precursor  of  a  final  attack,  which  they  feared  would  be 
the  end  of  them.  Indeed  Powell,  in  his  report,  says  that 
another  attack  would  have  been  successful.  From  the 
heat  and  the  frightful  strain  of  the  long  period  of  steady 
fighting,  the  men  were  in  a  critical  condition.  The  am- 
munition, inexhaustible  as  it  had  seemed,  was  running 
low;  many  of  the  rifles  were  useless.  They  still  pre- 
served, however,  their  calm,  unbroken  front  to  the  foe, 
and  made  a  slow,  deliberate,  careful  reply  to  the  firing 
that  was  poured  upon  them. 

Red  Cloud,  however,  had  no  thought  of  again  at- 
tacking. He  only  wanted  to  get  away.  Under  cover 
of  his  skirmishers  he  succeeded  in  carrying  off  most  of 
the  dead,  the  wounded  who  were  able  to  crawl  getting 
away  themselves.  A  warrior,  protecting  himself  as  well 
as  he  could  with  the  stout  buffalo-hide  shield  he  carried, 
would  creep  forward,  attach  the  end  of  a  long  lariat  to 
the  foot  of  a  dead  man,  and  then  rapidly  retreating  he 
would  pull  the  body  away.  All  the  while  the  hills  and 
mountains  resounded  with  the  death  chants  of  the  old 
men  and  women. 

At  the  close  of  these  operations  a  shell  burst  in  the 
midst  of  the  Indian  skirmishers,  and  through  the  trees 
off  to  the  left  the  weary  defenders  saw  the  blue  uni- 
forms of  approaching  soldiers,  who  a  moment  afterwards 
debouched  in  the  open. 

An  astonishing  sight  met  the  eyes  of  the  relief  party. 
Clouds  of  Indians  covered  the  plain.  The  little  corral 
was  still  spitting  fire  and  smoke  into  the  encircling  mass. 
They  had  got  there  in  time  then.  Without  hesitation 
the  troops  deployed  and  came  forward  on  the  run. 
Their  cheers  were  met  by  welcoming  shouts  from 
Powell  and  his  heroic  comrades. 


56          Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

The  herders,  woodsmen,  and  guards  who  had  es- 
caped from  their  camp  in  the  morning,  had  reached  the 
fort  at  last  with  the  news  of  Powell's  imminent  danger. 
Major  Smith,  with  one  hundred  men  and  a  howitzer, 
was  at  once  despatched  to  his  support.  No  one 
dreamed  that  the  force  of  Indians  was  so  great,  or  per- 
haps more  men  would  have  been  sent,  although  the 
number  at  the  fort  was  still  insufficient  to  permit  of  the 
detachment  of  a  very  large  party.  It  was  now  three 
o'clock  in  the  afternoon.  The  Indians,  disheartened 
and  dismayed  by  their  fearful  repulse,  sullenly  re- 
treated before  the  advance  of  the  charging  soldiers. 
There  was  a  splendid  opportunity  presented  to  them 
to  wipe  out  Smith's  command  with  their  overwhelming 
force,  for  they  could  have  attacked  him  in  the  open;  but 
they  had  had  enough  for  that  day,  and  the  opportunity 
was  not  embraced. 

Major  Smith  realized  instantly  that  the  proper  thing 
for  him  to  do,  in  the  face  of  such  great  odds,  was  to  get 
Powell's  men  and  return  with  all  speed.  Carrying  the 
bodies  of  the  dead  and  wounded,  the  little  band  of  de- 
fenders joined  the  rescuers  and  returned  to  the  fort, 
leaving  the  barren  honors  of  the  field  to  the  Indians, 
who  occupied  it  on  the  heels  of  the  retiring  soldiers.* 

IV.   After  the  Battle.     The  Scout's  Story 

Powell  modestly  estimated  he  had  killed  sixty-seven 
Indians  and  wounded  one  hundred  and  twenty.  Most 
of  his  men  declared  the  Indian  loss  to  have  been  be- 
tween three  and  four  hundred,  but  it  was  not  until  a 

*  Dr.  Horton  writes  me  that  when  Powell's  men  reached  the  post  they  were  literally 
crazed  with  excitement  and  the  nervous  strain  of  the  fight.  The  health  of  many  of  them 
was  completely  broken.  Powell  himself  never  fully  recovered  from  the  strain  of  that 
awful  day,  his  wife  informs  me. 


Thirty-two  Against  Three  Thousand  57 

year  after  the  battle  that  the  real  facts  were  ascertained 
from  the  Indians  themselves.  The  loss  in  killed  and 
wounded  in  the  engagement,  on  the  part  of  the  Indians, 
was  one  thousand  one  hundred  and  thirty-seven.  In 
other  words,  each  of  the  defenders  had  accounted  for 
at  least  thirty-six  of  the  Indians.  Amply,  indeed,  had 
the  little  band  avenged  the  death  of  their  comrades 
under  Fetterman. 

As  Colonel  Dodge  justly  says,  the  account  reads  like 
a  story  of  Cortes.*  At  first  sight  it  appears  to  be  in- 
credible. In  explanation  of  it,  the  following  account, 
which  Colonel  Dodge  has  preserved  of  a  subsequent 
conversation  between  the  frontiersman  to  whom  the 
eight  guns  were  allotted  and  the  department  commander 
is  of  deep  interest: — 

"How  many  Indians  were  in  the  attack  ?"  asked  the  General. 

"Wall,  Gin'r'll,  I  can't  say  fer  sartin,  but  I  think  thar  wur  nigh  onto 
three  thousand  uv  'em." 

"How  many  were  killed  and  wounded  ?" 

"Wall,  Gin'r'll,  I  can't  say  fer  sartin,  but  I  think  thar  wur  nigh  onto 
a  thousand  uv  'em  hit." 

"How  many  did  you  kill  ?" 

"Wall,  Gin'r'll,  I  can't  say;  but  gi'me  a  dead  rest,  I  kin  hit  a  dollar 
at  fifty  yards  every  time,  and  I  fired  with  a  dead  rest  at  more'n  fifty  of 
them  varmints  inside  of  fifty  yards." 

"For  Heaven's  sake,  how  many  times  did  you  fire  ?"  exclaimed  the 
astonished  General. 

"Wall,  Gin'r'll,  I  can't  say,  but  I  kept  eight  guns  pretty  well  het  up 
for  more'n  three  hours." 

On  this  occasion  Powell  received  his  third  brevet  for 
heroism  and  distinguished  conduct  on  the  field. 

The  next  fall  a  new  treaty  was  made  with  the  Indians, 
and  the  post  which  had  been  the  scene  alike  of  heart- 

*  "Our  Wild  Indians,"  by  Colonel  R.  I.  Dodge,  U.  S.  A.  Mrs.  Powell,  in  a 
letter  to  me,  also  vouches  for  the  anecdote  quoted. 


58          Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

breaking  disaster  and  defeat  and  of  triumph  unprece- 
dented, was  abandoned  to  them.  The  troops  were 
withdrawn.  The  Indians  at  once  burned  it  to  the 
ground.  It  was  never  reoccupied,  and  to-day  is  re- 
membered simply  because  of  its  association  with  the  first 
and,  with  one  exception,  the  most  notable  of  our  Indian 
defeats  in  the  west,  and  with  the  most  remarkable  and 
overwhelming  victory  that  was  ever  won  by  soldiers 
over  their  gallant  red  foemen  on  the  same  ground. 

At  this  writing  (September,  1903)  the  once  mighty 
Red  Cloud,  now  in  his  eighty-ninth  year,  is  nearing  his 
end,  and  already  various  claimants  for  the  now  practi- 
cally empty  honor  of  the  Head-Chieftainship  of  the 
Sioux  have  arisen,  the  two  most  prominent  candidates 
being  young  Red  Cloud  and  the  son  of  old  Sitting  Bull. 

NOTE 

Since  the  first  publication  of  this  article  I  have  received 
the  following  letter,  which,  as  it  tends  to  confirm  what 
seems  incredible,  the  terrible  Indian  loss,  I  quote  in  full: 

DEAR  MR.  BRADY: 

Although  I  am  much  nearer  three  score  than  fifty,  I  still  enjoy  his- 
torical romance  and  facts,  and  I  have,  I  think,  read  most  of  your  writ- 
ings. I  have  just  read  your  last  article  and  it  recalls  a  conversation 
with  Red  Cloud  twenty  years  ago. 

He  was  with  my  dear  old  friend,  "Adirondack  Murray"  and, 
I  think,  J.  Amory  Knox  and  myself.  He,  Murray  and  Knox  had  been 
photographed  in  a  group.  In  reminiscing  in  regard  to  the  Piney  Is- 
land battle,  he  said  he  went  in  with  over  three  thousand  braves  and  lost 
over  half.  Murray  asked  him  if  he  meant  over  fifteen  hundred  had 
been  killed  then,  and  he  said : 

"  I  lost  them.     They  never  fought  again." 

He  knew  Murray,  Knox  and  myself  wielded  the  pen  sometimes 
but  that  we  never  used  private  talks.  I  tell  you  the  above  for  your 
personal  satisfaction.  Sincerely,  W.  R.  E.  COLLINS, 

3~22-'o4.  1438    Broad — Exchange,  New  York. 


CHAPTER   FOUR 

Personal   Reminiscences  of  Fort   Phil 
Kearney  and  the  Wagon-Box  Fight 

By  Mr.  R.  J.  Smyth.* 

"  Cherokee,  la.,  6-27-1904. 

A  I  was  a  member  of  the  Carrington  Powder 
River  Expedition  of  1866, 1  take  the  liberty  of 
sending  you  a   short    sketch   of  happenings 
about  Fort  Phil  Kearney.     Being  actively  en- 
gaged with  others  for  some  two  years  in  making  the 
history  of  that  place,  I  think  that  the  account  may  be 
of  interest. 

I  left  Fort  Leavenworth  early  in  the  spring  of  1866. 
At  Fort  Kearney,  Nebraska,  we  found  Col.  Carrington 
and  a  part  of  his  command,  consisting  of  several  com- 
panies of  the  Eighteenth  Regular  Infantry.  Early  in 
April  we  received  some  recruits  for  said  command,  and 
in  a  short  time  started  on  what  at  that  time  was  called 
the  Carrington  Powder  River  Expedition.  We  fol- 
lowed the  overland  trail  (sometimes  called  the  Salt  Lake 
trail)  up  the  south  side  of  the  South  Platte  River  to 
Julesberg,  crossed  the  river  there,  then  crossed  the 

*  The  serial  publication  of  these  articles  brought  me  many  letters  filled  with 
corrections,  suggestions,  and  other  material,  written  by  participants  in  the  events 
described.  Among  them  all  none  is  more  graphic  and  more  interesting  than  this 
from  Mr.  Smyth,  formerly  Teamster  with  Carrington,  which  I  count  it  a  privilege  to 
insert  in  this  book  in  his  own  words.  —  C.  T.  B. 

59 


60          Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

divide  to  the  North  Platte.  From  here  we  went  to 
Fort  Laramie.  From  this  point  we  marched  west  to 
Mussa  ranch,  crossed  Horse  Creek,  and  followed  the 
Bozeman  trail.  This  was  a  new  road,  and  a  short  cut 
to  Montana.  After  following  this  trail  fifteen  miles  we 
struck  the  North  Platte  at  Bridger's  Ferry.  We 
crossed  here  in  a  ferryboat  —  a  large  flat  boat  attached 
to  a  large  cable  rope  stretched  across  the  river. 

We  followed  the  North  Platte  River  up  on  the  right 
side  to  a  point  opposite  to  the  present  site  of  Fort  Fet- 
terman.  At  this  point  we  left  the  river  and  struck 
across  the  country,  crossing  Sand  Creek  and  several 
other  small  creeks,  among  which  I  now  remember  the 
North,  South,  and  Middle  Cheyennes.  They  were  then 
merely  the  dry  beds  of  what  would  be  quite  large  rivers 
at  the  time  of  the  melting  of  the  snow  in  the  mountains. 
At  a  point  twenty-two  miles  east  of  the  Powder  River 
we  struck  the  head  of  the  Dry  Fork  of  the  Powder 
River  and  followed  it  down  to  the  river. 

There  on  the  west  side  we  found  Fort  Reno,  estab- 
lished by  General  Conner  in  '65  and  garrisoned  by  a 
few  "galvanized  soldiers."  The  garrison  had  been 
greatly  reduced  by  desertions  during  the  winter,  the 
soldiers  making  for  Montana.  "Galvanized  soldiers" 
was  a  name  given  to  captured  Rebel  soldiers  who  enlisted 
in  the  Union  Army  to  do  frontier  duty  in  order  to  get 
out  of  prison,  and  incidentally  to  draw  pay  from  Uncle 
Sam.  We  laid  over  here  for  a  few  days,  and  on  the 
fourth  of  July  the  Indians  stampeded  the  stock  of  Al. 
Leighton,  the  sutler.  The  colonel  made  a  detail  of 
soldiers  and  citizens  to  go  out  after  the  Indians  and  re- 
cover the  stock  if  possible. 

It  was  indeed  a  laughable  sight  to  see  the  soldiers 
trying  to  ride  mules  that  were  not  broken  to  ride  —  and 


The  Wagon-Box  Fight  61 

the  soldiers  knew  about  as  much  about  riding  as  the 
mules  did.  We  followed  the  Indians  to  the  Pumpkin 
Buttes  and  I  am  free  to  say  for  myself  that  I  was  very 
glad  that  we  did  not  find  them.  Had  we  got  in  touch 
with  them  we  would  have  had  the  smallest  kind  of  a 
show  to  save  our  hair.  The  soldiers  being  mounted  on 
green  mules,  and  being  armed  with  the  old  Springfield 
musket,  and  that  strapped  on  their  backs,  a  very  few 
Indians  could  have  stampeded  the  mules  and,  in  fact, 
the  soldiers  as  well. 

We,  the  citizens,  had  made  arrangements  that  if  the 
Indians  attacked  us  we  would  stick  together  and  fight 
it  out  the  best  that  we  could.  Jim  Bridger,  our  guide, 
was  with  this  party.  He  was  an  old  timer  in  the  moun- 
tains. I  had  two  years  experience  in  the  mountains 
and  plains  prior  to  this  time;  the  rest  of  the  citizens  were 
good  men.  We  returned  to  the  fort  safely  but  did  not 
recover  any  the  stock. 

A  day  or  two  later  we  left  the  fort.  The  first  day's 
march  was  a  very  hard  one,  thirty-six  miles  to  Crazy 
Woman's  Fork.  This  creek  was  a  very  fine  one,  clear, 
cool,  and  very  rapid.  The  command  was  badly  de- 
moralized by  this  long,  hot,  and  dry  march,  no  water 
between  that  point  and  Fort  Reno.  The  soldiers  had 
been  paid  off  a  day  or  two  before,  many  had  been  drunk, 
many  more  thoughtless,  and  did  not  provide  for  water 
in  spite  of  orders.  I  saw  five  dollars  paid  for  a  canteen 
of  water  on  this  march.  On  our  arrival  at  Crazy  Wom- 
an's Fort,  the  commanding  officer  detailed  a  guard  to 
keep  the  soldiers  from  jumping  into  the  creek  and  drink- 
ing too  much  water. 

We  laid  over  here  two  days,  to  repair  wagons  and 
bring  in  the  stragglers.  Had  the  Indians  been  on  hand, 
they  could  have  cleaned  up  many  of  the  soldiers  at  this 


62          Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

time.  From  this  creek  west  to  the  Big  Horn  the  coun- 
try is  very  fine;  plenty  of  wood,  water,  and  grass;  in  fact, 
a  paradise.  We  traveled  west  to  the  forks  of  the  Pineys. 
The  big  and  little  Pineys  fork  near  where  we  made  our 
camp,  sixty-five  miles  west  of  the  Powder  River. 

On  the  twenty-fourth  day  of  July  we  moved  to  the 
place  where  we  established  Fort  Phil  Kearney.  The 
grasshoppers  were  so  thick  in  the  air  that  day  that  they 
nearly  obscured  the  sun  from  sight.*  In  fact,  it  did  not 
look  bigger  than  a  silver  dollar.  The  fort  was  built 
about  as  you  have  described  it,  and  from  the  day  that  we 
established  it  until  I  left  there,  in  November,  '67,  the 
Indians  were  very  much  in  evidence  and  plenty  of  fight- 
ing nearly  all  that  time. 

I  was  a  teamster  on  this  expedition,  driving  an  am- 
bulance team.  Made  several  trips  to  Fort  Laramie  and 
to  Fort  C.  F.  Smith  on  the  Big  Horn.  This  latter  Fort 
was  established  by  Carrington  a  short  time  after  the 
establishment  of  Fort  Phil  Kearney,  and  was  a  two- 
company  post. 

I  was  with  the  hay-making  party  down  the  Big  Piney 
during  a  part  of  the  summer  of  '66.  During  one  of  our 
trips  to  the  hay  field,  we  were  accompanied  by  a  man 
who  represented  Frank  Leslie's  Illustrated  Weekly  as 
an  artist.  This  man  rode  with  me  a  part  of  the  way.  He 
intended  to  do  some  sketching  near  there  but  I  advised 
him  to  stay  with  our  outfit.  However,  he  insisted  on 
stopping  by  the  way.  On  our  return  we  found  him 
dead,  a  cross  cut  on  his  breast,  which  indicated  that  they 
thought  him  a  coward  who  would  not  fight.  He  wore 
long,  black  hair  and  his  head  had  been  completely 
skinned.  Probably  it  was  the  work  of  a  band  of  young 
Cheyenne  bucks;  they  could  cut  the  scalps  into  many 

*  I  have  observed  similar  visitations  in  other  parts  of  the  West  years  ago. — C.  T.  B. 


The  Wagon-Box  Fight  63 

pieces  and  thereby  make  a  big  show  in  camp.  Was  very 
sorry  for  this  man;  he  appeared  to  be  a  perfect  gentle- 
man. His  thought  was,  that  if  the  Indians  found  him 
they  would  not  hurt  him,  as  he  intended  to  show  them 
his  drawings,  and  also  explain  to  them  that  he  was  not 
armed. 

Later  on  the  Indians  got  so  thick  that  we  had  to 


A.Cent-«TW 
B  Head  of  Post 
C.DoulU  plank  T 

D.  Junction  of  torftir*. 

E.  CTOunot-  Plan. 

F.  CiossScetion. 


P.    Pl<mk.3mek«*UX. 

R. 

T. 

V.  Ventilating  ctuct 

X       PosttotcaroutttTdoor 

wh«rv  open 


abandon  this  hay-making  business.  The  day  that  we 
broke  camp  we  had  a  great  deal  of  fighting  with  the 
Indians.  I  remember  a  soldier  named  Pate  Smith  who 
borrowed  a  revolver  from  me  that  day.  This  man  was 
mounted.  He  rode  too  far  ahead  of  the  outfit,  the  In- 
dians cut  him  off.  Later  we  heard  from  the  Crows  that 


64          Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

the  Sioux  caught  him,  skinned  him  alive.  This  man 
was  an  old  volunteer  soldier,  but  what  show  has  a  man 
with  the  old-fashioned  Springfield  musket  ?  One  shot 
and  you  are  done. 

I  was  at  the  Fort  at  the  time  of  the  Phil  Kearney  mas- 
sacre and  went  down  with  the  reinforcements  to  that 
sad  scene.  Our  men  were  all  down  when  we  got  there, 
and  cut  up  in  the  most  brutal  manner,  such  as  only  a 
red  brute  would  do.  We  buried  them  a  little  east  of  the 
fort.  They  fought  a  good  fight,  but  were  surprised  and 
overpowered.  As  we  approached  the  scene  of  action 
the  country  was  black  with  Indians  to  the  west. 

The  officers  were  clearly  to  blame  for  this  slaughter; 
they  disobeyed  the  colonel's  orders,  which  were  to  guard 
the  wood  train  to  the  fort,  and  not  to  engage  the  Indians 
unless  attacked  by  them.  At  a  point  about  two  miles 
west  of  the  fort  they  left  the  wood  train;  crossed  the  Big 
Piney  Creek;  got  nearly  to  the  Peno  Creek,  and  were  am- 
bushed by  about  three  thousand  Indians,  and  the  entire 
command  killed.  This  band  of  Indians  included  all  of 
the  different  tribes  of  the  Sioux,  also  Cheyennes,  Black- 
feet,  Arapahoes,  and  some  young  renegade  Crow  bucks. 
I  knew  this  latter  statement  to  be  true,  from  the  fact  that 
one  member  of  Company  C,  Second  Cavalry,  had  stolen 
a  revolver  from  me  some  time  before  and  it  was  with  him 
in  this  fight.  It  was  taken  from  his  body  by  the  Indians. 
Next  spring  a  young  Crow  came  to  the  fort.  I  saw  the 
gun  under  his  blanket  and  took  it  away  from  him.  If 
he  was  in  camp  on  the  Big  Horn  with  his  people,  he 
could  not  have  got  this  gun  on  this  field  of  slaughter.  I 
had  been  wounded  about  six  weeks  prior  to  this  fight 
and  had  not  reported  for  duty,  but  on  call  for  volunteers 
to  reinforce  the  Fetterman  party,  reported  for  duty  and 
went  with  the  command  to  the  scene  of  the  massacre. 


The  Wagon-Box  Fight  65 

You  are  in  error  in  stating  that  there  was  no  commu- 
nication with  the  outside  world  during  this  winter.  I 
made  one  trip  with  my  ambulance  to  Fort  Laramie. 
We  had  an  escort  of  ten  cavalry  soldiers.  We  made,  I 
think,  three  trips  after  this  without  an  escort,  using  pack 
mules,  the  party  consisting  of  two  packers  and  the  mail- 
carrier,  Van  Volsey,  a  very  fine  man  and  a  brave  one, 
too.  Last  trip  up  I  saw  Indian  signs  in  the  dry  forks  of 
the  Powder  River,  consisting  of  the  remains  of  a  camp 
fire,  not  entirely  burned  out,  and  some  Indian  traps  lying 
around  it.  I  refused  to  make  another  trip  without  an 
escort.  On  our  arrival  at  the  fort  we  reported  the  facts, 
and  demanded  an  escort  for  the  next  trip.  But  owing  to 
the  fact  that  the  stock  was  in  such  poor  condition  on 
account  of  the  scarcity  of  food,  they  could  not  furnish 
one  mounted. 

They  persuaded  me  to  take  one  more  trip  with  Van 
Volsey,  which  I  foolishly  consented  to  do.  On  the  first 
day  out  I  got  snow  blind  and  on  our  arrival  at  Fort 
Reno  requested  him  to  get  a  substitute  in  my  place. 
He  refused  to  do  so  and  insisted  that  I  accompany  him 
to  Fort  Laramie,  but  after  being  on  the  road  a  short 
time,  my  eyes  played  out  entirely.  I  had  to  return  to 
the  fort  and  there  secured  another  man  to  take  my  place. 
They  made  the  trip  down  all  right  and  returning  were 
accompanied  by  two  or  three  soldiers,  who  were  going 
to  join  their  commands.  They  had  got  nearly  to  the 
head  of  the  dry  fork  of  the  Powder  River  when  the  In- 
dians killed  the  entire  party.  We  found  the  bones  of 
the  men  and  mules  and  some  of  the  mail  sacks.  We 
buried  the  men's  remains  there. 

During  the  summer  of  '67  life  was  one  continual 
round  of  fighting.  We  lost  a  great  many  men,  but 
damaged  the  Sioux  much  more  than  during  the  pre- 


66          Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

vious  year.  The  soldiers  had  better  guns,  and  were 
far  better  Indian  fighters.  They  had  learned  that  it 
was  safer  to  keep  their  faces  to  the  Indians,  than,  as 
during  the  previous  year,  their  backs.  When  you  run 
from  an  Indian  you  are  his  meat. 

On  the  day  of  the  wagon-box  fight,  accompanied  by 
my  partner,  I  left  the  fort  before  daylight.  We  went  to 
the  foot-hills  to  get  some  deer.  A  short  time  after  day- 
light we  discovered  a  lot  of  Indian  smoke  signals  on  the 
hills,  and  decided  that  we  had  better  get  back  to  the 
fort.  In  making  our  way  back  we  followed  the  Little 
Piney  down  for  some  distance,  and  found  that  the  coun- 
try was  full  of  Indians.  We  then  struck  out  for  the 
wood  train.  The  Indians  had  got  between  us  and 
it.  We  then  went  to  the  wagon-box  corral,  and  got 
there  none  too  soon. 

Your  description  of  the  corral  is  correct  as  I  remem- 
ber it  to  be.  Its  location  is  about  right,  except  that  it 
was  not  on  an  island.  I  never  heard  of  Little  Piney 
Island,  and  I  do  not  believe  such  an  island  existed  there 
at  that  time.*  The  wagon  boxes  were  of  the  ordinary 
government  boxes.  They  were  set  off  from  the  wagons, 
as  the  wagons  were  in  corral.  The  intervals  between 
were  packed  with  logs,  bales  of  blankets,  clothing,  sacks 
of  corn,  etc.  As  to  the  wagon  boxes  being  lined  with 
iron,  you  are  right.  They  were  not.  Up  to  that  time, 
and  during  my  time  on  the  plains,  I  never  saw  wagon 
boxes  so  lined.  The  wagon  box  that  I  was  detailed  to 
fight  in  had  no  such  protection,  but  we  had  gunny  sacks 
of  corn  placed  on  edge  two  deep  on  the  inside  of  the  box, 
with  a  two  inch  auger  hole  at  the  point  where  the  four 
sacks  came  together.  This  made  good  protection  for 

*  General  Carrington's  map  on  page  27  shows  the  island.  Mr.  Smyth's  rec- 
ollection is  in  error  here. — C.  T.  B. 


The  Wagon-Box  Fight  67 

the  body  when  lying  down.  As  stated  in  your  article, 
the  tops  of  the  wagon  boxes  were  literally  torn  to  pieces 
with  the  bullets  fired  at  us  by  the  Indians.  Without 
this  protection  the  fight  would  not  have  lasted  very 

long- 
There  was  a  surplus  of  ammunition  and  guns.     I  had 

two  Spencer  carbines,  and  two  revolvers  (six-shot  army 
Colt's).  During  the  first  charge  I  emptied  the  carbines 
and  the  revolvers  less  two  shots  (reserved  for  myself  in 
case  of  a  show  down).  The  balance  of  our  men  must 
have  fired  as  many  shots  as  I  did.  The  soldier  that  was 
in  the  box  with  me  had  a  needle  gun  and  a  Spencer;  also 
one  or  two  revolvers.  And  he  kept  them  busy  while  he 
lived.  This  man  was  an  infantry  soldier  —  do  not  re- 
member his  company.  He  was  shot  through  the  head, 
dying  in  about  two  hours  after  being  shot. 

Lieutenant  Jenness  had  just  cautioned  me  not  to  ex- 
pose my  person,  and  to  hold  my  fire  until  I  was  sure  of 
getting  an  Indian  at  each  shot.  He  had  moved  a  few 
feet  from  my  box  when  he  was  shot  through  the  head.  I 
think  he  died  instantly.  He  was  a  grand,  good  man, 
and  a  fearless  officer.  I  told  him  to  keep  under  cover. 
He  stated  he  was  compelled  to  expose  himself  in  order 
to  look  after  his  men. 

I  got  a  slight  wound  in  my  left  hand;  a  bullet  came  in 
through  my  porthole,  which  I  thought  was  close  shoot- 
ing for  a  Sioux. 

This  fight  lasted  about  four  hours,  and  was  very  hot 
from  the  start.  I  had  been  in  several  Indian  fights 
prior  to  this  time,  but  never  saw  the  Indians  make  such  a 
determined  effort  to  clean  us  up  before.  They  should 
have  killed  the  entire  party.  They  certainly  had  force 
enough  to  ride  over  us,  but  our  fire  was  so  steady  and 
severe  that  they  could  not  stand  the  punishment. 


68          Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

Our  men  stood  the  strain  well,  held  their  fire  until  the 
bullets  would  count.  In  fact,  shooting  into  such  a  mass 
of  Indians  as  charged  on  us  the  first  time,  it  would  be 
nearly  impossible  for  many  bullets  to  go  astray.  In  all 
my  experience  in  fighting  Indians  prior  to  this  time,  I 
never  saw  them  stand  punishment  so  well  as  they  did  at 
this  time;  they  certainly  brought  all  their  sand  with 
them.  In  charging  on  our  little  corral  they  rode  up 
very  close  to  the  wagon  boxes,  and  here  is  where  they 
failed.  Had  they  pushed  home  on  the  first  charge,  the 
fight  would  not  have  lasted  ten  minutes  after  they  got 
over  the  corral. 

Many  dead  and  wounded  Indians  lay  within  a  few 
feet  of  the  wagon  boxes.  The  wounded  Indians  did  not 
live  long  after  the  charge  was  over.  They  would  watch 
and  try  to  get  a  bullet  in  on  some  of  our  men.  We  had 
to  kill  them  for  self-protection.  Anyway,  it  was  evening 

IT-  11  'T-l  11  b 

up  the  V  etterman  deal.  1  hey  never  showed  mercy  to  a 
wounded  white  man,  and  should  not  expect  any  different 
treatment.  I  had  a  canteen  of  water  when  the  fight 
commenced,  and  used  most  of  it  to  cool  my  guns. 

You  state  that  all  of  our  loss  occurred  at  time  of  the 
first  charge.  This  is  an  error,  as  the  man  in  my  box 
was  shot  after  he  had  been  fighting  nearly  an  hour.  I 
think  that  his  name  was  Boyle.  Up  to  the  time  that  he 
was  shot  he  certainly  filled  the  bill  and  did  his  duty, 
dying  with  his  face  to  the  foe  as  a  soldier  should. 

I  do  not  try  to  estimate  the  number  of  the  Indians,  but, 
as  my  partner  said,  "The  woods  were  full  of  them." 
This  was  the  largest  gathering  of  Indians  that  I  ever 
saw,  and  the  hardest  fighting  lot  that  I  ever  encoun- 
tered. 

When  the  reinforcements  came  in  sight  we  took  on  a 
new  lease  of  life,  and  when  they  dropped  a  shell  over  the 


The  Wagon-Box  Fight  69 

Indians  we  knew  that  the  fight  was  won.  Indians  will 
not  stand  artillery  fire.  They  call  it  the  "wagon  gun." 
The  reinforcements  came  just  in  time.  One  hour  more 
of  such  fighting  would  have  exhausted  our  men  and 
ammunition. 

As  to  the  Indians  carrying  off  all  their  dead  and 
wounded,  here  you  are  again  mistaken,  as  many  of  our 
men  carried  away  with  them  scalps,  etc.,  taken  from 
the  bodies  of  the  dead  Indians  near  the  corral.*  The 
Indians  certainly  hauled  off  all  their  dead  and  wound- 
ed that  they  could,  but  did  not  expose  themselves 
very  much  in  order  to  get  the  dead  ones  near  the 
corral. 

On  arrival  of  reinforcements  we  immediately  re- 
treated to  the  fort.  Captain  Powell  was  the  right  man 
to  command  under  such  trying  circumstances.  No 
better  or  braver  man  ever  held  a  lieutenant's  com- 
mission than  Jenness.  As  to  the  Indian  loss,  I  think  you 
have  overestimated  it.  We  thought  that  we  had  killed 
and  wounded  some  more  than  four  hundred.  How- 
ever, you  may  be  right  in  your  estimates.  We  had  the 
opportunity  to  clean  up  that  number,  and  we  certainly 
did  our  best  to  do  so. 

After  the  massacre  of  '66  (Dec.)  we  received  re- 
inforcements, as  I  now  remember,  four  companies  of 
infantry  and  two  companies,  L  and  M,  of  the  2d  Cav. 
This  large  additional  force,  stationed  at  a  four-company 
fort,  and  only  provisioned  for  four  companies,  caused 
a  great  deal  of  suffering  during  the  winter,  resulting  in 

*  Surgeon  Horton  writes  me  that  the  "soldiers  brought  back  to  the  fort  the 
head  of  an  Indian  for  a  scientific  study  of  Indian  skulls!"  He  afterwards  sent  it  to 
Washington.  He  also  states  that  there  were  a  number  of  dead  bodies  too  near  the  cor- 
ral for  the  Indians  to  get  them  during  the  action.  When  he  and  other  officers  visited  the 
place  the  next  day,  after  the  withdrawal  of  the  Indians,  there  were  no  dead  bodies  to  be 
found,  not  even  the  headless  one. — C.  T.  B. 


yo          Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

much  sickness  and  many  deaths  from  scurvy.  Nearly 
all  of  us  were  suffering  from  this  disease.  I  have  never 
fully  recovered  from  the  effect  of  it. 

Colonel  Carrington  was  severely  censured  by  the  War 
Department  and  many  others  for  the  Fort  Phil  Kearney 
massacre,  and,  I  think,  unjustly.  Had  Col.  Fetterman 
and  Capt.  Brown  and  the  other  officers  in  command 
obeyed  his  orders,  the  massacre  would  not  have  oc- 
curred, not,  at  least,  at  this  time. 

Fetterman  and  Brown  were  dare-devil  fighters,  al- 
ways anxious  for  a  fight,  and  took  this  opportunity  to 
get  into  one.  Capt.  Brown,  on  his  "calico"  pony,  was 
a  familiar  figure  around  this  fort  —  the  boys  called 
him  "Baldy."  The  Indians  were  very  anxious  to  kill 
Brown;  he  was  a  thorn  in  their  sides.  While  we  to 
some  extent  lay  the  blame  of  the  massacre  on  Brown 
and  Fetterman,  to  be  honest,  we  were  nearly  all  partly  to 
blame.  We  were  always  harping  at  the  colonel  to  send 
a  large  force  out  and  fight  the  Indians,  but  he  always  in- 
sisted on  a  conservative  course.  We  all  thought  up  to 
that  time  that  one  hundred  good  men  could  walk 
through  the  entire  Sioux  Nation.  This  massacre  de- 
monstrated that  in  a  fight  in  the  open  the  Sioux  should 
not  have  over  five  to  one  of  us. 

I  was  well  posted  in  regard  to  the  Carrington  Pow- 
der River  Expedition  of  1866  and  the  history  of  Fort 
Phil  Kearney  from  the  date  of  establishment  to  Nov., 
1867,  and  acquainted  with  all  of  the  officers  and  many 
of  the  soldiers  and  citizens.  I  probably  would  not 
have  written  this  little  statement  of  actual  history  were 
it  not  for  the  fact  that  in  your  article  you  stated  that 
you  got  some  of  the  record  from  the  only  living  mem- 
ber of  the  celebrated  wagon-box  fight.  I  am  still  in 
the  flesh  and  will  pull  down  the  scale  at  two  hundred 


The  Wagon-Box  Fight  71 

pounds.     In  all  probability  there  are  others  alive,  as 
we  all  were  young  men  at  that  time. 

The  history  of  the  three  forts  established  in  1865  and 
1866,  well  written,  would  make  interesting  history,  as 
almost  every  day  was  full  of  stirring  events.  Quite  a 
number  of  the  citizens  in  that  country  at  this  time  were 
discharged  volunteer  soldiers  and  some  rebel  soldiers 
also.  As  a  rule,  they  were  hard  nuts  for  the  Indians  to 
crack.  It  was  noticeable  that  they  would  not  take 
chances  fighting  citizens  that  they  would  take  with  the 
soldiers. 

After  leaving  Fort  Phil  Kearney  I  went  to  Cheyenne 
and  followed  the  Union  Pacific  R.  R.  to  the  finish.  Was 
at  Promontory  Point  in  Utah  when  the  Union  Pacific 
and  Central  Pacific  R.  Rs.  connected;  this  was  one  of 
the  mile-stones  in  the  history  of  the  West,  and  prac- 
tically solved  the  Indian  problem.  The  Indians  fought 
hard  for  this  territory.  It  was  the  best  hunting  ground 
that  they  had  left.  There  were  many  half-breeds  among 
them,  and  they  were  daring  and  shifty  fighters. 
Respectfully  yours, 

R.  J.  SMYTH  " 


CHAPTER   FIVE 

Forsyth  and  the  Rough  Riders  of  '68 

I.  The  Original  "Rough  Riders." 

NO  one  will  question  the  sweeping  assertion 
that  the  grittiest  band  of  American  fighters 
that  history  tells  us  of  was  that  which  de- 
fended the  Alamo.     They  surpassed  by  one 
Leonidas    and    his    Spartans;   for  the    Greeks  had   a 
messenger  of  defeat,  the  men  of  the  Alamo  had  none. 
But    close   on   the    heels   of  the   gallant  Travis    and 
his    dauntless    comrades     came     "Sandy"     Forsyth's 
original    "Rough    Riders,"   who    immortalized    them- 
selves by  their  terrific  fight  on  Beecher's  Island  on  the 
Arickaree  Fork  of  the  Republican   River,  in   Eastern 
Colorado,  in  the  fall  of  1868. 

The  contagion  of  the  successful  Indian  attacks  on 
Fort  Phil  Kearney  had  spread  all  over  the  Central  West. 
The  Kansas  Pacific  was  then  building  to  Denver,  and  its 
advance  was  furiously  resisted  by  the  Indians.  As 
early  as  1866,  at  a  council  held  at  Fort  Ellsworth, 
Roman  Nose,  head  chief  of  the  Cheyennes,  made  a 
speech  full  of  insolent  defiance. 

"This  is  the  first  time,"  said  the  gigantic  warrior, 
who  was  six  feet  three  and  magnificently  proportioned,* 

*  General  Fry,  in  his  valuable  book,  "Army  Sacrifices,"  now  unfortunately  out  of 
print  and  scarce,  thus  graphically  describes  him:  "A  veritable  man  of  war,  the  shock 

72 


CAPT.  LOUIS    H.  CARPENTER 
MAJ.  GEORGE  A.  FORSYTH 


LIEUT.  FREDK.    H.   BEECHER  * 
SCOUT  JACK  STII.LWELL 

BEECHER'S    ISLAND    FIGHTERS 

*  Killed  on  the  Island 
All  contemporary  portraits  except  Stillweli's 


The  Rough  Riders  of  '68  73 

"that  I  have  ever  shaken  the  white  man's  hand  in 
friendship.  If  the  railway  is  continued  I  shall  be  his 
enemy  forever." 

There  was  no  stopping  the  railway.  Its  progress  was 
as  irresistible  as  the  movement  of  civilization  itself. 
The  Indians  went  on  the  war-path.  The  Cheyennes 
were  led  by  their  two  principal  chiefs,  Black  Kettle 
being  the  second.  We  shall  see  subsequently  how 
Custer  accounted  for  Black  Kettle.  This  story  deals 
with  the  adventures  of  Roman  Nose. 

As  fighters  these  Indians  are  entitled  to  every  ad- 
miration. As  marauders  they  merit  nothing  but  cen- 
sure. The  Indians  of  the  early  days  of  the  nation, 
when  Pennsylvania  and  New  York  were  border  states, 
and  across  the  Alleghenies  lay  the  frontier,  were 
cruel  enough,  as  the  chronicle  of  the  times  abundantly 
testify;  but  they  were  angels  of  light  compared  with  the 
Sioux  and  Cheyennes,  the  Kiowas,  Arapahoes  and 
Comanches,  and  these  in  turn  were  almost  admirable 
beside  the  Apache.  The  first-named  group  were  as  cruel 
as  they  knew  how  to  be,  and  they  did  not  lack  knowl- 
edge, either.  The  Apaches  were  more  ingenious  and 
devilish  in  their  practices  than  the  others.  The  Sioux 
and  the  Cheyennes  were  brutal  with  the  brutality  of  a 
wild  bull  or  a  grizzly  bear.  To  that  same  kind  of  bru- 
tality the  Apaches  added  the  malignity  of  a  wildcat  and 

of  battle  and  scenes  of  carnage  and  cruelty  were  as  of  the  breath  of  his  nostrils;  about 
thirty  years  of  age,  standing  six  feet  three  inches  high,  he  towered  giant-like  above  his 
companions.  A  grand  head  with  strongly  marked  features,  lighted  by  a  pair  of  fierce 
black  eyes;  a  large  mouth  with  thin  lips,  through  which  gleamed  rows  of  strong,  white 
teeth;  a  Roman  nose  with  dilated  nostrils  like  those  of  a  thoroughbred  horse,  first  at- 
tracted attention,  while  a  broad  chest,  with  symmetrical  limbs  on  which  the  muscles 
under  the  bronze  of  his  skin  stood  out  like  twisted  wire,  were  some  of  the  points  of  this 
splendid  animal.  Clad  in  buckskin  leggings  and  moccasins  elaborately  embroidered 
with  beads  and  feathers,  with  a  single  eagle  feather  in  his  scalp-lock,  and  with  that  rarest 
of  robes,  a  white  buffalo,  beautifully  tanned  and  soft  as  cashmere,  thrown  over  his  naked 
shoulders,  he  stood  forth,  the  war  chief  of  the  Cheyennes." 


74          Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

the  subtlety  of  a  snake.  The  men  of  the  first  group 
would  stand  out  and  fight  in  the  open  to  gain  their  ends, 
although  they  did  not  prefer  to.  They  were  soldiers 
and  warriors  as  well  as  torturers.  The  Apache  was  a 
lurking  skulker,  but,  when  cornered,  a  magnificent 
fighter  also.*  General  Crook  calls  him  "the  tiger  of 
the  human  species."  However,  from  the  point  of  de- 
testableness  there  wasn't  much  to  choose  between  them. 

Perhaps  we  ought  not  to  blame  the  Indians  for  acting 
just  as  our  ancestors  of,  say  the  Stone  Age,  acted  in  all 
probability.  And  when  you  put  modern  weapons  and 
modern  whisky  in  the  hands  of  the  Stone  Age  men  you 
need  not  be  surprised  at  the  consequences.  The  Indian 
question  is  a  terrible  one  any  way  you  take  it.  It  can- 
not be  denied  they  have  been  treated  abominably  by 
the  United  States,  and  that  they  have  good  cause  for 
resentment;  but  the  situation  has  been  so  peculiar  that 
strife  has  been  inevitable. 

As  patriots  defending  their  country,  they  are  not 
without  certain  definite  claims  to  our  respect.  Recog- 
nizing the  right  of  the  aborigines  to  the  soil,  the  govern- 
ment has  yet  arbitrarily  abrogated  that  right  at  pleasure. 
At  times  the  Indians  have  been  regarded  as  independent 
nations,  with  which  all  differences  were  to  be  settled  by 
treaty  as  between  equals;  and  again,  as  a  body  of  sub- 
jects whose  affairs  could  be  and  would  be  administered 
willy-nilly  by  the  United  States.  Such  vacillations  are 
certain  to  result  in  trouble,  especially  as,  needless  to  say, 
the  Indians  invariably  considered  themselves  as  much 
independent  nations  as  England  and  France  might 
consider  themselves,  in  dealing  with  the  United  States 
or  with  one  another.  And  the  Indians  naturally 

*  Chains  F.  Lummis  refers  to  the  Apaches  as  among  the  most  ferocious  and 
most  success  *ul  warriors  in  history. 


The  Rough  Riders  of  '68  75 

claimed  and  insisted  that  the  territory  where  their  fath- 
ers had  roamed  for  centuries  belonged  solely  and  wholly 
to  them.  They  admitted  no  suzerainty  of  any  sort, 
either.  And  they  held  the  petty  force  the  government 
put  in  the  field  in  supreme  contempt  until  they  learned 
by  bitter  experience  the  illimitable  power  of  the  United 
States. 

To  settle  such  a  growing  question  in  a  word,  offhand, 
as  it  were,  is,  of  course,  impossible,  nor  does  the  settle- 
ment lie  within  the  province  of  these  articles;  but  it  may 
be  said  that  if  the  United  States  had  definitely  decided 
upon  one  policy  or  the  other,  and  had  then  concentrated 
all  its  strength  upon  the  problem;  if  it  had  realized  the 
character  of  the  people  with  whom  it  was  dealing,  and 
had  made  such  display  of  its  force  as  would  have  ren- 
dered it  apparent,  to  the  keenest  as  well  as  to  the  most 
stupid  and  besotted  of  the  Indians,  that  resistance  was 
entirely  futile,  things  might  have  been  different.  But  it  is 
the  solemn  truth  that  never,  in  any  of  the  Indian  wars 
west  of  the  Missouri,  has  there  been  a  force  of  soldiers  in 
the  field  adequate  to  deal  with  the  question.  The  blood 
of  thousands  of  soldiers  and  settlers  —  men,  women,  and 
children  —  might  have  been  spared  had  this  fact  been 
realized  and  acted  upon. 

The  Cheyennes  swept  through  western  Kansas  like  a 
devastating  storm.  In  one  month  they  cut  off,  killed, 
or  captured  eighty-four  different  settlers,  including 
their  wives  and  children.  They  swept  the  country  bare. 
Again  and  again  the  different  gangs  of  builders  were 
wiped  out,  but  the  railroad  went  on.  General  Sheridan 
finally  took  the  field  in  person,  as  usual  with  an  inade- 
quate force  at  his  disposal.  One  of  his  aides-de-camp 
was  a  young  cavalry  officer  named  George  Alexander 
Forsyth,  commonly  known  to  his  friends  as  "Sandy" 


76          Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

Forsyth.  He  had  entered  the  volunteer  army  in  1861 
as  a  private  of  dragoons  in  a  Chicago  company.  A 
mere  boy,  he  had  come  out  a  brigadier-general.  In  the 
permanent  establishment  he  was  a  major  in  the  Ninth 
Cavalry.  Sheridan  knew  him.  He  was  one  of  the  two 
officers  who  made  that  magnificent  ride  with  the  great 
commander  that  saved  the  day  at  Winchester,  and  it  was 
due  to  his  suggestion  that  Sheridan  rode  down  the  re- 
adjusted lines  before  they  made  the  return  advance 
which  decided  the  fate  of  the  battle.  During  all  that 
mad  gallop  and  hard  fighting  young  Forsyth  rode  with 
the  General.  To-day  he  is  the  only  survivor  of  that 
ride. 

Forsyth  was  a  fighter  all  through,  and  he  wanted  to 
get  into  the  field  in  command  of  some  of  the  troops  oper- 
ating directly  on  the  Indians  in  the  campaign  under  con- 
sideration. No  officer  was  willing  to  surrender  his  com- 
mand to  Forsyth  on  the  eve  of  active  operations,  and 
there  was  no  way,  apparently,  by  which  he  could  do 
anything  until  Sheridan  acceded  to  his  importunities 
by  authorizing  him  to  raise  a  company  of  scouts  for  the 
campaign.  He  was  directed,  if  he  could  do  so,  to  enlist 
fifty  men,  who,  as  there  was  no  provision  for  the  em- 
ployment of  scouts  or  civilian  auxiliaries,  were  of  ne- 
cessity carried  on  the  payrolls  as  quartermasters'  em- 
ployees for  the  magnificent  sum  of  one  dollar  per  day. 
They  were  to  provide  their  own  horses,  but  were  allowed 
thirty  cents  a  day  for  the  use  of  them,  and  the  horses 
were  to  be  paid  for  by  the  government  if  they  were  "  ex- 
pended" during  the  campaign.  They  were  equipped 
with  saddle,  bridle,  haversack,  canteen,  blanket,  knife, 
tin  cup,  Spencer  repeating  rifle,  good  for  seven  shots 
without  reloading,  six  in  the  magazine,  one  in  the  barrel, 
and  a  heavy  Colt's  army  revolver.  There  were  no 


The  Rough  Riders  of  '68  77 

tents  or  other  similar  conveniences,  and  four  mules  con- 
stituted the  baggage  train.  The  force  was  intended  to 

oo    o 

be  strictly  mobile,  and  it  was.  Each  man  carried  on  his 
person  one  hundred  and  forty  rounds  of  ammunition  for 
his  rifle  and  thirty  rounds  for  his  revolver.  The  four 
mules  carried  the  medical  supplies  and  four  thousand 
rounds  of  extra  ammunition.  Each  officer  and  man 
took  seven  days'  rations.  What  he  could  not  carry  on 
his  person  was  loaded  on  the  pack  mules;  scanty  rations 
they  were,  too. 

As  soon  as  it  was  known  that  the  troop  was  to  be  or- 
ganized, Forsyth  was  overwhelmed  with  applications 
from  men  who  wished  to  join  it.  He  had  the  pick  of  the 
frontier  to  select  from.  He  chose  thirty  men  at  Fort 
Harker  and  the  remaining  twenty  from  Fort  Hayes. 
Undoubtedly  they  were  the  best  men  in  the  West  for 
the  purpose.  To  assist  him,  Lieutenant  Frederick  H. 
Beecher,  of  the  Third  Infantry,  was  detailed  as  second  in 
command.  Beecher  was  a  young  officer  with  a  record. 
He  had  displayed  peculiar  heroism  at  the  great  battle 
of  Gettysburg,  where  he  had  been  so  badly  wounded 
that  he  was  lame  for  the  balance  of  his  life.  He  was  a 
nephew  of  the  great  Henry  Ward  Beecher  and  a  worthy 
representative  of  the  distinguished  family  whose  name 
he  bore.  The  surgeon  of  the  party  was  Dr.  John  H. 
Mooers,  a  highly-trained  physician,  who  had  come  to 
the  West  in  a  spirit  of  restless  adventure.  He  had 
settled  at  Hayes  City  and  was  familiar  with  the  frontier. 
The  guide  of  the  party  was  Sharp  Grover,  one  of  the 
remarkable  plainsmen  of  the  time,  regarded  as  the  best 
scout  in  the  government  service.  The  first  sergeant 
was  W.  H.  H.  McCall,  formerly  brigadier-general, 
United  States  Volunteers.  McCall,  in  command  of  a 
Pennsylvania  regiment,  had  been  promoted  for  con- 


78          Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

spicuous  gallantry  on  the  field,  when  John  B.  Gordon 
made  his  magnificent  dash  out  of  Petersburg  and  at- 
tacked Fort  Steadman. 

The  personnel  of  the  troop  was  about  equally  divided 
between  hunters  and  trappers  and  veterans  of  the 
Civil  War,  nearly  all  of  whom  had  held  commissions  in 
either  the  Union  or  Confederate  Army,  for  the  command 
included  men  from  both  sides  of  Mason  and  Dixon's 
line.  It  was  a  hard-bitten,  unruly  group  of  fighters. 
Forsyth  was  just  the  man  for  them.  While  he  did  not 
attempt  to  enforce  the  discipline  of  the  Regular  Army, 
he  kept  them  regularly  in  hand.  He  took  just  five  days 
to  get  his  men  and  start  on  the  march.  They  left  Fort 
Wallace,  the  temporary  terminus  of  the  Kansas  Pacific 
Railroad,  in  response  to  a  telegram  from  Sheridan  that 
the  Indians  were  in  force  in  the  vicinity,  and  scouted  the 
country  for  some  six  days,  finally  striking  the  Indian 
trail,  which  grew  larger  and  better  defined  as  they  pur- 
sued it.  Although  it  was  evident  tfciat  the  Indians  they 
were  chasing  greatly  outnumbered  them,  they  had  come 
out  for  a  fight  and  wanted  one,  so  they  pressed  on. 
They  got  one,  too.* 

II.  The  Island  of  Death 

On  the  evening  of  the  fifteenth  of  September,  hot  on 
the  trail,  now  like  a  well-beaten  road,  they  rode  through 
a  depression  or  a  ravine,  which  gave  entrance  into  a  val- 
ley some  two  miles  wide  and  about  the  same  length. 
Through  this  valley  ran  a  little  river,  the  Arickaree. 
They  encamped  on  the  south  bank  of  the  river  about 

*  The  reason  a  large  body  of  men  had  not  been  detailed  for  the  pursuit  was  that  the 
greater  the  number  the  slower  the  movement  would  have  been,  and  the  Indians  could 
and  would  have  kept  out  of  the  way  with  ease.  If  the  Indians  were  laying  a  trap  for 
Forsyth,  he  was  tempting  them  to  stop  and  fight. 


The  Rough  Riders  of  '68 


MAP  OF  FORSYTH'S  DEFENSE  OF  BEECHER'S  ISLAND,  ARIKAREE  RIVER.  COLORADO 

(Drawn  by  the  author  from  rough  sketches  and  maps  furnished  by  General  Forsyth) 
Explanation  of  Map:  A.  Forsyth's  camp  before  attack.  B.  Rifle-pits  on  island.  C.  Low, 
unoccupied  land  on  island  with  solitary  cottonwood  at  end.  D.  Indian  charge  led  by  Roman 
Nose  and  Medicine  Man.  EE.  Low  banks  fringed  with  trees.  FF.  Dry  sandy  bed  of  the 
river.  HH.  Indian  riflemen  on  the  banks.  KK.  Indian  women  and  children  on  bluffs,  half  a 
mile  from  river.  L.  Ground  sloping  gently  to  river.  M.  Level  grassy  plain  to  bluffs. 


8o          Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

four  o'clock  in  the  afternoon.  The  horses  and  men 
were  weary  with  hard  riding.  Grazing  was  good. 
They  were  within  striking  distance  of  the  Indians  now. 
Forsyth  believed  there  were  too  many  of  them  to  run 
away  from  such  a  small  body  as  his  troop  of  scouts. 
He  was  right.  The  Indians  had  retreated  as  far  as  they 
intended  to. 

The  river  bed,  which  was  bordered  by  wild  plums, 
willows  and  alders,  ran  through  the  middle  of  the  valley. 
The  bed  of  the  river  was  about  one  hundred  and  forty 
yards  wide.  In  the  middle  of  it  was  an  island  about 
twenty  yards  wide  and  sixty  yards  long.  The  gravelly 
upper  end  of  the  island,  which  rose  about  two  feet  above 
the  water  level,  was  covered  with  a  thick  growth  of 
stunted  bushes,  principally  alders  and  willows;  at  the 
lower  end,  which  sloped  to  the  water's  edge,  there  rose 
a  solitary  cottonwood  tree.  There  had  been  little  rain 
for  some  time,  and  this  river  bed  for  the  greater  part 
of  its  width  was  dry  and  hard.*  For  a  space  of 
four  or  five  yards  on  either  side  of  the  island  there  was 
water,  not  over  a  foot  deep,  languidly  washing  the  grav- 
elled shores.  When  the  river  bed  was  full  the  island 
probably  was  overflowed.  Such  islands  form  from  time 
to  time,  and  are  washed  away  as  quickly  as  they  develop. 
The  banks  of  the  river  bed  on  either  side  commanded 
the  island. 

The  simple  preparations  for  the  camp  of  that  body  of 
men  were  soon  made.  As  night  fell  they  rolled  them- 
selves in  their  blankets,  with  the  exception  of  the  sen- 
tries, and  went  to  sleep  with  the  careless  indifference  of 
veterans  under  such  circumstances. 

*  In  dry  seasons  I  have  often  seen  Western  river  beds  half  a  mile  wide  absolutely 
devoid  of  water.  In  the  wet  season  these  same  beds  would  be  roaring  torrents  from 
bank  to  bank. 


The  Rough  Riders  of  '68  81 

Forsyth,  however,  as  became  a  captain,  was  not  so 
careless  or  so  reckless  as  his  men.  They  were  alone  in 
the  heart  of  the  Indian  country,  in  close  proximity  to  an 
overwhelming  force,  and  liable  to  attack  at  any  moment. 
He  knew  that  their  movements  had  been  observed  by  the 
Indians  during  the  past  few  days.  Therefore  the 
young  commander  was  on  the  alert  throughout  the  night, 
visiting  the  outposts  from  time  to  time  to  see  that  care- 
ful watch  was  kept. 

Just  as  the  first  streaks  of  dawn  began  to  "lace  the 
severing  clouds,"  he  happened  to  be  standing  by  the 
sentry  farthest  from  the  camp.  Silhouetted  against  the 
sky-line  they  saw  the  feathered  head  of  an  Indian.  For 
Forsyth  to  fire  at  him  was  the  work  of  an  instant.  At 
the  same  time  a  party  which  had  crept  nearer  to  the 
picket  line  unobserved  dashed  boldly  at  the  horses,  and 
resorting  to  the  usual  devices  with  bells,  horns,  hideous 
yells,  and  waving  buffalo  robes,  attempted  to  stampede 
the  herd. 

Men  like  those  scouts  under  such  circumstances  slept 
with  their  boots  on.  The  first  shot  called  them  into 
instant  action.  They  ran  instinctively  to  the  picket 
line.  A  sharp  fire,  and  the  Indians  were  driven  off  at 
once.  Only  the  pack  mules  got  away.  No  pursuit  was 
attempted,  of  course.  Orders  were  given  for  the  men 
to  saddle  their  horses  and  stand  by  them.  In  a  few 
moments  the  command  was  drawn  up  in  line,  each  man 
standing  by  his  horse's  head,  bridle  reins  through  his 
left  arm,  his  rifle  grasped  in  his  right  hand  —  ready! 
Scarcely  had  the  company  been  thus  assembled  when 
Grover  caught  Forsyth's  arm  and  pointed  down  the 
valley. 

"My  God!"  he  cried,  "look  at  the  Injuns!" 

In  front  of  them,  on  the  right  of  them,  in  the  rear  of 


82  Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

them,  the  hills  and  valleys  on  both  sides  of  the  river 
seemed  suddenly  to  be  alive  with  Indians.  It  was  as 
quick  a  transformation  from  a  scene  of  peaceful  quiet 
to  a  valley  filled  with  an  armed  force  as  the  whistle  of 
Roderick  Dhu  had  effected  in  the  Scottish  glen. 

The  way  to  the  left,  by  which  they  had  entered  the  val- 
ley, was  still  open.  Forsyth  could  have  made  a  running 
fight  for  it  and  dashed  for  the  gorge  through  which  he 
had  entered  the  valley.  There  were,  apparently,  no 
Indians  barring  the  way  in  that  direction.  But  For- 
syth realized  instantly  that  for  him  to  retreat  would 
mean  the  destruction  of  his  command,  that  the  In- 
dians had  in  all  probability  purposely  left  him  that  way 
of  escape,  and  if  he  tried  it  he  would  be  ambushed  in  the 
defile  and  slain.  That  was  just  what  they  wanted  him 
to  do,  it  was  evident.  That  was  why  he  did  not  attempt  it. 
He  was  cornered,  but  he  was  not  beaten,  and  he  did  not 
think  he  could  be.  Besides,  he  had  come  for  that  fight, 
and  that  fight  he  was  bound  to  have. 

Whatever  he  was  to  do  he  must  do  quickly.  There 
was  no  place  to  which  he  could  go  save  the  island. 
That  was  not  much  of  a  place  at  best,  but  it  was  the  one 
strategic  point  presented  by  the  situation.  Pouring  a 
heavy  fire  into  the  Indians,  Forsyth  directed  his  men  to 
take  possession  of  the  island  under  cover  of  the  smoke. 
In  the  movement  everything  had  to  be  abandoned,  in- 
cluding the  medical  stores  and  rations,  but  the  precious 
ammunition  —  that  must  be  secured  at  all  hazards. 
Protected  by  a  squad  of  expert  riflemen  on  the  river 
bank,  who  presently  joined  them,  the  scouts  reached 
the  island  in  safety,  tied  their  horses  to  the  bushes 
around  the  edge  of  it,  and  in  the  intervals  of  fighting 
set  to  work  digging  rifle-pits  covering  an  ellipse  twenty 
by  forty  yards,  one  pit  for  each  man,  with  which  to  de- 


The  Rough  Riders  of  '68  83 

fend  the  upper  and  higher  part  of  the  island  They 
had  nothing  to  dig  with  except  tin  cups,  tin  plates,  and 
their  bowie  knives,  but  they  dug  like  men.  There  was 
no  lingering  or  hesitation  about  it. 

The  chief  of  the  Indian  force,  which  was  made  up 
of  Northern  Cheyennes,  Oglala  and  Brule  Sioux, 
with  a  few  Arapahoes  and  a  number  of  Dog  Soldiers, 
was  the  famous  Roman  Nose,  an  enemy  to  be  feared 
indeed.  He  was  filled  with  disgust  and  indignation  at 
the  failure  of  his  men  to  occupy  the  island,  the  strategic 
importance  of  which  he  at  once  detected.  It  is  believed 
that  orders  to  seize  the  island  had  been  given,  but  for 
some  reason  they  had  not  been  obeyed;  and  to  this  over- 
sight or  failure  was  due  the  ultimate  safety  of  Forsyth's 
men.  It  was  not  safe  to  neglect  the  smallest  point  in 
fighting  with  a  soldier  like  Forsyth. 

With  more  military  skill  than  they  had  ever  displayed 
before,  the  Indians  deliberately  made  preparations  for 
battle.  The  force  at  the  disposal  of  Roman  Nose  was 
something  less  than  one  thousand  warriors.  They  were 
accompanied  by  their  squaws  and  children.  The  latter 
took  position  on  the  bluffs  on  the  east  bank  of  the  river, 
just  out  of  range,  where  they  could  see  the  whole  affair. 
Like  the  ladies  of  the  ancient  tournaments,  they  were 
eager  to  witness  the  fighting  and  welcome  the  victors, 
who,  for  they  never  doubted  the  outcome,  were  certain 
to  be  their  own. 

Roman  Nose  next  lined  the  banks  of  the  river  on  both 
sides  with  dismounted  riflemen,  skilfully  using  such 
concealment  as  the  ground  afforded.  The  banks  were 
slightly  higher  than  the  island,  and  the  Indians  had 
a  plunging  fire  upon  the  little  party.  The  riflemen  on 
the  banks  opened  fire  at  once.  A  storm  of  bullets  was 
poured  upon  the  devoted  band  on  the  island.  The 


84          Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

scouts,  husbanding  their  ammunition,  slowly  and  de- 
liberately replied,  endeavoring,  with  signal  success,  to 
make  every  shot  tell.  As  one  man  said,  they  reckoned 
"every  ca'tridge  was  wuth  at  least  one  Injun."  The 
horses  of  the  troop,  having  no  protection,  received  the 
brunt  of  the  first  fire.  They  fell  rapidly,  and  their  car- 
casses rising  in  front  of  the  rifle-pits  afforded  added  pro- 
tection to  the  soldiers.  There  must  have  been  a  rene- 
gade white  man  among  the  savages,  for  in  a  lull  of  the 
firing  the  men  on  the  island  heard  a  voice  announce  in 
perfect  English,  "There  goes  the  last  of  their  horses, 
anyway."  Besides  this,  from  time  to  time,  the  notes  of 
an  artillery  bugle  were  heard  from  the  shore.  The  cas- 
ualties had  not  been  serious  while  the  horses  stood,  but 
as  soon  as  they  were  all  down  the  men  began  to  suffer.* 

During  this  time  Forsyth  had  been  walking  about  in 
the  little  circle  of  defenders  encouraging  his  men.  He 
was  met  on  all  sides  with  insistent  demands  that  he  lie 
down  and  take  cover,  and,  the  firing  becoming  hotter,  he 
at  last  complied.  The  rifle-pit  which  Surgeon  Mooers 
had  made  was  a  little  wider  than  that  of  the  other  men, 
and  as  it  was  a  good  place  from  which  to  direct  the 
fighting,  at  the  doctor's  suggestion  some  of  the  scouts 
scooped  it  out  to  make  it  a  little  larger,  and  Forsyth  lay 
down  by  him. 

The  fire  of  the  Indians  had  been  increasing.  Several 
scouts  were  killed,  more  mortally  wounded,  and  some 
slightly  wounded.  Doctor  Mooers  was  hit  in  the  fore- 
head and  mortally  wounded.  He  lingered  for  three  days, 
saying  but  one  intelligent  word  during  the  whole  period. 
Although  he  was  blind  and  speechless,  his  motions  some- 

*  As  the  Indians  surrounded  the  island  and  the  fire  came  in  from  all  quarters,  the  men 
had  to  dig  the  earth  for  protection  in  rear  as  well  as  in  front,  and  the  rifle-pits  were,  in 
fact,  hollows  scooped  out  of  the  ground  just  long  enough  for  a  man  to  lie  in. 


The  Rough  Riders  of  '68  85 

times  indicated  that  he  knew  where  he  was.  He  would 
frequently  reach  out  his  foot  and  touch  Forsyth.  A 
bullet  struck  Forsyth  in  the  right  thigh,  and  glancing 
upwards  bedded  itself  in  the  flesh,  causing  excruciating 
pain.  He  suffered  exquisite  anguish,  but  his  present 
sufferings  were  just  beginning,  for  a  second  bullet  struck 
him  in  the  leg,  between  the  knee  and  ankle,  and  smashed 
the  bone,  and  a  third  glanced  across  his  forehead, 
slightly  fracturing  his  skull  and  giving  him  a  splitting 
headache,  although  he  had  no  time  to  attend  to  it  then. 

III.  The  Charge  of  the  Five  Hundred 

During  all  this  time  Roman  Nose  and  his  horsemen 
had  withdrawn  around  the  bend  up  the  river,  which 
screened  them  from  the  island.  At  this  juncture  they 
appeared  in  full  force,  trotting  up  the  bed  of  the  river  in 
open  order  in  eight  ranks  of  about  sixty  front.  Ahead 
of  them,  on  a  magnificent  chestnut  horse,  trotted  Roman 
Nose.  The  warriors  were  hideously  painted,  and  all 
were  naked  except  for  moccasins  and  cartridge  belts. 
Eagle  feathers  were  stuck  in  their  long  hair,  and  many 
of  them  wore  gorgeous  feather  war  bonnets.  They  sat 
their  horses  without  saddles  or  stirrups,  some  of  them 
having  lariats  twisted  around  the  horses'  bellies  like  a 
surcingle.  Roman  Nose  wore  a  magnificent  war  bonnet 
of  feathers  streaming  behind  him  in  the  wind  and  sur- 
mounted by  two  buffalo-horns;  around  his  waist  he  had 
tied  an  officer's  brilliant  scarlet  silk  sash,  which  had  been 
presented  to  him  at  the  Fort  Ellsworth  conference. 
The  sunlight  illumined  the  bronze  body  of  the  savage 
Hercules,  exhibiting  the  magnificent  proportions  of  the 
man.  Those  who  followed  him  were  in  every  way  wor- 
thy of  their  leader. 


86          Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

As  the  Indian  cavalry  appeared  around  the  bend  to 
the  music  of  that  bugle,  the  fire  upon  the  island  from  the 
banks  redoubled  in  intensity.  Forsyth  instantly  di- 
vined that  Roman  Nose  was  about  to  attempt  to  ride 
him  down.  He  also  realized  that,  so  soon  as  the  horses 
were  upon  him,  the  rifle  fire  from  the  bank  would  of 
necessity  be  stopped.  His  order  to  his  men  was  to 
cease  firing,  therefore;  to  load  the  magazines  of  their 
rifles,  charge  their  revolvers,  and  wait  until  he  gave  the 
order  to  fire.  The  rifles  of  the  dead  and  those  of  the 
party  too  severely  wounded  to  use  them  were  distributed 
among  those  scouts  yet  unharmed.  Some  of  the  wound- 
ed insisted  upon  fighting.  Forsyth  propped  himself  up 
in  his  rifle-pit,  his  back  and  shoulders  resting  against 
the  pile  of  earth,  his  rifle  and  revolver  in  hand.  He 
could  see  his  own  men,  and  also  the  Indians  coming  up 
the  river. 

Presently,  shouting  their  war  songs,  at  a  wild  pealed 
whoop  from  their  chief,  the  Indian  horsemen  broke  into 
a  gallop,  Roman  Nose  leading  the  advance,  shaking 
his  heavy  Spencer  rifle  —  captured,  possibly,  from  Fet- 
terman's  men  —  in  the  air  as  if  it  had  been  a  reed. 
There  was  a  last  burst  of  rifle  fire  from  the  banks,  and 
the  rattle  of  musketry  was  displaced  by  the  war  songs 
of  the  Indians  and  the  yells  of  the  squaws  and  children 
on  the  slopes  of  the  hills.  As  the  smoke  drifted  away 
on  that  sunny  September  morning,  they  saw  the  Indians 
almost  upon  them.  In  spite  of  his  terrible  wounds  the 
heroic  Forsyth  was  thoroughly  in  command.  Waiting 
until  the  tactical  moment  when  the  Indians  were  but 
fifty  yards  away  and  coming  at  a  terrific  speed,  he 
raised  himself  on  his  hands  to  a  sitting  position  and 
cried,  "Now!" 

The  men  rose  to  their  knees,  brought  their  guns  to 


Copyright,   1900,  ty  Cliartcs  Schrtyrogel 

ROMAN    NOSE    LEADING    THE    CHARGE    AGAINST    FORSYTH'S 
DEVOTED    BAND 

Drawing  by  Charles  Schreyvogel 


The  Rough  Riders  of  '68  87 

their  shoulders,  and  poured  a  volley  right  into  the  face 
of  the  furious  advance.  An  instant  later,  with  another 
cartridge  in  the  barrel  they  delivered  a  second  volley. 
Horses  and  men  went  down  in  every  direction;  but,  like 
the  magnificent  warriors  they  were,  the  Indians  closed  up 
and  came  sweeping  down.  The  third  volley  was  poured 
into  them.  Still  they  came.  The  war  songs  had  ceased 
by  this  time,  but  in  undaunted  spirit,  still  pealing  his  war 
cry  above  the  crashing  of  the  bullets,  at  the  head  of  his 
band,  with  his  magnificent  determination  unshaken, 
Roman  Nose  led  such  a  ride  as  no  Indian  ever  attempt- 
ed before  or  since.  And  still  those  quiet,  cool  men  con- 
tinued to  pump  bullets  into  the  horde.  At  the  fourth 
volley  the  medicine  man  on  the  left  of  the  line  and  the 
second  in  command  went  down.  The  Indians  hesi- 
tated at  this  reverse,  but  swinging  his  rifle  high  in  the  air 
in  battle  frenzy,  the  great  war  chief  rallied  them,  and 
they  once  more  advanced.  The  fifth  volley  staggered 
them  still  more.  Great  gaps  were  opened  in  their  ranks. 
Horses  and  men  fell  dead,  but  the  impetus  was  so  great, 
and  the  courage  and  example  of  their  leader  so  splendid, 
that  the  survivors  came  on  unchecked.  The  sixth  vol- 
ley did  the  work.  Just  as  he  was  about  to  leap  on  the 
island,  Roman  Nose  and  his  horse  were  both  shot  to 
pieces.  The  force  of  the  charge,  however,  was  so  great 
that  the  line  was  not  yet  entirely  broken.  The  horse- 
men were  within  a  few  feet  of  the  scouts,  when  the 
seventh  volley  was  poured  into  their  very  faces.  As  a 
gigantic  wave  meets  a  sharply  jutting  rock  and  is  parted, 
falling  harmlessly  on  either  side  of  it,  so  was  that  charge 
divided,  the  Indians  swinging  themselves  to  the  sides 
of  their  horses  as  they  swept  down  the  length  of  the 
island. 

The  scouts  sprang  to  their  feet  at  this  juncture,  and 


88          Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

almost  at  contact  range  jammed  their  revolver  shots  at 
the  disorganized  masses.  The  Indians  fled  precipi- 
tately to  the  banks  on  either  side,  and  the  yelling  of  the 
war  chants  of  the  squaws  and  children  changed  into 
wails  of  anguish  and  despair,  as  they  marked  the  death 
of  Roman  Nose  and  the  horrible  slaughter  of  his  fol- 
lowers. 

It  was  a  most  magnificent  charge,  and  one  which  for 
splendid  daring  and  reckless  heroism  would  have  done 
credit  to  the  best  troops  of  any  nation  in  the  world. 
And  magnificently  had  it  been  met.  Powell's  defense 
of  the  corral  on  Piney  Island  was  a  remarkable  achieve- 
ment, but  it  was  not  to  be  compared  to  the  fighting  of 
these  scouts  on  the  little  open,  unprotected  heap  of  sand 
and  gravel  in  the  Arickaree. 

As  soon  as  the  Indian  horsemen  withdrew,  baffled 
and  furious,  a  rifle  fire  opened  once  more  from  the 
banks.  Lieutenant  Beecher,  who  had  heroically  per- 
formed his  part  in  the  defense,  crawled  over  to  Forsyth 
and  said: 

"  I  have  my  death  wound,  General.  I  am  shot  in  the 
side  and  dying." 

He  said  the  words  quietly  and  simply,  as  if  his  com- 
munication was  utterly  commonplace,  then  stretched 
himself  out  by  his  wounded  commander,  lying,  like 
Steerforth,  with  his  face  upon  his  arm. 

"No,  Beecher,  no,"  said  Forsyth,  out  of  his  own  an- 
guish; "it  can  not  be  as  bad  as  that." 

"Yes,"  said  the  young  officer,  "good-night." 

There  was  nothing  to  be  done  for  him.  Forsyth 
heard  him  whisper  a  word  or  two  of  his  mother,  and  then 
delirium  supervened.  By  evening  he  was  dead.  In 
memory  of  the  brave  young  officer,  they  called  the  place 
where  he  had  died  Beecher's  Island. 


The  Rough  Riders  of  '68  89 

At  two  o'clock  in  the  afternoon  a  second  charge  of 
horse  was  assayed  in  much  the  same  way  as  the  first 
had  been  delivered;  but  there  was  no  longer  a  great  war 
chief  in  command,  and  this  time  the  Indians  broke  at 
one  hundred  yards  from  the  island.  At  six  o'clock  at 
night  they  made  a  final  attempt.  The  whole  party, 
horse  and  foot,  in  a  solid  mass  rushed  from  all  sides 
upon  the  island.  They  came  forward,  yelling  and  firing, 
but  they  were  met  with  so  severe  a  fire  from  the  rifle- 
pits  that,  although  some  of  them  actually  reached  the 
foot  of  the  island,  they  could  not  maintain  their  posi- 
tion, and  were  driven  back  with  frightful  loss.  The 
men  on  the  island  deliberately  picked  off  Indian 
after  Indian  as  they  came,  so  that  the  dry  river  bed 
ran  with  blood.  The  place  was  a  very  hell  to  the 
Indians.  They  withdrew  at  last,  baffled,  crushed, 
beaten. 

With  nightfall  the  men  on  the  island  could  take  ac- 
count of  the  situation.  Two  officers  and  four  men  were 
dead  or  dying,  one  officer  and  eight  men  were  so  se- 
verely wounded  that  their  condition  was  critical.  Eight 
men  were  less  severely  wounded,  making  twenty-three 
casualties  out  of  fifty-one  officers  and  men.*  There 
were  no  rations,  but  thank  God  there  was  an  abundance 
of  water.  They  could  get  it  easily  by  digging  in  the 
sandy  surface  of  the  island.  They  could  subsist,  if 
necessary,  on  strips  of  meat  cut  from  the  bodies  of  the 
horses.  The  most  serious  lack  was  of  medical  atten- 
tion. The  doctor  lying  unconscious,  the  wounded  were 
forced  to  get  along  with  the  unskilled  care  of  their  com- 
rades, and  with  water,  and  rags  torn  from  clothing  for 
dressings.  Little  could  be  done  for  them.  The  day 
had  been  frightfully  hot,  but,  fortunately,  a  heavy  rain 

*  Two  of  the  scouts  had  been  left  behind,  at  Fort  Wallace,  because  of  illness. 


9O          Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

fell  in  the  night,  which  somewhat  refreshed  them.  The 
rifle-pits  were  deepened  and  made  continuous  by  piling 
saddles  and  equipments,  and  by  further  digging  in  the 
interspaces. 

One  of  the  curious  Indian  superstitions,  which  has 
often  served  the  white  man  against  whom  he  has  fought 
to  good  purpose,  is  that  when  a  man  is  killed  in  the  dark 
he  must  pass  all  eternity  in  darkness.  Consequently, 
he  rarely  ever  attacks  at  night.  Forsyth's  party  felt 
reasonably  secure  from  any  further  attack,  therefore, 
notwithstanding  which  they  kept  watch. 

IV.  The  Siege  of  the  Island 

As  soon  as  darkness  settled  down  volunteers  were 
called  for  to  carry  the  news  of  their  predicament  to 
Fort  Wallace,  one  hundred  miles  away.  Every  man 
able  to  travel  offered  himself  for  the  perilous  journey. 
Forsyth  selected  Trudeau  and  Stillwell.  Trudeau  was 
a  veteran  hunter,  Stillwell  a  youngster  only  nineteen 
years  of  age,  although  he  already  gave  promise  of  the 
fame  as  a  scout  which  he  afterwards  acquired.  To 
them  he  gave  the  only  map  he  possessed.  They  were 
to  ask  the  commander  of  Fort  Wallace  to  come  to  his 
assistance.  As  soon  as  the  two  brave  scouts  had  left, 
every  one  realized  that  a  long  wait  would  be  entailed 
upon  the  little  band,  if,  indeed,  it  was  not  overwhelmed 
meanwhile,  before  any  relieving  force  could  reach  the 
island.  And  there  were  grave  doubts  as  to  whether,  in 
any  event,  Trudeau  and  Stillwell  could  get  through  the 
Indians.  It  was  not  a  pleasant  night  they  spent,  there- 
fore, although  they  were  busy  strengthening  the  de- 
fenses, and  nobody  got  any  sleep. 

Early  the  next  morning  the  Indians  again  made  their 


The  Rough  Riders  of  '68  91 

appearance.  They  had  hoped  that  Forsyth  and  his  men 
would  have  endeavored  to  retreat  during  the  night,  in 
which  event  they  would  have  followed  the  trail  and 
speedily  annihilated  the  whole  command.  But  For- 
syth was  too  good  a  soldier  to  leave  the  position  he  had 
chosen.  During  the  fighting  of  the  day  before  he  had 
asked  Grover  his  opinion  as  to  whether  the  Indians 
could  deliver  any  more  formidable  attack  than  the  one 
which  had  resulted  in  the  death  of  Roman  Nose,  and 
Grover,  who  had  had  large  experience,  assured  him  that 
they  had  done  the  best  they  could,  and  indeed  better 
than  he  or  any  other  scout  had  ever  seen  or  heard  of  in 
any  Indian  warfare.  Forsyth  was  satisfied,  therefore, 
that  they  could  maintain  the  position,  at  least  until  they 
starved. 

The  Indians  were  quickly  apprised,  by  a  volley  which 
killed  at  least  one  man,  that  the  defenders  of  the  island 
were  still  there.  The  place  was  closely  invested,  and 
although  the  Indians  made  several  attempts  to  approach 
it  under  a  white  flag,  they  were  forced  back  by  the  ac- 
curate fire  of  the  scouts,  and  compelled  to  keep  their 
distance.  It  was  very  hot.  The  sufferings  of  the 
wounded  were  something  frightful.  The  Indians  were 
having  troubles  of  their  own,  too.  All  night  and  all  day 
the  defenders  could  hear  the  beating  of  the  tom-toms 
or  drums  and  the  mournful  death  songs  and  wails  of  the 
women  over  the  bodies  of  the  slain,  all  but  three  of  whom 
had  been  removed  during  the  night.*  These  three  were 

*  The  reason  why  an  Indian  will  sacrifice  everything  to  remove  the  body  of  one  of  his 
tribe  or  kin  who  has  been  killed,  is  to  prevent  the  taking  of  his  scalp.  The  religious  be- 
lief of  the  Indians  is  that  a  man  who  is  scalped  cannot  enter  the  happy  hunting  grounds, 
but  is  doomed  to  wander  in  outer  darkness  forever.  For  that  reason  he  always  scalps  his 
enemy,  so  that  when  he  himself  reaches  the  happy  hunting  grounds  he  will  not  be  both- 
ered by  a  lot  of  enemies  whom  he  has  met  and  overcome  during  his  lifetime.  Naturally, 
it  was  a  point  of  honor  for  him  to  get  the  bodies  of  his  friends  away,  so  that  they  might 
not  be  debarred  from  the  Indian  Heaven  in  the  hereafter.  Sometimes,  however,  the  In- 


92          Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

lying  so  near  the  rifle-pits  that  the  Indians  did  not  dare 
to  approach  near  enough  to  get  them.  The  three  dead 
men  had  actually  gained  the  shore  of  the  island  before 
they  had  been  killed. 

The  command  on  the  island  had  plenty  to  eat,  such 
as  it  was.  There  was  horse  and  mule  meat  in  abun- 
dance. They  ate  it  raw,  when  they  got  hungry  enough. 
Water  was  plentiful.  All  they  had  to  do  was  to  dig  the 
rifle-pits  a  little  deeper,  and  it  came  forth  in  great  quan- 
tities. It  was  weary  waiting,  but  there  was  nothing  else 
to  do.  They  dared  not  relax  their  vigilance  a  moment. 
The  next  night,  the  second,  Forsyth  despatched  two 
more  scouts,  fearing  the  first  two  might  not  have  got 
through,  thus  seeking  to  "make  assurance  double  sure." 
This  pair  was  not  so  successful  as  the  first.  They  came 
back  about  three  o'clock  in  the  morning,  having  been 
unable  to  pass  the  Indians,  for  every  outlet  was  heavily 
guarded. 

The  third  day  the  Indian  women  and  children  were 
observed  withdrawing  from  the  vicinity.  This  cheered 
the  men  greatly,  as  it  was  a  sign  that  the  Indians  intend- 
ed to  abandon  the  siege.  The  warriors  still  remained, 
however,  and  any  incautious  exposure  was  a  signal  for 
a  volley.  That  night  two  more  men  were  despatched 
with  an  urgent  appeal,  and  these  two  succeeded  in  get- 
ting through.  They  bore  this  message: 

dian  did  not  scalp  the  body  of  a  particularly  brave  man,  for  this  reason:  It  is  his  belief 
that  if  he  kills  a  man  in  battle  and  does  not  scalp  him,  that  man  will  be  his  slave  or  ser- 
vant in  the  happy  hunting  grounds,  and  although  the  victim  still  possesses  capacities  for 
mischief,  the  Indian  sometimes  risks  all  in  the  future  glory  that  will  come  to  him  from 
holding  in  slavery  a  brave  man,  or  a  noted  warrior,  as  a  spiritual  witness  to  his  prowess. 
It  is  stated  that  the  Indians  never  scalp  the  bodies  of  negroes  and  suicides.  "Buffalo  sol- 
dier heap  bad  medicine,"  is  their  universal  testimony  when  asked  why  they  do  not 
scalp  negro  troopers  whom  they  have  killed  or  captured.  Perhaps  they  cannot  scalp  a 
woolly,  kinky-haired  black  soldier,  and  that  is  the  reason  it  is  "  bad  medicine."  Suicide 
is  "bad  medicine,"  too,  for  some  unexplained  reason. 


The  Rough  Riders  of  '68  93 

"Sept.  19,  1868. 
To  COLONEL  BANKHEAD,  or  Commanding  Officer, 

Fort  Wallace : 

I  sent  you  two  messengers  on  the  night  of  the  I  yth 
inst.,  informing  you  of  my  critical  condition.  I  tried  to 
send  two  more  last  night,  but  they  did  not  succeed  in 
passing  the  Indian  pickets,  and  returned.  If  the  others 
have  not  arrived,  then  hasten  at  once  to  my  assistance. 
I  have  eight  badly  wounded  and  ten  slightly  wounded 
men  to  take  in.  ...  Lieutenant  Beecher  is  dead,  and 
Acting  Assistant  Surgeon  Mooers  probably  cannot  live 
the  night  out.  He  was  hit  in  the  head  Thursday, 
and  has  spoken  but  one  rational  word  since.  I  am 
wounded  in  two  places  —  in  the  right  thigh,  and  my 
left  leg  is  broken  below  the  knee. 

I  am  on  a  little  island,  and  have  still  plenty  of  am- 
munition left.  We  are  living  on  mule  and  horse  meat, 
and  are  entirely  out  of  rations.  If  it  was  not  for  so 
many  wounded,  I  would  come  in,  and  take  the  chances 
of  whipping  them  if  attacked.  They  are  evidently  sick 
of  their  bargain.  ...  I  can  hold  out  for  six  days 
longer  if  absolutely  necessary,  but  please  lose  no  time. 

P.  S.  —  My  surgeon  having  been  mortally  wounded, 
none  of  my  wounded  have  had  their  wounds  dressed  yet, 
so  please  bring  out  a  surgeon  with  you." 

The  fourth  day  passed  like  the  preceding,  the  squaws 
all  gone,  the  Indians  still  watchful.  The  wound  in 
Forsyth's  leg  had  become  excruciatingly  painful,  and 
he  begged  some  of  the  men  to  cut  out  the  bullet.  But 
they  discovered  that  it  had  lodged  near  the  femoral 
artery,  and  fearful  lest  they  should  cut  the  artery  and  the 
young  commander  should  bleed  to  death,  they  positively 
refused.  In  desperation,  Forsyth  cut  it  out  himself. 


94          Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

He  had  his  razor  in  his  saddle  bags  and,  while  two  men 
pressed  the  flesh  back,  he  performed  the  operation  suc- 
cessfully, to  his  immediate  relief. 

The  fifth  day  the  mule  and  horse  meat  became  putrid 
and  therefore  unfit  to  eat.  An  unlucky  coyote  wan- 
dered over  to  the  island,  however,  and  one  of  the  men 
was  fortunate  enough  to  shoot  him.  Small  though  he 
was,  he  was  a  welcome  addition  to  their  larder,  for  he 
was  fresh.  There  was  but  little  skirmishing  on  the  fifth 
day,  and  the  place  appeared  to  be  deserted.  Forsyth 
had  half  a  dozen  of  his  men  raise  him  on  a  blanket  above 
the  level  of  the  rifle  beds  so  that  he  might  survey  the 
scene  himself.  Not  all  the  Indians  were  gone,  for  a  sud- 
den fusillade  burst  out  from  the  bank.  One  of  the  men 
let  go  the  corner  of  the  blanket  which  he  held  while  the 
others  were  easing  Forsyth  down,  and  he  fell  upon  his 
wounded  leg  with  so  much  force  that  the  bone  protruded 
through  the  flesh.  He  records  that  he  used  some  severe 
language  to  that  scout. 

On  the  sixth  day  Forsyth  assembled  his  men  about 
him,  and  told  them  that  those  who  were  well  enough  to 
leave  the  island  would  better  do  so  and  make  for  Fort 
Wallace;  that  it  was  more  than  possible  that  none  of  the 
messengers  had  succeeded  in  getting  through;  that  the 
men  had  stood  by  him  heroically,  and  that  they  would 
all  starve  to  death  where  they  were  unless  relief  should 
come;  and  that  they  were  entitled  to  a  chance  for  their 
lives.  He  believed  the  Indians,  who  had  at  last  dis- 
appeared, had  received  such  a  severe  lesson  that  they 
would  not  attack  again,  and  that  if  the  men  were  cir- 
cumspect they  could  get  through  to  Fort  Wallace  in 
safety.  The  wounded,  including  himself,  must  be  left 
to  take  care  of  themselves  and  take  the  chances  of  escape 
from  the  island. 


The  Rough  Riders  of  '68  95 

The  proposition  was  received  in  surprised  silence  for 
a  few  moments,  and  then  there  was  a  simultaneous  shout 
of  refusal  from  every  man:  "Never!  We'll  stand  by 
you."  McCall,  the  first  sergeant  and  Forsyth's  right- 
hand  man  since  Beecher  had  been  killed,  shouted  out 
emphatically :  "  We've  fought  together,  and,  by  Heaven, 
if  need  be,  we'll  die  together." 

They  could  not  carry  the  wounded;  they  would  not 
abandon  them.  Remember  these  men  were  not  regu- 
lar soldiers.  They  were  simply  a  company  of  scouts, 
more  or  less  loosely  bound  together,  but,  as  McCall  had 
pointed  out,  they  were  tied  to  one  another  by  something 
stronger  than  discipline.  Not  a  man  left  the  island, 
although  it  would  have  been  easy  for  the  unwounded  to 
do  so,  and  possibly  they  might  have  escaped  in  safety. 

For  two  more  days  they  stood  it  out.  There  was  no 
fighting  during  this  time,  but  the  presence  of  an  Indian 
vedette  indicated  that  they  were  under  observation. 
They  gathered  some  wild  plums  and  made  some  jelly  for 
the  wounded ;  but  no  game  came  their  way,  and  there  was 
little  for  them  to  do  but  draw  in  their  belts  a  little  tighter 
and  go  hungry,  or,  better,  go  hungrier.  On  the  morn- 
ing of  the  ninth  day,  one  of  the  men  on  watch  suddenly 
sprang  to  his  feet,  shouting: 

"There  are  moving  men  on  the  hills."  Everybody 
who  could  stand  was  up  in  an  instant,  and  Grover,  the 
keen-eyed  scout,  shouted  triumphantly: 

"  By  the  God  above  us,  there's  an  ambulance !  "  They 
were  rescued  at  last. 

NOTE. — The  serial  publication  of  this  article  called 
forth  another  version  of  this  affair,  differing  from  it  in 
some  non-essential  features,  which  was  written  by  Mr. 
Herbert  Myrick,  and  published  serially.  Mr.  Myrick 


96          Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

accounts  for  the  "mysterious  voice  "which  the  scouts 
heard  saying  in  English,  "  There  goes  the  last  of 
their  horses  anyway, "  by  disclosing  the  interesting  fact 
that  there  were  two  renegade  white  men  among  the 
Indians.  One  of  them  was  called  "Nibsi"  or  "Black 
Jack,"  a  notorious  desperado,  who  was  afterwards 
hung  for  murder.  The  other  was  Jack  Clybor,  once 
a  trooper  of  the  Seventh  Cavalry.  Having  been  shot 
and  left  for  dead  in  an  engagement,  the  Indians  cap- 
tured him,  nursed  him  back  to  life,  adopted  him,  and 
named  him  "Comanche. "  He  v/as  a  singular  com- 
pound of  good  and  evil,  and  became  as  notorious  for  his 
good  deeds  as  for  his  bad  acts.  Mr.  Myrick  has  been 
collecting  a  mass  of  unknown  and  unpublished  Western 
material  for  many  years,  which  when  published  will 
undoubtedly  clear  up  many  mysteries,  throw  light  upon 
many  disputed  questions,  and  prove  of  the  deepest  in- 
terest as  well. 


CHAPTER   SIX 

The  Journey  of  the  Scouts  and  the  Rescue 
of  Forsyth 

I.  The  Adventures  of  the  Scouts 


T 


"^RUDEAU  and  Stillwell,  the  first  pair  of  scouts 
despatched  by  Forsyth  with  the  story  of  his 
desperate  situation  on  Beecher's  Island,  left 
their  commander  about  midnight  on  the  even- 
ing of  the  first  day  of  the  attack.  The  Indians  had 
withdrawn  from  the  immediate  vicinity  of  the  river 
and  were  resting  quietly  in  the  camps  on  either  side, 
although  there  were  a  number  of  warriors  watching 
the  island.  The  men  bade  a  hasty  good-by  to  their 
comrades,  received  their  captain's  final  instructions, 
and  with  beating  hearts  stole  away  on  their  desperate 
errand. 

They  neglected  no  precaution  that  experience  could 
dictate.  They  even  took  off  their  boots,  tied  them 
together  by  the  straps,  slung  them  around  their  necks, 
and  walked  backward  down  the  bed  of  the  river  in  their 
stocking  feet,  so  that,  if  the  Indians  by  any  chance 
stumbled  upon  their  trail  the  next  morning,  it  would 
appear  to  have  been  made  by  moccasined  feet  and  per- 
haps escape  attention,  especially  as  the  tracks  would 
point  toward  the  island  instead  of  away  from  it.  Fur- 

97 


98          Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

ther  to  disguise  themselves,  they  wrapped  themselves  in 
blankets,  which  they  endeavored  to  wear  as  the  Indians 
did. 

They  proceeded  with  the  most  fearsome  caution. 
Such  was  the  circumspection  with  which  they  moved 
and  the  care  necessary  because  of  the  watchfulness  of 
the  foe,  who  might  be  heard  from  time  to  time  moving 
about  on  the  banks,  that  by  daylight  they  had  pro- 
gressed but  two  miles.  During  most  of  the  time  after 
leaving  the  river  bed  they  had  crawled  on  their  hands 
and  knees.  Before  sunrise  they  were  forced  to  seek 
such  concealment  as  they  could  find  in  a  washout,  a  dry 
ravine,  within  sight  and  sound  of  the  Indian  camps. 
Providence  certainly  protected  them,  for  if  any  of  the 
Indians  had  happened  to  wander  in  their  direction  there 
was  nothing  to  prevent  their  discovery;  and  if  the  sav- 
ages had  stumbled  upon  their  hiding-place  it  would 
have  been  all  up  with  them.  Death  by  torture  would 
have  been  inevitable  if  they  were  taken  alive,  and  the 
only  way  to  prevent  that  would  be  suicide.  They  had 
determined  upon  that.  They  had  pledged  each  other  to 
fight  until  the  last  cartridge,  and  to  save  that  for  them- 
selves. They  had  nothing  to  eat  and  nothing  to  drink. 
The  sun  beat  down  upon  them  fiercely  all  the  long  day. 
After  their  experience  of  the  one  before,  it  was  a  day 
calculated  to  break  down  the  strongest  of  men.  They 
bore  up  under  the  strain,  however,  as  best  they  could, 
and  when  darkness  came  they  started  out  once  more. 

This  night  there  was  no  necessity  for  so  much  caution 
and  they  made  better  progress,  although  they  saw  and 
successfully  avoided  several  parties  of  Indians.  When 
the  day  broke  they  were  forced  to  conceal  themselves 
again.  The  country  was  covered  with  wandering  war 
parties,  and  it  was  not  yet  safe  to  travel  by  daylight. 


The  Rescue  of  Forsyth  99 

This  day  they  hid  themselves  under  the  high  banks  of 
a  river.  Again  they  were  fortunate  in  remaining  unob- 
served, although  several  times  bands  of  warriors  passed 
near  them.  They  traveled  all  the  third  night,  making 
great  progress.  Morning  found  them'on  an  open  plain 
with  no  place  to  hide  in  but  a  buffalo  wallow  —  a  dry 
alkali  mud-hole  which  had  been  much  frequented  in  the 
wet  season  by  buffalo  —  which  afforded  scanty  cover 
at  best. 

During  this  day  a  large  party  of  scouting  Indians 
halted  within  one  hundred  feet  of  the  wallow.  Simul- 
taneously with  their  arrival  a  wandering  rattlesnake 
made  his  appearance  in  front  of  the  two  scouts,  who  were 
hugging  the  earth  and  expecting  every  minute  to  be 
discovered.  The  rattlesnake  in  his  way  was  as  deadly 
as  the  Indians.  The  scouts  could  have  killed  him 
easily  had  it  not  been  for  the  proximity  of  the  Cheyennes. 
To  make  the  slightest  movement  would  call  attention 
to  their  hiding-place.  Indeed,  the  sinister  rattle  of  the 
venomous  snake  before  he  struck  would  probably  at- 
tract the  notice  of  the  alert  Indians.  Between  the 
savage  reptile  and  the  savage  men  the  scouts  were  in 
a  frightful  predicament,  which  young  Stillwell,  a  lad 
of  amazing  resourcefulness,  instantly  and  effectually 
solved.  He  was  chewing  tobacco  at  the  time,  and  as 
the  snake  drew  near  him  and  made  ready  to  strike,  he 
completely  routed  him  by  spitting  tobacco  juice  in  his 
mouth  and  eyes  and  all  over  his  head.  The  rattlesnake 
fled;  he  could  not  stand  such  a  dose.  The  Indians 
presently  moved  on,  having  noticed  nothing,  and  so  end- 
ed perhaps  the  most  terrible  half  hour  the  two  men  had 
ever  experienced. 

They  started  early  on  the  evening  of  the  fourth  night, 
and  this  time  made  remarkable  progress.  Toward 


ioo        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

morning,  however,  Trudeau  all  but  broke  down.  The 
brunt  of  the  whole  adventure  thereupon  fell  on  Still- 
well.  He  encouraged  his  older  companion,  helped  him 
along  as  best  he  could,  and  finally,  late  at  night,  they 
reached  Fort  Wallace  and  told  their  tale.  Instantly  all 
was  excitement  in  the  post.  Captain  and  Brevet  Lieu- 
tenant-Colonel Louis  H.  Carpenter,  with  seventy  men 
of  Troop  H,  of  the  Tenth  Cavalry  (a  negro  regiment), 
with  Lieutenants  Banzhaf  and  Orleman,  Doctor  Fitz- 
gerald and  seventeen  scouts,  with  thirteen  wagons  and 
an  ambulance,  had  been  sent  out  from  the  post  the  day 
before  with  orders  to  make  a  camp  on  the  Denver  road, 
about  sixty  miles  from  the  fort.  From  there  he  was  to 
scout  in  every  direction,  keep  off  the  Indians,  and  pro- 
tect trains. 

At  eleven  o'clock  at  night  a  courier  was  despatched 
to  Carpenter  with  the  following  order: 

"  Headquarters,  Fort  Wallace,  Kansas, 

September  22,  1868,  II  :oo  P.  M. 
Brevet  Lieut.-Colonel  L.  H.  CARPENTER,  loth  U.  S. 

Cavalry.     On  Scout. 
Colonel : 

The  Commanding  Officer  directs  you  to  proceed  at 
once  to  a  point  on  the  "Dry  Fork  of  the  Republican," 
about  seventy-five  or  eighty  miles  north,  northwest  from 
this  point,  thirty  or  forty  miles  west  by  a  little  south 
from  the  forks  of  the  Republic,  with  all  possible  des- 
patch. 

Two  scouts  from  Colonel  Forsyth's  command  arrived 
here  this  evening  and  bring  word  that  he  (Forsyth)  was 
attacked  on  the  morning  of  Thursday  last  by  an  over- 
whelming force  of  Indians  (700),  who  killed  all  the  ani- 
mals, broke  Colonel  Forsyth's  left  leg  with  a  rifle  ball, 


The  Rescue  of  Forsyth  101 

severely  wounding  him  in  the  groin,  wounded  Doctor 
Mooers  in  the  head,  and  wounded  Lieutenant  Beecher 
in  several  places.  His  back  is  supposed  to  be  broken. 
Two  men  of  the  command  were  killed  and  eighteen  or 
twenty  wounded. 

The  men  bringing  the  word  crawled  on  hands  and 
knees  two  miles,  and  then  traveled  only  by  night  on 
account  of  the  Indians,  whom  they  saw  daily. 

Forsyth's  men  were  intrenched  in  the  dry  bed  of  the 
creek  with  a  well  in  the  trench,  but  had  only  horse-flesh 
to  eat  and  only  sixty  rounds  of  ammunition. 

General  Sheridan  orders  that  the  greatest  despatch 
be  used  and  every  means  employed  to  succor  Forsyth 
at  once.  Colonel  Bradley  with  six  companies  is  now 
supposed  by  General  Sheridan  to  be  at  the  forks  of  the 
Republic. 

Colonel  Bankhead  will  leave  here  in  one  hour  with 
one  hundred  men  and  two  mountain  howitzers. 

Bring  all  your  scouts  with  you. 

Order  Doctor  Fitzgerald  at  once  to  this  post,  to  re- 
place Doctor  Turner,  who  accompanies  Colonel  Bank- 
head  for  the  purpose  of  dressing  the  wounded  of  For- 
syth's party. 

I  am,  Colonel,  very  respectfully  your  obedient  ser- 
vant, HUGH  JOHNSON, 
ist  Lieutenant  5th  Infantry."    ActinS  Post  Adjutant. 

One  hour  afterward  Bankhead  himself,  with  one 
hundred  men  and  two  howitzers  and  the  surgeon, 
started  for  the  relief  of  Forsyth.  With  Bankhead  went 
the  undaunted  Stillwell  as  guide.  Trudeau  had  suf- 
fered so  much  during  the  perilous  journey  that  he  was 
unable  to  accompany  the  relief  party,  and  he  soon  after- 


IO2         Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

ward  died  from  the  hardships  and  excitement  of  the 
horrible  days  he  had  passed  through. 

II.  The  Rescue  of  Forsyth 

Carpenter  had  bivouacked  on  the  evening  of  the  22d 
of  September  at  Cheyenne  Wells,  about  thirty-five 
miles  from  Fort  Wallace.  He  had  broken  camp  early 
in  the  morning  and  had  marched  some  ten  miles,  when, 
from  a  high  point  on  a  divide  he  had  reached,  which 
permitted  a  full  view  of  the  Rocky  Mountains  from 
Pike's  to  Long's  Peaks,  he  observed  a  horseman  gal- 
loping frantically  toward  them.  He  was  the  courier 
despatched  by  Colonel  Bankhead.  Carpenter  was  a 
splendid  soldier.  He  had  received  no  less  than  four 
brevets  for  gallantry  during  the  Civil  War.  He  had 
been  on  Sheridan's  staff  with  Forsyth,  and  the  two  were 
bosom  friends.  No  task  could  have  been  more  con- 
genial to  him  than  this  attempt  at  rescue. 

He  communicated  the  situation  of  their  white  com- 
rades to  his  black  troopers,  and  their  officers  crowded 
close  about  him.  The  orders  were  received  with  ex- 
ultant cheers.  The  regiment  had  been  raised  since  the 
war,  and  had  not  yet  had  a  chance  to  prove  its  mettle. 
There  were  no  veterans  among  them,  and  Carpenter  and 
the  other  officers  had  been  obliged  to  build  the  regiment 
from  the  ground  up.  Now  was  an  opportunity  to  show 
what  they  could  do.  Carpenter  had  been  trained  to 
obey  orders  to  the  letter.  In  this  instance  he  determined 
to  disobey  the  command  regarding  Doctor  Fitzgerald. 
It  appeared  to  him  that  Bankhead  had  little  hope  that 
he  (Carpenter)  would  find  Forsyth,  for  he  had  sent  him 
no  guide;  but  Carpenter  perceived  that  if  he  did  find 
Forsyth  —  and  he  intended  to  find  him  —  the  condi- 


The  Rescue  of  Forsyth  103 

tions  would  be  such  that  the  services  of  a  physician 
would  be  vitally  necessary.  He  therefore  retained  the 
doctor.  He  also  retained  the  wagon  train,  having  no 
other  way  of  carrying  necessary  supplies.  For  one 


Map  of  Marches  to  Relieve  Colonel  Forsyth  and  to  Escort 
General  Carr,  Drawn  by  General  Carpenter 

reason,  if  he  had  detached  a  guard  for  the  train,  it  would 
have  weakened  his  force  so  greatly  as  to  have  made  it 
inadequate  to  the  enterprise.  The  mules  were  strong 
and  fresh,  and  he  decided  to  keep  the  wagons  with  him. 
The  pace  was  to  be  a  fast  one,  and  he  instructed  the 
wagon  masters  that,  if  any  of  the  mule  teams  gave  out, 


IO4        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

they  should  be  shot  and,  if  necessary,  the  wagon  should 
be  abandoned. 

There  was  no  one  in  his  command,  he  found,  who 
had  ever  been  in  that  territory.  Indeed,  it  is  probable 
that,  save  Forsyth's  men,  no  white  men  had  ever  pene- 
trated that  section  of  the  country  before.  The  map  that 
Carpenter  had  was  very  defective.  He  studied  over  the 
matter  a  few  moments,  and  then  led  his  command 
toward  the  place  where  he  supposed  Forsyth  to  be. 
They  advanced  at  a  fast  trot,  with  intervals  of  walking, 
and  when  they  camped  at  night  near  some  water  holes 
they  had  covered  nearly  forty-five  miles.  The  mules, 
under  the  indefatigable  and  profane  stimulus  of  their 
drivers,  had  kept  up  with  the  rest.  As  soon  as  it  was 
dawn  the  next  day  they  started  once  more,  and,  after  a 
twenty-mile  ride,  arrived  at  the  dry  bed  of  a  river. 

Whether  this  was  the  fork  of  the  Republican,  on  which 
Forsyth  was  besieged,  no  one  could  tell.  It  happens 
that  the  Republican  has  three  forks  —  a  north  fork,  the 
Arickaree,  and  the  south  or  dry  fork.  Carpenter  was 
afraid  to  leave  the  fork  he  had  found  without  satisfying 
himself  that  Forsyth  was  not  there,  so  he  concluded  to 
scout  up  the  river  for  some  fifteen  or  eighteen  miles. 
Finding  nothing,  he  then  turned  northward  again  until 
he  came  to  a  stream  flowing  through  a  wide,  grass- 
covered  valley  surrounded  by  high  hills.  As  they  entered 
the  valley  they  came  across  a  very  large,  fresh  Indian 
trail.  The  scouts  estimated  that  at  least  two  thousand 
ponies  had  passed  along  the  trail  within  a  few  hours. 
Various  other  signs  showed  a  large  village  had  moved 
down  the  trail. 

They  had  traveled  over  forty  miles  this  second  day, 
and  were  apprehensive  that  the  Indians,  being  so  close  to 
them,  might  attack  them.  It  was  nearly  evening.  A  spot 


The  Rescue  of  Forsyth  105 

well  adapted  for  defense  was  chosen  near  the  water, 
the  wagons  were  corralled,  and  preparations  made  for 
a  stout  resistance  in  case  of  an  attack.  While  the  men 
were  making  camp,  Carpenter  with  a  small  escort  rode 
to  the  top  of  one  of  the  high  hills  hordering  the  valley. 
He  could  see  for  miles,  but  discovered  no  Indians  nor 
any  other  living  object  in  any  direction.  In  front  of 
them,  however,  on  the  top  of  another  hill,  were  a  number 
of  scaffolds,  each  one  bearing  a  human  body.  The 
Cheyenne  method  of  burial  was  instantly  recognized. 
A  nearer  look  developed  that  the  scaffolds  had  been 
recently  erected.  Five  of  them  were  examined,  and  in 
each  case  the  body  contained  was  that  of  a  Cheyenne 
warrior,  who  had  been  killed  by  a  gunshot  wound. 
This  was  proof  positive  that  they  were  some  of  the  In- 
dians who  had  been  fighting  against  Forsyth. 

While  this  was  going  on,  one  of  the  troopers  noticed 
something  white  in  a  ravine  on  the  opposite  side  of  the 
valley.  They  galloped  over  to  it,  and  found  it  to  be  an 
elaborate  and  beautiful  tepee  or  wigwam,  made  out  of 
freshly  tanned  white  buffalo  skins.  The  colonel  dis- 
mounted, opened  the  tepee,  and  entered.  There,  upon  a 
brush  heap,  lay  a  human  figure  wrapped  in  buffalo  robes. 
When  the  robes  were  taken  away  the  body  of  a  splendid 
specimen  of  Indian  manhood  was  disclosed.  "He  lay 
like  a  warrior  taking  his  rest,  with  his  martial  cloak 
around  him."  His  stern  and  royal  look,  the  iron  majesty 
of  his  features,  even  though  composed  in  death,  revealed 
at  once  a  native  chieftain.  In  his  breast  was  a  great,  gap- 
ing wound,  which  had  pierced  his  heart.  He  lay  in  his 
war-gear,  with  his  weapons  and  other  personal  prop- 
erty close  at  hand. 

After  the  examination  they  re-covered  him  and  left 
him  undisturbed.  Then  they  went  back  to  the  camp. 


io6        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

The  corral  was  watchfully  guarded  during  the  night, 
but  no  one  appeared  to  molest  them.  It  was  decided 
to  follow  the  Indian  trail  at  daylight,  as  it  would  prob- 
ably lead  to  the  site  of  Forsyth's  fight.  Early  the  next 
morning,  while  they  were  packing  up,  they  saw  some 
horsemen  coming  over  the  hills  to  the  south  of  them. 
They  were  white  men,  led  by  a  scout  named  Donovan. 
Two  more  men  had  been  despatched  by  Forsyth  from 
the  island  on  the  third  night  of  the  siege,  and  being 
unobserved  by  the  Indians,  they  had  made  their  way 
to  Fort  Wallace.  When  they  arrived  there  they  found 
that  Colonel  Bankhead  had  already  gone;  whereupon 
Donovan  had  assembled  five  bold  spirits  and  had  imme- 
diately started  out  on  the  return  journey.  Fortunately 
for  Carpenter,  Donovan  had  struck  the  latter's  trail, 
and  had  followed  it  to  the  camp. 

Carpenter  thereupon  took  thirty  of  his  best  mounted 
troopers  and  the  ambulance  loaded  with  hard-tack, 
coffee,  and  bacon,  and  set  out  on  a  gallop  in  the  direc- 
tion in  which  they  supposed  the  island  lay.  Banzhaf 
was  left  in  command  of  the  rest,  with  orders  to  come  on 
as  fast  as  he  could. 

Carpenter  went  forward  at  a  rapid  gallop,  and  after 
traveling  eighteen  miles,  while  it  was  yet  early  in  the 
morning,  came  to  a  spur  of  land  from  which  he  had 
a  view  of  the  surrounding  country  for  miles.  As  he 
checked  his  horse  on  the  brink,  he  saw  to  the  right  of 
him  a  valley  through  which  meandered  a  narrow  silver 
stream. 

In  the  center  of  the  valley  there  was  an  island.  From 
it  rose  a  solitary  cottonwood.  Men  could  be  seen  mov- 
ing about  the  place.  Donovan  recognized  it  instantly. 
The  horses  of  the  detachment  were  put  to  a  run,  and  the 
whole  party  galloped  down  the  valley  toward  the  island. 


The  Rescue  of  Forsyth  107 

The  scouts  swarmed  across  the  river  with  cries  of  joy, 
and  welcomed  the  soldiers.  The  faithful  mules  dragged 
the  ambulance  close  behind.  There  was  food  for  every- 
body. Carpenter  was  struck  with  the  wolfish  look  on 
the  faces  of  the  hungry  men  as  they  crowded  around  the 
ambulance.  Later  one  of  them  brought  him  a  piece  of 
mule  or  horse  meat  which  was  to  have  been  served  for 
dinner  that  day,  if  the  rescuers  had  not  appeared.  Car- 
penter could  not  endure  even  the  odor  of  it. 

Galloping  across  the  river  bed,  the  first  to  enter  the 
rifle-pits  on  the  island  was  Carpenter.  There,  on  the 
ground  before  him,  lay  Forsyth.  And  what  do  you  sup- 
pose he  was  doing  ?  He  was  reading  a  novel !  Some 
one  had  found,  in  an  empty  saddle-bag,  an  old  copy  of 
Oliver  T^vist.  Forsyth  was  afraid  to  trust  himself.  He 
was  fearful  that  he  would  break  down.  He  did  not  dare 
look  at  Carpenter  or  express  his  feelings.  Therefore 
he  made  a  pretense  of  being  absorbed  in  his  book. 

The  black  cavalry  had  arrived  in  the  very  nick  of 
time.  Forsyth  was  in  a  burning  fever.  Blood-poison- 
ing had  set  in,  and  his  wounds  were  in  a  frightful  con- 
dition. Another  day  and  it  would  have  been  too  late. 
Everything  was  gone  from  him  but  his  indomitable  reso- 
lution. Many  others  were  in  like  circumstances.  It  was 
well  that  Carpenter  had  brought  his  surgeon  with  him, 
for  his  services  were  sadly  needed.  The  men  were  taken 
off  the  island,  moved  half  a  mile  away  from  the  terrible 
stench  arising  from  the  dead  animals;  the  wagon  train 
came  up,  camps  were  made,  the  dead  were  buried  on 
the  island  they  had  immortalized  with  their  valor,  and 
everything  possible  done  for  the  comfort  of  the  living 
by  their  negro  comrades. 

The  doctor  wanted  to  amputate  Forsyth's  leg,  but 
he  protested,  so  that  the  amputation  was  not  performed, 


io8        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

and  the  leg  was  finally  saved  to  its  owner.  One  of  the 
scouts,  named  Farley,  however,  was  so  desperately 
wounded  that  amputation  had  to  be  resorted  to.  The 
doctor  performed  the  operation,  assisted  by  Carpenter. 
A  military  commander  in  the  field  has  to  do  a  great 
many  things. 

The  next  day  Bankhead  made  his  appearance  with 
his  detachment.  He  had  marched  to  the  forks  of  the 
river  and  followed  the  Arickaree  fork  to  the  place.  He 
was  accompanied  by  two  troops  of  the  Second  Cavalry, 
picked  up  on  the  way.  He  did  not  find  fault  with 
Carpenter  for  his  disobedience  in  retaining  Doctor 
Fitzgerald.  On  the  contrary,  such  was  his  delight 
at  the  rescue  that  he  fairly  hugged  his  gallant  sub- 
ordinate. 

As  soon  as  it  was  possible,  the  survivors  were  taken 
back  to  Fort  Wallace.  Forsyth  and  the  more  severely 
wounded  were  carried  in  the  ambulance.  It  took  four 
days  to  reach  the  fort.  Their  progress  was  one  long 
torture,  in  spite  of  every  care  that  could  be  bestowed 
upon  them.  There  was  no  road,  and  while  the  drivers 
chose  the  best  spots  on  the  prairie,  there  was,  neverthe- 
less, an  awful  amount  of  jolting  and  bumping. 

Forsyth  was  brevetted  a  brigadier-general  in  the 
Regular  Army  for  his  conduct  in  this  action.  This  was 
some  compensation  for  two  years  of  subsequent  suffer- 
ing until  his  wounds  finally  healed. 

III.   The  End  of  Roman  Nose 

On  the  way  back  the  men  stopped  at  the  white  tepee 
in  the  lonely  valley.  Grover  and  McCall  rode  over  to 
the  spot  with  the  officers  and  examined  the  body  of  the 
chieftain.  They  instantly  identified  him  as  Roman 


The  Rescue  of  Forsyth  109 

Nose.  With  a  touch  of  sentiment  unusual  in  fron- 
tiersmen they  respected  his  grave,  and  for  the  sake  of 
his  valor  allowed  him  to  sleep  on  undisturbed.  His 
arms  and  equipments,  however,  were  considered  legiti- 
mate spoils  of  war,  and  were  taken  from  him.  It  was  a 
sad  end,  indeed,  to  all  his  splendid  courage  and  glorious 
defiance  of  his  white  foemen. 

The  loss  of  the  Indians  in  the  several  attacks  was 
never  definitely  ascertained.  They  admitted  to  seventy- 
five  killed  outright  and  over  two  hundred  seriously 
wounded,  but  it  is  certain  that  their  total  losses  were 
much  greater.  The  fighting  was  of  the  closest  and 
fiercest  description,  and  the  Indians  were  under  the  fire 
of  one  of  the  most  expert  bodies  of  marksmen  on  the 
plains  at  half  pistol-shot  distance  in  the  unique  and 
celebrated  battle.  The  whole  action  is  almost  unparal- 
leled in  the  history  of  our  Indian  wars,  both  for  the 
thrilling  and  gallant  cavalry  charge  of  the  Indians  and 
the  desperate  valor  of  Forsyth  and  his  scouts. 

IV.   A  Few  Words  About  Forsyth's  Men 

The  heroism  and  pluck  of  the  men  in  the  fight  had 
been  quite  up  to  the  mark  set  by  their  captain.  A 
man  named  Farley  had  fought  through  the  action  with 
a  severe  bullet  wound  in  the  shoulder,  which  he  never 
mentioned  until  nightfall;  his  father  was  mortally 
wounded,  but  he  lay  on  his  side  and  fought  through  the 
whole  of  the  long  first  day  until  he  died.  Another  man 
named  Harrington  was  struck  in  the  forehead  by  an 
arrow.  He  pulled  out  the  shaft,  but  the  head  remained 
imbedded  in  the  bone.  An  Indian  bullet  struck  him  a 
glancing  blow  in  the  forehead  and  neatly  extricated  the 
arrow  —  rough  surgery,  to  be  sure,  but  it  served.  Har- 


no        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

rington  tied  a  rag  around  his  head,  and  kept  his  place 
during  the  whole  three  days  of  fighting. 

When  they  first  reached  the  island  one  of  the  men 
cried  out,  "Don't  let's  stay  here  and  be  shot  down  like 
dogs!  Will  any  man  try  for  the  opposite  bank  with 
me  ?"  Forsyth,  revolver  in  hand,  stopped  that  effort 
by  threatening  to  shoot  any  man  who  attempted  to  leave 
the  island.  In  all  the  party  there  was  but  one  coward. 
In  looks  and  demeanor  he  was  the  most  promising  of  the 
company — a  splendid  specimen  of  manhood  apparently. 
To  everybody's  surprise,  after  one  shot  he  hugged  the 
earth  in  his  rifle-pit  and  positively  refused  to  do  any- 
thing, in  spite  of  orders,  pleadings,  jeers,  and  curses. 
He  left  the  troop  immediately  on  its  arrival  at  Fort 
Wallace. 

Per  contra,  one  of  the  bravest,  where  all  but  one  were 
heroes,  was  a  little,  eighteen-year  old  Jewish  boy,  who 
had  begged  to  be  enlisted  and  allowed  to  go  along.  He 
had  been  the  butt  of  the  command,  yet  he  proved  himself 
a  very  paladin  of  courage  and  efficiency  when  the  fight- 
ing began.* 

*  In  General  Fry's  entertaining  story  of  "Army  Sacrifices,"  the  following  little  poem 
about  him  appears: 

"  When  the  foe  charged  on  the  breastworks 

With  the  madness  of  despair, 
And  the  bravest  souls  were  tested, 
The  little  Jew  was  there. 

"  When  the  weary  dozed  on  duty, 
Or  the  wounded  needed  care, 
When  another  shot  was  called  for, 
The  little  Jew  was  there 

u  With  the  festering  dead  around  them, 

Shedding  poison  in  the  air, 
When  the  crippled  chieftain  ordered, 
The  little  Jew  was  there." 


The  Rescue  of  Forsyth  in 

One  of  the  last  acts  of  the  recent  Congress  was  the 
setting  apart  of  one  hundred  and  twenty  acres  of  land 
in  Yuma  County,  Colorado,  as  a  national  park.  This 
reservation  forever  preserves  Forsyth's  battlefield  and 
the  vicinity  from  settlement.  On  the  edge  of  the  river 
bank,  on  what  was  once  Beecher's  Island,  which  the 
shifting  river  has  now  joined  to  the  bank,  is  a  wooden 
monument  to  Beecher  and  the  other  scouts  who  were 
buried  somewhere  in  those  shifting  sands.* 

The  few  survivors  of  the  battle  have  formed  them- 
selves into  an  association  which  holds  an  annual  reunion 
on  the  battlefield.  Soon  there  will  be  none  of  them 
left.  Would  it  not  be  a  graceful  act  for  some  one  who 
honors  courage,  manliness,  and  devotion  to  duty  to 
erect  a  more  enduring  monument  to  the  memory  of 
Beecher  and  his  comrades  than  the  perishable  wooden 
shaft  which  now  inadequately  serves  to  call  attention  to 
their  sacrifice  and  their  valor  ? 

NOTE. — The  following  interesting  communication 
slightly  modifies  one  of  the  statements  in  the  above 
article.  It  certainly  shows  prompt  decision  upon  the 
part  of  Lieutenant  Johnson,  who  was  left  in  command 
of  the  post  after  Bankhead's  departure. 

Great  Barrington,  Mass.,  August  5th,  1904. 
Dr.  Brady  says  "  Donovan  had  assembled  five  bold 
spirits,  and  had  immediately  started  out  on  the  return 
journey."     As  a  matter  of  fact,  Donovan  did  no  such 

*  "  To-day  cattle  stand  knee-deep  in  the  Arickaree.  The  water  no  longer  ripples 
around  the  island,  as  the  shifting  sands  have  filled  the  channel  to  the  south.  But  if  one 
digs  under  the  cottonwoods  he  can  find  bullets,  cartridges,  and  knives.  And  near  at 
hand  is  the  simple  white  shaft  that  tells  where  Beecher  and  Roman  Nose,  typifying  all 
that  is  brave  in  white  man  and  red,  forgot  all  enmity  in  the  last  sleep  that  knows  no 
dreams  of  racial  hatred."  I  cut  this  from  a  newspaper  the  other  day.  How  well  writ- 
ten, frequently,  are  the  modestly  unsigned  articles  in  the  daily  press  ! 


ii2        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

thing.  The  departure  of  General  Bankhead's  relief 
column  stripped  the  garrison  of  Fort  Wallace  to  seven 
enlisted  men,  took  away  the  last  horse,  and  placed  me 
in  command.  Forsyth's  second  note,  brought  by  Don- 
ovan, fell  into  my  hands.  It  was  telegraphed  in  full  to 
General  Sheridan,  who  ordered  me  to  spare  no  expense 
of  men,  money,  and  horses  to  hasten  relief  to  Forsyth. 
By  the  promise  of  $100  each,  four  citizens  of  the  neigh- 
boring town  of  Pond  Creek  were  induced  to  seek  the 
Carpenter  command.  Donovan  I  persuaded  to  guide 
them,  promising  him  $100  in  addition  to  his  pay  as  a 
scout.  This  party  started  at  daylight,  on  government 
mules,  rode  all  day,  all  night,  and  found  Carpenter's 
command  on  the  south  fork  of  the  Republican  River, 
about  ten  miles  southeast  of  the  scene  of  the  fight. 
Guided  by  these  men,  Carpenter  pushed  out,  and  For- 
syth and  his  men  were  relieved  some  hours  in  advance 
of  the  arrival  of  the  other  relief  commands. 

The  country  from  Fort  Wallace  to  Arickaree  Fork  I 
passed  over  the  following  December,  in  an  unsuccessful 
endeavor  to  secure  the  bodies  of  those  killed  in  the  fight. 
We  surprised  a  village  of  Indians  at  the  scene  of  the 
fight,  fought  them  off,  and  found  the  body  of  one  of 
the  scouts,  but  Lieutenant  Beecher's  and  Dr.  Mooers' 
graves  were  empty.  Yours  very  truly, 

HUGH  M.  JOHNSON, 
Late  Lieutenant  5th  U.  S.  Infantry. 


CHAPTER   SEVEN 

A  Scout's  Story  of  the  Defense  of 
Beecher's  Island 

BY  great  good  fortune  I  am  permitted  to  insert 
here  a  private  letter  to  me  from  Mr.  Sigmund 
Schlesinger,   the    Jewish    boy    referred    to   in 
Chapter  Six,  which,  as  it  contains  an  original 
account   of  the  defense  of  Beecher's  Island  from  the 
standpoint  of  one  of  the   participants,    is   an    unique 
document  in  our  Western  historical  records: — C.T.B. 

For  several  days  we  had  been  following  an  Indian 
trail  so  broad  that  it  looked  like  a  wagon-road.  Those 
in  our  command  experienced  in  Indian  warfare  told  us 
that  we  must  be  on  the  track  of  an  Indian  village  on  the 
move,  with  a  large  herd  of  horses.  Evidently  they 
knew  that  we  were  behind  them,  and  seemed  to  be  in 
a  hurry  to  get  away,  for  we  found  camp  utensils,  tent- 
poles,  etc.,  which  had  been  dropped  and  no  time  taken 
to  pick  them  up.  Among  other  things  we  saw  fresh 
antelope  meat,  quarters,  etc.,  and  although  our  rations 
were  nearly,  if  not  all,  gone,  except  some  coffee  and  very 
little  "  sow-belly,"  we  did  not  dare  eat  the  Indians' 
remnants. 

The  night  of  Sept.  i6th,  before  the  attack  next  morn- 

"3 


H4        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

ing,  Scout  Culver,  who  was  killed  next  day,  pointed  out 
to  a  few  of  us  some  torch-lights  upon  the  hills  that  were 
being  swung  like  signals.  I  knew  that  something  "  would 
be  doing"  soon,  but,  like  a  novice,  I  was  as  if  on  an  anx- 
ious seat,  under  a  strain  of  anticipation,  expecting  some- 
thing strange  and  dangerous.  The  next  thing  that  I 
now  recall  was  that  I  was  awakened  just  before  day- 
light by  a  single  cry,  "  Indians!"  so  loud  and  menacing 
that  when  I  jumped  up  from  the  ground  I  was  bewil- 
dered and  felt  as  if  I  wanted  to  ward  off  a  blow,  coming 
from  I  knew  not  where,  for  it  was  still  quite  dark.  That 
cry  I  will  never  forget.  Soon  I  perceived  a  commotion 
among  our  horses  and  mules.  The  Indians,  about  a 
dozen,  tried  to  stampede  them.  I  could  see  in  the  dawn- 
ing light  the  outlines  of  a  white  horse  in  the  distance, 
and  from  the  noise  I  realized  that  they  were  driving 
some  of  our  stock  before  them.  Later,  in  the  daylight 
we  could  recognize  some  of  our  ponies  on  a  neighboring 
hill  in  the  possession  of  the  Indians. 

As  soon  as  we  crossed  from  the  north  bank  of  the 
river  to  the  island,  just  before  the  attack,  we  tied  our 
horses  and  pack  mules  to  shrubs  as  best  we  could. 
During  the  day  a  mule  with  a  partial  pack  on  his  back 
got  loose  and  wandered  around  the  vicinity  of  my  pit. 
He  had  several  arrows  sticking  in  his  body  and  seemed 
wounded  otherwise,  which  caused  him  to  rear  and  pitch 
to  such  an  extent  that  Jim  Lane,  my  neighbor,  and  I, 
decided  to  kill  him.  After  shooting  him  he  fell  and  lay 
between  us,  and  served  us  the  double  purpose  of  food 
and  barricade. 

My  horse  was  securely  tethered  to  the  underbrush  on 
the  island,  and  later  that  day  I  saw  the  poor  beast 
rearing  and  plunging  in  a  death  struggle,  having  been 
shot  and  killed  like  the  rest  of  our  horses  and  mules. 


He  also  furnished  me  with  several  meals  during  the  siege, 
even  after  he  began  to  putrefy.  There  was  little  to 
choose  between  horse  and  mule  meat  under  such  cir- 
cumstances —  both  were  abominable. 

When  day  broke  that  Tuesday,  the  seventeenth  of 
September,  1868,  we  saw  our  pickets  riding  toward 
camp  as  fast  as  their  horses  could  carry  them,  excited- 
ly yelling:  "Indians!  Indians!"  As  I  looked  up  the 
valley  toward  the  west  I  beheld  the  grandest,  wildest 
sight  —  such  as  few  mortals  are  permitted  to  see  and  live 
to  tell  about.  Many  hundreds  of  Indians  in  full  war 
paraphernalia,  riding  their  splendid  war  ponies,  rushed 
toward  us  en  masse.  Some  were  galloping  in  one  di- 
rection, others  cantering  in  another,  their  lances  topped 
with  many-colored  streamers,  the  fantastic  Indian  cos- 
tumes lending  an  awful  charm  to  the  whole.  About 
this  time  those  among  us  who  had  any  had  boiled  some 
coffee  and  were  preparing  to  cross  over  to  the  island. 

I  will  frankly  admit  that  I  was  awed  and  scared.  I 
felt  as  if  I  wanted  to  run  somewhere,  but  every  avenue 
of  escape  was  blocked.  Look  where  I  might  I  per- 
ceived nothing  but  danger,  which  increased  my  agita- 
tion; so  I  naturally  turned  to  Colonel  Forsyth  as  a  pro- 
tector, as  a  young  chick  espying  the  hawk  in  the  air 
flutters  toward  the  mother  wing.  Under  such  condi- 
tions of  strain  some  things  engrave  themselves  vividly 
upon  your  mind,  while  others  are  entirely  forgotten.  I 
remember  that  distinctly  as  in  my  trepidation  I  in- 
stinctively kept  close  to  the  colonel.  I  was  reassured 
by  his  remarkable  self-possession  and  coolness.  While 
stirring  every  one  to  activity  round  us,  he  consulted  with 
Lieutenant  beecher  and  the  guide,  Sharp  Grover,  giv- 
ing directions  here,  advice  there,  until  most  of  the  com- 
mand had  crossed;  then  he  crossed  himself  and  posted 


n6        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

the  men,  telling  them  where  to  take  up  their  ;tt 

positions.     Meantime  the  Indians  were  comin  <» 

I  was  just  behind  the  colonel  when  the  first  s 
the  enemy  came  flying  seemingly  over  our  h 
heard  him  say,  smilingly,  "Thank  you,"  but  imr         ,'tfie- 
afterward  he  ordered  every  one  of  us  to  lie  flat         »irjt  I 
ground,  while  he,  still  directing,  kept  on  his  fee 
ing  around  among  us,  leading  his  horse.     Th  i 

began  coming  thicker,  and  many  of  us  yelled  to  . 
lie  down  also.     How  long  after  this  I   do  not  k 
but    I    heard   the  colonel  cry  out  that  he  was  s 
and  I  saw  him  clutch  his  leg  and  get  down  in  a  sitti 
position. 

I  was  lying  alongside  of  Lou  McLaughlin;  some  tall 
weeds  obscured  my  vision,  so  I  asked  Lou  to  crouch  lower 
and  I  rolled  over  him  to  the  other  side  and  was  there 
kept  busy  with  my  carbine,  for  the  Indians  were  onto  us. 
They  were  circling  around  while  others  were  shooting. 
Very  soon  I  heard  Lou  growl  and  mutter.  I  looked  at 
him  and  saw  that  he  was  hit,  a  bullet  coming  from  the 
direction  where  I  was  lying  struck  his  gun-sight  and 
glanced  into  his  breast.  He  told  me  what  had  hap- 
pened, but  I  could  give  him  no  attention,  for  there 
seemed  lots  of  work  to  do  before  us.  But  later,  after  the 
repulse  of  the  attack,  I  looked  at  Lou  and  was  surprised 
to  see  him  lying  in  a  wallow.  In  his  pain  he  had  torn 
up  the  grass  and  dug  his  hands  into  the  sand.  In  an- 
swer to  my  question  whether  he  was  hurt  bad,  he  told 
me  not  bad,  and  advised  me  to  dig  into  the  sand  and 
make  a  hole,  as  it  would  be  a  protection. 

I  am  not  sure  at  this  time,  but  I  am  now  under  the 
impression  that  I  told  Colonel  Forsyth  of  this;  and  from 
that  time  on  we  began  to  dig  with  our  hands  or  what- 
ever we  could  use,  and  kick  with  our  heels  and  toes  in 


I 


THE    CRUCIAL   MOMENT    ON    BEECHER'S    ISLAND 
Drawing  by  R.  F.  Zogbaum 


Defense  of  Beecher's  Island       117 

the  sand,  and  some  of  us  soon  had  holes  dug  deep 
enough  to  protect  the  chest,  at  least. 

Time  seemed  out  of  our  calculations.  I  heard  some 
one  call,  "What  time  is  it  ?"  An  answer  came,  "  Three 
o'clock."  I  had  thought  it  was  about  ten  A.M.  We  had 
nothing  to  eat  or  drink  all  day  and,  strange  to  say,  I 
was  not  hungry,  which  may  have  been  the  reason  why 
I  thought  it  was  still  early.  Word  was  passed  that 
Lieutenant  Beecher  and  Scouts  Wilson  and  Culver  were 
killed,  Colonel  Forsyth  wounded  again,  also  Doctor 
Mooers  shot  in  the  head  and  others  hurt  whose  names  I 
do  not  now  remember. 

We  fought  steadily  all  day.  After  dark  the  Indians 
withdrew;  then  nature  began  to  assert  itself.  I  got 
hungry;  there  was  nothing  to  eat  in  the  camp  that  I  knew 
of,  except  some  wild  plums  that  I  had  gathered  the  day 
before,  which  were  in  my  saddle-bags,  still  on  the  body 
of  my  horse.  I  got  out  of  my  hole,  creeping  on  hands 
and  knees  toward  where  I  knew  the  poor  animal  lay. 
As  I  felt  my  way  in  the  darkness  I  touched  something 
cold,  and  upon  examination  found  that  it  was  Wilson's 
dead  hand.  He  lay  where  he  fell;  it  was  a  most  horrible 
feeling.  The  shivers  ran  up  and  down  my  back,  but  I 
got  to  my  horse  at  last,  and  tugging,  I  finally  secured  the 
bag  and  my  plums.  I  also  found  in  it  a  piece  of  bacon, 
the  size  of  two  fingers,  which  I  reserved  for  a  last  emer- 
gency, and  was  still  in  possession  of  that  rusty  piece  of 
fat  when  relief  came. 

On  my  way  back  to  my  hole  I  passed  one  where  Doc- 
tor Mooers  lay  wounded,  moaning  piteously.  I  put  a 
plum  in  his  mouth,  and  I  saw  it  between  his  teeth  next 
morning.  He  died  on  the  night  of  the  iQth.  All  our 
wounded  were  very  cheerful,  and  to  look  at  Colonel  For- 
syth and  talk  to  him  as  he  lay  there  helpless,  no  outsider 


n8        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

would  have  suspected  that  he  was  crippled.  We  used 
to  gather  round  him  in  his  pit  and  hold  conversation,  not 
like  men  in  a  desperate  situation,  but  like  neighbors 
talking  over  a  common  cause. 

Colonel  Forsyth  was  the  right  man  in  command  of 
such  a  heterogeneous  company.  Like  the  least  among 
us,  he  attended  to  his  own  horse  when  in  camp,  and 
many  times  have  I  seen  him  gather  buffalo  chips  to 
supply  the  mess  fuel.  While  he  was  our  commander  in 
practice  he  was  our  friend,  and  as  such  we  respected 
him,  followed  and  obeyed  him. 

On  about  the  fifth  day,  as  the  Indians  began  leaving 
us,  we  began  to  walk  about  and  look  around.  About 
fifteen  or  twenty  feet  from  my  pit  I  noticed  a  few  of  our 
men  calling  to  the  rest  of  us.  I  ran  to  the  place,  and 
there,  against  the  edge  of  the  island,  I  saw  three  dead 
Indians.  Their  friends  evidently  could  not  reach  them 
to  carry  them  off,  which  explained  to  us  the  persistent 
fighting  in  this  direction.  When  I  got  there  the  Indians 
were  being  stripped  of  their  equipments,  scalps,  etc. 
One  of  them  was  shot  in  the  head  and  his  hair  was  clot- 
ted with  blood.  I  took  hold  of  one  of  his  braids  and  ap- 
plied my  knife  to  the  skin  above  the  ear  to  secure  the 
scalp,  but  my  hand  coming  in  contact  with  the  blood, 
I  dropped  the  hair  in  disgust. 

Old  Jim  Lane  saw  my  hesitation,  and  taking  up  the 
braid,  said  to  me:  "My  boy,  does  it  make  you  sick  ?  " 
Then  inserting  the  point  of  the  knife  under  the  skin,  he 
cut  around,  took  up  the  other  braid,  and  jerked  the  scalp 
from  the  head.  I  had  been  about  three  years  in  that 
country  and  four  years  in  America,  and  life  on  the  plains 
under  such  hardships  as  I  had  undergone  hardens  the 
sensibility,  yet  I  was  not  quite  ripe  for  such  a  cutting 
affray,  even  with  a  dead  Indian. 


Defense  of  Beecher's  Island       119 

After  this  we  were  not  molested,  but  devoted  our  time 
to  looking  around  for  something  to  eat  besides  the  rotten 
horse  and  mule  meat,  which  we  boiled  several  times  in 
water  and  powder,  not  to  get  it  soft,  but  to  boil  out  the 
stench  as  much  as  possible.  We  found  some  cactus 
fruit,  and  killed  a  coyote,  of  which  the  brains  and  a  rib 
were  my  portion.  Aside  from  this  we  had  nothing  but 
horse  and  mule  during  the  siege,  which  soon  told  on 
our  bowels;  but  in  spite  of  all  this,  I  do  not  remember  a 
despondent  man  in  our  crowd. 

One  morning,  being  the  ninth  since  we  were  attacked, 
I  was  lying  outside  of  my  pit,  having  done  some  guard 
duty  during  the  night;  I  was  half  dozing  and  dreaming 
of  home  and  a  good  meal.  I  felt  so  homesick  and  so 
hungry  when  I  heard  some  one  call  attention  to  some- 
thing moving  on  the  hill. 

I  was  all  attention  at  once.  Soon  I  heard  again  "I 
think  that's  Doctor  Fitzgerald's  greyhound."  Whoever 
it  might  be,  we  would  welcome.  We  would  even  have 
been  pleased  to  have  the  Indians  attack  us  again,  in 
hopes  of  killing  one  of  their  horses  for  fresh  meat;  but 
it  was  soon  evident  that  help  was  coming,  and  when  I 
fully  realized  this  fact,  enfeebled  as  I  was,  I  jumped  up 
and  joined  in  a  lunatics'  dance  that  was  in  progress  all 
around  us.  Those  on  the  hill  must  have  seen  us,  for 
there  was  a  rush  of  horsemen  down  the  hill  toward  us, 
followed  by  one  or  two  ambulance  wagons. 

They  were  as  eager  to  reach  us  as  we  were  to  greet 
them,  and  as  I  ran  uphill  I  noticed  a  soldier  on  a  white 
horse  coming  full  tilt.  The  momentum  carried  him 
past  me,  but  in  passing  I  grabbed  his  saddle-bag  and 
was  taken  off  my  feet,  but  it  would  have  taken  more  than 
one  horse  to  drag  me  from  my  hold.  I  suspected  some 
eatables  in  there,  and  as  soon  as  he  could  stop,  without 


I2O        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

dismounting  he  assisted  me  to  open  that  bag.  With 
both  hands  I  dived  in,  and  with  each  hand  I  clutched 
some  hardtack,  but  only  one  hand  could  reach  my 
mouth;  my  other  was  in  the  grip  of  one  of  our  men, 
who  ravenously  snatched  the  "  tacks."  We  ate,  cried, 
laughed,  and  ate,  all  in  a  breath. 

As  soon  as  possible  we  put  our  dead  in  the  ground. 
Those  that  died  at  one  end  of  the  island  were  cared  for 
by  those  in  that  vicinity,  and  others  in  their  vicinity,  so 
that  one  part  of  the  island  was  not  aware  of  the  location 
of  the  corpses  of  the  other  part;  at  least  I  did  not  know 
where  the  bodies  lay  of  those  killed  on  the  eastern  end 
of  the  island.  So  one  time,  as  I  walked  around  among 
the  pits,  I  noticed  something  red  and  round  sticking  out 
of  the  sand,  like  a  half-buried  red  berry.  I  kicked  it, 
but  by  so  doing  it  was  not  dislodged;  I  kicked  again,  but 
to  no  result.  I  then  looked  closer  and  discovered  that 
it  was  the  nose  of  a  dead  man.  I  called  others  to  my 
assistance,  and  we  fixed  matters  so  that  no  desecration 
was  possible  again. 

Our  mortally  wounded  were  made  as  comfortable  as 
possible  before  they  died.  I  assisted  at  such  ministra- 
tions given  to  Lieutenant  Beecher.  We  removed  his 
boots,  coat,  etc.,  and,  of  course,  these  things  were  not  re- 
placed on  the  body  after  he  was  dead,  but  lay  around 
unnoticed.  My  shoes  were  quite  badly  worn,  especial- 
ly after  being  used  for  digging  in  the  sand,  so  when  re- 
lief came  and  we  were  preparing  to  leave  the  island,  I 
put  on  his  shoes,  which  were  just  about  my  size,  and  wore 
them  even  after  I  got  back  to  New  York  City,  leaving 
my  old  shoes  in  their  stead  on  the  island. 

At  one  of  our  "  sittings  "  around  Colonel  Forsyth  in 
his  pit,  the  incident  of  killing  the  coyote  was  discussed, 
and  plans  were  suggested  for  the  killing  of  more  of  them. 


Defense  of  Beecher's  Island       121 

Along  with  others,  I  also  suggested  a  scheme,  but  it 
was  ridiculed,  and  I  soon  retired  to  my  pit,  which  was 
near  enough  to  the  colonel's,  so  that  I  could  hear  what 
was  said  there.  One  of  the  men  remaining  was  saying 
uncomplimentary  things  about  me,  when  the  colonel 
silenced  him,  telling  him  that  I  was  but  a  boy  unused 
to  such  things  and  that,  under  the  circumstances,  I  was 
doing  better  than  some  of  the  older  men.  Colonel 
Forsyth  is  unconscious  of  the  fact  that  I  am  very  grate- 
ful to  him  for  his  kindness  to  that  strange  "boy"  among 
those  strangers,  and  that  I  still  hope  some  day  that  I 
may  have  the  opportunity  to  show  my  appreciation. 

Jack  Stillwell  and  I  were  the  only  boys  in  the  com- 
pany, and  naturally  gravitated  toward  each  other.  We 
were  friends  as  soon  as  we  met  and  chums  before  we 
knew  each  other's  names.  When  the  colonel  asked  for 
volunteers  to  go  to  Fort  Wallace  for  help,  Jack  was 
among  the  first  to  announce  himself.  I  wanted  to  go 
with  him,  but  the  colonel  gave  no  heed  to  my  request; 
even  Jack  discouraged  me,  for  he  knew  I  was  too  inex- 
perienced. After  Colonel  Carpenter  came  to  our  relief 
Jack  was  not  with  him,  which  made  me  and  others  feel 
very  uneasy.  The  day  after  Colonel  Carpenter's  arrival 
we  saw  the  mounted  sentinel  that  had  been  posted  by 
Colonel  Carpenter  on  a  high  eminence  in  the  hills  about 
three  miles  from  the  island,  signaling  that  a  body  of  men 
was  approaching,  which  created  a  flutter  of  excitement, 
but  there  was  a  strong  sensation  of  security,  mingled 
with  a  sense  of  dependence  upon  our  black  rescuers 
permeating  our  emaciated  party,  after  being  cooped  up, 
so  to  say,  for  so  long  a  period  in  dread  and  suspense.  At 
least  that  was  my  sensation.  I  remember  watching  that 
vedette,  horse  and  rider  turning  around  and  around, 
being  the  only  moving  object  in  that  dim  distance,  indi- 


122         Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

eating  to  the  anxious  watchers  that  either  friend  or  foe 
was  in  the  vicinity.  As  he  showed  no  inclination  to  leave 
his  post,  it  was  soon  evident  he  had  no  fear  of  the  ap- 
proaching column,  and  that  friends  were  coming.  Not 
long  after  a  few  horsemen  were  seen  coming  around  the 
bend  of  the  river  bed,  and  among  them  was  my  friend 
Jack  Stillwell.  Nearly  all  of  us  ran  to  meet  the  party. 
Soon  Jack  jumped  from  his  horse,  and  in  his  joy  to  see 
so  many  of  us  alive  again,  he  permitted  his  tears  free  flow 
down  his  good  honest  cheeks.  I  kept  up  correspond- 
ence with  him  all  these  years  past.  Last  year  he  died.* 
He  was  a  big-hearted,  jovial  fellow,  brave  to  a  fault. 

*  Stillwell  studied  law,  and  ultimately  became  a  judge  in  Texas.  He  was  a  friend 
of  Generals  Miles  and  Custer  —  also  of  "  Wild  Bill  "  Hickock,  "  Texas  Jack  "  Omo- 
hundro,  and  other  famous  figures  on  the  frontier;  and  when  he  died,  a  couple  of 
years  ago,  he  was  the  subject  of  glowing  tributes  from  high  and  low  alike. — C.  T.  B. 


CHAPTER   EIGHT 

Carpenter  and   His   "Brunettes."*     The 
Fight  on  Beaver  Creek 

CARPENTER  had   performed   a   very  com- 
mendable  thing   in   his    march    of  over  one 
hundred  miles   in  two  days  for  the  relief  of 
Forsyth.     And  it  is  marvelous  that  he   had 
been  able  to  find  him  in  that  vast  expanse  of  country. 
He   received    high    praise   for   it,  which  he  fully   de- 
served;   but  the  battle  which,   with    his    black    com- 
rades, he  fought  three  weeks  later,  elicited  still  more 
praise.     The  fight  was  one  of  the  prettiest  and  most 
typical  of  any  in  our  Indian   campaigns;   and  I  am 
fortunate  in  being  able  to  give  it  in  General  Carpenter's 
own  words,  written  especially  for  this  book,  the  notes 
appended  being  my  own  contribution. — C.  T.  B. 

While  on  the  forced  march  to  relieve  the  party  of 
scouts  with  Colonel  George  A.  Forsyth,  surrounded  by 
Indians  on  the  Arickaree  fork  of  the  Republican  River, 
the  troops  under  my  command  discovered  a  large  trail 
of  the  Indians  who  had  been  engaged  in  that  fight 
on  the  south  fork  of  the  Republican. 

*  Negro  troops  were  often  so  styled  by  their  white  comrades  in  the  service. — 
C.  T.  B. 

123 


124       Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

The  scouts  discovered  that  this  trail  left  the  valley 
of  the  stream  a  short  distance  below  and  struck  across 
country  in  the  direction  of  the  Beaver  Creek.  After  the 
relief  of  Forsyth,  on  my  return  to  Fort  Wallace  with  the 
survivors  and  wounded,  a  report  was  made  to  General 
Sheridan,  then  to  the  east  of  Fort  Hayes,  Kansas,  of  the 
probable  whereabouts  of  the  Indians;  and  the  Fifth 
Cavalry,  which  had  just  arrived  from  the  East  by  rail, 
was  disembarked  between  Hayes  and  Wallace  and  or- 
dered to  move  north  under  Major  Royall,  and  strike  the 
savages,  if  possible,  on  the  Beaver.  A  day  or  two  after 
the  Fifth  had  left,  Brevet-Major-General  Eugene  A. 
Carr  reported  for  duty  to  General  Sheridan.  Carr  had 
been  a  general  officer  of  volunteers  during  the  Civil  War 
with  an  excellent  record,  and  now  reverted  to  his  rank 
in  the  regulars  of  Major  in  the  Fifth  Cavalry. 

Sheridan  was  anxious  to  have  Carr  join  his  regiment 
because  of  his  experience  with  Indians  and  his  general 
reputation,  and  therefore  sent  him  to  Fort  Wallace  with 
orders  to  have  the  two  troops  of  cavalry  there  go  under 
my  command  and  escort  Carr  and  overtake  the  Fifth, 
if  possible,  to  enable  him  to  join  his  regiment.  The 
troops  consisting  of  Troops  H  and  I,  Tenth  Cavalry, 
were  officered  by  myself  and  Captain  Graham,  Lieu- 
tenants Banzhaf,  Amick,  and  Orleman,  and  were  soon  in 
readiness  for  the  duty  required.  We  had  returned  from 
the  relief  of  Forsyth  Oct.  1st,  and  we  started  with  Carr 
at  ten  A.M.  Oct.  I4th. 

I  concluded  to  march  north  so  as  to  strike  the  Beaver 
as  soon  as  possible,  and  then  to  follow  down  that  creek 
with  the  expectation  of  finding  the  Fifth  Cavalry  or  of 
striking  its  trail.  On  the  I5th  I  reached  the  Beaver  at 
about  one  P.M.,  and  after  proceeding  some  miles  down, 
went  into  bivouac.  As  we  expected,  we  found  a  very 


The  Fight  on  Beaver  Creek       125 

large  Indian  trail  about  two  weeks  old,  over  which  over 
two  thousand  head  of  ponies  had  been  ridden  or  driven, 
going  in  the  same  direction. 

The  next  day  we  continued  our  journey  down  the 
stream,  rinding  plenty  of  water,  a  fine  bottom  covered 
with  grass  and  timber,  and  still  observing  the  Indian 
trail,  which  ran  to  a  point  about  twenty  miles  east  from 
the  place  where  we  first  struck  the  Beaver.  At  this  lo- 
cality the  signs  showed  that  the  Indians  had  encamped 
for  the  night.  The  ground  was  covered  for  acres  with 
old  fire-places,  pieces  of  wood,  and  the  manure  of  ponies; 
and  a  little  distance  off  we  found  a  dead  Cheyenne, 
wrapped  in  his  robes,  lying  upon  a  scaffolding  in  a  tree, 
a  protection  against  ravenous  wolves.  The  trail  then 
struck  south  toward  Short  Nose  Creek,  the  Indian  name 
for  a  stream  about  twenty  miles  south  of  the  Beaver. 
We  continued  our  course,  however,  on  the  Beaver,  until 
we  made  about  thirty  miles,  and  then  stopped  for  the 
night. 

As  there  was  no  pack  outfit  at  Wallace,  I  was  com- 
pelled to  take  wagons  to  carry  our  supplies,  and  had 
eleven  with  me.  The  mules,  dragging  heavy  loads  over 
rough  country,  were  made  to  trot  in  order  to  keep  up 
with  the  cavalry  column.  We  had  now  moved  down 
the  Beaver  about  forty-five  miles  without  finding  any- 
thing about  the  Fifth,  and  it  began  to  look  as  if  some- 
thing had  taken  the  regiment  in  another  direction. 

The  next  morning  I  sent  Lieutenant  Amick  and  ten 
men  well  mounted  with  Sharp  Grover,  the  famous  scout, 
with  orders  to  proceed  as  quickly  as  possible  across 
country  to  the  Short  Nose  to  look  for  signs  of  the  Fifth 
Cavalry  and  to  keep  a  sharp  lookout  for  Indians. 

Grover,  who,  it  will  be  remembered,  had  been  with 
Forsyth,  afterward  joined  my  command.  He  had  mar- 


126        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

ried  a  Sioux  woman  and  had  lived  for  years  with  the 
Indians  before  the  outbreak  of  hostilities.  He  could 
speak  their  language  and  knew  their  ways  and  customs, 
and  was  perfectly  trained  in  reading  signs.  It  was  in- 
teresting to  see  how  he  could  read  what  the  tracks  meant, 
as  if  they  had  been  books.  He  could  tell  how  long  since 
the  tracks  were  made,  whether  they  were  made  by  horses 
or  ponies,  shod  or  unshod,  how  many  were  ridden, 
how  many  were  driven,  whether  it  was  a  war  party  or  a 
party  changing  camp.  If  Indians  stopped  for  the  night 
he  could  tell  how  many  men  or  squaws  were  in  the  party, 
to  what  tribe  they  belonged,  from  the  shape  of  their 
moccasins,  and  many  more  details.  Like  most  of  his 
ilk,  Grover  drank  heavily  on  occasion.  When  the  In- 
dians went  on  the  war-path  Grover  could  not  stay  longer 
with  the  Sioux,  as  his  life  was  not  safe,  and  he  entered 
the  government  employ,  where  he  rendered  heroic  and 
invaluable  services.  Later  he  was  killed  in  a  row  at 
Pond  City,  near  Fort  Wallace. 

Amick  and  his  party  soon  disappeared  over  the  hills 
to  our  right  and  we  kept  on  down  the  stream,  the  general 
course  of  which  was  to  the  northeast.  I  began  to  feel  cer- 
tain that  the  Fifth  Cavalry  had  never  reached  the  Beaver, 
and  that  we  would  probably  be  attacked  by  the  Indians 
if  this  was  the  case.  Under  these  circumstances  I  felt 
that  it  would  be  wise  to  be  cautious  and  on  the  lookout 
against  surprise.  The  road  we  passed  over  was  very 
rough  and  the  stream  in  most  places  ran  through  deep- 
cut  banks  several  feet  high,  with  very  few  places  suitable 
for  crossing. 

As  night  came  on  a  place  was  selected  for  a  camp  in  a 
bend  of  the  creek  where  the  wagons  could  be  placed 
across,  giving  room  inside  to  graze  the  animals  without 
fear  of  a  stampede  from  howling  savages.  Amick  re- 


The  Fight  on  Beaver  Creek       127 

turned  just  before  night,  having  scouted  some  miles 
beyond  the  Short  Nose  without  discovering  any  trace  of 
the  Fifth  Cavalry.  Grover  told  me  that  as  they  passed 
across  the  divide  between  the  Beaver  and  the  Short 
Nose  he  came  across  a  single  Indian  pony  track.  This 
track  was  coming  from  a  direction  to  our  rear,  and 
showed  that  the  pony  was  going  at  a  rapid  gallop. 
Grover  inferred  from  this  that  it  was  probably  an  Indian 
hunter  returning  homeward  who  had  most  likely 
crossed  our  trail  behind  us,  discovered  our  presence  in 
the  country,  and  was  riding  as  fast  as  possible  to  carry 
the  news  to  the  Indian  camps  somewhere  to  our  front 
and  not  far  off. 

After  a  council  over  the  situation  General  Carr  came 
to  the  conclusion,  after  having  traveled  some  sixty  miles 
down  the  Beaver  without  finding  the  Fifth,  that  the  regi- 
ment had  never  reached  that  stream  and  that  therefore 
he  would  give  it  up  and  start  on  our  return  in  the  morn- 
ing. About  seven  A.M.  on  the  next  day,  Oct.  I5th, 
Captain  Graham  expressed  a  wish  to  make  a  scout  for 
a  short  distance  to  the  front,  and  rode  forward  with  two 
men.  The  command  was  ordered  saddled  up  and  every- 
thing made  in  readiness  to  move.  In  view  of  the  fact 
that  the  south  side  of  the  creek  was  hilly  and  difficult 
and  offered  opportunities  for  ambuscades,  I  determined 
to  go  back  by  the  north  side,  which  was  comparatively 
open.  The  afternoon  before  I  had  sent  Lieutenant 
Orleman  with  a  detachment  to  dig  down  the  sides  of  the 
creek  and  prepare  a  practicable  passage  for  the  wagons 
and  troops. 

Graham  had  hardly  ridden  a  thousand  yards  when 
twenty-five  Indians  suddenly  dashed  over  the  hill  to  his 
rear,  with  the  evident  intention  of  cutting  him  off.  They 
were  almost  upon  Graham  before  he  discerned  them,  but 


128         Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

he  instantly  struck  spurs  into  his  horse  and  dashed  for 
the  creek,  the  Indians  firing  a  volley  at  short  range  upon 
the  party.  One  of  the  bullets  passed  through  Graham's 
hat,  another  through  his  coat,  and  a  third  through  his 
leggings  without  wounding  him.  One  of  the  horses  was 
shot  through  the  shoulder  and  fell.  His  rider  succeeded 
in  getting  into  the  creek  and  behind  the  bank  along  with 
the  other  soldiers,  and  they  commenced  firing  upon  the 
Indians.  Graham's  girth  burst  as  his  horse  sprang 
away  at  the  first  fire,  but  as  his  saddle  gave  way  he  seized 
his  horse's  mane  and  dragged  himself  forward  on  the 
animal.  He  then  dashed  the  horse  over  the  bank  of  the 
creek,  about  ten  feet  to  the  bottom.  He  fell  from  his 
horse  in  this  jump,  but  the  horse,  fortunately,  ran  in 
our  direction.* 

By  this  time  I  started  out  thirty  men  under  Lieutenants 
Amick  and  Orleman  to  cover  the  retreat  of  Graham's 
men.  As  they  charged  toward  the  hill  the  savages  rushed 
from  the  creek  to  avoid  being  cut  off,  and  were  hotly  pur- 
sued by  our  men.  Judging  that  the  presence  of  these 
Indians  indicated  that  a  large  party  could  not  be  far 
ofF,  I  thought  it  best  to  be  prudent  and  sent  a  trumpeter 
to  overtake  Amick  and  tell  him  to  discontinue  the  pur- 
suit and  fall  back  slowly  to  camp.  Without  further 
delay  I  now  broke  up  the  camp,  crossed  the  creek  with 
wagons  and  troops,  and,  having  dismounted  the  men,  de- 
ployed them  as  riflemen  to  cover  the  retreat  of  Amick. 

In  a  few  minutes  the  absent  party  made  its  appear- 
ance on  the  hills,  with  bodies  of  Indians,  numbering  at 
least  a  hundred,  skirmishing  on  our  flank  and  rear. 

*  Luckily  for  Graham,  just  as  he  fell  from  his  horse  Arrack's  men  charged  the 
Indians,  who  thereupon  retreated.  One  of  the  troopers  caught  the  horse  and  held  him 
until  the  captain  came  running  up.  Carpenter's  prompt  action  in  instantly  throwing 
Amick's  detachment  on  the  savages  undoubtedly  saved  the  lives  of  Graham  and  his 
men.  As  it  was,  it  was  a  fearfully  narrow  escape  for  them. —  C.  T.  B. 


The  Fight  on  Beaver  Creek        129 

They  slowly  fell  back  toward  the  creek,  and  when  within 
range  the  dismounted  men  on  the  banks  opened  fire  on 
the  advancing  savages,  and  under  cover  of  this  Amick 
crossed  and  joined  the  command,  while  the  Indians 
kept  at  a  respectful  distance. 

The  wagons  were  now  placed  in  double  column 
so  as  to  make  everything  as  compact  as  possible.* 
H  Troop  was  assigned  on  the  flanks  and  advance, 
deployed  in  open  order.  Troop  I  covered  the  rear  in 
the  same  manner,  with  one  platoon  under  Graham  as 
a  reserve.  These  arrangements  being  completed,  we 
moved  steadily  up  the  creek  bottom.  As  soon  as  this 
movement  commenced,  a  large  body  of  Indians  made 
their  appearance  and  charged  toward  us,  taking  advan- 
tage of  ravines,  trees,  and  bluffs  to  fire  from  the  south 
side  of  the  creek.  Some  of  the  balls  were  well  aimed 
and  came  close. 

I  soon  saw  that  if  we  continued  down  the  creek  bot- 
tom the  enemy  would  harass  us  immensely  under  cover 
of  the  timber  and  banks,  and  therefore  changed  our 
course  so  as  to  leave  the  valley  and  take  the  higher 
ground  or  divide.  The  Indians  followed,  showing 
about  two  hundred  strong,  and  acted  boldly  in  their 
attacks  on  the  rear  and  flanks.  The  men  and  officers 
behaved  very  coolly,  facing  toward  the  enemy  and  driv- 
ing them  back  without  stopping  the  progress  of  the 
column. 

At  one  point  we  passed  near  a  deep  ravine,  and  the 
enemy,  quick  to  observe  cover  of  any  kind,  occupied  it 
with  quite  a  number  of  warriors  and  opened  up  a  seri- 
ous fire.  The  reserve  platoon  under  Graham  charged 
at  the  place  as  we  were  passing  and,  arriving  at  the  edge 
of  the  ravine,  poured  in  a  volley  at  close  range  on  the 

*  Sir  wagons  on  one  side,  five  on  the  other.  —  L.H.C. 


130        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 


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Position  of  Wagons  and  Soldiers  in  Beaver  Creek  Fight 

T,  Troopers  Surrounding  Wagons;    H,  Horses  Inside  the  Incloiurc 
Drawn  by  General  Carpenter 


The  Fight  on  Beaver  Creek        131 

savages.  A  number  must  have  been  hurt  and  the  In- 
dians certainly  lost  no  time  in  getting  out  of  their  posi- 
tion. Afterward  they  were  more  cautious  in  occupying 
ground  too  close  to  us.  The  flankers,  under  Banzhaf 
and  Orleman,  also  repulsed  the  Indians  on  several  occa- 
sions. 

One  Indian  carried  a  red  flag  with  some  white  device 
upon  it,  and  by  his  movements  the  whole  force  seemed 
more  or  less  governed.  They  were  all  stripped  to  the 
waists,  and  were  decorated  by  various  ornaments  hang- 
ing from  their  heads  and  their  shields,  quivers,  and  bri- 
dles, so  as  to  glisten  and  shine  in  the  sun  at  every  turn 
of  the  ponies.  Up  to  this  time  five  Indians  were  known 
to  be  killed  at  various  points  and  quite  a  number 
wounded. 

At  one  P.M.  the  enemy  seemed  to  stop  the  fight  and 
apparently  withdrew,  and  I  supposed  that  I  had  seen  the 
last  of  them;  but  half  an  hour  afterward,  hearing  an  ex- 
clamation, I  looked  back  and  saw  the  Indians  appearing 
again  on  the  hills  to  our  rear.  On  they  came,  one  body 
after  another  coming  in  sight  until  it  was  estimated  by  all 
present  that  at  least  six  hundred  warriors  were  in  view. 
Emboldened  by  their  number  they  rushed  forward,  di- 
recting themselves  toward  our  front,  flanks  and  rear, 
making  things  look  rather  serious.  I  soon  saw  that  we 
could  not  continue  the  march  and  meet  this  force,  but 
that  we  must  select  a  position  and  make  a  stand. 

In  the  first  attack  in  the  morning  I  had  offered  the 
command  to  General  Carr,  as  the  senior  officer  pres- 
ent, but  he  declined  it,  stating  that  he  considered  him- 
self simply  as  a  passenger  to  be  escorted,  and  I  there- 
fore continued  to  direct  the  operations.* 

*  General  Carr,  while  he  used  a  rifle  efficiently  during  the  whole  of  the  action,  did  not 
interfere  with  Carpenter's  arrangements;  with  rare  self-restraint  he  refrained  even  from 


132        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

I  looked  around  and  saw  a  small  knoll  or  rise  a  short 
distance  to  the  front,  from  which  the  ground  fell  in 
every  direction,  and  this  point  was  immediately  selected. 
The  teamsters  were  directed  to  take  the  trot,  aim  for 
this  place,  and  on  arrival  at  the  knoll  immediately  to 
form  a  circular  corral,  half  a  circle  on  either  side,  with 
the  mules  facing  inward,  affording  a  shelter  within  and 
something  of  a  fortification.  As  soon  as  we  increased 
our  pace  the  Indians  evidently  thought  we  were  run- 
ning from  them,  and  sent  up  a  yell  which  made  shivers 
run  down  the  backs  of  some  of  our  recruits.  We  kept 
on,  however,  at  a  fast  gait,  and  the  moment  we  struck 
the  highest  ground,  the  wagons  were  corralled  with  six 
wagons  one  side,  five  wagons  on  the  other,  and  the 
troops  were  rushed  inside  at  a  gallop  and  dismounted. 
The  horses  were  tied  together  inside  the  corral  with 
some  men  to  watch  them,  and  the  rest  were  formed  out 
side  the  corral  in  open  order.*  This  was  done  in  aboi 
two  minutes  and  then  the  advance  of  the  Indians  w; 
upon  us. 

A  fire  commenced  from  our  seven-shooter  Spencei 
which  sounded  like  the  fire  of  a  line  of  infantry.     TI 

offering  suggestions.  Although  he  showed  plenty  of  nerve  and  was  entirely  calm  a 
collected  throughout  the  hot  affair,  he  is  reported  to  have  said  after  the  fight  that 
thought  he  was  in  the  tightest  box  in  which  he  was  ever  caught  in  his  life,  and  that  thi 
was  nothing  left  for  them  all  to  do  but  to  sell  their  lives  as  dearly  as  possible.  He  h 
never  served  on  the  plains  with  negro  troopers  before,  and  had  no  knowledge  as  to  ho 
they  would  behave  against  Indians  —  nobody  had,  for  that  matter. —  C.  T.  B. 

*  When  there  are  many  wagons,  the  corral  is  formed  with  the  wagons  close  together, 
axles  touching,  tongues  and  mules  inward;  but  in  this  case  they  had  to  form  an  open 
corral  with  about  twenty  feet  between  the  wagons.  The  horses,  to  the  number  of  one 
hundred  —  the  troops  being  reduced  to  that  number  by  illness,  hard  work,  and  other 
causes  —  were  forced  inside  the  wagons  in  columns  of  four,  each  set  of  fours  being  tied 
together,  with  horse-holders  detailed  to  look  after  them.  The  duty  of  the  horse- 
holders  was  most  important.  They  had  always  to  be  on  watch  to  prevent  a  stam- 
pede. If  the  troops  had  been  deprived  of  their  horses  on  that  open  knoll  their  position 
would  have  been  hopeless  indeed.  The  dismounted  men  were  formed  in  front  and  rear 
and  on  both  sides  of  the  corral,  as  Indian  attacks  must  be  expected  from  every  direction. 
The  plan  made  by  General  Carpenter  explains  the  situation  perfectly.  —  C.  T.  B. 


THE    CHIEF   MEDICINE    MAN  AT   BEAVER   CREEK 

Drawing  by  Will  Crawford 


The  Fight  on  Beaver  Creek       133 

Indians  charged  up  around  the  wagons,  firing  rapidly 
and  seriously  wounded  some  of  the  men,  but  in  a  very 
short  time  they  were  driven  back  in  wild  disorder,  leav- 
ing the  ground  covered  with  ponies,  arms,  and  some 
bodies.  Three  dead  warriors  lay  within  fifty  feet  of  the 
wagons.  One  man  who  was  killed  here  was  carried  off 
by  his  comrades. 

The  chief  Medicine  Man,  on  a  fine  looking  horse,  rode 
out  in  front  of  our  line  about  two  hundred  yards  off, 
after  the  retreat  of  the  Indians,  to  try  to  show  that 
his  medicine  was  good  and  the  white  man's  bullets 
could  not  hurt  him.  I  directed  several  men  near  me 
to  aim  carefully  at  him.  They  fired  and  the  Medicine 
Man  went  down,  accompanied  by  a  howl  from  the  more 
distant  Indians.  After  the  repulse  the  men  rushed  for- 
ward from  the  wagons,  seized  and  hauled  in  ten  bodies 
of  the  Indians.  The  savages,  disheartened  and  sur- 
prised at  this  reception,  withdrew  out  of  gunshot  and 
assembled,  apparently  for  council.* 

The  men  carried  corn  sacks  and  made  breastworks 
near  the  wagons  and  we  waited,  expecting  a  renewal  of 
the  attack,  for  about  an  hour,  when  it  became  evident 
that  some  of  the  Indians  were  withdrawing.  The  day 
was  very  warm,  we  had  been  engaged  about  eight  hours, 
and  in  the  hot  sun  men  and  animals  were  suffering  very 

*  Just  after  the  first  repulse  of  the  Indians,  Graham  went  to  General  Carr  very  im- 
properly (he  had  no  business  to  communicate  with  him  except  through  Carpenter,  his 
immediate  commanding  officer),  and  suggested  that  he  order  the  wagons  abandoned, 
the  teamsters  mounted  on  the  mules,  and  the  whole  party  to  retreat  in  that  fashion  as 
fast  as  possible.  Carr,  of  course,  referred  the  matter  to  Carpenter,  who  promptly  re- 
fused to  sanction  any  such  manoeuver.  To  leave  the  wagons,  which  afforded  some  pro- 
tection on  the  hill,  would  be  to  enable  six  or  seven  hundred  Indians  to  surround  the  hun- 
dred troopers  in  his  command  and  invite  annihilation.  Carpenter  assured  Carr  that  as 
he  had  defeated  the  Indians  once,  he  was  certain  that  he  could  do  it  again.  Carr  wisely 
persisted  in  his  determination  not  to  interfere,  and  Graham  had  his  suggestion  decisively 
negatived  by  Carpenter.  Graham  deserved  reprobation  for  his  un military  action, 
as  well  as  for  hit  foolish  suggestion. —  C.  T.  B. 


134        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

much  from  thirst.  I  made  up  my  mind  to  move  for 
water,  and  keeping  the  wagons  in  double  column,  the 
horses  inside  and  the  men  dismounted  on  the  outside, 
we  marched  for  the  Beaver.  A  large  party  of  Indians 
followed  up  to  where  their  dead  comrades  lay  and  set 
up  a  mournful  howl  over  their  remains.  Their  loss  in 
this  fight,  added  to  what  they  had  suffered  the  month 
before  in  the  conflict  with  Forsyth,  must  have  had  a 
sobering  effect. 

We  now  proceeded  to  the  creek  without  further  inter- 
ference, and  selecting  a  wide  bottom  encamped  for  the 
night,  preparing  some  rifle-pits  to  cover  our  outlying 
pickets  and  to  enable  them  to  receive  the  enemy  if  an 
attack  were  made  in  the  morning.  We  heard  them 
around  us  all  night  imitating  coyotes,  but  they  did  not 
find  a  weak  place  and  refrained  from  molesting  us. 
The  next  morning  the  Indians  were  gone  and  we 
marched  by  the  shortest  route  to  Fort  Wallace,  arriving 
there  on  the  2ist. 

On  our  return  journey  we  passed  through  Sheridan 
City,  a  frontier  town  located  at  the  then  terminus  of  the 
Kansas  Division  of  the  Union  Pacific  R.  R.  It  was  full 
of  taverns,  saloons,  gambling  houses  and  dens,  and  of 
a  rather  tough  lot  of  citizens  and  desperadoes.  These 
people  and  others  crowded  into  the  streets  when  we 
passed  through,  and  when  they  saw  the  troopers  and 
their  horses  decorated  with  the  spoils  from  the  Indians 
whose  dead  bodies  we  had  captured,  they  knew  that  we 
had  been  in  a  successful  fight  and  they  gave  us  a  perfect 
ovation. 

The  savages  suffered  a  considerable  loss,  but  we  es- 
caped with  a  few  men  wounded  (some  of  them  seriously) 
and  none  killed.  General  Carr  found  the  Fifth  Cavalry 
had  returned  to  the  railroad,  and  through  mistake  they 


The  Fight  on  Beaver  Creek       135 

never  reached  the  Beaver.  He  took  command  of  the 
regiment,  marched  again  and  pursued  the  Indians  over 
the  Platte  River,  and  followed  them  on  a  long  campaign. 

This  was  one  of  the  smartest  and  most  successful  In- 
dian fights  on  record.  Carpenter's  tactics  throughout 
had  been  admirable.  General  Carr  was  much  sur- 
prised and  pleased  at  the  conduct  of  these  black  troop- 
ers, and  on  his  return  to  Fort  Wallace  telegraphed  to 
General  Sheridan  that  "the  officers  and  troops  behaved 
admirably."  General  Sheridan  published  a  general 
order  highly  commending  the  commander,  the  officers 
and  the  men  for  this  brilliant  and  gallant  affair.  Car- 
penter was  brevetted  colonel  in  the  Regular  Army  (his 
fifth  brevet),  and  afterward  received  a  medal  of  honor 
for  this  fight  and  the  relief  of  Forsyth.  Well  did  he 
deserve  them  both.  —  C.  T.  B. 


CHAPTER   NINE 

A  Further   Discussion  of  the  Beaver 
Creek  Affair 

WHEN  General  Carpenter's  account  of  the 
fight  on  the  Beaver  Creek  was  published 
serially,  General  Carr  took  exception  to  it  in 
a  public  letter  to  the  editor  of  the  periodical 
in  which  it  appeared.     I  am  permitted  by  the  editor  to 
make  extracts  from  this  letter,  which,  with  my  own  com- 
ment  and   General  Carpenter's    rejoinder,  appear  as 
follows : 

I.   General  Carr's  Account 

I  do  not  think  that  General  Sheridan  sent  orders  for 
my  escort  to  go  under  command  of  Colonel  Carpenter. 
I  know  that,  after  waiting  with  General  Sheridan  at 
Fort  Hayes  for  several  days,  he  ordered  me  to  go  to 
Fort  Wallace,  take  an  escort  and  go  to  find  Royall,  who 
had  not  been  heard  from  as  expected. 

While  we  were  going  over  the  "rough  hills"  Colonel 
Carpenter,  and  perhaps  some  of  the  others,  came  up  and 
remonstrated  with  me  for  marching  the  command  so 
hard;  said  they  could  not  be  responsible  for  its  effect 
on  the  horses,  and  when  I  insisted,  asked  me  to  take 
command  and  be  responsible.  I  said,  "All  right,  I 

136 


The  Beaver  Creek  Affair          137 

will  take  command;  but  you  must  attend  to  the  details. 
I  will  not  appoint  an  adjutant  and  take  the  office  work'* 
(detailing  guards,  stable  duties,  etc.,  etc.). 

I  had  with  me  an  officer  of  my  regiment,  Captain 
Kane,  Fifth  Cavalry,  and  now  wish  I  had  appointed  him 
adjutant  and  taken  formal  command. 

Finding  that  the  stream  (Beaver  Creek)  was  persist- 
ently hugging  the  south  side  of  the  valley,  on  which  we 
were  traveling,  creating  bluffs  and  ravines  over  which  it 
was  difficult  to  move  the  wagons,  I  determined  to  cross 
to  the  north  side,  where  the  valley  consisted  of  a  gentle 
and  smooth  slope. 

I  selected  the  camp  in  an  "ox  bow"  bend  of  the  creek, 
putting  the  tents  and  wagons  across  the  entrance,  the 
guard  at  the  bow  and  the  animals  inside,  selected  a  place 
for  crossing,  and  ordered  the  banks  to  be  cut  down  to  the 
bed  of  the  creek,  so  that  the  wagons  and  animals  could 
cross. 

In  the  Indian  country  I  always  had  my  commands  up 
and  under  arms  before  daylight,  which  is  the  most  dan- 
gerous time;  and  next  morning  we  were  up,  had  break- 
fast, the  tents  struck  and  the  wagons  packed,  and  were 
standing  'round  the  camp  fire  when  Amick  called  out 
"Indians!" 

I  had  intended  to  move  camp  across  trie  creek  and  get 
fresh  grass.  Graham  had  started  on  his  trip,  following 
a  narrow  path  between  the  bluff  and  the  river  bank. 
He  was  riding  a  fine  horse  called  "Red  Eye,"  which  had 
a  very  deep  chest  and  thin  barrel.  As  he  told  me  after- 
ward, his  saddle  began  to  slip  back,  but  he  waited  to  get 
down  to  fix  it  till  he  should  reach  a  more  open  place 
ahead  at  the  mouth  of  a  ravine,  when  bang,  bang  !  came 
some  shots.  His  horse  dodged  and  jumped  down  the 
bank  into  the  creek,  slipping  the  saddle  farther  back  and 


138        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

kicking  it  clear,  while  Graham  landed  on  the  shoulders 
of  the  horse  and  from  there  on  the  bed  of  the  creek. 
He  turned  back  with  his  gun  toward  the  bank,  which 
protected  him  while  he  fired,  till  I  sent  Lieutenant 
Amick  with  some  skirmishers,  who  covered  his  retreat. 
His  two  men  jumped  their  horses  down  into  and  up  out 
of  the  creek  and  fell  back,  and  when  we  got  the  men  all 
in  I  moved  the  command  up  to  and  over  the  crossing  I 
had  prepared  and  out  to  the  open  slope  on  the  north  side 
of  the  valley.  As  we  had  not  found  Royall  but  had 
found  the  Indians,  or,  rather,  they  had  found  us,  it  was  of 
no  use  to  go  farther  down  the  Beaver,  and  I  determined 
to  move  toward  home. 

The  Indians  kept  coming  out  from  those  bluffs,  cross- 
ing the  creek  and  following  us,  and  I  arranged  the  wag- 
ons in  two  columns,  with  Carpenter's  company  in  front 
and  on  the  flanks,  and  Graham's  company  in  rear,  where 
I  was  also. 

Some  of  the  Indians  got  on  our  flanks  as  skirmishers, 
a  few  in  front  and  more  in  rear,  while  the  main  body  got 
into  two  columns,  about  like  the  two  halves  of  a  regi- 
ment in  columns  of  four,  marching  steadily  and  gradu- 
ally, closing  on  us  by  increasing  their  gait.  I  estimated 
them  at  seven  hundred  warriors;  we  had  about  one  hun- 
dred colored  soldiers.  Their  chiefs  were  marching  be- 
tween the  heads  of  their  columns;  they  had  a  flag  and  a 
bugle.  I  sent  word  to  Carpenter  to  turn  more  toward 
the  higher  ground,  away  from  the  timber  along  the  creek, 
which  Indians  were  using  for  cover.  Pretty  soon  he  be- 
gan to  trot,  and  I  had  to  send  Captain  Kane  to  him  with 
orders  to  go  slower,  for  fear  of  a  stampede.  I  was  in  the 
rear  near  Graham's  troop.  He  was  one  of  the  bravest 
men  I  ever  saw.  He  would  amuse  himself  with  the  In- 
dians by  concealing  men  in  hollows,  taking  away  their 


The  Beaver  Creek  Affair          139 

horses  till  Indians  came  up  for  them  to  shoot  at,  then 
charging  up  with  their  horses,  mounting  and  bringing 
them  off.  Most  of  the  men  were  cool,  but  I  saw  one 
man  loading  and  firing  when  the  Indians  were  a  mile 
away.  I  called  to  him  to  stop,  but  he  paid  no  attention, 
seemed  to  be  dazed,  and  I  had  to  go  up  and  lay  my  hand 
on  him  before  he  obeyed  my  order.  As  the  Indians  got 
closer,  one  of  the  men  dismounted  to  shoot.  When  he 
tried  to  remount,  his  horse  got  scared  and  edged  away 
from  him,  and  I  rode  up  on  the  off-side,  got  hold  of  the 
rein,  and  let  his  horse  come  against  mine.  Then  he  put 
his  foot  in  the  stirrup,  made  a  leap  and  got  his  leg  over, 
when  we  both  cantered  off  —  just  in  time.  He  lost  his 
cap,  and  we  lost  a  dog  which  was  playing  about  be- 
tween us  and  the  Indians,  interested  in  the  shooting  till 
he  got  near  enough  to  them  to  be  killed.  These  were 
our  only  losses. 

As  the  main  body  of  the  Indians  got  closer  and  in- 
creased their  gait  to  the  charge,  the  leading  wagons 
turned  toward  each  other  and  stopped.  The  others 
turned  their  mules  inside  of  those  in  front  of  them,  lap- 
ping onto  and  tying  to  the  wagons,  forming  a  corral  in 
shape  of  a  flat-iron,  and  the  horsemen  rode  inside,  dis- 
mounted, tied  their  horses,  and  began  to  fire  at  the 
Indians  who  were  thronging  around  us.  One  Indian, 
on  a  clay-bank  pony  and  wearing  a  red  blanket,  with  no 
arms,  rode  'round  and  'round  us  within  fifty  or  one  hun- 
dred yards,  and  seemed  to  bear  a  charmed  life.  I  shot  at 
him  several  times,  and  Grover  said  he  also  shot  at  him 
till  he  began  to  think  the  Indian  had  strong  medicine 
which  protected  him  —  Grover  was  a  squaw  man  and 
had  imbibed  some  of  their  superstitions.  He  was  shoot- 
ing a  Sharp's  carbine,  and,  taking  it  down  to  reload, 
happened  to  notice  that  he  had  the  sight  set  for  five 


140        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

hundred  yards  and  had  been  shooting  over  the 
Indian's  head. 

I  had  a  Spencer  carbine  which  had  been  sent  me  by 
the  company  for  trial.  With  it  I  shot  down  an  Indian, 
who  fell  and  lay  within  thirty  yards  of  the  corral.  He 
was  not  dead,  and  I  afterward  talked  with  him  through 
Grover.  He  said  his  name  was  Little  Crow,  and  men- 
tioned the  name  of  his  father,  whom  Grover  said  he 
knew.  He  was  young  —  about  eighteen.  I  asked  him 
why  they  attacked  us.  He  said  because  we  came  on 
their  creek.  He  told  where  their  camp  was,  so  that 
one  week  from  that  day,  which  was  Sunday,  October 
1 8th,  1868,  I  found  them  with  my  own  regiment,  the 
Fifth,  had  a  fight  lasting  two  days  and  two  nights,  and 
drove  them  out  of  Kansas. 

While  the  fight  was  going  on  our  soldiers  showed 
great  bravery.  While  inside  the  wagon  corral  they 
would  rush  from  one  side  to  the  other,  wherever  the  In- 
dians appeared,  so  as  to  fire  at  them.  Their  officers 
did  not  seem  to  keep  them  in  their  places,  and,  after 
it  was  over,  I  reprimanded  them  for  not  commanding 
their  men.  After  the  Indians  were  repulsed  we  went 
around  and  rearranged  the  wagons,  got  out  sacks, 
cracker-boxes,  etc.,  fixed  breastworks  in  anticipation 
of  another  attack,  and  then  sat  down  and  ate  our  lunch. 

It  was  two  o'clock.  Our  soldiers  wanted  to  scalp  the 
dead  Indians,  of  whom  about  ten  were  lying  too  near 
the  corral  for  their  friends  to  carry  off.  We  prevented 
this  till,  while  we  were  going  around  the  corral  rearrang- 
ing, the  soldiers  got  the  chance  to  scalp  them.  Two 
were  lying  wounded  when  two  soldiers  approached 
them;  one  drew  his  bow  and  sent  an  arrow  through  the 
thighs  of  one  of  the  men.  The  arrow  passed  through 
the  fleshy  part  of  one  thigh  and  entered  the  other  and 


The  Beaver  Creek  Affair          141 

stopped  against  the  bone.  It  had  to  be  cut  in  two  to 
extract  it.  Years  after,  at  Fort  Leavenworth,  a  first  ser- 
geant showed  me  an  arrow-head  with  the  point  marred, 
and  said  he  was  that  man. 

The  other  wounded  Indian  had  a  pistol,  and  shot  the 
other  soldier  in  the  calf  of  his  leg.  These  were  the  only 
men  we  had  hurt.  It  was  then  that  there  was  some 
talk  of  abandoning  the  wagons  and  going  direct  for  the 
railroad.  With  the  wagons,  we  had,  of  course,  to  go  by 
routes  over  which  wheeled  vehicles  could  travel.  I  do 
not  recall  whether  Captain  Graham  advocated  this,  but 
there  would  have  been  no  impropriety  in  his  stating  his 
views  to  me.  Any  officer  can  talk  to  his  commander, 
and  I  had  been  giving  orders  from  time  to  time  directly 
to  him  and  his  men.  We  sat  there  eating  our  lunch  and 
talking  with  each  other  and  the  wounded  Indian  who  lay 
in  front  of  us,  when  he  made  a  motion  with  his  hand 
back  toward  me.  I  asked  Grover  what  he  meant. 
He  said,  "He  wants  you  to  go  away;  says  his  heart  is 
bad."  This  pleased  me  very  much.  I  had  been  watch- 
ing the  Indians,  who  had  fallen  back  to  some  rising 
ground  nearly  a  mile  off.  They  were  moving  about, 
pow-wowing,  and,  I  supposed,  preparing  for  a  new  at- 
tack. They  seemed  to  be  diminishing  in  numbers,  but 
I  thought  they  were  trying  to  get  around  to  some  place 
where  they  would  have  a  better  chance  at  us.  I  really 
did  not  expect  to  get  out  of  that  fix.  If  those  Indians 
had  had  sufficient  resolution,  being  seven  to  one,  they 
ought  to  have  used  us  up.  When  the  wounded  Indian 
made  this  motion,  I  took  it  to  mean  that  he  knew  they 
were  giving  up.  He  could  see  them  as  well  as  we  could, 
and  knew  better  what  they  were  doing.  I  suppose  that 
those  who  remained  were  the  friends  of  the  dead,  wait- 
ing for  us  to  go. 


142        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

I  gave  orders  to  reload  the  wagons  and  move  out. 
Some  of  the  Indians  followed  us  for  several  miles,  but 
did  not  again  attack. 

Colonel  Carpenter  did  not  offer  the  command  to  me 
at  the  first  attack  in  the  morning,  nor  did  I  decline  it. 
I  was  exercising  the  command  all  the  time.  One  of  the 
articles  of  war  provides  that  "when  troops  join  and  do 
duty  together  the  highest  in  rank  of  the  line  of  the  army 
shall  command  the  whole,  and  give  the  orders  needful 
for  the  service,"  and  I  could  not  have  avoided  the  re- 
sponsibility. 

The  foregoing  narrative  shows  that  I  was  not  a  "pas- 
sive spectator, "  nor  did  I  "  refrain  from  advice  or  sugges- 
tion," nor  from  giving  orders  as  required. 

I,  no  doubt,  said  that  I  was  a  guest,  and  did  not  inter- 
fere unnecessarily;  but  my  long  experience  on  the  plains 
and  with  Indians  rendered  it  incumbent  on  me  to  exer- 
cise my  judgment. 

EUGENE  A.  CARR, 
Brevet  Major-General  and  Congressional  Medallist. 

With  reference  to  this  letter  from  General  Carr  I  beg 
to  point  out: 

That  General  Carr  in  his  letter  practically  admits  in 
two  places  that  he  was  not  in  command.  First,  when 
he  writes  of  Captain  Kane,  "I  wish  I  had  appointed  him 
adjutant  and  taken  formal  command."  Second,  when 
he  writes:  "I,  no  doubt,  said  that  I  was  a  guest,  and 
did  not  interfere  unnecessarily." 

I  do  not  see,  therefore,  that  there  is  really  any  serious 
discrepancy  between  the  account  of  General  Carpenter 
and  that  of  General  Carr.  I  presume,  if  there  is,  I  am 
more  to  blame  than  any  one  for  the  note  to  which  Gen- 
eral Carr  takes  exception.  The  original  wording  of 


The  Beaver  Creek  Affair          143 

that  note  was,  possibly,  not  happy,  and  probably  con- 
veyed more  than  I  intended.  I  did  not  suppose  that 
any  one  thought  that  General  Carr  sat  around  and 
twiddled  his  thumbs  while  the  fighting  was  going  on. 
I  have  made  changes  in  the  note,  which  appears  in  this 
book  in  its  amended  form. 

It  must  not  be  forgotten  that  General  Carpenter  re- 
ceived his  medal  of  honor  in  part  for  this  fight,  and  he 
certainly  would  not  have  received  it  had  he  not  been  in 
command. 

Here  follows  a  communication  from  General  Carpen- 
ter on  the  subject.  This  discussion,  I  think,  settles  the 
matter  in  a  way  which  I  trust  will  be  satisfactory  to  the 
friends  of  both  of  these  distinguished  officers. 

II.  General  Carpenter's  Reply 

I  was  very  much  surprised  in  reading  General  Carr's 
contention  that  he  was  in  command  of  the  troops  who 
constituted  his  escort  to  enable  him  to  join  the  Fifth 
Cavalry,  and  who  were  in  the  action  on  the  Beaver  in 
October,  1868.  The  account  I  wrote  is  from  my  recol- 
lection, and  from  letters  written  home  at  the  time$  and  I 
repeated  what  I  thought  there  was  no  question  about, 
and  had  no  desire  to  ignore  General  Carr  or  any  one 
concerned. 

The  two  troops  of  the  Tenth  Cavalry,  a  portion  of  the 
garrison  at  Fort  Wallace,  under  my  command  as  the 
senior  officer,  were  ordered  to  act  as  escort  for  General 
Carr,  then  Major,  Fifth  Cavalry. 

I  am  quite  positive  that  General  Carr  was  offered  the 
command  by  me,  knowing  him  to  be  senior,  and  that 
he  declined  it.  Many  officers  have  been  escorted  by 
troops  without  taking  command  of  the  escort  although 


144        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

of  senior  rank.  As  the  troops  were  to  escort  this  officer, 
of  course  he  was  consulted  about  the  direction  of  the 
march,  the  time  for  camping,  and  concerning  many 
other  details  of  greater  or  less  importance,  but  he  never 
took  formal  command.  If  he  did  not,  then,  it  would  be 
manifestly  improper  for  him  to  issue  orders  directly  to 
subordinate  officers  or  men.  The  officers  and  men  were 
mentioned  in  General  Orders  by  General  Sheridan  in 
1868  for  their  gallantry  and  bravery  in  this  action,  and 
it  is  stated  that  they  were  escorting  General  Carr. 

Thirty-five  years  have  passed  since  the  affair,  and  I 
never  heard  of  any  question  about  who  commanded  the 
troops  engaged.  This  length  of  time  naturally  accounts 
for  some  difference  of  memory,  and  no  two  narratives 
may  be  expected  altogether  to  agree.  As  mentioned 
before,  Carr  was  consulted  frequently  during  the  expe- 
dition and  his  wishes  were  carried  out,  as  was  proper 
under  the  circumstances. 

Some  of  the  details  mentioned  by  General  Carr  I  do 
not  remember,  but  I  certainly  regarded  myself  as  being 
in  command  of  the  troops  during  the  fight  and  gave  di- 
rections as  I  have  stated  in  accordance  with  my  recollec- 
tion, and  selected  the  ground  on  which  the  wagons  were 
corralled  and  the  Indians  repulsed. 

I  do  not  know  of  any  officers  being  reprimanded, 
but  when  we  returned  to  Fort  Wallace  we  were  in- 
formed that  General  Carr  had  reported  to  General 
Sheridan  that  "the  officers  and  men  had  behaved 
admirably." 

I  inclose  a  copy  of  General  Field  Orders,  No.  4, 
Headquarters  Department  of  the  Missouri,  dated 
October  27,  1868,  issued  by  order  of  General  Sheridan 
to  commend  the  conduct  of  the  troops  engaged  in  the 
combat  on  the  Beaver,  October  18,  1868: 


The  Beaver  Creek  Affair          145 

Headquarters  Department  of  the  Missouri. 
In  the  Field,  Fort  Hays,  Kansas,  October  27,  1868. 

General  Field  Orders,  No.  4. 

The  attention  of  the  officers  and  soldiers  of  this  department  is 
called  to  the  engagement  with  hostile  Indians  on  Beaver  Creek, 
Kansas,  October  18,  1868,  in  which  a  detachment  of  cavalry  (escort- 
ing Brevet  Major-Gen'l  E.  A.  Carr,  Major,  Fifth  Cavalry  to  his 
Regiment)  under  the  command  of  Brevet  Lient-Col.  Louis  H. 
Carpenter,  Captain,  Tenth  Cavalry,  consisting  of  Companies  I,  Tenth 
Cavalry,  under  Capt.  George  W.  Graham  and  1st  Lieut.-Major  J. 
Amick,  and  H,  Tenth  Cavalry,  under  1st  Lieut.  Charles  Banzhaf 
and  ad  Lieut.  Louis  H.  Orleman,  engaged  about  five  hundred  (500) 
Indians  for  several  hours,  inflicting  a  loss  on  the  savages  of  ten  (10) 
killed  and  many  wounded,  losing  three  (3)  enlisted  men  wounded. 

The  major-general  commanding  desires  to  tender  his  thanks  for 
the  gallantry  and  bravery  displayed  by  this  small  command  against 
so  large  a  body  of  Indians. 

By  command  of  Major-General  Sheridan. 

J.  SCHUYLER  CROSBY, 

Brevet  Lieut.-Col.  A.  D.  C. 

A.  A.  A.  General. 

It  is  expressly  stated  that  the  detachment  of  cavalry 
(escorting  Brevet  Major-General  Eugene  A.  Carr, 
Major,  Fifth  Cavalry,  to  his  regiment)  was  "under  the 
command  of  Brevet  Lieut.-Col.  Louis  H.  Carpenter, 
Captain,  Tenth  Cavalry." 

The  records  show,  further,  that  Brevet  Lieut.-Col. 
Louis  H.  Carpenter  was  brevetted  colonel  for  gallant 
and  meritorious  conduct  in  the  engagement  with  Indians 
on  Beaver  Creek,  Kansas,  October  18,  1868.  This 
appointment  was  made  on  the  recommendation  of 
General  Sheridan,  and  was  undoubtedly  conferred  on 
this  officer  as  being  in  command  of  the  troops  during 
the  fight.  Others  behaved  gallantly  and  their  conduct 
deserved  recognition,  but  this  was  the  only  brevet  given 
at  the  time.  Louis  H.  CARPENTER. 


CHAPTER  TEN 
The  Battle  of  the  Washita 

I.    Custer  and  the  Famous  Seventh  Cavalry 

A  FIGHTER  of  fighters  and  a  soldier  of  sol- 
diers was  that  beau  sabreur  of  the  American 
Army,  Giorge  Armstrong  Custer,  "Old 
Curly"  to  }iis  men,  "The  White  Chief  with 
the  Yellow  Hair,"  or,  more  briefly,  "Long  Hair" 
to  the  Indians.  Frorn  Bull  Run  to  Appomattox  his 
career  was  fairly  meteoric.  Second  lieutenant  in  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  ^at  twenty-one,  fresh  from  West 
Point,  a  brigadier-general  at  twenty-three,  a  major- 
general  at  twenty-four,  and  commander  of  the  third  cav- 
alry division,  which,  in  the  six  months  preceding  the 
downfall  of  the  Confederacy,  had  taken  one  hundred  and 
eleven  guns,  sixty-five  battle-flags,  and  over  ten  thousand 
prisoners  of  war,  without  losing  a  flag  or  gun,  and  with- 
out a  failure  to  capture  whatever  it  went  for  —  such 
was  his  record.* 

I  have  heard  my  father  tell  of  the  impression  made  by 
the  dashing  young  soldier  whose  spirited  horse  ran  away 
on  Pennsylvania  Avenue  at  the  Grand  Review  in  Wash- 

*  This  statement  has  been  called  in  question.  The  facts  are  taken  from  Custer's 
farewell  order  to  his  division,  April  19,  1865,  as  published  in  Captain  Frederick 
Whittaker's  "  Complete  Life  of  General  George  A.  Custer,"  Sheldon  &  Co.,  New 
York,  1876.  There  is  no  possible  doubt  as  to  the  correctness  of  the  statement. 

I46 


The  Battle  of  the  Washita        147 

ington,  in  spite  of  the  efforts  of  his  rider  —  a  peerless 
horseman  —  to  restrain  him.  Custer's  hat  fell  off,  his 
long,  yellow  curls  floated  back  in  the  wind,  making  a 
dashing  and  romantic  picture.  He  was  a  man  of  su- 
perb physique  and  magnificent  strength.  I  saw  him 
when  I  was  a  boy,  and  I  have  never  forgotten  him.  His 
devoted  wife,  in  one  of  the  three  charming  books  in 
which  she  has  told  the  deathless  romance  of  their  mar- 
ried life  on  the  frontier,  relates  how,  on  one  occasion, 
riding  by  her  side,  with  his  left  arm  he  lifted  her  out  of 
the  saddle  high  in  the  air,  held  her  there  for  a  moment  or 
two,  then  gently  replaced  her  on  her  horse.  No  fatigue 
was  too  great  for  him  to  surmount,  no  duty,  however 
arduous,  ever  caused  him  to  give  back.* 

Reams  have  been  written  about  Kis  unfortunate  cam- 
paign upon  the  Little  Big  Horn,  in  which  he  went  down 
to  such  awful  destruction,  but  little  is  known  of  some  of 
the  exploits  of  his  early  career  on  the  plains.  After  the 
war,  more  fortunate  than  most  of  the  younger  general 
officers  who  were  forced  to  content  themselves  with  cap- 
taincies or  less,  General  Custer  was  appointed  Lieuten- 
ant-Colonel of  the  new  Seventh  Regular  Cavalry,  a 
regiment  which  was  born  with  him,  lived  with  him,  and 
a  large  part  of  which  died  with  him. 

The  officers  of  the  regiment  were  a  set  of  unusual 
men.  Custer  himself  was  allowed  considerable  voice 
in  the  selection  of  them,  and  such  a  body  of  officers  had 
been  rarely  assembled  in  one  command.  Most  of  the 
troopers  were  not  at  first  of  the  high  grade  to  which  they 
afterward  attained.  The  best  men,  in  the  ranks  at 
least,  at  the  close  of  the  Civil  War,  had  had  enough  of 

*  It  is  interesting,  in  view  of  his  great  services  to  his  country,  to  learn  that  the  first 
American  ancestor  of  the  Custer  family  was  a  Hessian  officer  who  was  captured  at  Sara- 
toga in  1777. 


148        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

fighting.  They  wanted  to  get  back  to  civil  life  once 
more.  Not  frequently  it  was  only  the  inferior  soldiers 
who  could  be  induced  to  re-enlist  from  the  volunteer 
into  the  regular  regiments  which  were  being  organized 
or  reorganized. 

There  were  in  the  ranks,  however,  a  leaven  of  vet- 
erans who  were  soldiers  from  love  as  well  as  from  habit. 
With  these  as  a  nucleus,  Custer  and  his  officers,  by  a 
judicious  weeding  out  and  a  rigorous  course  of  disci- 
pline, soon  gathered  a  body  of  troopers  than  which  there 
were  none  finer  in  the  service  of  the  United  States,  nor, 
in  fact,  in  any  other  service.  Owing  to  the  fact  that  the 
colonel,  a  distinguished  general  officer  in  the  war,  was 
on  detached  service  commanding  a  department,  the 
regiment  was  practically  continuously  under  the  com- 
mand of  Custer  until  his  death  in  1876. 

The  duty  that  devolved  upon  it  was  the  protection  of 
the  settlers  in  Kansas.  The  job  was  no  sinecure.  In 
the  last  half  of  the  year  1868  statistics,  which  do  not 
pretend  to  be  comprehensive,  for  they  are  only  facts  re- 
ported officially  to  the  headquarters  of  the  Department  of 
the  Missouri,  show  one  hundred  and  fifty-seven  people 
killed,  fifty-seven  wounded,  including  forty-one  scalped, 
fourteen  women  outraged  and  murdered,  one  man,  four 
women  and  twenty-four  children  taken  into  captivity, 
one  thousand  six  hundred  and  twenty-seven  horses, 
mules  and  cattle  stolen,  twenty-four  ranches  or  settle- 
ments destroyed,  eleven  stage  coaches  attacked,  and 
four  wagon  trains  annihilated.  This  with  a  total  loss  to 
the  Indians  of  eleven  killed  and  one  wounded.  Truly 
there  was  a  reign  of  blood  upon  that  frontier.  Every 
man  murdered  was  also  frightfully  and  disgustingly 
mutilated.  This  record  takes  no  account  of  soldiers 
who  were  killed. 


The  Battle  of  the  Washita        149 

In  one  instance  ten  troopers  under  Lieutenant  Kid- 
der,  of  the  Second  Cavalry,  with  a  message  for  Custer's 
command,  then  in  the  field,  were  overtaken  and  slaugh- 
tered to  a  man  after  a  desperate  defense.  When  Cus- 
ter  came  upon  the  scene  of  battle  the  bodies  were  so 
mutilated  that  it  was  impossible  to  tell  one  from  the 
other.  The  only  distinguishing  mark  upon  any  one  of 
them  was  a  shirt  neckband  made  of  a  material  of  a 
peculiar  marking,  which  was  yet  a  common  article  of 
wearing  apparel  at  that  time.  It  was  by  this  shirt  collar 
that  the  body  of  Lieutenant  Kidder  was  subsequently 
identified  by  his  mother  and  taken  East  for  burial. 

As  usual,  there  was  strife  between  the  Indian  agents 
and  the  army.  There  always  has  been,  there  always 
will  be.  The  agents  invariably  declared  that  there  was 
peace  in  the  land  and  sought  to  embarrass  the  army  in 
its  efforts  to  protect  the  frontier.  Popular  indignation, 
however,  at  last  forced  the  government  to  act,  and  the 
campaign  was  long  and  arduous  during  the  latter  part 
of  the  summer  of  1868. 

The  success  of  the  soldiers  was  not  pronounced  at 
first.  The  extent  of  territory  was  great,  the  force  avail- 
able small,  the  Indians  exceedingly  mobile,  and  the 
troopers  had  as  yet  scarcely  learned  the  rules  of  the 
game,  so  that  it  was  a  matter  of  extreme  difficulty  to 
get  at  any  considerable  body  of  Indians  and  inflict  a 
crushing  blow.  As  we  have  seen,  General  Forsyth's  com- 
mand barely  escaped  annihilation  in  the  great  battle 
of  the  Arickaree.  Matters  dragged  on,  however,  with 
nothing  decisive  happening  until  the  summer  and  fall 
had  slipped  away  and  winter  was  at  hand.  The  Indians  v 
rarely  did  any  fighting  in  the  winter.  It  was  difficult  /\ 
and  dangerous  for  horsemen  to  move  on  the  exposed 
prairies  in  the  winter  season,  and  hitherto  fighting  had 


150        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

been  abandoned  with  the  advent  of  the  cold.  The  In- 
dians, during  the  winter,  naturally  tended  southward, 
seeking  a  less  severe  climate  if  it  might  be  had,  and  from 
November  to  April  had  been  considered  a  closed  season. 

II.   The  March  in  the  Blizzard 

General  Sheridan,  however,  who  had  command  of  the 
department,  determined  to  inaugurate  a  winter  cam- 
paign in  the  hope  that  the  Indians,  who  would  naturally 
congregate  in  large  villages  in  secluded  spots  sheltered 
by  trees  along  the  river  banks,  might  be  rounded  up  and 
defeated  decisively.  The  force  at  his  disposal  for  these 
projected  operations  consisted  of  eleven  troops  of  the 
Seventh  Cavalry,  four  companies  of  infantry,  and  the 
Nineteenth  Kansas  Volunteer  Cavalry,  a  regiment  of 
settlers  and  old  soldiers  which  had  been  organized  for 
the  campaign. 

The  expedition  was  under  command  of  Sheridan  him- 
self. The  rendezvous  was  at  Camp  Supply,  in  the  In- 
dian Territory,  about  one  hundred  miles  south  of  Fort 
Dodge,  Kansas.  No  Indians — in  any  considerable  body, 
that  is  —  had  been  seen  by  any  of  the  scouts  sent  out, 
and  no  outrages  were  reported.  It  was  evident  that  the 
hostiles  were  lying  snugly  concealed  somewhere  for  the 
winter  season.  Sheridan  determined  to  detach  Custer 
and  his  regiment  from  the  command  and  send  them 
scouting  farther  southward,  while  with  the  rest  of  the 
force,  so  soon  as  it  should  be  in  condition  to  march,  he 
himself  would  explore  the  country  in  other  directions. 

Custer  received  his  orders  on  the  22d  of  November, 
late  at  night.  Reveille  was  sounded  at  four  o'clock  on 
the  twenty-third.  The  thermometer  was  below  zero. 
There  was  a  foot  of  snow  upon  the  ground,  and  it  was 


The  Battle  of  the  Washita         151 

still  coming  down   furiously  when  Custer  reported  to 
Sheridan  that  he  was  ready  to  move. 

"What  do  you  think  of  this?"  asked  Sheridan, 
alluding  to  the  weather. 

"It's  all  right,"  answered  Custer,  cheerfully;  "we 
can  move.  The  Indians  can't." 

There  was  a  hasty  breakfast,  coffee  and  hardtack, 
each  trooper  standing  by  the  head  of  his  horse,  and  the 
column  moved  off.  The  undaunted  band  of  the  regi- 
ment, surely  made  up  of  the  most  heroic  and  hardy  musi- 
cians that  ever  tooted  horn  or  thumped  sheepskin,  in 
gallant  style  played  them  out  and  into  the  terrible  bliz- 
zard then  raging,  with  the  old  marching  tune  "The 
Girl  I  left  Behind  Me,"  which  was  more  fancy  than 
truth,  for  there  were  no  "girls"  with  that  expedition, 
save  one  hard-featured  old  campaigner,  red-headed  at 
that,  who  went  along  as  the  commanding  officer's  cook 
at  her  own  earnest  request. 

No  one  can  realize  the  force  of  a  blizzard  on  the  plains 
who  has  not,  as  I  have,  experienced  it.  The  guides  al- 
most immediately  declared  themselves  unable  to  lead 
the  regiment.  Every  cavalry  officer  in  the  field  carries  {X 
a  pocket  compass.  Custer  knew  where  he  wanted  to 
go.  With  his  own  compass  to  show  the  way  he  led  the 
regiment  forward.  The  men  stumbled  on  through  the 
awful  snow  and  hurricane  until  two  o'clock,  when  they 
were  stopped  on  the  bank  of  Wolf  Creek,  fifteen  miles 
from  the  starting  point.  First  caring  for  the  exhausted 
horses,  they  made  camp,  and  as  the  wagons  came  up 
fires  were  soon  burning,  meals  were  prepared,  and  some 
of  the  effects  of  the  deadly  cold  were  dissipated. 

The  next  morning,  November  24th,  they  marched 
down  Wolf  Creek.  The  snow  had  stopped  falling,  but 
the  temperature  stood  at  seven  degrees  below  zero.  The 


152        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

25th  they  continued  the  march.  Many  another  com- 
mander would  have  been  stopped  by  the  fearful  weather; 
but  Custer  was  known  as  a  man  who  would  press  on 
as  long  as  the  mules  could  draw  the  wagons,  and  when 
they  could  not  he  would  abandon  the  wagons  and 
live  off  the  mules.  He  kept  on.  On  the  twenty-sixth, 
Thanksgiving  Day,  arriving  at  the  north  bank  of  the 
Canadian  River,  he  despatched  Major  Elliott,  the  sec- 
ond in  command  of  the  regiment,  with  three  troops  on 
a  scouting  expedition  up  the  river,  which  he  proposed 
to  cross  with  the  balance  of  his  men.  There  was  no 
Thanksgiving  dinner  awaiting  them,  and  the  remem- 
brance of  the  holiday  spent  under  happier  circumstances 
but  aggravated  their  present  condition. 

The  river  was  frozen,  but  not  sufficiently  so  to  bear 
the  regiment.  They  had  to  break  through  the  ice  and 
find  a  ford  in  the  icy  water,  and  it  was  after  eleven 
o'clock  in  the  morning  before  the  whole  command  suc- 
ceeded in  passing  to  the  south  side.  Scarcely  had  they 
done  so  when  they  noticed  a  horseman  galloping  at  full 
speed  toward  them  on  the  other  side.  As  soon  as  he 
came  near  they  recognized  him  as  Scout  Corbin,  one  of 
Elliott's  guides.  He  brought  the  startling  news  that 
Elliott  had  come  upon  the  trail  of  an  Indian  war  party, 
at  least  one  hundred  and  fifty  strong,  and  not  twenty- 
four  hours  old,  which  led  to  the  south  side  of  the  river. 
The  scout  was  given  a  fresh  horse  and  ordered  to  return 
to  Elliott,  who  was  directed  to  follow  the  trail  cautiously 
until  eight  o'clock  at  night,  at  which  time  he  was  to  halt 
and  wait  for  Custer,  who  would  leave  the  wagon  train 
and  follow  him  immediately. 

Calling  the  officers  to  him,  Custer  briefly  gave  his 
orders  for  the  advance.  The  wagon  train  was  to  be 
left  under  the  care  of  an  officer  and  eighty  men.  Each 


The  Battle  of  the  Washita         153 

trooper  was  to  take  one  day's  rations  of  coffee  and  hard- 
tack and  one  hundred  rounds  of  ammunition  upon  his 
person,  together  with  a  little  forage  for  his  horse,  and 
the  regiment  was  to  push  on  at  the  highest  possible 
speed  to  join  Elliott. 

When  it  came  to  designate  an  officer  to  remain  with 
the  train,  the  detail  fell  upon  Captain  Louis  McLane 
Hamilton,  whose  turn  it  was  to  act  as  officer  of  the  day 
in  camp.  This  young  man  bore  two  historic  names. 
McLane  was  the  second  in  command  of  Light  Horse 
Harry  Lee's  famous  cavalry  in  the  Revolution,  and  he 
was  the  grandson  of  the  great  Alexander  Hamilton. 
He  demurred  bitterly  to  being  left  in  the  rear  in  com- 
mand of  the  train  under  such  circumstances.  There 
was  no  help  for  it,  however,  until  Custer  finally  in- 
formed him  that  if  he  could  get  any  one  to  take  his 
detail  he  could  go. 

It  was  discovered  upon  inquiry  that  one  of  the  officers 
of  the  regiment  had  become  almost  helpless  from  snow 
blindness,  the  glare  of  the  ice  and  snow  being  some- 
thing terrible,  especially  upon  an  open  prairie  such  as 
they  were  then  traversing.  This  officer  was  entirely 
unfit  for  active  campaigning,  but  such  was  his  zeal  to  go 
forward  that  he  concealed  his  ailment  until  Hamilton's 
scrutiny  brought  it  forth.  To  him,  therefore,  was  com- 
mitted the  charge  of  the  wagon  train,  much  against  his 
wish,  and  Hamilton  was  allowed  to  go  at  the  head  of  his 
troop. 

III.   The  Trail  in  the  Snow 

It  had  grown  somewhat  warmer  during  the  day. 
The  top  crust  of  the  snow  became  soft,  and  the  horses 
sank  through  it  to  their  knees.  There  was  no  road  or 


154        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

trail,  of  course,  but  the  command  advanced  straight 
across  the  open  prairie  toward  the  point  where  Corbin 
had  indicated  that  Elliott  had  picked  up  the  trail.  The 
several  troops  were  successively  placed  in  the  advance 
for  the  fatiguing  and  arduous  labor  of  breaking  up  the 
road.  There  was  every  desire  to  spare  the  horses,  but 
they  were  nevertheless  urged  to  the  last  limit  to  overtake 
Elliott.  Under  such  circumstances  it  was  problemati- 
cal whether  they  would  find  him  alive;  for  the  Indians, 
who  were  believed  to  be  in  great  force,  might  discover 
him,  ambush  him,  attack  him,  and  wipe  him  out  as  Fet- 
terman  had  been  annihilated,  or  as  Forsyth  had  been 
overwhelmed. 

During  the  afternoon  Custer  and  his  command  struck 
Elliott's  trail,  but  it  was  not  until  nine  o'clock  at  night 
that  they  overtook  him.  They  found  him  encamped  on 
the  banks  of  a  litttle  stream  and  thoroughly  concealed 
in  the  timber.  With  relief  the  regiment  halted,  and 
taking  advantage  of  the  deep  ravine  through  which  the 
creek  ran,  they  managed  to  build  a  few  fires,  which,  be- 
ing well  screened,  were  invisible  a  short  distance  away. 
Over  the  fires  the  men  made  coffee,  which,  with  the 
hardtack,  constituted  their  only  meal  since  morning  — 
a  Thanksgiving  dinner  indeed. 

Elliott  had  followed  the  trail,  which  was  still  well  de- 
fined, until  eight  o'clock,  and  then  had  halted  in  accord- 
ance with  the  orders  of  Custer,  and  had  waited  for  his 
commander.  A  hasty  council  was  held  and  some  were 
for  taking  up  the  advance  at  once.  But  it  was  pointed 
out  that  the  moon  would  rise  in  one  hour  and  by  waiting 
they  would  have  the  benefit  of  the  moonlight  in  following 
the  Indian  trail.  Besides,  the  short  rest  would  do  the 
command  good.  Saddles  were  taken  off,  the  horses 
rubbed  down  and  sparingly  fed  from  the  scanty  supply 


The  Battle  of  the  Washita         155 

of  forage.  At  ten  the  march  was  once  more  resumed 
in  this  order: 

First  of  all,  riding  some  distance  ahead  of  the  main 
body,  were  two  Osage  Indian  scouts.  One  of  these  was 
Little  Beaver,  who  was  chief  of  a  small  band  of  Indian 
auxiliaries  which  had  volunteered  for  the  campaign. 
Next  to  them  came  other  Indians,  several  famous  fron- 
tiersmen, California  Joe  and  Scout  Corbin,  and  a  hideous 
half  Negro,  half  Indian  interpreter  whose  name  was  Ro- 
mero, but  whom  the  soldiers  facetiously  dubbed  Romeo, 
because  he  was  so  ugly;  then  General  Custer  and  his 
staff,  and  then,  some  distance  in  rear,  the  successive 
troops  of  the  regiment  in  a  column  of  fours.  About 
three  miles  from  their  camping  place  Little  Beaver 
came  back  to  Custer  in  considerable  agitation  and  de- 
clared that  he  smelled  fire.  Nobody  else  smelled  any- 
thing, but  at  his  insistence  the  command  was  halted,  and 
he  and  one  of  his  men  went  forward  with  Custer  and  one 
or  two  of  the  scouts  until  they  had  gone  a  mile  from  the 
halting  place. 

Sure  enough,  after  surmounting  a  little  hill,  they  saw 
ahead  of  them  and  some  distance  away  the  embers  of  a 
fire.  The  advance  party  halted.  Little  Beaver  and 
the  other  Indians  snaked  their  course  over  the  ground, 
taking  advantage  of  every  cover  to  learn  what  they  could. 
With  beating  hearts  the  general  and  the  others  watched 
them.  Would  they  stumble  upon  the  foemen  then  and 
there  ?  They  waited,  concealed  beneath  the  hillock,  un- 
til Little  Beaver  returned  to  tell  them  that  the  fire  had 
evidently  been  kindled  by  the  boys  guarding  the  herds 
of  ponies  during  the  day.  At  any  rate  it  had  almost 
gone  out,  no  one  was  there,  and  the  way  was  safe  for 
the  present,  although  the  main  camp  was  probably  not 
far  distant. 


156        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

Orders  were  sent  back  to  the  regiment  to  advance  but 
to  keep  its  present  distance  behind  Custer  and  the 
scouts.  The  command  proceeded  with  the  utmost 
caution,  with  an  excitement  in  their  veins  at  the  stealthy 
approach  with  its  possible  consequences  which  made 
them  almost  insensible  to  the  frightful  cold.  About 
half  after  twelve  o'clock  on  the  morning  of  the  twenty- 
seventh,  Custer  saw  the  leading  Indian  suddenly  sink 
down  behind  a  hill  and  wave  his  hand  quickly  back- 
ward. The  whole  party  dismounted,  and  the  com- 
manding officer  with  one  of  his  scouts  crawled  to  the 
hill  where  the  Indian  lay.  Whispering  a  word  or  two, 
Little  Beaver  pointed  straight  in  jfront  of  him. 

Half  a  mile  away  a  huge  black  blotch  was  tremu- 
lously moving  on  the  snow  in  the  moonlight.  Expe- 
rienced eyes  recognized  a  herd  of  ponies.  Where  the 
ponies  were  there  were  the  Indians  also.  Custer 
watched  the  scene  for  a  moment,  and  upon  the  still  air  — 
the  wind  had  died  and  the  night  though  bitter  cold  was 
intensely  quiet  —  he  heard  the  sound  of  a  bell,  evidently 
tied  to  the  neck  of  the  leader  of  the  herd.  Dogs  barked, 
and  as  they  waited  they  marked  the  thin,  shrill  cry  of  a 
little  child.  It  was  an  Indian  camp  beyond  perad- 
venture.  Beyond  it,  among  the  bare  and  leafless  trees, 
gleamed  in  the  moonlight  the  ice-bound  shores  of  a  half- 
frozen  river  —  the  Washita. 

The  general,  as  tender-hearted  a  man  as  ever  lived, 
and  as  kindly  for  all  his  fights,  tells  us  how  strangely 
that  infant's  cry  heard  on  that  bitter  winter  night 
moved  him,  appealed  to  him.  It  filled  his  mind  with 
natural  regret  that  war  had  to  be  waged  and  an  attack 
delivered  upon  a  camp  in  which  there  were  women  and 
children;  but  the  stern  necessities  of  the  case  permitted 
no  other  course. 


MAJ.   JOEL  H.   ELLIOTT  *  CAPT.   LOUIS   McL.    HAMILTON  ' 

CAPT.  JAMES   M.   BELL  CAPT.  J.  W.  BENTEEN 

SOME    OFFICERS    OF    THE    SEVENTH    CAVALRY 
IN    THE    WASHITA    EXPEDITION 

*  Killed  in  the  Battle 


The  Battle  of  the  Washita         157 

The  band  of  Indians  under  his  gaze  was  that  of  Black 
Kettle,*  Head  Chief  of  the  Cheyennes  since  the  death 
of  Roman  Nose,  one  of  the  most  ferocious  and  brutal 
of  the  Plains  Indians.  The  blood  of  scores  was  upon 
his  hands  and  upon  the  hands  of  his  followers  as  well. 
Torture,  infamy,  treachery,  shame  beyond  estimation, 
had  stained  that  band.  Even  then  in  the  camp  there 
were  helpless  captives,  poor  women  whose  fate  cannot 
be  described  or  dwelt  upon. 

When  Custer  had  satisfied  himself  at  last  that  he  had 
found  the  camp  for  which  he  had  been  searching  — 
which  appeared  to  be  a  very  large  one  from  the  number 
of  lodges  which  they  thought  they  could  make  out  in  the 
distance  —  leaving  the  scouts  to  observe  the  Indians, 
he  tramped  back  through  the  snow  to  the  command, 
and  by  messengers  summoned  the  officers  about  him. 
Taking  off  their  sabers  for  the  moment,  so  that  their 
clanking  would  not  betray  them,  the  officers  crept  to  the 
crest  of  the  hill  and  made  themselves  as  familiar  with 
the  situation  as  they  could  by  such  inspection. 

There  Custer  gave  them  their  final  orders.  The 
regiment  was  divided  into  four  squadrons;  Major  El- 
liott, with  three  troops,  G,  H,  and  M,  was  ordered  to  cir- 
cle cautiously  to  the  left  and  get  in  the  rear  of  the  Indian 
camp.  Captain  Thompson,  with  troops  B  and  F,  was 
directed  to  make  a  long  detour  to  the  right  and  join 
Elliott.  Captain  Myers,  with  troops  E  and  I,  was  com- 
manded to  move  a  shorter  distance  to  the  right  and  take 
position  on  the  left  of  Thompson,  while  Custer  himself, 
with  the  four  remaining  troops  —  Captain  Hamilton 
commanding  one  squadron,  comprising  troops  A  and  C, 
Captain  West,  another,  of  troops  D  and  K,  with  the 

*  Mo-ke-ta-va-ta.  —  Letter  from  Mr.  W.  H.  Holmes,  Chief  of  the  Bureau  of 
American  Ethnology,  Smithsonian  Institution. 


158        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

Osages  and  scouts  and  forty  sharp-shooters  under  Ad- 
jutant Cook  —  was  to  approach  the  village  from  the 
point  where  they  then  stood. 

Not  a  sound  was  to  be  made,  not  a  shot  fired,  not  a 
signal  given.  The  attack  would  be  delivered  at  dawn. 
When  they  heard  the  bugler  sounding  the  charge  in  the 
still  air  of  the  morning  they  were  to  rush  in  immedi- 
ately. In  order  not  to  impede  their  movements  the  men 
were  directed  to  remove  their  overcoats  and  leave  them 
in  care  of  the  guard  in  the  rear  before  the  attack  was 
delivered.  Then,  after  hearty  handshakes  and  whis- 
pered salutations,  the  officers  assembled  their  several 
squadrons  and  silently  started  out  upon  the  long  de- 
tours necessary  to  enable  them  to  reach  their  designated 
positions. 

The  Indian  village  was  located  in  the  valley  of  a  small 
river  in  the  Indian  Territory,  an  affluent  of  the  Canadian 
called  the  Washita.  It  was  in  a  deep  depression,  below 
the  surrounding  country,  and  was  well  sheltered  by  trees 
on  the  banks  of  the  stream,  here  easily  fordable.  By  the 
time  all  preparations  had  been  made  in  Custer's  own 
detachment  it  still  wanted  some  four  hours  to  dawn. 
The  troops  with  Custer  had  nothing  to  do  but  wait  where 
they  were,  and  a  weary,  freezing  wait  it  was.  So  in- 
sistent was  the  general  that  there  should  be  no  noise 
that  he  refused  to  allow  the  men  even  to  beat  their 
breasts  to  keep  up  circulation,  or  to  stamp  their  feet  to 
ward  off  the  numbing  cold.  Conversation  was  for- 
bidden. They  were  dealing  with  a  warrior  who  was  the 
most  watchful  of  foemen,  with  men  who  could  detect  an 
enemy,  as  the  Osage  had  the  fire  a  mile  away,  seemingly 
by  instinct.  They  must  take  every  precaution.  The 
men  dismounted  and  stood  uncomplainingly  by  the  side 
of  their  horses.  Some  of  them  wrapped  themselves  in 


The  Battle  of  the  Washita         159 

their  overcoats,  and  attaching  their  bridle  reins  to  their 
wrists,  lay  down  on  the  ground  and  actually  went  to 
sleep. 

About  an  hour  before  dawn  Custer  despatched  the 
last  squadron  under  Captain  Myers,  who  had  but  a  short 
distance  to  go,  and  then,  as  the  first  pale  grayness  of  the 
morning  began  to  steal  over  the  eastern  hills  and  mingle 
with  the  moonlight,  he  gave  orders  to  call  the  troops  to 
attention.  The  first  sergeants  went  through  the  ranks 
and  by  a  touch  of  the  hand  woke  the  sleeping  men. 
Stiff  and  numb  with  the  cold,  they  staggered  to  their  feet, 
took  off  their  overcoats,  left  them  under  the  care  of  a 
small  guard,  and  mounted  their  horses.  Their  sabers 
had  been  left  behind  and  they  were  armed  with  revol- 
vers and  Spencer  carbines.  The  officers  quickly  formed 
up  their  troops  and  with  whispered  words  placed  them- 
selves at  the  head. 

The  troops  were  deployed  in  line,  Hamilton's  squad- 
ron to  the  right,  West's  to  the  left.  Cook's  sharp- 
shooters were  about  forty  yards  in  advance  of  the  left, 
dismounted,  their  horses  being  left  with  the  guard. 
Some  distance  in  front  of  all  the  rest  rode  Custer.  Fol- 
lowing him  was  his  bugler.  Next  to  the  bugler  was  the 
indomitable  regimental  band.  The  orders  were,  in 
Hamilton's  last  words,  "Now  men,  keep  cool;  fire  low, 
and  not  too  rapidly." 

The  Osages  had  been  somewhat  doubtful  as  to  the 
issue  of  the  attack.  They  had  made  medicine,  war- 
painted  themselves  and  arrayed  themselves  for  battle, 
but  with  a  great  deal  of  trepidation.  They  expected 
the  white  soldiers  would  be  beaten,  and  they  reasoned 
that  in  that  case  their  allies  would  endeavor  to  purchase 
their  own  salvation  by  surrendering  the  Osages  to  the 
vengeance  of  their  enemies.  They  determined  to  take 


160        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

such  a  position  as  would  enable  them  to  be  governed  by 
circumstances  in  their  movements  —  so  they  could  either 
fight  or  fly.  They  knew  the  reverence  with  which  the 
soldiers  regarded  their  flag.  Never  having  been  in 
action  with  the  white  man,  they  concluded  that  the  flag 
would  be  kept  in  a  place  of  safety  and  if  they  stood 
religiously  close  to  the  banner  they  would  be  in  a  good 
position  to  attack  or  retreat  as  circumstances  required. 
Consequently,  they  rallied  on  the  flag.  For  once  the  red 
man's  reasoning  led  him  into  trouble,  for,  as  it  happened, 
and  as  it  was  to  be  expected,  the  flag  was  in  the  thick  of 
the  fight,  and,  to  give  them  credit,  after  they  saw  their 
mistake  and  saw  no  means  of  rectifying  it,  the  Osages 
fought  as  bravely  and  as  efficiently  as  the  rest. 

The  command  went  silently  down  the  hill,  making  for 
the  center  of  the  valley  and  the  trees  where  lay  the  In- 
dian camp.  The  excitement  of  the  situation  was  in- 
tense. Nobody  knew  just  what  he  was  about  to  en- 
counter. No  one  could  tell  whether  the  other  troops 
had  succeeded  in  getting  within  supporting  distance  or 
not.  But  Custer  knew  his  officers,  and  he,  rightly  in 
this  instance  —  alas,  that  it  might  not  have  been  so  in 
other  cases !  —  depended  upon  them.  Nearer  and  nearer 
the  line  approached  the  village.  Clearer  and  clearer 
came  the  light  from  the  pale  sky.  Little,  hazy  clouds  of 
smoke  floated  above  the  tepees  under  the  trees,  but  aside 
from  that  there  was  yet  no  evidence  of  life  among  them. 

However  cautiously  it  was  conducted  the  advance 
of  such  a  body  of  men  over  the  snow  made  a  great  deal 
of  noise.  They  had  come  so  near  the  camp  that  they 
could  not  hope  to  remain  undiscovered  another  moment. 
At  the  instant  Custer  was  about  to  give  the  signal  a  rifle 
shot  was  heard  on  the  other  side  of  the  camp.  At  first  it 
was  thought  to  be  an  accidental  discharge  from  one  of 


The  Battle  of  the  Washita         161 

the  other  attacking  parties.  It  was  afterward  learned 
that  shot  was  fired  by  Black  Kettle  himself,  who  had 
heard  the  noise  of  the  advancing  troops,  for  every 
squadron  had  reached  its  appointed  place,  and  prac- 
tically at  the  same  time  they  commenced  their  advance 
upon  the  devoted  town.  So  soon  as  the  crack  of  the 
rifle  broke  upon  the  still  air  the  bugle  sounded  the 
charge. 

With  the  first  notes  Custer  turned  to  the  band.  Each 
trumpeter  had  his  trumpet  to  his  lips,  each  drummer  his 
drum-sticks  in  the  air. 

"Play!"  he  shouted,  and  for  the  first  time  in  action 
the  stirring  notes  of  the  tune  now  peculiar  to  the 
Seventh  Cavalry  as  its  battle  music-  "Garry  Owen" 
-  broke  on  the  air.  Three  answering  bugle  calls  rang 
out  from  the  different  squadrons  on  all  sides  of  the 
village.  The  cavalry  charged,  the  dismounted  soldiers 
advanced  on  the  run.  They  all  cheered. 

IV.  The  Attack  in  the  Morning 

The  village  was  strung  along  the  banks  of  the  creek 
and  the  troopers  fell  upon  it  like  a  storm.  The  Indians, 
completely  surprised,  nevertheless  did  not  lose  a  mo- 
ment. They  poured  out  of  the  lodges,  and  seeking  the 
shelter  of  the  trees  or  standing  knee-deep  in  the  icy 
water  of  the  river,  with  the  banks  acting  as  rifle-pits,  re- 
turned the  fire  of  the  white  men.  A  few  of  them  suc- 
ceeded in  breaking  away,  but  most  of  them  had  to  fight 
where  they  were,  and  right  well  they  fought. 

Brave  Captain  Hamilton,  who  had  sought  the  detail 
with  such  zeal,  was  shot  from  his  horse  and  instantly 
killed.  Captain  Barnitz  received  a  wound  through  the 
breast  under  his  heart.  Here  and  there  others  fell. 


162        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

Strict  orders  had  been  given  to  spare  the  women  and 
children.  Most  of  the  squaws  and  children  remained 
hidden  in  the  tepees.  Others  took  part  in  the  defense. 
The  various  troops  scattered  throughout  the  village  and 
the  fighting  was  hand-to-hand  of  a  most  vigorous  char- 
acter. Captain  Benteen,  galloping  forward,  was  ap- 
proached by  an  Indian  boy  about  fourteen  years  of  age 
on  horseback.  The  boy  was  armed  with  a  revolver. 
As  the  captain  drew  near  he  called  out  to  the  lad  that 
his  life  would  be  safe  if  he  would  throw  away  his  weapon. 
Fearing  he  could  not  understand  him  he  made  peace 
signs  to  him.  For  reply  the  boy  leveled  his  weapon  and 
shot  at  the  captain.  The  bullet  missed  him.  The 
Indian  fired  a  second  time  and  the  bullet  cut  through 
the  sleeve  of  Benteen's  coat.  The  captain  was  still  mak- 
ing signs  of  amity  and  friendship  when  the  boy  fired  a 
third  time  and  hit  his  horse.  As  he  raised  the  pistol  to 
fire  a  fourth  time  the  officer  was  forced  to  shoot  him 
dead. 

One  squaw  seized  a  little  white  boy,  a  captive,  and 
broke  for  the  river.  She  got  into  hiding  in  some  under- 
brush where  she  might  have  remained  unmolested,  but 
such  was  her  malignity  that  she  busied  herself  by  taking 
pot-shots  at  the  galloping  troops  with  her  revolver. 
They  captured  her  when  her  revolver  was  empty  and 
then  discovered  that  she  had  been  fighting  them  in  spite 
of  a  broken  leg. 

The  Indians  rallied  in  certain  places  favorable  for 
defense.  In  their  desperation  seventeen  braves  threw 
themselves  into  a  little  depression  in  the  ground  and  re- 
fused to  surrender,  fighting  until  all  were  killed.  In  a 
ravine  running  from  the  river  thirty-eight  made  a  heroic 
defense  until  they  were  all  shot.  In  all,  one  hundred 
and  three  were  killed,  including  Black  Kettle,  the  chief. 


The  Battle  of  the  Washita         163 

The  furious  fighting  had  lasted  one  hour.  The 
village  was  now  in  possession  of  the  troops.  A  number 
of  officers  and  men  had  been  wounded  and  a  temporary 
hospital  was  established  in  the  middle  of  the  village. 
Details  were  sent  through  the  lodges  to  rout  out  the 
squaws  and  children,  and  a  roll-call  was  ordered. 

Custer  was  dismayed  to  find  that  Major  Elliott  and 
fourteen  men,  including  Sergeant-Major  Kennedy  and 
three  corporals,  were  missing.  Where  they  had  gone  to 
no  one  at  first  could  imagine.  Finally  a  trooper  stated 
that  a  number  of  Indians  had  escaped  in  the  gap  bet- 
tween  Elliott  and  Thompson,  and  that  he  had  seen 
Elliott  with  a  few  troopers  break  away  in  pursuit  of 
them.  An  order  was  given  for  a  troop  to  search  for 
them,  but  before  it  could  get  away  Indians  were  per- 
ceived in  a  heavy  force  on  the  bluffs  directly  in  front  of 
the  command.  Custer  had  succeeded  in  killing  prac- 
tically the  whole  of  Black  Kettle's  band,  and  as  the  In- 
dians who  had  escaped  had  been  forced  to  run  for  their 
lives,  naked  as  they  came  from  the  lodges,  he  could  not 
understand  the  appearance,  just  out  of  range  of  his  men, 
of  this  portentous  and  constantly  increasing  force  ar- 
rayed in  full  war  panoply. 

Inquiry  among  the  captives  disclosed  the  fact  that  the 
valley  had  been  chosen  as  the  winter  headquarters  for 
the  principal  bands  of  the  Kiowas,  Arapahoes,  Chey- 
ennes,  "Dog  Soldiers,"*  Comanches,  and  even  a  wan- 
dering band  of  Apaches.  There  were  at  least  two 
thousand  warriors  in  this  assemblage.  At  that  moment 

*  Dog  Soldiers  were  bands  of  especially  ruthless  Indians  who  could  not  brook  even 
tribal  restraint.  They  included  members  of  different  tribes  and  were  unusually  formi- 
dable. Possibly  they  got  their  name  from  a  perversion  of  Cheyennes,  i.e.,  Chiens-dogs. 
Another  account  describes  them  as  a  sort  of  mercenary  police  at  the  service  of  a  chief  of  a 
tribe,  with  which  he  enforced  his  commands  upon  the  recalcitrant  and  generally  kept 
order.  In  any  case  they  were  men  of  exceptional  courage  and  bravery. 


164        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

the  men  who  had  been  guarding  the  overcoats  and  the 
lead  horses  came  running  in  saying  that  they  had  been 
driven  off  by  a  heavy  force  of  Indians.  The  situation 
was  indeed  critical. 

Something  had  to  be  done  at  once.  Custer  dis- 
mounted his  men,  threw  them  out  in  a  half  circle  about 
the  camp,  and  prepared  for  battle.  The  Indians  did  not 
delay  in  delivering  it.  Led  by  Little  Raven,  an  Arap- 
ahoe,  and  Satanta,*  a  famous  Kiowa,  and  Black  Kettle's 
successor,  Little  Rock,  they  at  once  attacked.  A  fierce 
battle  was  on  and  Custer's  ammunition  was  running  low. 
The  troops  were  now  fighting  for  their  lives.  They  had 
not  expected  anything  of  this  kind.  Fortunately,  at  this 
critical  juncture  a  four-mule  wagon  came  dashing 
through  the  Indian  line.  The  Indians,  being  occupied 
in  fighting,  did  not  observe  it  until  it  was  right  upon 
them.  Driving  the  wagon  was  Major  Bell,  the  quar- 
termaster, from  the  train.  With  him  was  a  small  es- 
cort. He  had  loaded  the  wagon  with  ammunition  and 
galloped  toward  the  sound  of  the  fighting.  With  the 
fresh  supplies,  therefore,  the  troops  at  last  made  a  bold 
charge  which  drove  the  Indians  headlong  down  the 
valley,  during  which  Little  Rock,  striving  to  rally  his 
braves,  was  killed. 

Custer  now  set  fire  to  the  lodges,  totally  destroying 
them  and  their  contents.  What  to  do  with  the  ponies  of 
the  herd  which  had  been  captured  in  spite  of  the  efforts 
of  the  squaws  to  run  ofF  with  them,  was  a  problem.  It 
was  impossible,  under  the  circumstances,  to  drive  them 
back  to  the  camp.  To  turn  them  loose  would  have 
allowed  them  to  fall  into  the  hands  of  other  Indians 
for  use  in  future  warfare.  They  had  to  be  shot.  It 

*A  corruption  of  Set-t'a-int-e,  "  White  Bear."—  Letter  from  Mr.  W.  H.  Holmes, 
Chief  of  the  Bureau  of  American  Ethnology,  Smithsonian  Institution. 


The  Battle  of  the  Washita         165 

was  a  most  unpleasant  and  repulsive  duty  for  the 
soldiers,  but  there  was  no  alternative.  The  whole  herd 
was  slaughtered.  It  took  an  hour  and  a  half  to  kill 
them,  and  those  engaged  in  the  work  said  they  had  never 
done  anything  so  harrowing  and  distressing. 

By  this  time  it  was  late  in  the  afternoon.  The  In- 
dians from  the  other  villages,  rinding  they  were  pursued 
but  a  short  distance,  had  reassembled  and  once  more 
prepared  for  attack.  It  was  necessary  for  Custer  to 
retreat  at  once.  He  put  every  available  man  on  horse- 
back, threw  out  skirmishing  parties,  the  colors  were 
brought  up,  the  indefatigable  band  started  playing,  and 
the  party  advanced  gaily  up  the  valley  toward  the  In- 
dians. As  he  hoped  and  planned,  they  immediately 
reasoned  that  he  would  not  advance  with  such  confi- 
dence against  such  an  overwhelming  force,  unless  he 
was  supported  by  heavy  reinforcements  to  his  com- 
mand. After  a  short  resistance  they  broke  and  fled. 

It  was  night  by  this  time,  and  Custer  lost  no  time  in 
getting  out  of  the  valley.  The  weather  was  still  fright- 
fully cold,  and  his  men  were  without  their  overcoats,  for 
they  had,  of  course,  not  recovered  them,  and  were  almost 
perishing.  They  got  back  in  safety,  however,  to  Camp 
Supply,  having  accomplished  the  object  of  their  ex- 
pedition in  dealing  a  decisive  blow  to  the  Indians. 
More  than  that,  they  had  shown  the  Indians,  who  trusted 
for  immunity  to  the  season,  that  winter  and  summer 
were  alike  to  the  American  soldier. 

The  Indian  loss  was  one  hundred  and  three  killed  in 
the  village,  including  Black  Kettle;  an  unknown  num- 
ber, believed  to  be  large,  killed  and  wounded  during  the 
all-day  fighting,  including  Little  Rock;  the  capture  of 
fifty-three  squaws  and  children;  eight  hundred  and 
seventy-five  ponies,  eleven  hundred  and  twenty-three 


166        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

buffalo  robes  and  skins;  the  destruction  of  over  five 
hundred  pounds  of  powder  and  one  thousand  pounds 
of  lead;  four  thousand  arrows,  seven  hundred  pounds 
of  tobacco,  besides  rifles,  pistols,  saddle-bows,  lariats, 
immense  quantities  of  dried  beef,  and  other  winter 
provisions;  in  short,  the  complete  destruction  of  the 
village  and  the  annihilation  of  the  band. 

The  losses  of  the  regiment  in  the  engagements  were 
one  officer  and  fourteen  men  missing  (Elliott  and  his 
party),  one  officer  and  five  men  killed,  three  officers  and 
eleven  men  wounded.  General  Sheridan  called  the 
affair  the  most  complete  and  satisfactory  battle  ever 
waged  against  the  Indians  to  that  time. 

Custer  had  marched  through  that  blizzard  and  over 
the  snow-clad  plains  to  victory.  His  stealthy  approach, 
the  skill  with  which  he  had  surrounded  the  village,  the 
strength  with  which  the  attack  had  been  delivered,  and 
the  battle  which  he  had  fought  with  the  unexpected 
Indian  force,  the  ruse  by  which  he  had  extricated  him- 
self, and,  last  but  not  least,  Bell's  gallant  dash  with  the 
ammunition  wagon,  were  all  given  the  highest  praise. 
And  well  they  merited  it. 

One  or  two  incidents  of  the  battle  are  worthy  of  espe- 
cial mention.  When  the  troops  obtained  possession  of 
the  village,  they  found  the  dead  body  of  a  white  woman. 
The  fact  that  she  still  had  some  vestige  of  civilized 
clothing  upon  her,  quite  new,  proved  that  she  had  been 
but  recently  captured.  She  had  been  shot  dead  by  the 
Indians  at  the  moment  of  attack  to  prevent  her  rescue; 
and  there  was  also  the  body  of  a  little  white  child,  who 
had  been  killed  by  those  who  had  him  in  charge,  lest  he 
should  be  returned  to  his  family  again. 

The  squaws,  of  course,  were  in  great  terror.  They 
thought  they  would  be  instantly  put  to  death  when 


The  Battle  of  the  Washita         167 

they  were  routed  from  their  tepees.  Black  Kettle's  sis- 
ter, Mah-wis-sa,  who  seemed  to  be  the  leading  woman 
of  the  village,  made  a  long  oration  to  Custer.  telling  him 
that  she  was  a  good  Indian,  and  that  she  had  tried  to 
restrain  Black  Kettle  in  his  nefarious  career  —  which  was 
all  a  lie,  of  course.  She  wound  up  by  bringing  the  come- 
liest  of  the  young  Indian  maidens  to  Custer,  and,  after 
solemnly  placing  the  hand  of  the  girl  in  that  of  the  Gen- 
eral, mumbled  some  kind  of  a  gibberish  over  the  two. 
The  General  observed  Romeo  standing  near  with  a 
broad  grin  upon  his  face,  and  asked  him  what  Mah- 
wis-sa  was  doing.  He  was  told  that  she  was  marrying 
him  to  the  beauty  of  the  tribe  to  propitiate  him.  That 
marriage  did  not  stand. 

V.  The  Fate  of  Elliott  and  his  Men 

The  fate  of  Elliott's  detachment  remained  a  mystery. 
His  comrades  hoped  that  he  had  escaped,  but  as  the 
days  passed  and  he  did  not  return  to  the  regiment,  and 
as  nothing  was  heard  from  him,  they  abandoned  hope 
in  despair.  This  was  not,  by  any  means,  the  end  of  the 
winter  campaigning;  and  some  time  after,  Custer  and 
his  men,  this  time  heavily  reinforced,  again  marched 
up  the  valley  of  the  Washita.  A  short  distance  from 
the  place  where  Black  Kettle's  band  had  been  annihi- 
lated they  found  the  remains  of  Elliott  and  his  men. 
The  evidence  of  the  field  and  what  was  afterward 
learned  from  Indian  captives  told  the  sad  story. 

Pursuing  the  fleeing  Indians,  Elliott  and  his  party 
suddenly  ran  into  the  midst  of  a  horde  of  braves  coming 
down  the  valley  to  help  Black  Kettle  and  the  men  who 
had  been  engaged  with  Custer.  To  fly  was  impossible. 
They  dismounted  from  their  horses,  formed  themselves 


i68        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

in  a  semicircle  a  few  feet  in  diameter,  stood  back  to 
back,  as  it  were,  and  fought  until  they  died.  There  were 
evidences  of  a  terrible  conflict  all  around  them.  Right 
dearly  had  they  sold  their  lives. 

The  last  survivor  of  that  gallant  little  band  had  been 
Sergeant-Major  Kennedy,  the  finest  soldier  in  the  regi- 
ment. He  was  not  wounded,  it  appeared,  but  had  ex- 
pended all  his  ammunition  for  both  rifle  and  revolver. 
Being  an  officer,  he  wore  a  sword.  Seeing  him,  as  they 
supposed,  helpless,  the  Indians  resolved  to  take  him 
alive  for  the  purpose  of  torturing  him.  There  was 
not  a  soldier  who  knew  of  the  habits  of  the  Indians  who 
would  not  chose  death  to  captivity  any  time.  The 
brave  Kennedy  stood  alone  in  the  midst  of  the  bodies 
of  his  comrades,  fronting  death,  sword  in  hand.  I  like 
to  think  of  the  courage  of  that  heroic  man  in  the  midst 
of  that  savage,  ravening  assemblage. 

With  wily  treachery  the  Indians  made  peace  signs, 
and  walked  toward  him  with  hands  outstretched, 
saying:  "How,  How!"  Kennedy,  who  knew  the  true 
value  of  such  proceedings,  waited  until  the  chief  of  the 
band  approached  him  nearly,  then  thrust  his  sword  up 
to  the  hilt  into  the  Indian's  breast.  When  they  found 
Kennedy's  body  he  had  been  pierced  by  no  less  than 
twenty  bullets.  The  other  troopers  had  received  one 
or  two  bullet  wounds  each.  They  were  all  stripped, 
scalped,  and  mutilated.* 

There  was  a  great  outcry  when  this  battle  became 
known,  and  Custer  was  accused  of  slaughtering  helpless, 
inoffensive,  gentle  Indians!  Unmerited  obloquy  was 
heaped  upon  him,  but  those  who  lived  near  enough  to 
feel  the  effects  of  the  Red  Scourge  realized  that  he  had 
done  for  the  settlers  the  best  thing  that  could  be  done. 

*  "  Our  Wild  Indians,"  Colonel  Richard  I.  Dodge,  U.  S.  A. 


The  Battle  of  the  Washita         169 

People  who   knew,  and  his  superior  officers,  not  only 
sustained  but  commended  him. 

Custer  again,  in  command  of  a  much  larger  force, 
surprised  a  more  populous  village  later  in  this  same  win- 
ter. It  was  completely  in  his  power.  He  could  have 
wiped  it  from  the  face  of  the  earth,  although  it  contained 
a  force  of  Indians  nearly  equal  to  his  own;  but  he  stayed 
his  hand,  and  said  he  would  spare  the  savages  if  they 
would  deliver  to  him  two  wretched  women,  one  a  young 
bride,  the  other  a  young  girl,  whom  they  held  in  cap- 
tivity and  for  whose  deliverance  the  campaign  had  been 
undertaken.  By  masterly  skill  Custer  captured  Satanta 
the  Infamous,  and  held  him  until  the  captives  were  given 
up.  With  the  expedition  was  the  brother  of  one  of  the 
captives.  Custer  tells,  in  his  simple,  terse  manner,  with 
what  feelings  that  whole  army  watched  the  poor  women 
brought  into  camp,  and  how  the  boy,  the  last  of  his 
family,  stood  trembling  by  the  general's  side  until  he 
recognized,  in  one  of  the  wrecks  of  humanity  which  the 
Indians  handed  over,  the  sister  whom  he  was  seeking.* 
The  red-headed  cook,  referred  to  above,  was  with  the 
army  again,  and  proved  herself,  in  her  rude  way,  an 
angel  of  mercy  and  tenderness  to  these,  her  wretched 
sisters. 

"...     and  at  the  last  the  brief  reference  to  that  episode  when  he  (Custer) 
let  glory  of  battle  go,  to  save  two  white  women! 

"  Has  any  one  told  you  that  the  long  line  of  soldiers  and  officers  drawn  up  to 
witness  the  return  of  the  two  captives  wept  like  women,  and  were  not  ashamed 
when  the  poor  creatures  came  into  the  lines  ?  Will  you  not  write  that  story  up  some 
day,  Dr.  Brady  ?  1  will  give  you  some  addresses  of  officers  who  were  eye-witnesses. 
They  cannot  seem  to  put  such  a  picture  before  the  public,  but  they  do  talk  well."— > 
Private  letter  to  me  from  the  wife  of  an  officer  present  on  the  occasion  noted. 


CHAPTER   ELEVEN 

Carr  and  Tall  Bull  at  Summit  Springs 

I.    A  Brilliant  Little  Fight 

GENERAL  Eugene  A.  Carr,  in  command  of 
the  Fifth  Cavalry,  did  some  brilliant  skirmish- 
ing and  fighting  in  1868-9  m  western  Kansas 
and  Colorado.     His  most  notable  exploit  was 
the    surprise    of  Tall    Bull's    camp.     Next    to    Black 
Kettle,  Tall  Bull  was   probably  the   most  vicious  and 
diabolical  of  the  Indian  raiders  in  these  two  states. 

Carr,  with  five  troops  of  the  Fifth  Cavalry  and  with 
W.  F.  Cody  (Buffalo  Bill)  as  chief  guide,  learning  where 
Tall  Bull's  camp  was,  marched  one  hundred  and  fifty 
miles  in  four  days  in  pursuit  of  him.  Halting  when  he 
believed  he  had  reached  the  vicinity  of  the  camp,  he  sent 
Buffalo  Bill  with  some  of  his  Pawnee  Indian  auxiliaries 
to  find  out  exactly  where  the  Indians  were  located. 

Cody,  having  discovered  the  location  of  the  village,  re- 
turned to  General  Carr  and  advised  him  to  take  a  wider 
detour,  keeping  his  forces  concealed  among  the  hills, 
so  that  he  could  approach  the  Indians  from  the  north, 
a  direction  from  which  they  would  not  be  expecting 
attack,  and  whence  they  might  be  the  more  easily  sur- 
prised. The  advice  was  followed,  the  command  made 
its  encircling  march  without  detection,  and  formed  up 

170 


Carr  and  Tall  Bull  171 

in  line  of  troops,  each  troop  two  abreast,  in  the  ravines 
about  twelve  hundred  yards  from  the  village. 

They  were  between  the  Indians  and  the  Platte  River. 
The  camp  was  located  at  Summit  Springs,  Colorado. 
Every  preparation  having  been  made,  Carr  ordered  the 
bugler  to  sound  the  charge.  The  man  was  so  excited 
that  he  was  unable  to  produce  a  note.  Twice  Carr  gave 
the  command.  Finally,  Quartermaster  Hayes  snatched 
the  bugle  from  the  agitated  musician  and  sounded  the 
charge  himself,  and  the  whole  regiment  rushed  out  into 
the  open. 

The  Indians  made  for  their  ponies  and  advanced  to 
meet  the  charge.  The  rush  of  the  soldiers  was  too 
threatening,  however.  After  a  hasty  fire  they  broke  and 
fled  on  their  horses,  the  whole  party,  soldiers  and  Indian 
scouts,  following  after  at  full  speed  through  the  village. 
The  attack  was  a  complete  success.  Fifty-two  Indians 
were  killed,  two  hundred  and  seventy-four  horses  and 
one  hundred  and  forty-five  mules  were  captured.  The 
soldiers  had  one  man  wounded,  with  no  other  casualties. 

In  the  camp  were  found  the  bodies  of  two  unfortunate 
white  women,  who  had  been  captured.  Swift  as  had 
been  the  dash  of  the  soldiers,  the  Indians  had  taken  time 
to  brain  one  of  the  women  with  a  war-club,  while  the 
second  was  shot  in  the  breast  and  left  for  dead.  She 
was  given  every  possible  attention  by  the  soldiers,  who 
took  her  back  to  Fort  Sedgwick,  and  her  life  was  even- 
tually spared.  Her  sufferings  and  treatment  had  been 
beyond  description.  Fifteen  hundred  dollars  in  money  — 
in  gold,  silver,  and  greenbacks  —  strange  to  say,  had 
been  found  in  the  camp.  This  sum  the  soldiers,  by  per- 
mission of  the  general,  donated  to  the  poor  woman, 
as  an  expression  of  their  sympathy  for  her. 

According  to  some  accounts,  Tall  Bull,  who  was  chief 


172        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

of  the  camp,  and  one  of  the  head  chiefs  of  the  Sioux, 
was  killed  in  this  attack.  Buffalo  Bill  tells  another  story.* 
The  day  after  the  fight  the  various  companies  of  the 
Fifth  Cavalry  —  which  had  remained  in  the  camp  all  the 
ensuing  day  and  night,  at  the  insistence  of  the  plucky 
commander,  in  spite  of  the  pleas  of  some  of  the  officers, 
who,  fearing  an  attack  in  force,  suggested  retiring  imme- 
diately—  separated  in  order  the  more  effectively  to  pur- 
sue the  flying  Indians.  Several  days  after  the  surprise 
the  detachment  for  which  Cody  was  guide  was  attacked 
by  several  hundred  Indians.  The  soldiers  fought 
them  off,  killing  a  number.  The  chief  of  this  party 
was  believed  by  Cody  to  be  Tall  Bull. 

Buffalo  Bill  crept  through  a  ravine  for  several  hun- 
dred feet,  unobserved  by  the  Indians,  until  he  reached  an 
opening  whence  he  had  the  savages  in  range.  Watching 
his  opportunity  as  the  Indians  were  careering  wildly 
over  the  prairie,  he  drew  a  bead  on  the  chief  and  shot 
him  dead.  Whether  that  was  Tall  Bull  or  not,  one  fact 
is  clear  —  that  he  was  killed  either  then  or  before,  for  he 
was  certainly  dead  thereafter. 

When  the  troops  were  following  the  Indian  trails  on 
the  march  to  Summit  Springs,  at  every  place  where  the 
Indians  had  camped  they  found  marks  of  white  wo- 
men's shoes.  It  was  this  knowledge  that  gave  additional 
determination  and  fire  to  their  magnificent  attack. 

General  Carr  deservedly  gained  great  reputation  for 
his  dash  and  daring. 

Here  I  include  a  letter  describing  this  battle  from  the 
standpoint  of  a  soldier,  which  is  a  most  interesting  con- 
tribution to  the  story  of  the  affair: 

*  I  have  written  several  times  to  General  Carr,  asking  information  as  to  this  and 
other  points,  but  have  not  received  any. — C.  T.  B. 


Carr  and  Tall  Bull  173 


II.    Account  of  the  Battle  of  Summit  Springs 

Written  by  J.  E.  Welch  to  his  comrade,  Colonel  Henry  O.  Clark,  of 

Vermont.* 

The  next  spring,  1869, 1  heard  that  General  Eugene 
A.  Carr,  commanding  a  detachment  of  the  Fifth  U.  S. 
Cavalry,  was  organizing  an  expedition  to  go  after  a  large 
band  of  Indians  (Sioux  and  Cheyennes)  who  had  been 
raiding  and  murdering  through  Colorado,  New  Mex- 
ico, and  Kansas.  Some  other  fellows  and  myself  went 
to  Fort  McPherson  and  offered  our  services  as  volun- 
teers to  serve  without  pay.  The  general  could  not  ac- 
cept our  services,  but  he  said  we  could  go  along  and  act 
with  the  scouts  —  so  along  we  went. 

The  expedition  consisted  of  about  four  hundred  cav- 
alry, one  hundred  and  fifty  Pawnee  scouts,  under  Colo- 
nel Frank  North,  and  about  twenty  civilians.  Buffalo 
Bill  was  the  guide.  He  struck  out  for  the  Republican 
River,  and  the  first  night  after  we  got  there  the  hostiles 
tried  to  stampede  our  horses;  they  came  near  accom- 
plishing their  object,  too,  but  they  only  succeeded  in 
wounding  a  teamster  and  killing  a  mule.  Next  day  we 
found  the  trail  of  their  main  body  and  followed  it,  but 
soon  found  that  we  could  not  gain  an  inch  on  them;  we 
kept  on,  however,  until  we  came  to  a  place  where  the 
trail  divided.  The  trail  to  the  right  was  very  plain, 
while  the  one  to  the  left  was  scattered  and  so  dim  it  was 
evident  to  the  most  inexperienced  man  in  the  command 
that  the  trail  they  intended  us  to  follow  was  the  one  to 
the  right.  So  General  Carr  detached  two  troops  of 

*  This  letter,  which  is  dated  Edith,  Coke  County,  Texas,  June  16,  1891,  was 
furnished  me  for  publication  by  Dr.  T.  E.  Oertel.  I  am  informed  that  the  writer  has 
since  died— C.  T.  B. 


174        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

cavalry  and  some  Indians,  under  Major  Royall,  caused 
them  to  make  as  big  a  show  as  possible  and  take  the  de- 
coy trail,  while  the  main  body  was  kept  back  in  a  low 
place  for  a  day  in  order  that  any  hostile  scouts  who 
might  be  watching  us  would  think  the  whole  command 
had  gone  on  the  decoy  trail.  Next  day  we  started  on 
the  dim  trail,  and  before  night  we  became  satisfied  that 
we  were  on  the  trail  of  the  main  body  of  the  hostiles. 
Major  Royall  followed  the  decoy  trail  until  it  scattered, 
then  turning  the  head  of  his  column  to  the  left  he  inter- 
cepted and  rejoined  the  command.  We  now  found 
that  we  were  gaining  on  the  game  we  were  after.  They 
evidently  thought  they  had  fooled  us,  and  were  taking 
their  time. 

On  the  tenth  of  July  we  marched  sixty-five  miles, 
passing  three  of  their  camps.  On  the  eleventh  we  were 
on  the  march  before  daylight.  The  trail  was  hot,  the 
Indians  making  for  the  Platte.  Every  one  knew  that  if 
they  succeeded  in  crossing  the  river  the  game  was  up. 
By  noon  we  had  marched  thirty-five  miles,  at  which 
time  Buffalo  Bill,  who  had  been  far  in  advance  of  the 
command  all  day,  was  seen  approaching  as  fast  as  his 
tired  horse  could  come.  As  soon  as  he  reached  the 
column  he  called  for  a  fresh  horse,  and  while  transfer- 
ring his  saddle  told  General  Carr  that  he  had  en- 
countered two  bucks  who  were  hunting  and  that  the 
Indian  camp  was  about  twelve  miles  ahead. 

The  general,  knowing  the  bucks  who  had  been  run  off 
by  Cody  would  make  every  effort  to  reach  their  camp 
ahead  of  us  in  order  to  give  the  alarm,  gave  the  com- 
mand "  Trot."  Both  horses  and  men  seemed  to  brighten 
up,  and  we  put  real  estate  behind  us  at  a  rapid  rate. 
When  within  a  mile  of  the  hostile  camp  a  halt  was  called 
to  let  the  Pawnees  unsaddle,  as  they  flatly  refused  to  go 


GEN.    GEORGE  CROOK 
GEN.   ELWELL  S.   OTIS 


GEN.  EUGENE  A.  CARR 
GEN.  HENRY  B.  CARRINGTON 


GROUP    OF   DISTINGUISHED    GENERAL    OFFICERS 


Carr  and  Tall  Bull  175 

into  action  with  saddles  on  their  horses.  They  began 
daubing  their  faces  with  paint  and  throwing  off  their 
clothing.  They  were  made  to  retain  enough  of  the  latter 
to  enable  us  to  distinguish  them  from  the  hostiles.  Af- 
ter this  short  delay  we  moved  forward  at  a  sharp  trot, 
and  in  a  few  moments  we  were  looking  down  at  "Tall 
Bull's"  camp  in  a  small  valley  below  us.  In  a  moment 
the  camp  was  alive  with  Indians  running  in  every  di- 
rection. 

General  Carr,  taking  in  the  situation  at  a  glance, 
gave  utterance  to  a  few  words  of  command,  winding  up 
his  remarks  with  the  order,  given  loud  and  clear  and 
sharp: 

"Charge!" 

Every  horse  leaped  forward  at  the  word,  and  in  a 
twinkling  we  were  among  them  and  the  fight  was  on. 
It  did  not  last  long.  There  was  rapid  firing  for  about 
five  minutes,  when  all  was  over  except  an  occasional 
shot  as  some  fellow  would  find  an  Indian  who  had  failed 
to  secure  a  horse  and  escape. 

The  result  of  the  fight  was  about  as  following:  no 
white  men  killed,  four  or  five  horses  killed,  about  one 
hundred  and  eighty-eight  dead  Indians,  forty  of  whom 
were  squaws  and  children;*  one  hundred  and  five  lodges 
captured,  many  rifles,  five  tons  of  dried  buffalo  meat 
baled  for  winter  use,  a  very  ample  supply  of  ammuni- 
tion, consisting  of  powder,  lead,  etc.,  and  a  greater  num- 
ber and  variety  of  brass  kettles  than  I  ever  saw  before. 

Of  their  live  stock  we  captured  five  hundred  and  sixty 
head  of  ponies  and  mules. 

To  pursue  those  who  had  fled  was  out  of  the  question, 
our  horses  being  too  badly  done  up.  As  we  charged 
the  camp,  we  saw  a  white  woman  run  from  among  the 

*  These  figures,  which  are  evidently  from  memory,  are  certainly  in  error. — C.T.B. 


176        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

Indians,  one  of  whom  fired  at  her  as  she  ran.  We 
shouted  to  her  to  lie  down,  which  she  did,  our  horses 
leaping  over  her  without  a  hoof  touching  her.  She 
was  wounded  in  her  side,  but  not  fatally.  Almost  at  the 
same  moment  we  saw  an  Indian  seize  another  white 
woman  by  the  hair  and  brain  her  with  a  tomahawk. 
Some  of  us  rode  straight  for  that  Indian,  and  there  was 
not  a  bone  left  in  his  dead  carcass  that  was  not  broken 
by  a  bullet.  I  dismounted  in  the  midst  of  the  hubbub 
to  see  if  I  could  help  the  woman,  but  the  poor  creature 
was  dead.  (She  had  the  appearance  of  being  far  gone 
in  pregnancy.)  I  mounted  my  horse  again  with  a  very 
good  stomach  for  a  fight. 

After  firing  a  few  shots,  I  happened  to  see  a  Red 
mounted  on  a  large  paint  pony  making  off  by  himself, 
and  driving  four  fine  mules  ahead  of  him.  I  gave  chase 
and  gained  on  him  rapidly,  which  he  soon  perceived, 
dropping  his  mules  and  doing  the  best  he  could  to  get 
away.  But  it  was  no  use.  "  Sam,"  my  horse,  was  Ken- 
tucky bred,  and  walked  right  up  on  him.  When  I  was 
within  seventy-five  or  one  hundred  yards  of  him  he 
wheeled  his  horse  and  fired,  the  bullet  passing  through 
the  calf  of  my  leg  and  into  my  horse.  The  Indian  threw 
his  gun  away  and  rode  at  me  like  a  man,  discharging 
arrows  as  he  came.  The  third  arrow  split  my  left  ear 
right  up  to  my  head.  It  was  then  my  turn,  and  I  shot 
him  through  the  head.  This  Indian's  name  was 
"  Pretty  Bear."  He  was  chief  of  a  band  of  Cheyennes. 
The  Pawnees  knew  him  and  were  anxious  to  secure  his 
scalp,  which  I  was  glad  to  give  them  as  I  soon  became 
disgusted  with  the  ghastly  trophy.  "Pretty  Bear"  had 
on  his  person  the  badge  of  a  Royal  Arch  Mason,  with 
West  Springfield,  111.,  engraved  on  it.  I  sent  the  badge 
to  the  postmaster  at  Springfield  with  a  statement  as  to 


Carr  and  Tall  Bull  177 

how  it  came  into  my  possession.  "Pretty  Bear"  had 
five  or  six  scalps  on  the  trail  of  his  shield,  one  of 
which  was  that  of  a  woman.  The  hair  was  brown, 
very  long,  and  silken. 

"Tall  Bull,"  the  Sioux  chief,  was  killed  by  Lieuten- 
ant Mason,  who  rode  up  to  him  and  shot  him  through 
the  heart  with  a  derringer.  After  I  had  taken  the  scalp 
of"  Pretty  Bear"  I  found  that  Sam  was  shot  through  the 
bowels.  I  unsaddled  him  and  turned  him  loose  to  die, 
but  he  followed  me  like  a  dog  and  would  put  his  head 
against  me  and  push,  groaning  like  a  person.  I  was 
forced  to  shoot  him  to  end  his  misery.  I  had  to  try  two 
or  three  times  before  I  could  do  it.  At  first  to  save 
my  life  I  could  not  do  it.  He  kept  looking  at  me  with 
his  great  brown  eyes.  When  I  did  fire  he  never  knew 
what  hurt  him.  He  was  a  splendid  horse,  and  could 
do  his  mile  in  1.57. 

My  wounds  being  slight,  I  rustled  around  and  soon 
managed  to  catch  a  small  mule,  which  I  mounted  bare- 
back, intending  to  scout  around  a  little.  I  did  not  carry 
out  my  intention,  however.  The  brevet  horse  ran  into 
the  middle  of  the  Indian  camp,  threw  me  into  a  big 
black  mud-hole,  my  boot  was  full  of  blood,  my  ear  had 
bled  all  over  one  side  of  me,  so  that  when  I  crawled  out 
of  that  mud-hole  I  was  just  too  sweet  for  anything.  By 
this  time  the  fight  was  over.  A  friend  of  mine,  Bill 
Steele,  went  with  me  to  the  spring  that  ran  into  the  mud- 
hole,  where  he  washed  me  as  well  as  he  could,  bandaged 
my  leg,  sewed  my  ear  together  with  an  awl  and  some 
linen  thread.  He  made  a  good  job  of  it,  and  I  was  all 
right  except  that  my  leg  was  a  little  sore  and  stiff. 

After  the  fight  we  found  we  had  one  hundred  and 
seventeen  prisoners,  four  squaws,  and  fifteen  children. 
They  were  turned  over  to  the  Pawnees.  The  Pawnees 


178        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

did  not  fight  well.  They  skulked  and  killed  the  women 
and  children.  I  have  never  seen  Indians  face  the  music 
like  white  men.  We  camped  where  we  were  that  night. 
Men  were  coming  into  camp  all  night.  In  fact,  they  did 
not  reach  the  scene  of  action  until  about  ten  o'clock  next 
day.  They  were  fellows  who  had  been  left  along  the 
trail  by  reason  of  their  horses  giving  out. 

Our  first  duty  next  day  was  to  bury  the  poor  woman 
they  had  so  foully  murdered  the  day  before.  Not  hav- 
ing a  coffin,  we  wrapped  her  in  a  buffalo  robe.  General 
Carr  read  the  funeral  service  and  the  cavalry  sounded 
the  funeral  dirge,  and  as  the  soft,  mournful  notes  died 
away  many  a  cheek  was  wet  that  had  long  been  a  stran- 
ger to  tears.  The  other  woman  was  found  to  be  all 
right  with  the  exception  of  a  wound  in  the  side.  She 
was  a  German,  unable  to  speak  English.  Both  of  the 
women  had  been  beaten  and  outraged  in  every  conceiv- 
able manner.  Their  condition  was  pitiful  beyond  any 
power  of  mine  to  portray. 

The  Indian  camp  and  everything  pertaining  thereto 
was  destroyed,  after  which  we  took  up  our  line  of  march 
for  Fort  Sedgwick,  where  we  arrived  in  due  time  without 
any  mishap. 

I  think  it  just  as  impossible  to  make  a  civilized  man 
of  the  Indian  as  it  would  be  to  make  a  shepherd  dog  of 
a  wolf,  or  a  manly  man  of  a  dude.  They  do  not  in  my 
opinion  possess  a  single  trait  that  elevates  a  man  above 
a  brute.  They  are  treacherous,  cowardly,  and  ungrate- 
ful, Cooper  to  the  contrary  notwithstanding.  I  knew  a 
Greek  in  Arizona  who  came  to  the  country  with  camels 
for  the  government.  After  the  camels  died  he  married 
an  Apache  squaw,  learned  the  language,  and  was  em- 
ployed by  the  United  States  government  as  an  inter- 
preter. This  man  told  me  that  in  the  Apache  dialect 


Carr  and  Tall  Bull  179 

there  was  no  word,  or  combination  of  words,  whereby 
they  could  convey  the  idea  that  we  do  by  using  the 
word  Gratitude.  What  do  you  think  of  that  ? 

Well,  old  man,  I  have  been  writing  half  the  night, 
and  have  only  got  as  far  as  the  nth  of  July  '69.  I  am 
discouraged,  and  right  here  I  quit  you  like  a  steer  in  the 
road.  How  long  am  I  to  wait  for  that  picture  ?  I  am 
curious  to  see  how  much  of  a  change  old  dad  Time  has 
wrought  in  you.  He  has  played  h — 1  with  me. 

As  ever, 

J.  E.  WELCH. 

P.  S.  The  photo  has  come.  I  could  have  known  you 
anywhere.  You  have  changed  a  little  —  for  the  better, 
I  think.  J.  E.  W. 


PART  II 

The  War  With  the  Sioux 


CHAPTER   ONE 

With  Crook's  Advance 

I.  The  Cause  of  the  Fighting 

LATE    in   1876  the    government    determined 
that  thereafter  all  Indians  in  the  Northwest 
must  live  on  the  reservations.     For  a  long 
time  the  Interior  Department,  to  which  the 
management  of  Indian  affairs  was  committed,   had 
been  trying  in  vain   by  peaceable   means  to  induce 
them  to  do  this.     The  Indians  were  at  last  definitely 
informed  that  if  they  did  not  come  into  the  reservation 
by  the  first  of  January,  1876,  and  stay  there,  the  task 
of  compelling  them  to  do  so  would  be  turned  over  to 
the  War  Department.     They  did  not  come  in;  on  the 
contrary,  many  of  those  on  the  reservations  left  them 
for  the  field;  and  thus  the  war  began. 

The  principal  adviser  and  most  influential  head  man 
among  the  Sioux  Nation  and  its  allied  tribe,  the  Chey- 
ennes,  was  Sitting  Bull,*  an  Unkpapa  chief  and  a 
great  medicine  man.  He  does  not  seem  to  have  been 
much  of  a  fighter.  The  Indians  said  he  had  a  big  head 
but  a  little  heart,  and  they  esteemed  him  something  of 
a  coward ;  in  spite  of  this,  his  influence  over  the  chiefs 

*  TatA  nka  I   yoti  nka,  according  to  a   letter   from   Mr.  W.   H.  Holmes,  Chief 
of  the  Bureau  of  American  Ethnology,  Smithsonian  Institution. 

183 


184        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

and  the  Indians  was  paramount,  and  remained  so 
until  his  death. 

Perhaps  he  lacked  the  physical  courage  which  is 
necessary  in  fighting,  but  he  must  have  had  abundant 
moral  courage,  for  he  was  the  most  implacable  enemy 
and  the  most  dangerous  —  because  of  his  ability, 
which  was  so  great  as  to  overcome  the  Indians'  con- 
tempt for  his  lack  of  personal  courage  —  that  the 
United  States  had  ever  had  among  the  Indians.  He 
was  a  strategist,  a  tactician  —  everything  but  a  fighter. 
However,  his  lack  of  fighting  qualities  was  not  serious, 
for  he  gathered  around  him  a  dauntless  array  of  war 
chiefs,  the  first  among  them  being  Crazy  Horse,  an 
Oglala,  a  skilful  and  indomitable,  as  well  as  a  brave 
and  ferocious,  leader. 

The  Sioux  country  was  encircled  by  forts  and  agen- 
cies. The  Missouri  River  inclosed  it  on  the  east  and 
north.  On  the  south  were  the  military  posts  along  the 
line  of  the  Union  Pacific  Railroad.  To  the  west  were 
the  mountains.  Sitting  Bull  and  his  followers  took 
position  in  the  valleys  of  the  Big  Horn  near  the  sources 
of  the  Powder  River,  right  at  the  center  of  the  encir- 
cling forts  and  agencies.  It  was  a  situation  whence 
they  could  move  directly  upon  the  enemy  in  any  di- 
rection as  necessity  required. 

For  years  unscrupulous  and  mercenary  traders  had 
supplied  the  savages  with  high-grade  firearms  in  spite 
of  government  protests.  The  Indians  were  better 
armed  than  the  soldiers,  and  possessed  ammunition  in 
plenty.  Their  numbers  in  the  field  have  been  esti- 
mated at  from  twelve  hundred  to  six  thousand  war- 
riors, with  their  wives  and  children.  Those  who  have 
studied  the  war  from  the  Indian  point  of  view  have  put 
the  number  at  the  lower  figure;  nearly  every  one  else  at 


With  Crook's  Advance  185 

from  three  thousand  up.  Whatever  the  facts,  there  were 
enough  of  them  to  give  the  United  States  Army  the 
busiest  time  that  it  had  enjoyed  since  the  Civil  War. 

Three  expeditions  were  planned  for  the  winter, 
which  were  to  be  launched  upon  the  Indians  simul- 
taneously. One,  under  General  Gibbon,  was  to  come 
eastward  from  western  Montana;  another,  under  Gen- 
eral Crook,  was  to  advance  northward  from  southern 
Nebraska;  and  the  third,  under  Custer,  was  to  strike 
westward  from  Fort  Lincoln.  It  was  believed  that 
any  one  of  the  three,  each  of  which  comprised  more 
than  a  thousand  men,  would  be  strong  enough  to  de- 
feat the  Indians,  the  only  problem  being  to  catch 
them  or  corner  them. 

The  well-known  disinclination  of  Indians  to  fight 
pitched  battles  is  a  factor  which  enters  largely  into 
every  campaign.  Somehow  or  other,  the  Indians  in  this 
campaign  did  not  seem  to  be  so  disinclined  that  way. 
One  cannot  but  admire  the  skill  with  which  they 
manoeuvered  and  the  courage  with  which  they  fought. 
Putting  aside  all  questions  of  their  cruelty  and  brutality 
—  and  what  else  could  be  expected  from  them  ?  —  they 
were  patriots  fighting  for  the  possession  of  their  native 
land.  Bravely  they  fought,  and  well.  They  were  fully 
apprised  of  the  movements  of  the  troops,  and  resolved 
to  attack  them  in  severalty  and  beat  them  in  detail. 
We  shall  see  how  completely  they  did  so,  and  with 
what  brilliant  success  they  battled,  until  they  were 
run  down,  worn  out,  scattered,  killed,  or  captured. 

II.  Reynolds'  Abortive  Attempt 

The  weather  was  something  frightful.  Indeed,  all 
through  the  ensuing  spring  it  was  unprecedentedly  in- 


1 86        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

clement.  Neither  Ouster's  expedition  nor  Gibbon's 
got  away  in  winter.  Crook  did  advance,  and  first 
came  in  touch  with  the  enemy  with  results  not  alto- 
gether satisfactory.  General  Joseph  J.  Reynolds,  with 
ten  troops  from  the  Second  and  Third  Cavalry,  sur- 
prised and  took  possession  of  Crazy  Horse's  village, 
on  the  Powder  River,  on  the  morning  of  March  17, 
1876.  The  troops  had  partially  destroyed  the  village 
while  under  a  severe  fire  from  the  Indians  who  had 
rallied  on  bluffs  and  hills  round  about  it,  when  Rey- 
nolds abandoned  the  position  and  retreated.  He  was, 
of  course,  pursued  by  the  Indians,  grown  bolder  than 
before,  if  possible,  as  they  saw  the  reluctant  soldiers 
giving  up  their  hard-won  prize. 

So  precipitate  was  Reynolds'  withdrawal,  in  fact, 
that  the  bodies  of  several  troopers  who  had  been  shot 
in  the  action  were  abandoned  to  the  malignity  of  the 
savages,  and  there  was  a  persistent  whisper,  which  will 
not  down,  to  the  effect  that  one  wounded  man  was  also 
left  behind. 

As  to  this,  an  army  officer  of  high  rank  personally 
stated  to  me  that  Reynolds  was  in  such  a  state  of  ex- 
citement, as  the  afternoon  wore  away  and  Crook  did 
not  join  him  in  the  village,  that  he  finally  perempto- 
rily ordered  the  troops  to  mount  and  go  away,  in  spite 
of  the  fact  that  the  work  of  destruction  was  not  com- 
plete. This  was  bad  enough,  but  my  informant  sol- 
emnly asserted  that  Reynolds,  in  spite  of  plea  and 
even  remonstrance,  compelled  him  to  leave  behind  a 
wounded  trooper,  who  must  necessarily  have  been 
tortured  by  the  Indians  so  soon  as  they  re-occupied 
the  village.  Captain  Bourke  has  gone  on  record  in 
his  "  On  the  Border  with  Crook,"  expressing  his  belief  in 
the  truth  of  this  charge,  which  forever  stains  the  name 


With  Crook's  Advance  187 

of  the  commander  of  the  expedition.  The  whole  af- 
fair was  a  disgrace  to  the  army,  and  many  of  the  offi- 
cers of  the  command,  capable  and  brave  men,  felt  it 
keenly.  They  chafed  for  a  chance  to  show  their 
qualities,  which  they  had  later  on. 

The  cold  was  intense,  the  temperature  dropping  to 
thirty  degrees  below  zero.  The  soldiers  suffered 
greatly  in  the  retreat.  The  Indians,  who  seemed  im- 
pervious to  cold,  pursued  them  and  succeeded  in  re- 
capturing their  pony  herd  of  some  seven  hundred 
head,  which  Reynolds  was  endeavoring  to  bring 
away  with  him.  Crook,  bringing  up  the  infantry  and 
wagons,  was  furious  when  he  met  the  retreating  cav- 
alry and  heard  its  story. 

There  were  a  number  of  courts-martial  subsequent- 
ly, but  little  came  of  them,  and  the  matter  was  finally 
allowed  to  drop  upon  the  retirement  or  resignation  of 
some  of  the  officers  chiefly  concerned.  It  was  a  dis- 
graceful affair,  and  all  the  honors  rested  with  Crazy 
Horse.  The  Indians  were  greatly  encouraged.  The 
loss  of  the  troops  was  four  men  killed  and  six  wound- 
ed, and  sixty-six  men  badly  frozen  or  otherwise  in- 
capacitated by  the  cold. 

III.   The  March  to  the  Tongue  River 

After  the  ignominious  outcome  of  Reynolds'  attack 
upon  the  village  of  Crazy  Horse,  the  various  expeditions 
noted  spent  the  greater  part  of  the  spring  in  preparing 
for  the  grand  advance  of  the  converging  columns  which 
were  to  inclose  the  recalcitrant  Indians  in  a  cordon 
of  soldiers,  force  them  back  on  the  reservations,  and 
thus,  it  was  sincerely  hoped,  end  the  war.  It  will  be 
necessary  to  follow  the  movements  of  the  several  col- 


1 88        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

umns  separately.  As  that  of  Crook  first  came  in  con- 
tact with  the  Indians,  its  history  will  be  first  discussed. 

The  reorganized  command  for  the  campaign,  which 
assembled  at  Fort  Fetterman,  Wyoming,  included  fif- 
teen troops  of  cavalry  —  about  nine  hundred  men  —  ten 
of  the  Third,  under  command  of  Colonel  Evans,  and 
five  of  the  Second,  under  Major  Noyes,  the  whole  being 
under  the  command  of  Colonel  William  B.  Royall,  of 
the  Third.*  There  were  also  three  companies  of  the 
Ninth  Infantry  and  two  of  the  Fourth,  a  total  of  three 
hundred  men,  under  the  command  of  Colonel  Chambers. 

There  was  an  abundance  of  transportation,  a  long 
wagon  train,  and  an  invaluable  pack  train.  The  troops 
were  generously  provided  with  everything  necessary  for 
the  hard  work  before  them.  It  was  the  largest,  and  it 
was  believed  to  be  the  most  efficient,  force  which  had 
ever  been  sent  against  the  Indians  in  the  West. 

Crook,  an  officer  of  large  experience,  especially  in  In- 
dian fighting,  assumed  personal  command  of  the  ex- 
pedition on  the  28th  of  May,  1876.  On  the  2Qth  the 
march  began.  The  objects  of  the  campaign  were  the 

*  General  King,  in  his  fascinating  book,  "Campaigning  with  Crook,"  has  preserved 
a  characteristic  anecdote  of  Royall,  which  I  venture  to  quote  as  illustrating  the  way 
they  have  in  the  army,  and  as  throwing  some  light  on  the  temperament  of  the  peppery 
old  fighter: 

"A  story  is  going  the  rounds  about  Royall  that  does  us  all  good,  even  in  that  dismal 
weather.  A  day  or  two  before,  so  it  was  told,  Royall  ordered  one  of  his  battalion  com- 
manders to  'put  that  battalion  in  camp  on  the  other  side  of  the  river,  facing  east.'  A 
prominent  and  well-known  characteristic  of  the  subordinate  officer  referred  to  was  a 
tendency  to  split  hairs,  discuss  orders,  and,  in  fine,  to  make  trouble  where  there  was  a 
ghost  of  a  chance  of  so  doing  unpunished.  Presently  the  colonel  saw  that  his  instruc- 
tions were  not  being  carried  out,  and,  not  being  in  a  mood  for  indirect  action,  he  put 
spurs  to  his  horse,  dashed  through  the  stream,  and  reined  up  alongside  the  victim  with: 

"  'Didn't  I  order  you,  sir,  to  put  your  battalion  in  camp  along  the  river,  facing 
east  ? ' 

"  'Yes,  sir  ;  but  this  ain't  a  river.    It's  only  a  creek.' 

"  ' Creek  be  d — d,  sir!  It's  a  river  —  a  river  from  this  time  forth,  by  order,  sir.  Now 
do  as  I  tell  you  ! ' 

"There  was  no  further  delay." 


With  Crook's  Advance  189 

villages  of  Crazy  Horse  and  Sitting  Bull,  which  were 
believed  to  be  somewhere  on  the  Rosebud  River.  The 
topography  of  that  country  is  well  known  now,  but  then 
it  was  more  or  less  of  a  terra  incognita  —  rather  more 
than  less,  by  the  way.  Certainly,  this  was  true  after  the 
Tongue  River  was  reached.  The  advance  was  made 
at  first  up  the  Bozeman  trail,  past  Fort  Reno,  and  over 
the  battle-fields  around  the  ruins  of  abandoned  and  de- 
stroyed Fort  Phil  Kearney,  which  were  objects  of  much 
interest  to  the  soldiers. 

On  the  Qth  of  June  the  army  encamped  on  the  south 
side  of  the  Tongue  River,  near  the  point  where  that 
stream  intersects  the  Montana  boundary  line.  Crazy 
Horse  *  had  been  fully  advised  by  disaffected  Indians  at 
the  agencies  and  military  posts,  as  well  as  by  his  own 
daring  scouts,  of  all  these  preparations  that  were  being 
made  to  overwhelm  him.  He  had  sent  to  Crook  a 
specific  warning  not  to  cross  the  Tongue  River,  and 
declared  his  intent  to  attack  him  immediately  he 
reached  that  stream.  To  prove  that  his  threat 
was  no  idle  boast,  he  mustered  his  warriors,  and  at 
half  after  six  o'clock  on  the  evening  of  the  Qth,  from 
the  high  bluffs  on  the  other  side,  opened  fire  upon 
the  camp. 

Through  a  fortunate  mistake  the  Indians  directed 
their  fire  to  the  tents  of  the  camp,  imagining  that  they 
would  be  full  of  men.  They  happened  to  be  empty. 
The  Sioux  soon  got  the  range,  and  the  camp  was 
swept  with  bullets.  They  ripped  open  mess  chests, 

*  "  Crazy  Horse  was  the  personification  of  savage  ferocity;  though  comparatively 
a  young  man,  he  was  of  a  most  restless  and  adventurous  disposition,  and  had  arrived 
at  great  renown  among  the  warriors,  even  before  he  was  twenty-six  years  of  age.  In 
fact,  he  had  become  the  war  chief  of  the  southern  Sioux  and  the  recognized  leader 
of  the  hostile  Oglalas." — "  Personal  Recollections  of  General  Nelson  A.  Miles, 
V,  5,  A." 


Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

shattered  the  sides  of  the  wagons,  destroyed  the  bag- 
gage, killed  a  few  horses,  but  did  little  damage  to 
the  men.* 

The  Third  Cavalry  was  divided  into  three  battal- 
ions, one  of  four,  and  two  of  three  troops  each. 
Captain  Mills  commanded  the  first  battalion,  Captain 
Henry  the  second,  Captain  Van  Vliet  the  third. 
Crook  acted  promptly.  He  sent  forward  three  com- 
panies of  his  infantry,  deploying  them  as  skirmishers, 
to  line  the  river  bank  and  open  fire  on  the  Indians 
in  plain  view  on  the  bluff  on  the  other  side.  At 
the  same  time  he  ordered  Captain  Mills  to  take  his 
battalion  across  the  river  and  charge  the  enemy.  The 
Sioux  were  already  unsettled  by  the  accurate  fire  of 
the  infantry  with  their  long-range  rifles,  and  as  Mills' 
battalion  deployed,  dashed  through  the  water  and  at 
the  steep  bluffs  on  the  other  side,  they  broke  and  fled, 
having  suffered  little  or  no  loss,  and  not  having  inflicted 
much  more. 

IV.   The  Flying  Column 

The  skirmish  was  simply  a  grim  earnest  of  the  deter- 
mined purpose  of  the  Indian  chief.  No  pursuit  was 
attempted  at  that  time.  Negotiations  had  been  entered 
into  between  the  Crows,  who  were  the  hereditary  ene- 
mies of  the  Sioux,  and  the  Shoshones,  with  a  view  to  se- 
curing a  body  of  Indian  auxiliaries  to  the  troops,  whose 
services  would  be  invaluable  for  scouting.  Persuaded 

*  One  bullet  smashed  the  pipe  of  a  small  camp  stove  in  Captain  Mills'  tent.  When 
the  Eastern  papers  learned  the  interesting  fact  that  Mills'  stovepipe  had  been  smashed, 
that  gallant  officer  was  severely  censured,  and  much  ridicule  was  heaped  upon  him,  un- 
der the  impression  that  he  wore  a  "stovepipe"  hat  in  action.  By  the  way,  when  Cap- 
tain Broke,  of  the  British  frigate  Shannon,  boarded  the  American  frigate  Chesapeake, 
Captain  Lawrence,  in  the  War  of  1812,  he  wore  just  such  a  hat ! 


With  Crook's  Advance  191 

thereto  by  Frank  Gruard,*  a  celebrated  scout,  some- 
thing less  than  two  hundred  Crows,  with  eighty  odd 
Shoshones,  joined  the  army  on  the  I5th  of  June. 

To  pursue  Indians  while  incumbered  with  infantry 
and  a  wagon  train  was  well  nigh  a  hopeless  task.  Crook 
determined  to  park  the  wagons  and  baggage,  leave 
them  under  the  command  of  Major  Furey,  the  quarter- 
master, strip  his  command  to  the  lightest  marching  or- 
der, and  make  a  dash  for  the  Rosebud  River  and  the 
Indian  country.  One  hundred  infantrymen,  protest- 
ing most  vehemently  against  their  orders,  to  their  credit, 
be  it  said,  were  detailed  to  remain  with  the  train.  Two 
hundred  others,  who  professed  to  have  some  skill  in 
riding,  were  mounted  on  the  mules  of  the  wagon  train 
to  accompany  the  cavalry. 

The  morning  of  the  I5th  was  spent  in  accustoming 
the  infantrymen  to  the  mules  and  the  mules  to  the  infan- 
trymen. The  cavalrymen  and  the  Indian  allies  enjoyed 
the  circus  which  ensued  when  the  mules  were  bridled 
and  saddled  for  the  first  time,  and  mounted  by  men 
who  had  never  before  straddled  anything  more  formi- 
dable than  a  fence  rail.  It  took  the  whole  morning 
before  the  infantrymen  and  the  mules  learned  to  get 
along  with  each  other,  even  in  a  half-hearted  way. 

*  "Frank  Gruard,  a  native  of  the  Sandwich  Islands,  was  for  some  years  a  mail  rider 
in  northern  Montana,  and  was  there  captured  by  the  forces  of  'Crazy  Horse';  his  dark 
skin  and  general  appearance  gave  his  captors  the  impression  that  Frank  was  a  native 
Indian,  whom  they  had  recaptured  from  the  whites;  consequently,  they  did  not  kill  him, 
but  kept  him  a  prisoner  until  he  could  recover  what  they  believed  to  be  his  native  tongue 
—  the  Sioux.  Frank  remained  several  years  in  the  household  of  the  great  chief  'Crazy 
Horse,'  whom  he  knew  very  well,  as  well  as  his  medicine  man,  the  since  renowned 
'  Sitting  Bull.'  Gruard  was  one  of  the  most  remarkable  woodsmen  I  have  ever  met; 
no  Indian  could  surpass  him  in  his  intimate  acquaintance  with  all  that  pertained  to  the 
topography,  animal  life,  and  other  particulars  of  the  great  region  between  the  head  of 
the  Piney,  the  first  affluent  of  the  Powder  on  the  west,  up  to  and  beyond  the  Yellowstone 
on  the  north;  no  question  could  be  asked  him  that  he  could  not  answer  at  once  and  cor- 
rectly. His  bravery  and  fidelity  were  never  questioned;  he  never  flinched  under  fire,  and 
never  growled  at  privation," — "  On  the  Border  with  Crook?"  Captain  John  G.  Bourke. 


192        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

At  five  A.M.,  on  the  i6th,  the  force,  numbering  a 
little  less  than  eleven  hundred  men,  with  two  hundred 
and  fifty  Indian  auxiliaries,  crossed  the  Tongue  River 
and  marched  to  the  Rosebud.*  They  bivouacked  that 
night  on  the  banks  of  the  Rosebud,  on  a  level  depres- 
sion surrounded  by  low  bluffs  on  all  sides,  forming  a 
sort  of  natural  amphitheater,  on  the  top  of  which  the 
pickets  were  stationed.  Each  man  carried  four  days' 
rations  of  hardtack,  coffee,  and  bau,-  in  his  saddle- 
bags and  one  hundred  rounds  of  ammunition  upon  his 
person.  The  pack  train  was  limited  to  two  mules  car- 
rying the  medical  supplies.  There  being  little  to  do  at 
the  wagon  camp  on  Goose  Creek,  a  number  of  mule 
packers,  led  by  a  veteran,  Tom  Moore,  accompanied 
the  expedition  to  help  the  foot  soldiers  to  manage  their 
mules,  and  incidentally  to  take  part  in  the  fighting. 
There  were  no  tents,  of  course,  and  but  one  blanket  (a 
single  blanket  at  that)  for  each  man.  This  blanket 
barely  kept  off  the  heavy  dew,  and  the  night  was  a 
thoroughly  uncomfortable  one. 

At  three  A.M.  on  the  iyth  of  June  reveille  was  sound- 
ed. After  breakfast  and  the  care  of  the  horses  and 
mules,  six  o'clock  found  the  troops  on  the  march  down 
the  Rosebud.  At  eight  o'clock  they  halted  and  unsad- 
dled their  animals  to  give  them  a  nibble  of  grass  and 
a  little  rest,  preparatory  to  a  farther  advance  later  on, 
while  the  Crows  and  Shoshones  were  sent  on  ahead  to 
scout.  The  place  in  which  they  had  stopped  was  an 
amphitheater,  like  their  camp  ground  of  the  night  be- 
fore, a  rolling  bit  of  boggy  prairie,  inclosed  on  all  sides 
by  bluffs,  every  point  being  within  rifle  shot  of  the  cen- 
ter. Through  this  amphitheater  ran  the  Rosebud 
River,  here  a  mere  creek,  its  general  direction  being 

*So  called  from  the  quantity  of  wild  roses  which  grew  along  its  banks  in  season. 


With  Crook's  Advance  193 

from  west  to  east.  Toward  the  east  side  of  the  amphi- 
theater the  creek  was  diverted  to  the  left,  the  north- 
eastward, and  plunged  into  a  gloomy  and  forbidding 
canon,  called  the  Dead  Canon  of  the  Rosebud.  The 
course  of  the  river  was  marked  by  a  rank  undergrowth 
of  grass,  small  trees,  etc. 

Mills'  battalion  of  the  Third  Cavalry  halted  on  the 
south  bank  of  the  creek.  In  rear  of  Mills  was  Noyes' 
battalion  of  the  Second  Cavalry.  Across  the  creek  were 
Henry's  and  Van  Vliet's  battalions  of  the  Third  Cavalry, 
the  mounted  infantrymen,  and  the  small  pack  train  with 
the  packers.  Crook  desired  to  keep  his  movements 
secret,  but  it  had  been  impossible  to  restrain  the  impet- 
uosity of  the  Indian  auxiliaries  the  day  before.  They 
had  come  across  a  herd  of  buffalo  and  had  made  great 
slaughter  of  the  helpless  animals,  killing  one  hundred 
and  fifty  of  them,  for  which  they  had  no  use  at  all.  It 
is  certain  that  so  able  a  general  as  Crazy  Horse  had 
scouts  watching  Crook  all  the  time,  and  would  have  dis- 
covered his  advance  in  any  event;  but  with  all  the  noise 
made  by  the  Indians  in  the  buffalo  hunt,  there  was  no 
possibility  of  a  surprise.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  it  was 
Crazy  Horse  who  began  the  game.  Crook  was  ready 
for  him. 

V.  The  Battle  of  the  Rosebud 

About  half  after  eight  o'clock  in  the  morning,  the 
resting  soldiers  were  called  to  attention  by  the  sound  of 
shots  from  the  bluffs  in  front  of  them,  over  which  their 
allies  had  disappeared.  It  was  at  first  supposed  that 
these  friendly  Indians  had  run  across  another  herd  of 
buffalo,  but  a  few  moments  told  the  practised  troopers 
that  the  firing  was  the  beginning  of  a  battle  rather  than 


194        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

that  of  a  hunt.  At  the  same  time  the  Indian  auxilia 
came  galloping  back  to  the  main  body  at  full  spe 
yelling: 

"Sioux,     Sioux!     Heap  Sioux!" 

Without  waiting  for  orders,  the  troopers  saddled  theii 
horses  and  fell  in.  They  got  ready  none  too  soon,  for 
right  on  the  heels  of  the  fleeing  Crows  and  Shoshones 
came  the  Sioux.  In  front  of  them  to  the  right,  the  left, 
the  low  bluffs  inclosing  the  plain,  were  ringed  with  In- 
dians in  full  war-gear.  As  one  observer  described  it  to 
me,  they  looked  like  swarms  of  blackbirds,  there  were 
so  many  of  them  and  in  such  rapid  motion.  They  kept 
coming  and  coming  into  view,  and  as  they  dashed  up  to 
the  brink  of  the  hills  upon  their  war  ponies  they  opened  a 
long-range  fire  upon  the  soldiers,  which  from  the  distance 
did  little  damage.  There  were  at  least  a  thousand  of 
them  in  plain  sight.  How  many  others  there  might  be, 
no  one  could  tell.  It  was  a  safe  guess  that  those  in 
sight  constituted  but  a  small  part  of  the  force. 

It  is  said  that  there  were  at  least  six  thousand  war- 
riors that  day  under  the  command  of  Crazy  Horse,  but 
that  most  of  them  were  not  engaged.  Crazy  Horse  had 
planned  an  ambush  for  General  Crook,  and  he  had 
hoped  to  defeat  him  by  luring  the  soldiers  into  it,  or  by 
separating  the  army  into  small  detachments  and  over- 
whelming them  in  detail.  His  plans  were  well  devised, 
and  came  very  near  being  successful.  That  they  did 
not  succeed  is  probably  due  more  to  the  acts  of  the 
Indians  themselves  than  because  of  the  wariness  of  the 
soldiers. 

Crook  acted  at  once.  Sending  his  staff  officers  to 
rally  the  Crows  and  Shoshones,  he  directed  them  to  cir- 
cle to  the  right  and  left,  and  make  ready  to  fall  on  the 
flanks  of  the  Indians.  Mills,  who  had  behaved  so  gal- 


With  Crook's  Advance  195 

lantly  at  the  Tongue  River,  was  ordered  to  charge  the 
Indians  straight  up  the  valley  to  the  bluff  to  the  north- 
ward, the  front.  Two  troops  of  Van  Vliet's  squadron 
were  rushed  off  to  the  southward,  the  rear,  to  seize  a 
commanding  position  to  prevent  the  Indians  from  cir- 
cling around  in  that  direction  and  getting  in  Crook's 
rear.  The  infantry  and  part  of  the  Second  Cavalry  were 
dismounted,  a^d  thrown  forward  as  skirmishers  around 
the  foot  of  the  bluffs.  Royall  took  Henry's  battalion, 
with  Van  Vliet's  remaining  troop,  one  of  Mills'  troops 
which  he  detached  while  the  battalion  was  on  the 
gallop,  and  another  of  Noyes'  troops,  and  charged  the 
Indians  on  the  left. 

Mills'  charge  was  most  gallantly  delivered.  The  sol- 
diers struggled  through  the  bog,  raced  across  the  bot- 
tom land  for  about  eight  hundred  yards,  and  scrambled 
up  the  bluffs  in  twenty  minutes,  finding  themselves, 
when  they  reached  the  top,  within  fifty  paces  of  the 
Sioux.  There  was  no  time  to  use  carbines.  Firing 
revolvers,  the  battalion  rushed  at  the  Indians.  The 
savages  fired  ineffectively,  gave  way,  and  fled  instantly 
to  higher  ground  six  hundred  yards  further  on,  where 
they  opened  fire.  In  their  excitement  they  shot  badly. 
Mills  dismounted  his  battalion,  deployed  them  as  skir- 
mishers, rushed  the  second  ridge  and  cleared  it,  the 
Indians  sullenly  retiring  before  him,  and  again  opened 
fire  on  the  troops,  to  which  the  cavalrymen  made  effec- 
tive reply.  The  Sioux  galloped  rapidly  to  and  fro,  yell- 
ing and  firing  from  their  horses,  kicking  up  clouds  of 
dust,  but  doing  little  harm. 

Royall,  Henry,  and  Van  Vliet  had  a  similar  success  on 
the  left,  where  the  ground  was  much  more  open  and  un- 
favorable for  defense,  although  the  Indians  were  massed 
more  heavily  in  that  quarter  than  before  Mills. 


196        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

Meanwhile  the  Crows  and  Shoshones  had  fallen  upon 
the  flanks  of  the  Sioux,  but  not  very  effectively.  Every 
one  in  the  field  except  a  small  reserve  was  now  hotly  en- 
gaged. The  pressure  on  Mills  became  stronger,  but  he 
drove  the  Indians  from  him  by  another  gallant  attack. 
Thereafter  he  was  reinforced  by  Noyes'  battalion.  The 
front  of  his  line  was  finally  partially  cleared  by  this  last 
dash.  The  Indians  who  had  been  attacking  him  there- 
upon left  him,  and  joined  the  others  before  Royall  and 
Henry. 

Crook  now  withdrew  Mills'  command  from  the  battle- 
field, and  Mills  was  ordered  to  take  his  three  troops 
down  the  Dead  Canon  of  the  Rosebud  and  attack  the 
villages  which  it  was  believed  the  Indians  were  defend- 
ing. Mills'  movements  were  supported  by  the  five  troops 
of  the  Second  Cavalry  under  Noyes.  Crook  promised 
to  follow  up  the  movement,  and  support  it  with  the  re- 
maining cavalry  and  infantry.  We  will  follow  this 
movement  later. 

Mills'  place  in  the  line  was  occupied  by  Tom  Moore 
and  his  packers  and  some  other  auxiliaries  from  the 
camp,  and  a  smart  fire  was  kept  up  in  that  direction.  On 
the  left  the  firing  was  fast  and  furious.  The  Indians  from 
the  front  cleared  by  Mills  joined  their  associates  on  the 
left,  and  again  and  again  attacked  Royall,  Henry,  and 
Van  Vliet,  who  had  joined  the  other  two,  with  the 
most  determined  courage.  Charge  and  counter  charge 
were  made  over  that  portion  of  the  field.  Now  the 
troops  gave  way  before  the  Indian  advance,  now  the 
soldiers  were  rallied  and  hurled  back  the  Indians,  now 
the  Indians  retreated  before  some  desperate  counter- 
charge. So  went  the  varying  fortunes  of  the  hour. 
The  number  of  savages  increased  with  every  passing 
moment.  To  the  eyes  of  the  astonished  soldiers  they 


With  Crook's  Advance 


197 


seemed  to  spring  from  the  ground.     If  one  fell  in  the 
line,  a  dozen  were  ready  to  take  his  place. 

In  one  of  the  charges  Captain  Henry  was  shot  through 
the  face  and  frightfully  wounded.  The  troopers  had 
dismounted,  but  the  officers  remained  mounted.  Henry 


SKtTCM   BV   THE 
AUTHOR    MAOt 
F-POM  NOTE'S 
AMD  DESCRIPTIONS 
F-URNISHCO  Bv 
GENERAL  MILLS 


BATTLE  OF   THE 
ROSEBUD 

.',„.     / 

•//m\>° 

,     ».*' 

,,»«     ,  <M.  „»«« 

%•  «m«?  *.'\* ?„*..,.-' 

^    ..*•'    m-;'>°° 
.***  *r      -^^<i%°*  iiis* 

*  ^      -"*''  o"5'  ^°'o»i,/*^""*«""W,,,      *"" 

/    **  &°%"   &&}  \\""''»<,,    m- 

I,  <£S5T'*5L  * ,  \  x  :A 

'  *s*J(  ,&"     ^-^r^<-'"">  ~  -^>~     —S'<i  '• 
-°^x      ^,-ry    ,      t—- f  ) 


SlOUX  AND 
CHtVtMNtS 

OOOOO      F"RI6NOLV 

INDIANS 

SOLOIEBS 

A- MILLS'  BATTALION 
B  -  Moves' 
C  -  HCNBVS 

D-VANVutT'S      • 

t  -  MOUNTCO  INF-ANTRV 
AMD  PACK  TRAIN 

a  a  a-  MlLLS  MARCH 
UP  THE  CARON  AMD 
PtTUQN  TO  THE  FIELD 

tit-  RtTRtAT  OF- 

INDIAMS  AROUND  REAR 
OP  C  BOOK'S  ARMY 
f~-  INDIAN  VILLAGE 

G  -  DAM  AND  AMBUSCADE- 


reeled  in  his  saddle  as  the  bullet  pierced  both  his  cheek 
bones  and  tore  out  the  whole  front  of  his  face  below  the 
eyes.  Although,  as  an  eye-witness  has  it,  he  was  spit- 
ting blood  by  the  handful,  he  continued  on  the  battle 
line.  The  situation  of  Royall's  wing  of  Crook's  army 


198        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

was  precarious.  Henry's  battalion  held  the  extreme 
left  flank.  It  was  his  duty  to  remain  there.  Vroom's 
troop  L,  of  the  Third  Cavalry,  had  become  separated  from 
the  main  body  during  the  battle,  and  was  caught  ahead 
of  the  line  and  surrounded  by  Indians,  in  imminent 
danger  of  annihiliation.  Crook  had  ordered  Royall 
to  bring  his  men  back  to  their  horses,  in  order  to  mount 
them  and  prepare  for  a  general  charge.  The  Indians 
took  this  movement  for  a  retreat,  and  came  dashing 
after  the  retrograding  troopers.  Only  the  cool  courage 
of  Royall  and  Henry,  and  the  magnificent  way  in  which 
they  handled  their  forces  when  they  went  forward  to  the 
rescue,  prevented  the  annihilation  of  Vroom's  troops. 

It  was  in  the  midst  of  this  operation  that  Henry  re- 
ceived his  fearful  wound  and  stayed  on  the  line.*  Pres- 
ently he  fell  from  his  horse.  As  he  did  so,  the  sol- 
diers, dismayed  by  his  fall,  began  to  give  back  before 
the  Sioux.  The  impetuous  Indians  charged  over  the 
place  where  Henry  lay.  Fortunately,  he  was  not  struck 
by  the  hoofs  of  the  galloping  horses.  His  men  rallied 
and  rushed  to  his  rescue.  Old  Chief  Washakie  and  his 
Shoshones  at  this  period  of  the  fighting  displayed  splen- 
did courage.  The  fight  actually  raged  over  the  body  of 
Captain  Henry  until  the  Indians  were  driven  off,  and 
Henry  was  rescued  from  what  would  otherwise  have 
been  certain  death.  After  this  fierce  struggle,  part 
breaking  through  the  line  and  part  turning  the  flank, 
the  Indians  galloped  down  the  valley  between  the  river 
and  the  troops,  and  finally  disappeared  on  the  other  side 
of  the  Dead  Canon,  their  retreat  accelerated  by  the 
movement  of  Mills  toward  the  villiage.  The  fighting 
had  lasted  a  little  more  than  two  hours. 

*  For  a  sketch  of  General  Henry  and  an  account  of  his  experiences  in  this  battle 
and  elsewhere,  see  the  last  chapter  of  this  book. 


With  Crook's  Advance  199 


VI.    Mills'  Advance  down  the  Canon 

Meanwhile  Mills  and  his  men,  in  a  column  of  twos, 
trotted  down  the  gloomy  depths  of  the  Dead  Canon,  the 
rocky  walls  of  which,  towering  on  either  side,  would  have 
afforded  abundant  cover  for  Indian  riflemen.  Before 
entering  the  canon,  they  had  cleared  the  mouth  of  it  of 
a  body  of  Sioux  by  a  smart  charge,  and  they  were  there- 
after unmolested.  They  advanced  rapidly  but  with  cau- 
tion, although  what  they  could  have  done  if  attacked  it  is 
hard  to  see,  and  how  caution  would  have  saved  them  it 
is  difficult  to  tell.  They  had  their  orders  to  go  through 
the  canon  and  attack  the  village.  There  was  nothing  to 
do  but  obey.  Sending  them  forward  was  a  mistake 
which  might  have  resulted  in  a  terrible  disaster,  al- 
though nobody  believed  that  then.  The  soldiers  had 
not  yet  realized  what  fighters  these  Indians  were.  The 
Custer  disaster  was  still  to  come,  and  no  one  imagined 
that  so  large  a  body  as  that  commanded  by  Mills  and 
Noyes  could  be  defeated.  If  Crook  had  followed  with 
his  whole  force,  the  troops  under  his  command  would 
have  been  annihilated;  it  is  probable  that  not  one  of 
them  would  have  come  out  of  that  canon. 

When  Crook  began  to  prepare  to  follow  Mills  with 
the  rest  of  his  force,  he  discovered  that  he  had  a  much 
larger  number  of  wounded  than  he  had  thought  possible, 
and  the  doctors  protested  against  their  being  left  with  a 
feeble  guard  while  Crook  with  the  best  of  the  force  went 
up  the  canon.  The  protest  was  justified  by  the  situa- 
tion. Besides,  the  attack  on  Royall  and  Henry  had  not 
yet  ceased.  Crook  reflected,  concluded  that  he  could  not 
leave  the  field,  and  that  Mills'  force  was  too  weak  for  the 
work  assigned  it.  The  general  thereupon  depatched 


2OO        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

Captain  Nickerson,  of  his  staff,  attended  by  a  single  or- 
derly, at  the  imminent  peril  of  their  lives,  with  orders  to 
ride  after  Mills  and  tell  him  to  leave  the  canon,  defile  to 
the  left,  and  rejoin  him  at  once.  Crook  hoped  that 
Mills,  on  his  return  to  the  field,  might  succeed  in  get- 
ting in  the  rear  of  any  Indians  who  might  be  lurking 
in  the  hills  before  Royall's  shattered  line. 

So  rapid  had  been  Mills'  movements,  that  Nickerson, 
although  going  at  the  full  speed  of  his  horse,  did  not  over- 
take him  until  he  had  penetrated  some  seven  miles  down 
the  canon.  Fortunately  for  all  concerned,  the  com- 
mand had  halted  where  a  cross  canon  made  an  opening 
toward  the  west,  and  on  that  side  the  canon  was  so 
broken  and  so  sloping  that  it  could  be  scaled  by  the 
troopers.  Firing  was  heard  to  the  front,  and  the  In- 
dians were  detected  massing  to  attack  Mills'  detach- 
ment. A  halt  had  been  ordered  for  the  purpose  of 
making  final  preparations  for  the  attack. 

"Mills,"  said  Nickerson,  as  he  came  galloping  up, 
"  Royall  has  been  badly  handled  —  there  are  many 
wounded.  Henry  is  severely  hurt,  and  Vroom's  troop 
is  all  cut  up.  The  General  orders  that  you  and  Noyes 
defile  by  your  left  flank  out  of  this  canon  and  return  to 
the  field  at  once.  He  cannot  move  out  to  support  you 
and  the  rest  on  account  of  the  wounded." 

Never  was  order  more  unwelcome.  The  officers  at 
the  head  of  the  column  urged  Mills  to  go  on.  The  In- 
dian village  was  in  sight.  Crook  could  not  have  known 
how  near  they  were,  or  he  would  not  have  recalled  them. 
Mills,  however,  was  a  thorough  soldier.  In  his  mind 
orders  were  to  be  obeyed,  and  he  silenced  the  objectors 
and  advisers,  and  did  as  he  was  directed,  although  with 
great  disappointment  and  reluctance.  Never  was  obedi- 
ence better  justified.  General  Mills  admits  now  that,  had 


With  Crook's  Advance  201 

he  disobeyed  Crook,  his  command  would  have  been 
annihilated. 

The  canon  was  the  mouth  of  Crazy  Horse's  trap.  A 
short  distance  farther  on,  it  ended  in  a  great  dam  covered 
with  broken  logs,  making  a  dangerous  abattis.  Here 
the  main  body  of  the  Indians  had  been  massed.  Here 
they  expected,  seeing  the  confident  advance  of  the  eight 
troops  of  cavalry  up  the  canon,  to  fall  upon  them  and 
kill  them  all,  which  they  might  easily  have  done.  Nick- 
erson  got  there  just  in  time. 

Mills  instantly  turned  to  the  left  and  led  his  troops 
up  the  broken  wall  of  the  canon  to  the  high  ground  on 
the  farther  side;  fortunately,  he  had  been  overtaken  at 
about  the  very  point  where  the  ascent  was  practicable 
for  troops.  Presently  the  detachment  rejoined  the  main 
body,  their  progress  being  unmolested. 

There  were  ten  soldiers  killed  and  twenty-seven  se- 
riously wounded,  besides  a  great  number  of  slightly 
wounded.  Most  of  the  casualties  were  in  Royall's 
command,  Vroom's  troop  having  lost  heavily  while  it 
was  in  such  peril. 

Crook  camped  for  the  night  on  the  battle-field.  The 
dead  were  buried,  the  wounded  looked  after  tempo- 
rarily, and  the  next  morning  the  soldiers  withdrew. 
They  went  back  to  their  camp  at  Goose  Creek  and 
stayed  there.  The  battle  was  in  one  sense  a  victory  for 
the  white  soldiers,  in  that  they  drove  the  Indians  from 
the  field,  forcing  them  back  at  least  five  miles.  In  an- 
other, and  a  larger  and  more  definite  sense,  it  was  a  de- 
cided victory  for  Crazy  Horse.  He  had  fought  Crook 
to  a  standstill.  He  had  forced  him  back  to  his  base  of 
supplies.  He  had  stopped  the  farther  progress  of  that 
expedition.  He  had  protected  his  villages  and  had 
withdrawn  his  army  in  good  order. 


2O2        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

If  Mills'  command  had  not  been  recalled,  it  is  cer- 
tain that  it  would  have  been  annihilated.  As  it  was,  the 
Indians  had  done  remarkably  well.  Crazy  Horse,  free 
from  further  apprehension  of  pursuit  by  Crook  for  the 
present,  had  leisure  to  turn  his  attention  to  the  other  two 
expeditions,  which  there  is  no  doubt  he  was  well  aware 
had  been  launched  against  him. 

While  technically  it  was  perhaps  a  drawn  battle,  as  a 
feat  of  arms  the  battle  of  the  Rosebud  must  go  down 
to  the  credit  of  the  Indians.  It  was  more  like  a  pitched 
battle  than  any  that  had  been  fought  west  of  the  Mis- 
souri heretofore.  The  individual  officers  and  soldiers 
of  the  army  did  splendidly;  so  did  the  Indians.  Mills 
had  displayed  commendable  dash  and  daring  in  all  his 
charges.  Royall,  Henry  and  Van  Vliet,  and  Cham- 
bers with  the  infantry,  had  fought  skilfully  and  bravely 
against  an  overwhelming  force.  Crook's  dispositions 
were  good  on  the  field,  and  were  well  carried  out  by  his 
subordinates.  The  same  may  be  said  of  Crazy  Horse, 
his  subchiefs,  and  their  warriors. 

Crook  had  nearly  exhausted  his  ammunition  in  the 
hard  fighting,  the  larger  part  of  his  supplies  had  been  ex- 
pended, and  he  had  a  number  of  very  seriously  wounded 
on  his  hands.  There  was  not  one  chance  in  a  thousand 
that  he  could  catch  the  Indians  now.  There  was  nothing 
left  for  him  to  do  but  go  back  to  the  main  camp,  send 
his  wounded  back  to  Fort  Fetterman  for  treatment,  order 
up  more  supplies  and  more  troops,  and  await  a  favor- 
able opportunity  to  attack  again. 

To  anticipate  events,  it  may  be  noted  that,  owing  to  the 
disaster  to  Terry's  column,  Crook  did  not  advance  until 
August. 


CHAPTER    TWO 

Ex-Trooper  Towne  on  the  Rosebud  Fight 

I  AM  afraid  that  any  attempt  on  my  part  to  comply 
with  your  request  will   be  a  very  feeble  attempt 
to   describe    to   you   the    Battle  of  the  Rosebud, 
which  took  place  on  June  i/th,  1876.     There  are 
many  men  living  who  participated  in  that  battle  who 
can  describe  more  fully  and  more  comprehensively  than 
I  the  details  of  that  day.     However,  I  will  do  my  best. 
On  the  i6th  day  of  June,  1876,  General  Crook  with 
his  command  was  camped  on  the  Tongue  River  await- 
ing the  arrival  of  three  hundred  Crow  and  Shoshone 
Indians  to  be  used  as  scouts,  under  Frank  Gruard,  a 
noted  scout  of  the  Indian  country,  it  being  Crook's  in- 
tention thoroughly  to  scout  the  whole  country  from  the 
Powder  and  Tongue  Rivers  north  to  the  Yellowstone, 
and  to  co-operate  with  the  other  columns  in  the  field 
under  Custer,  Terry,  and  Gibbon. 

At  about  five  P.M.  on  the  afternoon  of  June  i6th  the 
three  hundred  scouts  came  into  our  camp,  and  shortly 
afterward  General  Crook  gave  orders  to  the  command 
to  prepare  for  a  night  march.  Extra  ammunition  and 
extra  rations  were  issued,  and  at  about  eight  P.M.  we 

O 

broke  camp  and  mounted  into  the  saddle  to  commence 
our  march  into  the  Indian  country,  which  was  overrun 

203 


2O4        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

by  the  Oglalas,  Brules,  Unkpapas,  and  Miniconjous, 
the  four  most  powerful  tribes  of  Sioux  Indians  on  the 
plains,  for  it  is  to  be  remembered  that  the  whole  Sioux 
Nation  had  left  their  reservations  and  was  then  on  the 
war-path. 

General  Crook  had,  on  the  morning  of  the  i6th,  sent 
out  scouts  to  find  and  report  any  Indian  signs  that  might 
be  found.  Numerous  signs  were  found  which  indi- 
cated that  a  large  party  of  Indians  had  recently  passed 
that  way  going  in  a  northerly  direction,  with  the  evident 
intention  of  joining  those  from  the  Brule  agency  on  the 
Yellowstone.  It  was  General  Crook's  purpose  to 
cut  them  off.  Thus  the  forced  march  of  the  night  of 
the  i 6th.* 

After  a  long  and  tiresome  journey  of  all  night,  about 
seven  A.M.  of  the  i/th  Indians  were  seen  on  the  hills 
to  our  front  and  left  who  were  evidently  watching  our 
movements.  It  was  reported  to  General  Crook  by  the 
scouts  that  we  had  gotten  into  a  country  that  was  com- 
pletely alive  with  hostile  Indians  and  that  we  were  near 
an  immense  Indian  camp. 

General  Crook  at  about  7.30  A.M.  went  into  camp 
with  the  intention  of  making  another  night  march  and, 
if  possible,  overtake  their  camp  the  next  day.  As  we  had 
been  in  the  saddle  all  night,  men  and  horses  needed  a 
few  hours  rest. 

After  going  into  camp  we  unsaddled  and  put  our 
horses  to  graze,  but  first  hobbling  them  to  prevent  any 
stampede  that  might  be  attempted.  While  we  were 
putting  our  horses  to  graze  the  whole  range  of  hills  in 
our  front  became  literally  alive  with  Indians,  and  at  the 

*  Trooper  Towne  is  in  error  here  ;  there  was  no  night  march,  according  to  Captain 
Bourke.  See  his  "On  the  Border  with  Crook,"  See  also  "War  Path  and  Bivouac," 
b7  Finerty.— C.  T.  B. 


Towne  on  the  Rosebud  Fight     205 

same  time  the  Crow  and  Shoshone  Indians  with  us  com- 
menced their  warlike  preparations  by  daubing  them- 
selves with  war  paint  and  riding  their  ponies  in  a  circle 
one  behind  the  other,  and  at  the  same  time  singing  their 
war  songs. 

After  riding  in  this  manner  a  short  while,  the  circle 
broke  and  the  whole  group  of  Indian  scouts  charged  up 
the  hill  toward  their  enemies.  It  is  a  well  known  fact 
that  the  Sioux  and  Crow  Indians  were  enemies  toward 
each  other  at  that  time.  I  have  seen  the  Crow  Indians 
shoot  buffalo  an"d  let  them  lie  where  they  fell,  not  even 
undertaking  to  remove  the  hide,  because,  they  would  say, 
"Sioux  Buffalo  no  good,"  which  indicated  that  as  the 
Sioux  Indians  were  their  enemies,  so  were  the  buffalo 
found  in  the  Sioux  country  their  enemies  also.  Every- 
thing in  the  Sioux  country  was  an  enemy  to  the  Crow 
Indian. 

While  our  Indians  were  making  their  charge  upon  the 
Sioux,  General  Crook  gave  orders  to  saddle  up,  for  well 
he  knew  that  a  battle  was  on  hand.  After  we  had  sad- 
dled and  formed  in  line,  my  troop,  F,  Third  Cavalry,* 
was  placed  on  the  left  flank  of  the  command,  and  it  with 
two  other  troops  were  detailed  as  skirmishers  and  were 
ordered  to  make  a  flank  movement  to  our  left  and  gain 
the  hills,  where  we  dismounted,  leaving  each  fourth 
trooper  to  hold  the  horses.  We  then  formed  the  skir- 
mish line  on  foot,  which  was  commanded  by  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  Royall. 

At  this  time  I  witnessed  a  most  daring  act  by  a  bugler 
by  the  name  of  Snow,  who  was  carrying  a  despatch  from 
General  Crook  to  Colonel  Royall.  General  Crook  was 
stationed  on  one  of  the  hills  to  our  right,  near  the  center 

*This  troop  was  commanded  by  Lieutenant  Reynolds,  and  was  in  Henry's, 
battalion.— C.  T.  B. 


206        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

of  the  line,*  where  he  could  view  all  that  was  taking 
place.  Wishing  to  send  an  order  to  Colonel  Royall,  he 
directed  his  orderly,  Bugler  Snow,  to  carry  it  with  all 
haste.  The  most  direct  route  was  down  a  steep  hill 
and  across  a  level  plain  and  then  up  another  hill,  where 
Colonel  Royall  was.  All  chances  of  reaching  there 
alive  were  against  him. 

When  I  saw  him  he  was  coming  as  fast  as  his  horse 
could  carry  him,  while  two  Indians  were  after  him  with 
the  intention  of  capturing  him.  Seeing  that  they  could 
not  capture  him,  they  finished  the  game  by  shooting  at 
him,  and  proved  their  good  marksmanship  as  poor  Snow 
fell  from  his  horse,  shot  through  both  arms,  but  he 
delivered  his  orders  all  right. 

After  remaining  on  the  skirmish  line  for  perhaps  two 
hours,  we  were  ordered  to  fall  back  and  remount  our 
horses  to  take  a  new  position  (our  horses  were  held  in 
check  in  a  ravine),  as  it  was  impossible  to  hold  our  pres- 
ent position  against  such  overwhelming  odds.  I  must 
say  that  I  never  saw  so  great  a  body  of  Indians  in  one 
place  as  I  saw  at  that  time,  and  I  have  seen  a  great  many 
Indians  in  my  time.  It  seemed  that  if  one  Indian  was 
shot  five  were  there  to  take  his  place.  If  we  had  re- 
mained in  our  first  position  we  would  all  have  been 
killed,  and  I  consider  that  we  retreated  in  the  right 
time. 

I  had  not  gone  more  than  one  third  of  the  distance 
from  our  position  to  where  the  horses  were  when  I  over- 
took three  other  soldiers  of  my  own  troop  carrying  a 
sergeant  by  the  name  of  Marshall,  who  had  been  shot 
through  the  face.  I  knew  that  time  was  precious  and 
none  to  lose.  I  could  not  give  them  the  cold  shoulder 
by  passing  them  without  giving  a  helping  hand.  Glanc- 

*  Crook  was  right  in  the  fighting  ;  his  horse  was  shot  under  hinjt — C,  Ti  B. 


Towne  on  the  Rosebud  Fight     207 

ing  back,  I  saw  the  hostiles  coming  over  the  hill.  I  said 
to  the  others,  "Quick,  here  they  come!  " 

At  that  instant  my  comrades,  to  save  themselves, 
dropped  the  wounded  sergeant  and  hastened  to  their 
horses.  The  sergeant,  seeing  that  I  was  the  only  one 
left,  said: 

"  Save  yourself  if  you  can,  because  I  am  dying.  Don't 
stay  with  me."  I  replied: 

"Dave,  old  boy,  I  am  going  to  stay  right  here  with 
you  and  will  not  desert  you." 

Grasping  him  with  all  my  strength,  I  carried  my  com- 
rade until  it  was  useless  to  carry  him  any  farther,  for  he 
was  dead.  I  then  laid  him  down  and  left  him  and  hur- 
ried to  get  away. 

I  don't  think  that  I  had  gone  more  than  ten  yards 
when  I  was  surrounded  by  about  twenty  or  more  of  the 
most  murderous  looking  Indians  I  ever  saw.  You  can 
talk  of  seeing  devils;  here  they  were  in  full  form,  painted 
in  the  most  terrifying  manner,  some  with  their  war  bon- 
nets adorned  with  horns  of  steers  and  buffalo.  It  was 
enough  to  strike  terror  to  anyone's  heart. 

I  knew  that  my  time  had  come,  I  knew  that  I  would 
be  taken  prisoner.  I  fought,  but  it  was  fighting  against 
terrible  odds.  There  I  was  down  in  that  ravine,  alone 
and  in  the  midst  of  a  lot  of  murderous  savages. 

Taking  my  carbine  from  me  and  throwing  a  lariat 
over  my  head  and  tightening  it  about  my  feet,  I  was 
helpless.  This  was  all  done  in  an  instant,  while  I  strug- 
gled and  fought  in  vain,  until  I  was  struck  on  the  head 
with  something  which  rendered  me  unconscious  and 
caused  me  to  fall.  As  I  went  down  a  bullet  struck  me 
in  the  body. 

I  think  that  when  the  bullet  struck  me  I  regained 
my  consciousness,  because  I  realized  I  was  being 


2o8        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

dragged  at  a  lively  pace  over  the  ground  by  a  pony  at 
the  other  end  of  the  lariat.  It  was,  I  think,  the  inten- 
tion of  the  Indians  either  to  drag  me  to  death  at  the 
heels  of  the  pony  or  after  getting  me  away  to  torture 
me  in  some  other  manner. 

They  captured  one  other  comrade  of  mine  by  the 
name  of  Bennett,  of  L  Troop,  Third  Cavalry,  and  com- 
pletely cut  him  in  pieces.  His  remains  were  buried  in 
a  grain  sack. 

After  I  was  dragged  in  this  manner  for  some  distance, 
my  captors  were  charged  by  one  of  the  troops  of  cavalry, 
and  to  save  themselves  from  capture  abandoned  me  and 
made  their  escape.  Thus  was  I  enabled  to  regain  my 
liberty. 

I  was  immediately  sent  to  the  field  hospital,  and  three 
days  later  I,  with  eighteen  other  wounded  men,  was 
sent  to  the  post  hospital  at  Fort  Fetterman.  You  ask 
in  your  letter  did  I  get  a  medal  of  honor  for  trying  to  get 
my  sergeant  away.  I  am  very  sorry  to  say  that  I  did 
not,  although  I  do  think  that  even  at  this  late  day  had  I 
some  one  who  would  speak  a  good  word  in  my  behalf 
I  think  that  my  case  would  be  taken  up  and  that  I  might 
get  one.* 

I  receive  a  very  small  pension  for  the  wound  received 
in  this  Indian  battle,  and  that  is  all  my  recompense. 

Hoping  that  this  narrative  of  my  experience  in  the 
Battle  of  the  Rosebud  may  be  of  interest,  I  have  the 
honor  to  remain, 

Yours  sincerely, 

c    T      -AT  PHINEAS  TOWNE. 

St.  Louis,  Mo. 

*  The  official  records  show  that  Marshall  was  killed  and  Towne  wounded  in  the  bat- 
tle. If  this  account  falls  under  the  eye  of  any  one  in  authority,  I  trust  an  investigation 
may  be  made,  and  that  the  medal  may  be  awarded,  if  it  has  been  earned. — C.  T.  B. 


CHAPTER  THREE 

The  Grievance  of  Rain-in-the-Face 

I.    The  Yellowstone  Expedition  of  1873 


H 


AVING  thus  disposed  of  the  most  formi- 
dable column,  Crook's,  in  so  summary  and 
so  effective  a  manner,  the  Indians  under 
their  able  leadership  turned  their  attention 
to  Custer  and  Gibbon. 

Before  the  Little  Big  Horn  campaign  is  discussed, 
however,  in  order  the  better  to  understand  the  most 
terribly  dramatic  episode  in  the  most  disastrous  of  our 
Indian  battles,  it  will  be  necessary  to  go  back  a  little 
and  take  up  the  thread  of  the  discourse  later. 

The  country  watered  by  the  Yellowstone  and  its 
affluents,  traversed  by  the  Black  Hills  and  other  ranges 
of  mountains,  and  protected  by  the  almost  impassable 
Bad  Lands  in  Dakota,  had  been  up  to  1873  practical- 
ly a  terra  incognita.  However,  the  Northern  Pacific 
Railroad  was  even  then  surveying  a  route  across  it. 
Gold  had  been  discovered,  and  miners  and  settlers  were 
crowding  in.  The  Indians,  since  the  treaty  of  1868, 
which  had  resulted  in  the  abandonment  of  Fort  Phil 
Kearney  and  the  other  posts,  had  been  ugly  in  mood  and 
troublesome  in  action.  They  welcomed  neither  rail- 
road nor  men. 

209 


2io        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

An  expedition  of  some  seventeen  hundred  men  under 
General  Stanley  was  sent  into  the  country  in  1873.  Cus- 
ter  and  the  Seventh  Cavalry  formed  a  large  part  of  the 
command.  There  were  no  guides.  The  country,  espe- 
cially in  the  Bad  Lands,  was  a  terrible  one  to  cross,  and 
Custer  volunteered  to  take  two  troops  of  cavalry  and 
ride  some  miles  ahead  of  the  main  body  every  day  to 
mark  a  road.  Custer  possessed  a  faculty  for  this  sort 
of  work  which  was  simply  marvelous.  He  was  a  born 
pathfinder,  better  even  than  Fremont. 

On  the  4th  of  August  he  left  camp  at  five  o'clock  in 
the  morning  with  the  troops  of  Moylan  and  Tom  Cus- 
ter, eighty-six  men,  five  officers,  and  a  favorite  Arik- 
ara  scout,  called  Bloody  Knife.  At  ten  A.M.,  reach- 
ing the  crest  of  some  bluffs  along  the  river  bank,  they 
saw  spread  before  them  a  beautiful  village,  through 
which  the  river  gently  meandered  between  the  tree-clad 
banks.  They  advanced  two  miles  up  the  valley,  and 
made  camp  under  the  trees  for  a  noonday  rest.  They 
had  come  at  a  smart  pace  and  were  far  ahead  of  the 
main  column,  which  was  out  of  sight  in  the  rear.  The 
passage  through  the  valley  was  easy,  and  there  was  no 
necessity  for  them  to  press  on.  The  weather  was  hot. 
After  picketing  the  horses,  partaking  of  their  noonday 
meal  and  posting  sentries,  officers  and  men  threw  them- 
selves on  the  grass  and  fell  asleep. 

At  one  o'clock  the  sentry  on  the  edge  of  the  timber 
gave  the  alarm.  A  small  party  of  Indians  was  ap- 
proaching, in  the  hope  of  stampeding  the  horses.  All 
Indian  attacks  begin  that  way.  After  the  horses  are 
stampeded  the  soldiers  have  to  fight  where  they  are, 
and,  as  the  Indians  are  mounted,  the  dismounted 
troopers  are  at  a  disadvantage.  Custer  was  on  his  feet 
in  an  instant,  shouting: 


Grievance  of  Rain-in-the-Face      211 

"Run  to  your  horses,  men!" 

The  troopers  were  no  less  alert.  Before  the  Indians 
could  stampede  the  horses,  each  man  had  reached  his 
animal  and  led  him  back  into  the  timber.  A  few  shots 
drove  off  the  little  party  of  savages,  the  horses  were  sad- 
dled, and  the  men  moved  out.  As  they  did  so,  six  mount- 
ed Indians  appeared  on  the  crest  of  a  little  hill.  Custer 
led  the  way  toward  them.  They  retreated  slowly,  keep- 
ing just  out  of  range.  In  this  manner  they  drew  the  sol- 
diers some  two  miles  up  the  valley. 

Finally,  in  the  hope  of  getting  near  to  them,  Custer 
took  twenty  men,  with  his  brother  and  Lieutenant  Var- 
num  in  command,  and  rode  out  some  two  hundred 
yards  ahead  of  the  remainder  under  Captain  Moylan, 
who  were  directed  to  keep  that  distance  in  rear  of  the 
advance.  Custer,  accompanied  only  by  an  orderly, 
rode  about  the  same  distance  ahead  of  the  advance, 
making  peace  signs  to  the  six  Indians  whom  they  had 
pursued.  As  he  approached  nearer  to  them,  their  pace 
slackened  and  they  suddenly  stopped. 

To  the  left  of  the  soldiers  was  a  thick  wood.  It 
occurred  to  Custer  that  Indians  might  be  concealed 
therein,  and  he  sent  his  orderly  back  to  the  advance  to 
caution  them  to  be  on  their  guard.  Scarcely  had  the 
orderly  reached  the  advance  when  the  Indians  they 
had  been  pursuing  turned  and  came  at  full  gallop 
toward  Custer,  now  alone  in  the  valley.  At  the  same 
instant,  with  a  terrific  war  whoop,  three  or  four  hundred 
splendidly  mounted  Sioux  burst  out  from  the  trees  on 
the  left. 

Custer  was  riding  a  magnificent  thoroughbred.  In  a 
second  he  was  racing  for  his  life  toward  the  advance- 
guard.  The  Indians  had  two  objects  in  view.  They 
wanted  to  intercept  Custer  and  also  cut  oflF  the  advance 


Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

party  from  Moylan's  men,  who  were  coming  up  at  a 
gallop.  Only  the  speed  of  Custer's  horse  saved  his  life. 
As  he  galloped  toward  them,  he  shouted  to  Tom  Custer 
to  dismount  his  men.  He  was  not  heard  in  the  con- 
fusion, but  young  Custer  knew  exactly  what  to  do. 
While  five  men  held  the  horses,  the  other  fifteen  threw 
themselves  on  the  ground.  On  came  the  Indians  after 
Custer.  As  soon  as  they  were  within  easy  range,  the 
dismounted  men  blazed  away  right  in  their  faces. 
The  troopers  were  armed  with  breech-loaders,  and  the 
first  volley  was  succeeded  by  a  second.  Several  of  the 
savages  were  hit  and  many  of  their  horses.  They  reeled, 
swerved,  and  Custer  rejoined  his  men.  A  few  moments 
after,  Moylan  came  up  with  the  main  body. 

Custer  now  dismounted  most  of  his  men,  and  keep- 
ing a  bold  front  to  the  Indians,  retreated  in  the  timber, 
fighting  hard  all  the  way.  Reaching  the  river,  they  made 
good  their  defense.  The  Indians  tried  all  their  devices 
to  get  them  out.  They  set  fire  to  the  grass,  but  it  was 
green  and  did  not  burn  readily.  All  their  efforts  to 
dislodge  the  troopers  failed,  and  late  in  the  afternoon 
a  heavy  squadron  came  up  on  the  gallop  from  the  main 
body  under  Stanley  and  put  them  to  flight.  It  was  a 
sharp  affair,  and  the  Indians  suffered  severely. 

The  only  losses  to  the  expedition  on  that  day  were 
two  civilians:  Doctor  Honzinger,  a  fat  old  German,  who 
was  the  veterinarian  of  the  regiment,  and  Mr.  Baliran, 
the  sutler.  They  were  both  quiet,  inoffensive,  peace- 
able men,  very  much  liked,  especially  the  doctor.  They 
were  amateur  naturalists,  and  frequently  wandered 
away  from  the  main  body  on  botanizing  excursions. 
They  had  done  so  that  morning,  following  Custer's  ad- 
vance, and  the  Indians  had  fallen  upon  them  and  mur- 
dered them.  It  was  the  discovery  of  the  remains  of 


Grievance  of  Rain-in-the-Face      213 

these  two  men  which  had  caused  General  Stanley  to 
despatch  the  cavalry  to  the  relief  of  the  advance. 

Bitter  was  the  anger  of  the  officers  and  men  over  this 

O 

murder  of  unarmed  non-combatants,  and  deep  and 
abiding  was  their  thirst  for  vengeance  on  the  Indians 
who  perpetrated  it. 

II.   The  Capture  of  Rain-in-the-Face 

The  next  year,  1874,  the  Seventh  Cavalry  being  sta- 
tioned at  Fort  Abraham  Lincoln,  near  Bismarck,  on  the 
upper  Missouri,  word  was  brought  to  Custer  by  a  scout 
that  a  famous  Sioux,  called  by  the  picturesque  name  of 
Rain-in-the-Face,  was  at  Standing  Rock  Agency,  some 
twenty  miles  away,  boasting  that  he  had  killed  Doc- 
tor Honzinger  and  Mr.  Baliran.  Rain-in-the-Face  was 

O 

already  a  renowned  warrior,  of  more  than  ordinary 
courage.  That  he  should  have  left  the  hostiles  under 
Sitting  Bull  to  come  to  the  agency  was  a  thing  implying 
peculiar  bravery;  and  that  he  should  there  openly  boast 
of  the  murder  was  even  more  extraordinary.  Custer 
immediately  determined  upon  his  capture,  although  to 
effect  it  would  be  a  matter  of  difficulty  and  danger. 

The  agency  was  filled  with  Indians  waiting  for  the 
issue  of  rations;  and,  though  they  were  on  a  peaceable 
errand,  they  were  always  unruly,  insubordinate,  and 
on  the  alert.  Captain  Yates  and  Captain  Tom  Custer, 
with  one  hundred  troopers,  were  detailed  to  make  the 
arrest.  The  arrival  of  one  hundred  men  at  the  agency 
instantly  excited  the  suspicion  of  the  Indians.  To  di- 
vert it  from  the  real  object,  Captain  Yates  ostentatiously 
detached  a  lieutenant  with  fifty  men  to  ride  to  some 
villages  ten  miles  away  in  quest  of  certain  Indians  who 
had  some  time  before  raided  a  settlement  and  run  off 


214        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

some  stock,  killing  the  herders.  With  the  remainder 
he  purposed  to  wait  for  the  return  of  the  detachment. 
Meanwhile  it  was  learned  from  a  scout  that  Rain-in-the- 
Face  was  in  the  sutler's  store. 

Tom  Custer,  with  five  picked  men,  was  ordered  to 
enter  the  store  and  make  the  arrest.  The  store  was  full 
of  Indians.  The  weather  was  very  cold,  and  the  Indians 
kept  their  blankets  well  around  their  faces.  It  was  im- 
possible to  tell  one  from  another.  Tom  Custer  had 
received  a  good  description  of  Rain-in-the-Face,  how- 
ever, but  it  availed  him  nothing  under  the  circumstances. 
He  and  his  men,  therefore,  mingled  freely  with  the 
Indians  from  time  to  time,  making  small  purchases  of 
the  sutler  to  divert  suspicion  as  they  lounged  about  the 
store.  They  deceived  the  savages  entirely,  in  spite  of 
their  watchful  scrutiny  and  suspicion.  At  last  one  In- 
dian dropped  his  blanket  and  stepped  to  the  counter, 
either  to  speak  to  the  trader  or  to  make  a  purchase. 

It  was  Rain-in-the-Face.  Custer  recognized  him  im- 
mediately. Stepping  behind  him,  he  threw  his  arms 
about  him  and  seized  him  in  an  iron  grasp.  The  In- 
dian, who  had  observed  the  movement  too  late,  attempt- 
ed to  fire  his  Winchester;  but  Custer  was  too  quick  for 
him.  The  five  troopers  sprang  to  the  side  of  their  cap- 
tain, disarmed  Rain-in-the-Face,  and  presented  their 
guns  to  the  astonished  and  infuriated  Indians.  The 

O 

room  was  filled  with  seething  excitement  in  a  moment. 
The  Indians  surged  toward  the  troopers,  and  perhaps 
would  have  made  short  work  of  them,  had  not  Captain 
Yates  at  this  juncture  entered  the  room  with  a  detail 
of  his  men. 

Rain-in-the-Face,  a  magnificent  specimen  of  Indian 
manhood,  had  ceased  to  struggle  the  moment  he  was 
convinced  that  it  was  unavailing.  He  was  led  outside, 


Grievance  of  Rain-in-the-Face      215 

securely  bound  and  mounted  on  a  horse.  The  troopers 
were  assembled,  and  in  spite  of  threats  and  menaces  by 
the  Indians,  who  did  not  venture  to  attack,  they  started 
back  to  Fort  Lincoln  with  their  prisoner. 

Messengers  were  sped  in  every  direction  to  the  dif- 
ferent bands  of  Indians  to  mass  a  force  to  release  Rain- 
in-the-Face,  who  was  a  man  of  such  importance,  being 
the  brother  of  Iron  Horse,  one  of  the  principal  chiefs  of 
the  Unkpapas,  that  no  price  was  counted  too  great  to 
secure  his  liberty;  indeed,  before  starting,  they  had 
offered  Yates  two  warriors  in  exchange  for  him.  The 
rapidity  with  which  the  troops  moved  was  such  that  the 
prisoner  was  safely  imprisoned  at  Fort  Lincoln  before 
anything  could  be  done. 

Rain  in-the-Face  stubbornly  refused  to  say  anything 
for  a  day  or  two,  but  finally  made  full  confession  that  he 
had  shot  Mr.  Baliran  and  wounded  Doctor  Honzinger, 
who  had  fallen  from  his  horse,  whereupon  he  had 
crushed  his  head  with  stones.  He  was  put  in  the  guard- 
house preparatory  to  being  tried  for  murder,  and  kept 
there  in  spite  of  the  efforts  to  release  him  that  were  made 
by  many  prominent  Indians.  In  the  same  guard-house 
were  some  civilians  who  had  been  caught  stealing  grain. 
One  bitterly  cold  night,  during  a  raging  blizzard,  the  ci- 
vilians, with  some  outside  assistance,  succeeded  in  mak- 
ing their  escape.  Rain-in-the-Face  took  advantage  of 
the  opportunity  and  left  also.  He  joined  the  hostiles 
under  Sitting  Bull,  and  sent  back  word  that  he  intended 
to  have  his  revenge  on  the  Custers  for  the  treatment  he 
had  received. 


CHAPTER    FOUR 

The  Little  Big  Horn  Campaign 

I.    Custer  Loses  His  Command 

TO  return  to  the  spring  of  1876.     When  the 
column  which  Custer  was  to  have  commanded 
moved  out,  Custer  led  his  own  regiment,  while 
Major-General  Alfred  H.  Terry  was  in  per- 
sonal  command   of  the  column.     I   give   the    reason 
in  the  words  of  General  George  A.  Forsyth  in  a  recent 
letter  to  me: 

"  For  some  reason  Custer,  one  of  the  most  splendid 
soldiers  that  ever  lived,  hated  General  Belknap,  the 
Secretary  of  War.  He  was  a  good  hater,  too.  When 
General  Belknap  was  imprisoned  and  undergoing  trial 
Custer  wrote  that  he  knew  of  certain  things  regarding 
the  appointment  of  post-traders  on  the  upper  Missouri 
River,  which  things  the  prosecution  thought  were  what 
they  needed  to  insure  conviction.  As  a  matter  of  fact, 
Custer  did  not  know  anything.  He  had  heard  disap- 
pointed men  who  had  failed  to  get  said  post-trader- 
ships  curse  Belknap  and  say  that  they  knew  Belknap 
had  sold  the  traderships  to  the  appointees.  It  was  not  so. 
Belknap  had  given  these  appointments  to  certain  able 
Iowa  politicians  for  their  friends,  in  order  to  secure  their 
influence  in  the  next  campaign  for  United  States  Senator 

216 


The  Little  Big  Horn  Campaign    217 

from  Iowa,  as  he  had  determined  to  try  for  a  senatorship 
from  his  state,  viz.,  Iowa. 

"It  was  entirely  within  his  own  right  to  make  these 
appointments  and  there  was  really  nothing  wrong  in 
doing  so.  Of  course  the  disappointed  applicants  were 
furious,  and  especially  certain  men  who  had  served  with 
Belknap  during  the  Civil  War  and  who  thought  they 
had  a  claim  on  him.  They  could  not  tell  lies  fast 
enough  about  Belknap  and  especially  to  Custer,  who  was 
thoroughly  honest  and  believed  what  they  said.  This 
was  what  Custer  thought  he  knew. 

"Custer  was  summoned  to  Washington  of  course. 
When  he  was  questioned  by  the  House  Committee  of  pros- 
ecution it  was  apparent  that  he  did  not  know  anything. 
His  evidence  was  all  hearsay  and  not  worth  a  tinker's 
dam.  The  President  —  General  Grant  —  was  indignant 
at  Custer's  statements  regarding  Belknap,  which  turned 
out  to  be  all  hearsay.  .  .  .  The  President  directed 
General  Sherman  not  to  permit  Custer  to  take  the  field 
against  Sitting  Bull  —  undoubtedly  to  punish  him. 

"You  will  recall  that  Belknap  was  —  in  a  sort  of 
Scotch  verdict  way,  '  Not  proven,  my  lord '  -  acquit- 
ted. It  was  only  upon  the  strong,  insistent  and  urgent 
request  of  General  Sheridan  to  General  Sherman  —  the 
then  Commanding  General  of  the  Army  —  that  the 
President  finally  said  that  if  General  Sheridan  regarded 
Custer's  services  of  great  importance  in  the  campaign, 
Sherman  might  authorize  Sheridan  to  permit  him  to 
join  his  regiment  and  serve  under  General  Terry,  who 
was  appointed  to  command  the  expedition.  Sherman 
wired  Sheridan  what  the  President  said,  and  Sheridan 
at  once  applied  for  Custer  as  in  his  opinion  'necessary.'* 

*  It  was  General  Terry's  urgent  representations  which  were  the  main-springs  of 
Sheridan's  action.  —  C.  T.  B. 


218        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

"I  was  in  Europe  at  the  time  of  the  Custer  disaster, 
and  on  my  return  to  General  Sheridan's  headquarters 
I  saw  all  the  correspondence  in  the  case." 

Therefore,  instead  of  commanding  the  column,  Custer 
was  placed  under  Terry,  who  was  to  command  Gibbon's 
column  as  well,  when  the  junction  had  been  made  be- 
tween the  two.  On  the  iyth  of  May  the  command  left 
Fort  Lincoln.  The  seriousness  of  the  situation  was  felt 
as  never  before  in  an  Indian  campaign.  It  was  realized 
that  no  child's  play  was  before  the  troops,  and  it  was 
with  unusual  gravity  that  the  regiment  marched  away. 
Mrs.  Custer  tells  how  General  Terry  ordered  the  force 
to  parade  through  Fort  Lincoln  to  reassure  the  women 
and  children  left  behind  by  the  sight  of  its  formidable 
appearance. 

The  best  part  of  the  expedition  was  the  Seventh 
Cavalry,  six  hundred  strong,  with  Custer  at  its  head. 
The  band  played  "Garry  Owen,"  the  famous  battle 
tune  of  the  Washita,  as  they  marched  away.  They 
halted  on  the  prairie  afterward,  and  an  opportunity  was 
given  to  the  officers  and  men  to  say  good-by  to  the 
dear  ones  to  be  left  behind;  then,  to  the  music  of  "The 
Girl  I  Left  Behind  Me,"  they  started  on  that  campaign 
from  which  half  of  them  never  came  back. 

They  reached  the  Powder  River  without  mishap,  and 
were  there  joined  by  General  Gibbon,  who  reported  his 
command  encamped  along  the  Yellowstone,  near  the 
mouth  of  the  Big  Horn.  Major  Reno,  of  the  Seventh 
Cavalry,  with  six  troops  had  been  sent  on  a  scouting 
expedition  to  the  southward,  and  had  discovered  a  big 
Indian  trail  leading  westward  toward  the  Big  Horn 
country.  On  the  iyth  of  June  Reno's  men  had  been 
within  forty  miles  of  the  place  where  Crook  was  righting 


The  Little  Big  Horn  Campaign    219 

his  fierce  battle,  although,  of  course,  they  knew  nothing 
of  it  at  this  time.  On  the  22<i  Custer  was  ordered  to 
take  his  regiment  with  fifteen  days'  rations  and  march 
down  the  Rosebud,  thoroughly  examining  the  country 
en  route  until  he  struck  the  Indian  trail  reported  by 
Reno. 

II.    Did  Custer  Obey  His  Orders  ? 

And  now  we  come  to  the  most  important  question  of 
this  remarkable  campaign.  On  the  one  hand,  General 
Terry  has  been  severely  censured  for  its  dire  failure; 
the  death  of  Custer  and  the  escape  of  the  Indians  have 
been  laid  at  his  door.  On  the  other  hand,  it  has  been 
urged  that  Custer  disobeyed  his  orders,  broke  up  Terry's 
plan  of  campaign,  and  by  his  insubordination  brought 
about  a  terrible  disaster  and  let  slip  the  opportunity  for 
administering  a  crushing  defeat  to  the  Indians,  which 
probably  would  have  ended  the  war  and  prevented  a 
deplorable  loss  of  life,  to  say  nothing  of  prestige  and 
treasure.  Both  officers  had,  and  still  have,  their 
partizans,  and  the  matter  has  been  thoroughly  threshed 
out. 

As  between  Custer  and  Terry,  I  profess  absolute  im- 
partiality, although,  if  I  have  any  natural  bias,  it  is 
toward  Custer,  whose  previous  career,  as  I  have  inves- 
tigated it,  appeals  to  me  more  than  Terry's,  distin- 
guished as  were  the  latter's  services.  I  have  studied  the 
situation  carefully,  examining  all  the  evidence  published 
by  both  sides,  and  very  reluctantly,  in  spite  of  my  liking 
for  poor  Custer,  I  am  compelled  to  admit  that  he 
did  disobey  his  orders;  that  his  action  did  break  up  a 
most  promising  plan,  which,  it  is  highly  probable,  would 
have  resulted  in  a  decisive  battle  with  the  Indians  and 


22O        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

the  termination  of  the  war;  and  that  he,  and  he  alone, 
must  be  held  resronsible  for  the  subsequent  disaster. 

General  Terry's  order  to  Custer,  which  follows,  is  en- 
tirely clear  and  explicit: 

Camp  at  Mouth   of  Rosebud  River,  M.  T., 

June  22d,  1876. 
Lieutenant-Colonel  Custer,  7th  Cavalry.    Colonel: 

The  Brigadier-General  Commanding  directs  that, 
as  soon  as  your  regiment  can  be  made  ready  for  the 
march,  you  will  proceed  up  the  Rosebud  in  pursuit  of 
the  Indians  whose  trail  was  discovered  by  Major  Reno 
a  few  days  since.  It  is,  of  course,  impossible  to  give  you 
any  definite  instructions  in  regard  to  this  movement, 
and  were  it  not  impossible  to  do  so,  the  Department 
Commander  places  too  much  confidence  in  your  zeal, 
energy,  and  ability  to  wish  to  impose  upon  you  precise 
orders  which  might  hamper  your  action  when  nearly  in 
contact  with  the  enemy.  He  will,  however,  indicate  to 
you  his  own  views  of  what  your  action  should  be,  and 
he  desires  that  you  should  conform  to  them,  unless  you 
should  see  sufficient  reasons  for  departing  from  them. 
He  thinks  that  you  should  proceed  up  the  Rosebud 
until  you  ascertain  definitely  the  direction  in  which  the 
trail  above  spoken  of  leads.  Should  it  be  found  (as  it 
appears  almost  certain  that  it  will  be  found)  to  turn 
toward  the  Little  Horn,*  he  thinks  that  you  should  still 
proceed  southward,  perhaps  as  far  as  the  head-waters  of 
the  Tongue,  and  then  turn  toward  the  Little  Horn,  feel- 
ing constantly,  however,  to  your  left,  so  as  to  preclude 
the  possibility  of  the  escape  of  the  Indians  to  the  south 
or  southeast  by  passing  around  your  left  flank.  The  col- 

*  At  the  time  this  was  written,  it  was  not  generally  understood  that  the  full  Indian 
appellation  of  this  stream  was  Little  Big  Horn.  —  C.  T.  B. 


GEN.  GEORGE  ARMSTRONG   CUSTER 
Killed  with  half  his  regiment  at  the  Little  Big  Horn 


The  Little  Big  Horn  Campaign    221 

umn  of  Colonel  Gibbon  is  now  in  motion  for  the  mouth 
of  the  Big  Horn.  As  soon  as  it  reaches  that  point  it  will 
cross  the  Yellowstone  and  move  up  at  least  as  far  as  the 
forks  of  the  Big  and  Little  Horns.  Of  course  its  future 
movements  must  be  controlled  by  circumstances,  as  they 
arise,  but  it  is  hoped  that  the  Indians,  if  upon  the  Little 
Horn,  may  be  so  nearly  inclosed  by  the  two  columns 
that  their  escape  will  be  impossible. 

The  Department  Commander  desires  that  on  your 
way  up  the  Rosebud  you  should  thoroughly  examine  the 
upper  part  of  Tullock's  Creek,  and  that  you  should  en- 
deavor to  send  a  scout  through  to  Colonel  Gibbon's 
column,  with  information  of  the  result  of  your  examina- 
tion. The  lower  part  of  this  Creek  will  be  examined  by 
a  detachment  from  Colonel  Gibbon's  command.  The 
supply  steamer  will  be  pushed  up  the  Big  Horn  as  far 
as  the  forks  if  the  river  is  found  to  be  navigable  for  that 
distance,  and  the  Department  Commander,  who  will 
accompany  the  command  of  Colonel  Gibbon,  desires 
you  to  report  to  him  there  not  later  than  the  expiration 
of  the  time  for  which  your  troops  are  rationed,  unless  in 
the  meantime  you  receive  further  orders. 

Very  respectfully  your  obedient  servant, 

E.  W.  SMITH, 
Captain  i8th  Infantry, 
Acting  Assistant  Adjutant  General. 

Custer  was  directed  to  march  southward  until  he 
struck  the  trail  Reno  had  discovered.  If,  as  Terry  sup- 
posed, it  led  across  the  Rosebud,  he  was  not  to  follow  it 
westward  to  the  Little  Big  Horn,  or  until  he  met  the  In- 
dians, but  he  was  to  turn  to  the  southward  until  he 
struck  the  head-waters  of  the  Tongue  River.  If  he 
found  no  Indians  there,  he  was  to  swing  northward 


222        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

down  the  valley  of  the  Little  Big  Horn,  toward  the  spot 
where  Terry  supposed  the  Indians  to  be,  and  where,  in 
reality,  they  were.  Meanwhile  Gibbon  was  to  come  up 
the  Little  Big  Horn  from  the  north  toward  the  same 
spot.  In  the  general  plan  of  the  campaign,  Crook  and 
his  force  were  supposed  to  prevent  the  Indians  from 
moving  south  —  which  they  did,  by  the  way.  Custer  was 
to  keep  them  from  going  east,  and,  as  he  advanced,  was 
"to  feel  to  his  left"  to  preclude  all  possibility  of  their  slip- 
ping between  him  and  Crook,  while  Gibbon  was  to  keep 
them  from  going  off  to  the  north.  The  Indians  would 
have  no  direction  open  to  them  for  flight  except  westward, 
and  in  that  case  the  troops  hoped  to  overtake  them  in  a 
difficult  country,  inclosed  by  mountains  and  rivers. 

Terry,  although  he  was  not  an  experienced  Indian 
fighter,  had  divined  the  position  of  the  Indians  with  re- 
markable accuracy,  and  he  fully  expected  to  find  them 
on  the  Little  Big  Horn.  If  Custer  had  followed  Terry's 
orders,  he  would  have  reached  the  Indians  on  the  day 
that  Gibbon's  men,  as  we  shall  see,  rescued  Reno.  After 
the  disaster  Terry  magnanimously  strove  at  first  to  con- 
ceal from  the  public  the  fact  that  Custer  had  disobeyed 
his  orders.  Custer  had  paid  the  penalty  for  his  disobe- 
dience with  his  life,  and  Terry  was  willing  to  bear  the 
odium  of  the  defeat  and  failure.  His  self-sacrifice  was 
noble  and  characteristic;  but  a  mistake,  caused  by  the 
carelessness  of  General  Sherman,  coupled  with  the  en- 
terprise of  a  brilliant  newspaper  reporter,  who  posed  as 
a  regularly  accredited  government  messenger,  defeated 
Terry's  intent,  and  instead  of  the  first  report,  which 
made  no  allusion  to  the  disobedience  of  orders,  being 
made  public,*  a  second  report,  which  told  the  whole 

*  It  was  delayed  in  transmission,  owing  to  the  cutting  of  the  telegraph  wires  by  the 
Indians. 


The  Little  Big  Horn  Campaign    223 

story,  and  which  was  intended  for  the  authorities  alone, 
wasgiven  to  the  press  and  immediately  spread  broadcast. 
The  first  report  soon  turned  up,  andTerry  thereafter  was 
made  the  victim  of  unmerited  obloquy  by  Custer's  par- 
tizans,  who  said  that  the  absence  of  any  mention  in  the 
original  report  of  any  disobedience  on  the  part  of  Custer, 
and  the  alleged  failure  to  allude  to  the  plan  of  com- 
paign  which  Custer  had  frustrated,  was  evidence  that  no 
importance  was  attached  to  the  plan  by  Terry  or  any 
one  until  after  the  failure  and  consequent  popular 
indignation.  Terry's  answer  to  this  was  a  noble  silence, 
to  save  Custer's  reputation.  The  living  assumed  the 
responsibility  to  protect  the  fame  of  the  dead  —  honor 
to  him! 

General  Gibbon  also  has  gone  on  record  in  a  letter  to 
Terry  regarding  the  situation: 

"So  great  was  my  fear  that  Custer's  zeal  would  carry 
him  forward  too  rapidly,  that  the  last  thing  I  said  to  him 
when  bidding  him  good-by  after  his  regiment  had  filed 
past  you  when  starting  on  his  march  was,  'Now,  Custer, 
don't  be  greedy,  but  wait  for  us.'  He  replied  gaily  as, 
with  a  wave  of  his  hand,  he  dashed  off  to  follow  his 
regiment,  'No,  I  will  not.'  Poor  fellow!  Knowing 
what  we  do  now,  and  what  an  effect  a  fresh  Indian  trail 
seemed  to  have  had  upon  him,  perhaps  we  were  expecting 
too  much  to  anticipate  a  forbearance  on  his  part  which 
would  have  rendered  cooperation  of  the  two  columns 
practicable.* 

"  Except  so  far  as  to  draw  profit  from  past  experience, 
it  is  perhaps  useless  to  speculate  as  to  what  would  have 
been  the  result  had  your  plan,  as  originally  agreed  upon, 
been  carried  out.  But  I  cannot  help  reflecting  that  in 

*  Italics  mine. — C.  T.  B. 


224        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

that  case  my  column,  supposing  the  Indian  camp  to 
have  remained  where  it  was  when  Custer  struck  it, 
would  have  been  the  first  to  reach  it;  that  with  our  infan- 
try and  Catling  guns  we  should  have  been  able  to  take 
care  of  ourselves,  even  though  numbering  only  about 
two-thirds  of  Ouster's  force;  and  that  with  six  hundred 
cavalry  in  the  neighborhood,  led  as  only  Custer  could 
lead  it,  the  result  to  the  Indians  would  have  been  very 
different  from  what  it  was." 

With  regard  to  Gibbon's  generous  suggestion  that 
Custer  was  suddenly  carried  away  by  the  opportunity 
presented,  the  testimony  of  the  late  General  Ludlow  is 
interesting.  According  to  him,  Custer  stated  on  the 
8th  of  May,  in  St.  Paul,  Minnesota,  that  he  intended,  at 
the  first  chance  he  got  in  the  campaign,  to  "cut  loose 
from  (and  make  his  operations  independent  of)  General 
Terry  during  the  summer;"  that  he  had  "got  away  from 
Stanley  and  would  be  able  to  swing  clear  of  Terry."  * 

It  is  difficult,  nay,  it  is  impossible,  therefore,  to  acquit 
Custer  of  a  deliberate  purpose  to  campaign  on  his  own 
account  so  soon  as  he  could  get  away  from  General 
Terry.  The  sentence  of  Terry's  orders  commencing: 
"  It  is,  of  course,  impossible  to  give  you  any  definite  in- 
structions," etc.,  and  expressing  confidence  in  his  zeal 
and  energy,  and  Terry's  unwillingness  to  hamper  him 
with  precise  directions,  when  nearly  in  contact  with  the 
enemy,  did  not  warrant  Custer  in  disobeying  his  orders. 
It  was  only  to  govern  his  conduct  when  he  should  be  in 
contact  with  the  enemy,  in  which  case,  of  course,  he  would 
have  to  be  the  sole  judge  of  what  was  best  to  be  done. 

*  Journal  of  the  Military  Service  Institution  in  the  United  States,  Vol.  XVIII., 
No.  LXXTX.:  "  The  Campaign  Against  the  Sioui  in  1876,"  by  Major-General  Robert 
P.  Hughes,  U.  S.  A; 


The  Little  Big  Horn  Campaign    225 

His  conduct  in  that  case  will  be  considered  later.  In 
any  event  it  has  no  bearing  on  the  question  of  disobedi- 
ence, for  the  crux  is  here:  had  Custer  obeyed  orders, 
he  would  not  have  come  in  contact  with  the  enemy  when 
and  where  he  did.  The  conditions  would  have  differed 
greatly. 

Every  student  of  military  matters  knows  that  the 
words  used,  "He  desires  that  you  should  conform  to 
them  (his  own  views)  unless,"  etc.,  convey  a  direct,  pos- 
itive command.* 

The  abstract  question  of  disobedience  of  orders  is 
one  that  has  often  been  discussed.  It  is  impossible 
to  maintain  the  position  that  an  officer  should  never, 
under  any  circumstances,  disobey  his  orders.  Circum- 
stances sometimes  compel  him  to  do  so.  But  when  an 
officer  commanding  troops  which  are  supposed  to  act  in 
cooperation  with  other  troops  receives  orders  to  carry  out 
a  certain  specified  detail  of  a  stated  general  plan,  and  in 
the  exercise  of  his  own  discretion  concludes  to  disobey 
his  orders  and  do  something  other  than  what  he  was 
directed  to  do,  he  takes  upon  himself  the  onus  of  success 
or  failure,  not  merely  of  his  own  immediate  manoeuver, 
but  of  the  whole  general  plan.  If  the  plan  miscarries 

*In  Terry's  report  to  the  Secretary  of  War,  under  date  of  November  21,  1876,  he 
gives  his  own  understanding  of  his  orders,  which  is  fully  warranted,  in  the  following 
paragraph: 

"At  a  conference  which  took  place  on  the  2ist  between  Colonel  Gibbon,  Lieu- 
tenant-Colonel Custer,  and  myself,  I  communicated  to  them  the  plan  of  operations 
which  I  had  decided  to  adopt.  It  was  that  Colonel  Gibbon's  column  should  cross 
the  Yellowstone  near  the  mouth  of  the  Little  Big  Horn,  and  thence  up  that  stream, 
with  the  expectation  that  it  would  arrive  at  that  point  by  the  26th;  that  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  Custer  with  the  whole  of  the  Seventh  Cavalry  should  proceed  up  the  Rose- 
bud until  he  should  ascertain  the  direction  in  which  the  trail  discovered  by  Major 
Reno  led;  that  if  it  led  to  the  Little  Big  Horn  it  should  not  be  followed,  but  that 
Lieutenant-Colonel  Custer  should  keep  still  further  to  the  south  before  turning 
toward  that  river,  in  order  to  intercept  the  Indians  should  they  attempt  to  pass 
around  to  his  left,  and  in  order,  by  a  longer  march,  to  give  time  for  Colonel  Gib- 
bon's column  to  come  up." 


226        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

through  his  disobedience,  whatever  may  have  been  his 
motives,  woe  be  unto  him!  If  by  his  disobedience  he 
brings  about  the  end  at  which  the  original  plan  aimed, 
the  defeat  of  the  enemy,  that  is  another  proposition. 
The  event  has  then  justified  his  disobedience. 

Every  soldier  understands  that  reasons  for  disobedi- 
ence must  be  so  clear,  so  convincing,  and  so  unexpected, 
that  he  is  warranted  in  taking  so  prodigious  a  risk.  Dis- 
regarding for  the  moment,  for  the  sake  of  argument, 
General  Ludlow's  testimony  as  to  preconceived  and 
deliberate  intent  on  Custer's  part  to  disobey,  supposing 
Custer's  disobedience  to  have  been  caused  by  some  ex- 
igency or  crisis,  we  may  ask  ourselves  what  were  the  rea- 
sons that  caused  him  entirely  to  disregard  Terry's  plan 
and  so  to  manoeuver  as  to  bring  himself  directly  in  touch 
with  the  Indians  in  the  shortest  possible  time,  without 
attempting  either  to  examine  Tullock's  Creek*  or  to  in- 
cline to  the  southward — "feel  with  his  left"?  These 
reasons — if  any  there  were — can  never  be  known,  owing 
to  Custer's  death.  It  can  only  be  said  that  no  satisfac- 
tory reasons  appear  which  justify  Custer's  action. 

The  best  that  can  be  urged  in  defense  of  Custer  is  con- 
tained in  the  following  paragraph  taken  from  Colonel 
Godfrey's  Century  article. f 

"Had  Custer  continued  his  march  southward — that 
is,  left  the  Indian  trail — the  Indians  would  have  known 
of  our  movements  on  the  25th  and  a  battle  would  have 
been  fought  very  near  the  same  field  on  which  Crook  had 
been  attacked  and  forced  back  only  a  week  before;  the 

*  I  have  not  discussed  the  Tullock's  Creek  matter.  It  is  not  material,  except  that  the 
failure  to  examine  it  and  to  send  a  scout  to  Gibbon — some  of  Gibbon's  men  had  been 
detailed  with  Custer  for  the  purpose — with  a  report,  was  simply  a  further  disobedience, 
and  is,  perhaps,  a  confirmation  of  Custer's  deliberate  purpose. 

f  Century  Magazine,Vol.  XLIII.,  No.  3:  "  Custer's  Last  Battle,"  by  Colonel  E.  S. 
Godfrey,  U.  S.  A. 


The  Little  Big  Horn  Campaign    227 

Indians  would  never  have  remained  in  camp  and  al- 
lowed a  concentration  of  the  several  columns  to  attack 
them.  If  they  escaped  without  punishment  or  battle, 
Custer  would  undoubtedly  have  been  blamed." 

It  may  be  pointed  out  with  due  reverence  to  Colonel 
Godfrey — whom  I  consider  one  of  the  ablest  officers  in 
the  United  States  Army,  by  the  way — that  it  is  hard  to 
see  how  Custer  could  have  been  blamed  for  obeying  his 
orders,  and  that  it  is  by  no  means  certain  that  the  In- 
dians would  have  discovered  Custer's  column.  Indeed, 
his  previous  success  in  concealing  his  movements  and 
surprising  the  Indians  (witness  the  Washita  campaign) 
leads  me  to  believe  that  he  could  have  carried  out  his 
orders  without  observation.  If  Gibbon  had  struck  the 
Indians  first  and  had  held  them  in  play  Custer  could 
have  annihilated  them.  General  Fry's  comments  in 
the  Century  (appended  to  Colonel  Godfrey's  article)  on 
Custer's  action  are  entirely  wrong. 

As  to  what  would  have  happened  if  Custer  had  been 
successful,  it  is  more  or  less  idle  to  speculate.  Certainly, 
if  he  had  overwhelmingly  defeated  the  Indians,  I  do  not 
think  he  would  have  been  court-martialed;  but  if  he  had 
been  in  Reno's  place  and  had  been  besieged  with  heavy 
loss,  then  I  feel  certain  that  Terry  would  have  been  in 
duty  bound  to  prefer  charges  against  him.  All  this  is 
beside  the  main  question,  however,  and  it  is  now  time 
to  return  to  the  history  of  the  expedition. 

Terry  offered  Custer  four  troops  of  the  Second  Cavalry 
and  two  Catling  guns,  which  were  refused.  Custer  said 
that  any  force  that  was  too  big  for  the  Seventh  Cavalry 
alone  to  deal  with  would  be  too  big  for  the  Seventh  Cav- 
alry plus  the  four  troops,  and  urged  that  the  guns  would 
hamper  and  harass  his  movements.  Terry,  who  elected 
to  go  with  Gibbon's  infantry  column,  agreed  with  him. 


228        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

Neither  Terry  nor  Custer  nor  any  one  expected  to 
meet  more  than  one  thousand  warriors.  They  had  no 
knowledge  whatever  of  the  large  numbers  of  the  so- 
called  peaceable  Indians,  for  whom  rations  had  been 
regularly  issued,  who  had  broken  away  from  the  agen- 
cies and  joined  the  hostiles.  They  did  not  know  of 
Crook's  defeat,  and  the  great  effect  it  had  in  inducing 
wavering  bucks  to  give  their  allegiance  to  the  brave 
men  on  the  war-path.  It  will,  perhaps,  be  fair  to  esti- 
mate the  number  of  Indian  warriors  in  the  field  at  a 
mean  between  the  white  and  Indian  accounts,  which 
range  from  twelve  hundred  on  the  one  hand  to  three 
thousand  on  the  other.  To  be  on  the  safe  side,  I  shall 
call  it  at  least  two  thousand.*  Whatever  their  number, 
there  were  enough  of  them. 

In  their  way  they  were  two  thousand  of  the  fiercest 
and  most  desperate  fighters  on  the  face  of  the  globe 
While  they  were  undisciplined,  untrained,  and  not  en- 
tirely amenable  to  one  will,  as  were  the  soldiers,  they 
were,  nevertheless,  a  fearfully  formidable  force.  Their 
common  hatred  of  the  white  man  gave  them  sufficient 
coherence  to  form  a  rude  but  effective  organization. 
They  were  led  by  experienced  chiefs  and  were  used  to 
fighting.  From  1868,  after  the  close  of  the  treaty  by 
which  the  frontier  posts  were  abandoned  and  the  coun- 
try restored  to  the  Sioux  and  the  Cheyennes,  to  1876, 
no  less  than  two  hundred  distinct  fights,  like  that 
described  in  the  account  of  the  Yellowstone  expedi- 
tion, had  occurred  between  the  soldiers  and  the 
Indians.  They  were  now  to  be  tried  in  a  real  battle, 
and,  as  we  shall  see,  they  were  not  found  wanting; 
for,  in  the  end,  all  the  honors  of  the  campaign  rested 
with  them. 

*  Personally,  I  believe  there  were  many  more. 


The  Little  Big  Horn  Campaign    229 


III.   Ouster's  Expedition 

The  Seventh  Cavalry  left  the  camp  at  the  mouth  of 
the  Powder  River  at  twelve  o'clock  icon,  on  the  22d  of 
June,  1876.  Generals  Terry,  Giboon,  and  Custer  re- 
viewed it  as  it  marched  away.  With  the  column  were 
fifty  Ankara  ("Rees")  Indian  auxiliaries,  a  few  Crows, 
and  a  number  of  white  scouts  and  newspaper  corre- 
spondents. At  four  o'clock,  after  they  had  progressed 
twelve  miles,  the  march  was  halted,  and  that  evening  the 
officers  were  summoned  to  Custer's  headquarters,  and 
marching  instructions  were  given  them.  No  bugle-calls 
were  to  be  sounded.  The  march  was  to  be  made  with 
the  greatest  possible  rapidity;  every  officer  was  to  look 
carefully  to  his  men  and  horses.  Squadron  and  bat- 
talion formations  were  abandoned;  each  troop  com- 
mander was  to  report  to  Custer  in  person. 

Custer  was  usually  very  uncommunicative.  Ordi- 
narily, he  kept  his  plans  to  himself  until  the  time  to  strike 
arrived.  On  this  occasion,  however,  he  announced  his 
purpose,  which  was  to  follow  the  trail  until  they  found 
the  Indians,  and  then  "  go  for  them. "  He  was  not ''  car- 
ried away"  by  anything,  and  this  declaration  is  further 
evidence  of  his  deliberate  purpose.  His  manner,  at  all 
times  blunt  and  peremptory,  not  to  say  brusque,  was 
now  entirely  changed.  He  was  usually  full  of  cheerful- 
ness and  confidence.  There  appeared  to  be  a  marked 
absence  of  both  qualities  in  this  instance.  Officers  have 
recorded  that  he  seemed  worried  and  depressed.  It  may 
be  that  he  was  feeling  the  displeasure  of  Grant,  which  his 
imprudent  conduct  had  brought  about.  Perhaps  the 
serious  character  of  the  risk  he  was  taking  by  his  inde- 
pendent move  weighed  upon  him.  If  he  succeeded,  he 


230        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

would  regain  all  he  had  lost  in  the  censure.  If  he  failed 
—  well,  he  would  not  anticipate  that.  It  was  enough  to 
give  a  man  serious  thoughts.  His  letters  to  his  wife 
seem  as  cheerful  and  confident  as  ever,  but,  perhaps, 
he  may  have  affected  that  for  her  sake.  At  any  rate, 
the  testimony  as  to  his  mental  condition  is  unequivocal. 
However  he  may  have -felt,  he  acted  with  his  usual 
energy.  Starting  at  five  on  the  morning  of  the  23d,  the 
regiment  went  into  camp  at  five  in  the  afternoon,  having 
covered  thirty-three  miles  over  an  execrable  marching 
country  —  the  "  Bad  Lands. "  On  the  24th  they  marched 
twenty-eight  miles  over  an.  even  worse  territory.  In- 
dian signs  were  abundant.  Hundreds  of  Indians  evi- 
dently had  passed.  As  no  one  could  tell  how  near  they 
were  to  the  hostiles,  after  supper  on  the  24th  fires  were 
put  out  and  the  men  were  allowed  to  sleep  until  half 
after  eleven,  while  the  officers  and  scouts  examined  the 
trail.  It  was  reported  to  Custer  that  it  led  straight 
across  the  divide  separating  the  Rosebud  and  the  Little 
Big  Horn.  At  half  after  eleven  the  men  were  routed  out 
and  marched  ten  miles  toward  the  crest  of  the  Little  Big 
Horn  Mountains,  which  they  reached  at  two  o'clock  in 
the  morning  of  Sunday,  the  25th.  A  further  halt  was 
made,  and  at  eight  o'clock  the  advance  was  taken  up 
once  more. 

They  marched  ten  miles  farther,  and  concealed  them- 
selves in  a  large  ravine  near  the  devide  and  about 
sixteen  miles  from  the  little  Big  Horn,  about  half  after 
ten  in  the  morning.  Smoke  was  seen  trembling  in  the 
air  by  the  scouts  in  the  crow's  nest  on  the  top  of  the 
divide,  and  there  were  other  evidences  of  Indians  down 
the  valley  of  the  Little  Big  Horn.  It  is  believed  that 
Custer  intended  to  remain  in  hiding  during  the  day,  and 
deliver  his  attack  on  the  next  morning.  Unfortunately, 


The  Little  Big  Horn  Campaign    231 

however,  his  trail  had  been  crossed  by  the  Indians.  A 
box  of  hard  bread  had  fallen  from  one  of  the  pack-mules 
during  the  night  march.  When  its  loss  was  discovered, 
a  squad  of  men  had  been  sent  back  for  it.  They  found 
an  Indian  trying  to  open  it.  He  made  his  escape,  and 
would  undoubtedly  alarm  the  villages  they  were  ap- 
proaching. 

And  now  we  come  to  another  problem.  As  the  result 
of  his  disobedience  he  was  now  practically  in  contact 
with  the  enemy,  although  he  should  not  have  been.  Be- 
ing in  contact,  however,  what  was  he  to  do  ?  There 
were  no  orders  to  govern  him  now.  He  was  thrown  on 
his  own  resources  —  just  what  he  wanted,  and  what  he 
had  schemed  and  planned  for.  How  was  he  to  deal 
with  his  self-created  opportunity  ? 

Believing,  as  he  and  every  one  else  did,  that  the  Indian 
force  did  not  greatly  outnumber  his  own,  an  attack  was 
entirely  feasible.  Should  he  deliver  that  attack,  or 
should  he  wait  to  be  attacked  ?  The  advantage  is  usu- 
ally with  the  attacking  party  in  Indian  warfare.  Should 
he  seize  or  yield  that  ?  Suppose  he  decided  not  to  at- 
tack the  Indians,  and  they  moved  away  and  escaped  ? 
Would  he  not  be  censured  for  allowing  them  to  get  away, 
since  he  had  got  in  touch  with  them  ? 

Suppose  —  remote  contingency  —  he  were  not  entirely 
successful  in  his  attack  on  the  Indians  ?  Gibbon  must 
be  somewhere  in  the  vicinity.  A  day  or  two  would  prob- 
ably bring  him  to  the  rescue.  Could  he  not  fight  a  wait- 
ing battle,  if  necessary,  until  the  other  column  arrived  on 
the  field  ?  Was  it  not  absolutely  incumbent  upon  him 
to  embrace  the  opportunity  presented  to  him  ?  He  had 
what  he  believed  to  be  the  finest  regiment  of  cavalry  in 
the  service.  He  had  tried  it,  tested  it,  on  many  fields;  he 
knew,  or  thought  he  knew,  the  temper  of  his  officers  and 


232        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

men.  He  decided  to  attack.  Indeed,  there  was  nothing 
else  for  him  to  do.  Fight  he  must.  In  the  opinion  of 
distinguished  military  critics  who  have  expressed  them- 
selves upon  the  point,  from  General  Sheridan  down,  he 
was  justified  in  his  decision.  In  that  opinion  I  concur. 
And  there  is  no  evidence  that  he  ever  contemplated 
doing  anything  else.  He  had  arranged  matters  to  bring 
about  the  opportunity,  and  he  had  no  hesitation  in  em- 
bracing it.  Evidently,  he  had  absolutely  no  premoni- 
tion of  defeat  or  disaster. 

A  little  before  noon  he  communicated  his  intention 
to  his  officers  and  men.  He  divided  his  regiment  into 
three  battalions.  To  Major  Marcus  A.  Reno,*  an 
officer  with  no  experience  in  Indian  fighting,  he  gave 

*  As  the  conduct  of  Major  Reno  was  so  decisive  in  the  subsequent  fighting,  and  since, 
upon  his  conduct  as  a  pivot,  the  fortunes  of  the  day  turned,  it  is  well  to  say  something  of 
his  record,  which  I  have  compiled  from  official  sources. 

He  was  graduated  from  West  Point  in  1857,  and  was  immediately  appointed  to  the 
First  Dragoons,  and  had  risen  to  a  captaincy  in  the  First  Cavalry  at  the  outbreak  of  the 
Civil  War.  His  career  during  the  war  was  one  of  distinction.  He  was  brevetted  major, 
March  17,  1863,  for  gallant  and  meritorious  services  at  Kelly's  Ford,  and  lieutenant- 
colonel  for  gallant  and  meritorious  services  at  the  Battle  of  Cedar  Creek,  October  19, 
1864.  On  January  i,  1865,  he  was  appointed  colonel  of  the  Twelfth  Pennsylvania  Vol- 
unteer Cavalry,  and  was  brevetted  brigadier-general  of  Volunteers  at  the  close  of  the 
war.  Here  is  a  brave  and  honorable  record.  Would  that  it  might  never  have  been 
tarnished  ! 

He  joined  the  Seventh  Cavalry  December  19, 1869,  as  major.  Ke  had  had  no  Indian 
service  prior  to  that  time,  and  his  services  up  to  the  present  campaign  comprised  a  three 
months'  scouting  expedition  in  Colorado  in  the  summer  of  1870.  In  1879,  upon  his  own 
application,  a  court  of  inquiry  was  convened  for  the  purpose  of  investigating  his  con- 
duct at  the  Battle  of  the  Little  Big  Horn.  It  was  the  opinion  of  the  court  that  no  further 
proceedings  were  necessary  in  the  case.  One  sentence  of  the  record  is  significant:  "The 
conduct  of  the  officers  throughout  was  excellent,  and  while  subordinates  in  some  in- 
stances did  more  for  the  safety  of  the  command  by  brilliant  displays  of  courage  than  did 
Major  Reno,  there  was  nothing  in  his  conduct  which  requires  animadversion  from  this 
court." 

His  relations  with  General  Custer  had  not  been  friendly;  so  inimical  were  they, 
in  fact,  that  Custer  was  begged,  before  starting  on  the  fatal  campaign,  not  to  intrust 
the  command  of  any  supporting  movement  to  Reno.  Custer  refused  to  allow  any 
such  personal  considerations  to  prevent  Reno  receiving  the  command  to  which  his 
rank  entitled  him. 

In  1880  Major  Reno  was  found  guilty,  by  a  general  court-martial,  of  conduct  unbe- 
coming an  officer  and  a  gentleman.  While  in  an  intoxicated  condition  he  had  engaged 


The  Little  Big  Horn  Campaign    233 

Troops  A,  G,  and  M;  to  Captain  Benteen,  a  veteran  and 
successful  Indian  fighter,  Troops  D,  H,  and  K;  Captain 
McDougall,  with  Troop  B,  was  ordered  to  bring  up  the 
mule  train  and  take  it  in  charge;  Custer  himself  took  the 
five  remaining  troops,  C,  E,  F,  I,  and  L. 

They  left  the  ravine,  and  about  noon  crossed  the  di- 
vide which  separated  them  from  Little  Big  Horn  Valley. 
Benteen  was  ordered  to  swing  over  to  the  left  and  search 
the  country  thoroughly  in  that  direction,  driving  any 
hostiles  he  might  come  across  into  the  village  and  pre- 
venting any  escape  of  the  Indians  to  the  southward  and 
westward.  Reno  was  to  follow  a  small  creek,  some- 
times called  Reno's  Creek,  to  its  junction  with  the  Little 
Big  Horn  and  strike  the  head  of  the  village,  supposed  to 
be  there.  Custer's  movements  would  be  determined 
subsequently,  although  for  the  present  he  followed  Reno. 
McDougall  came  last,  following  their  trail  with  the 
slow-moving  train,  which  dropped  rapidly  to  the  rear 
as  the  others  proceeded  at  a  smart  pace.  Benteen  at 
once  moved  off  to  the  westward,  while  Reno,  followed 
by  Custer,  started  down  toward  the  valley  of  the  Little 
Big  Horn. 

This  river  is  a  rapid  mountain  stream  of  clear,  cold 
water,  with  a  pebbly  bottom,  from  twenty  to  forty  yards 
wide.  The  depth  of  the  water  varies  from  two  to  five 
feet.  While  it  is  very  tortuous,  the  general  direction  of 
the  stream  is  northward  to  the  Big  Horn,  which  flows 

in  a  brawl  in  a  public  billiard  saloon,  in  which  he  assaulted  another  officer,  destroyed 
property,  and  otherwise  conducted  himself  disgracefully.  The  court  sentenced  him  to 
be  dismissed  from  the  military  service  of  the  United  States.  The  sentence  was  approved 
by  President  Hayes,  and  Major  Reno  ceased  to  be  an  officer  of  the  Army  in  April,  1880. 
It  is  painful  to  call  attention  to  these  facts,  especially  as  Major  Reno  has  since  died; 
but  the  name  and  fame  of  a  greater  than  he  have  been  assailed  for  his  misconduct,  and 
in  defense  of  Custer  it  is  absolutely  necessary  that  Reno's  character  and  services  should 
be  thoroughly  understood.  For  a  further  discussion  of  Major  Reno's  conduct,  see 
Appendix  B. 


234        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

into  the  Yellowstone.  The  valley,  from  half  a  mile  to  a 
mile  in  width,  is  bordered  by  the  bare  bluffs.  Along  the 
river  in  places  are  thick  clumps  of  trees.  The  Indian 
camp,  the  end  of  which  they  could  see  as  they  crossed 
the  divide,  was  strung  along  the  valley  for  several  miles. 


MAP  TO  ILLUSTRATE 
THE:  ROUTEOP  TH  E 
THREE  BATTALIONS 
AT  THE  LiTTLE-BiG 

HORN 

DRAWN  FROM  MOTES 

ADD  SKETCHES  BY 

CAFTAIM  R.L.LIVERMORE.  U.S.A. 


N  < 


APPPOXIMATe  SCALt 
I  MILE 


Reno's  advance  down  the  creek  took  him  near  to  the 
east  bank  of  river.  Custer  had  followed  him,  slightly 
on  his  right  flank.  When  Reno  discovered  the  head  of 

O 

the  village  in  the  valley,  he  crossed  the  creek  to  Custer 
and  reported  what  he  had  seen.  Custer  directed  him  to 
cross  the  river,  move  down  the  valley,  and  attack  in 
force,  informing  him  that  he  would  be  "supported"  by 


The  Little  Big  Horn  Campaign    235 

Custer's  battalion.  Reno  accordingly  put  his  battalion 
to  a  fast  trot  in  columns  of  four,  crossed  the  Little  Big 
Horn  River  beyond  the  mouth  of  the  creek,  and  pro- 
ceeded onward  for  perhaps  half  a  mile.  Then  he  threw 
his  troops  in  line,  reaching  from  the  river  to  the  bluffs 
on  the  left,  with  the  Ankara  scouts  on  the  left  flank, 
and  galloped  down  the  valley  for  a  mile  farther.* 

Reno  stated  subsequently  that  he  believed  that  Cus- 
ter  intended  to  keep  behind  him  all  the  time;  and  he 
fully  expected,  should  he  come  in  contact  with  Indians, 
that  Custer  would  be  on  hand  to  join  in  the  attack. 
Custer,  however,  had  not  continued  down  the  creek  or 
crossed  the  river  with  Reno,  but  had  swung  off  to  the 
high  bluffs  on  the  right  bank  of  the  creek,  east  of  the 
river.  Reno  mistook  the  purport  of  Custer's  statement. 
In  order  to  support  an  attack,  it  is  not  necessary  to  get 
behind  it.  A  flank  attack  or  a  demonstration  in  force, 
from  some  other  direction,  frequently  may  be  the  best 
method  of  supporting  an  attack.  Custer's  plan  was  en- 
tirely simple.  Reno  was  to  attack  the  end  of  the  village. 
Benteen  was  to  sweep  around  and  fall  on  the  left  of  it, 
Custer  on  the  right.  The  tactics  in  the  main  were  those 
which  had  been  used  so  successfully  in  the  Battle  of  the 
Washita  (q-v.),  and  were  much  in  vogue  among  our 
Indian  fighters  during  the  Indian  wars. 

Dividing  forces  in  the  face  of  an  enemy  to  make  sev- 
eral simultaneous  attacks  is  dangerous,  because  it  is 
almost  impossible  to  secure  a  proper  cooperation 
between  the  attacking  units.  A  skilful  general  will  con- 
centrate his  force  upon  the  separately  approaching  and 
more  or  less  isolated  units  and  beat  them  in  detail. 
Washington's  tactics  at  Germantown  were  similar  to 

*  Sure  proof  that  the  horses  were  not,  as  is  sometimes  urged,  utterly  worn  out  by 
the  hard  marching. 


236        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

those  of  Custer;  and  his  force,  which  would  have  swept 
the  British  from  the  field  if  his  plans  had  been  carried 
out,  was  beaten  in  detail  for  lack  of  coordination  in  the 
separate  attacks.  Some  of  Napoleon's  most  brilliant 
battles  were  fought  when  he  occupied  interior  lines  and 
by  successive  attacks  broke  up  converging  columns. 

Still,  the  Indians  were  not  believed  to  be  veteran  tac- 
ticians, although  everybody  underestimated  their  quali- 
ties. They  were  extremely  liable  to  panic.  A  sudden 
attack  or  a  surprise  almost  always  disorganized  them 
and  threw  them  into  confusion.  Under  the  peculiar  cir- 
cumstances, I  think  there  is  little  question  that  Custer's 
tactics  were  entirely  sound  and  well  considered,  although 
this  conclusion  is  often  disputed.  Where  Custer  made 
a  mistake  appears  to  be  in  his  failure  to  take  greater  pre- 
cautions that  the  attacks  should  be  delivered  simulta- 
neously. He  had  a  much  longer  distance  to  go  than  Reno 
and  over  a  much  worse  country  before  he  could  attack, 
and  he  was  not  at  all  sure  as  to  where  Benteen  was  or 
when  he  could  join.  Nevertheless,  the  chances  of  suc- 
cess were  many,  the  chances  of  failure  few,  and  I  have 
no  doubt  that  Custer  would  have  been  successful  had 
there  not  been  a  woeful  lack  of  conduct  on  the  part  of  his 
principal  subordinate. 


CHAPTER   FIVE 

The  Last  of  Custer 

I.    Reno's  Failure  at  the  Little  Big  Horn 

IT  will  be  necessary,  in  order  clearly  to  comprehend 
the  complicated  little  battle,  to  treat  each  of  the 
three  operations  separately,  and  then  see  how  they 
were  related  to  one  another. 

As  Reno's  men  trotted  down  the  valley,  they  saw, 
some  distance  ahead  of  them  and  to  the  right  across  the 
river  on  a  line  of  high  bluffs,  Custer  attended  by  his  staff. 
The  general  waved  his  hat  at  them  encouragingly,  and 
disappeared  over  the  brow  of  the  hill.  That  glimpse  of 
Custer,  standing  on  that  hill  with  outstretched  arm  gal- 
lantly waving  his  troopers  on  to  battle,  was  the  last  any 
one  of  his  comrades  in  the  valley  had  of  him  in  life;  and 
it  is  certain  that  Reno  must  have  realized  then  that 
Custer  was  not  following  him,  and  that  he  was  expected 
to  attack  in  his  front  alone. 

However,  Reno,  having  drawn  near  to  the  village, 
deployed  his  skirmishers,  and  slowly  advanced  down 
the  valley.  In  a  few  moments  they  were  hotly  engaged 
with  a  constantly  growing  force  of  Indians. 

Now,  one  thing  about  the  battle  that  followed  is  the 
utter  unreliability  of  the  Indian  reports  of  their  move- 
ments. It  is  alleged  that  fear  of  punishment  made  them 

237 


238        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

and  keeps  them  reticent  and  uncommunicative.  Differ- 
ent Indians  tell  different  stories.  Most  of  these  stories 
disagree  in  their  essential  details,  and  it  is  impossible  to 
reconcile  them.  It  may  be  that  the  faculties  of  the  In- 
dians are  not  sufficiently  alert  to  enable  them  to  recall 
the  general  plan  of  the  battle,  or  at  least  to  relate  it, 
although  they  knew  well  enough  how  to  fight  it  at  the 
time.  Their  accounts  are  haphazard  to  the  last  degree. 
Some  say  that  they  knew  nothing  of  the  advent  of  the 
troops  until  Reno's  men  deployed  in  the  valley.  At  any 
rate,  they  had  sufficient  time,  on  account  of  his  dilatory 
and  hesitating  advance,  to  assemble  in  heavy  force. 
Reno  had  less  than  one  hundred  and  fifty  men  with  him. 
Even  if  Dr.  Eastman's  estimate,*  that  the  Indians  num- 
bered but  twelve  hundred  warriors,  be  true,  they  still 
outnumbered  Reno,  although,  owing  to  the  fact  that  the 
villages  were  strung  along  the  river  for  several  miles,  only 
a  portion  of  them  were  at  first  engaged  with  the  troops. 
Flushed  with  their  previous  victory  over  Crook  a  short 
time  before,  these  Indians  now  fell  upon  Reno  like  a 
storm. 

Reno's  line  extended  clear  across  the  valley,  which  was 
quite  narrow  where  the  battle  was  joined,  the  right  flank 
protected  by  the  river,  the  left  by  the  bluffs.  Recover- 
ing from  their  alleged  panic,  possibly  because  of  the 
feeble  advance  of  the  soldiers,  the  Indians  rallied,  and 
with  wonderful  generalship  massed  their  attack  on  the 
left  flank,  which  was  most  unfortunately  held  by  the 
Arikara  scouts.  No  Ankara  that  ever  lived  was  a 
match  for  the  Sioux  or  the  Cheyennes.  The  Rees,  as 
these  Indian  auxiliaries  were  called,  broke  and  fled  in- 

*  Charles  A.  Eastman,  M.  D.,  a  full-blooded  Sioux,  a  graduate  of  Dartmouth  and  the 
Boston  University  School  of  Medicine,  who  has  published  an  interesting  account  of  the 
battle  from  his  investigations  among  the  Sioux.  See  The  Chautauquan,  Vol.  XXXI., 
No.  4,  July,  190x3. 


CAPT.   MYLES   MOYLAN 
LIEUT.  A.   E.   SMITH  * 


MAJ.   MARCUS   A.  RENO 
CAPT.   EDWARD   S.   GODFREY 


SOME    OF   CTJSTER'S    OFFICERS 

*  Killed  with  Custer  at  the  Little  Big  Horn 


The  Last  of  Custer  239 

continently.  They  never  stopped  until  they  reached  the 
supply  camp  on  the  Powder  River,  miles  away.  At  the 
same  time  the  horses  of  two  troopers  in  the  command 
ran  away  with  them,  and  plunged  straight  into  the 
Indian  lines  with  their  riders.  Their  fate  was  plain. 

As  the  Ree  scouts  broke,  the  Indians  turned  Reno's 
left  flank.  The  troopers  gave  way  at  once.  There  was 
no  reserve  which  could  be  thrown  upon  the  Indians  until 
the  line  was  restored.  The  whole  force  was  slammed 
back,  like  a  door,  into  the  timber  on  the  bank  of 
the  river. 

Here  Reno  made  a  serious  mistake.  After  rallying 
his  men,  he  ordered  them  to  dismount.  Cavalry  may 
be  dismounted  for  defense,  but  sound  judgment  and 
military  usage  demand  that  for  an  attack,  especially 
upon  an  Indian  village  of  that  kind,  they  should  charge 
upon  horseback.  As  one  veteran  cavalryman  has 
written  me,  "I  never  could  understand  why  Reno  did 
not  charge  desperately  on  the  Indians  in  front  of  him. 
His  dismounting  his  men  was  against  all  sound  military 
judgment.  'Audacity,  always  audacity,'  is  the  motto 
for  a  cavalryman.  "*  Had  Reno  been  governed  by  this 
principle  and  charged,  as  he  should  have  done,  the 
result  would  have  been  different. f 

The  position  was  instantly  surrounded  by  yelling 
Indians  galloping  madly  to  and  fro,  firing  upon  the 
troops.  So  far,  Reno  had  lost  but  one  wounded  and 
the  two  who  had  galloped  into  the  Indian  line.  His 
second  position  was  admirable  for  defense.  Sheltered 
by  the  trees,  with  his  flanks  and  rear  protected  by 

*  General  G.  A.  Forsyth. 

f  The  unanimous  testimony  of  the  Indians  who  have  discussed  the  battle  subsequently 
is  that  they  were  panic-stricken  by  Reno's  approach,  and  would  have  fled  if  his  attack 
had  been  pressed  home.  This  is  about  the  only  statement  upon  which  the  Indians  all 
agree. 


240        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

the  river,  he  could  have  held  the  place  indefinitely. 
However,  he  had  not  been  detailed  to  defend  or  hold 
any  position,  but  to  make  a  swift,  dashing  attack.  Yet, 
after  a  few  moments  of  the  feeblest  kind  of  advance,  he 
found  himself  thrown  on  the  defensive.  Such  a  result 
would  break  up  the  most  promising  plan.  It  certainly 
broke  up  Ouster's.  In  spite  of  the  defection  of  the 
Rees,  a  vigorous  countercharge  down  the  valley  would 
have  extricated  Reno  and  might  have  saved  Custer. 

It  is  a  painful  thing  to  accuse  an  army  officer  of  mis- 
conduct; yet  I  have  taken  the  opinion  of  a  number  of 
army  officers  on  the  subject,  and  every  one  of  them  con- 
siders Reno  culpable  in  a  high  degree.  One  at  least  has 
not  hesitated  to  make  known  his  opinion  in  the  most 
public  way.  I  am  loath  to  believe  that  Major  Reno  was 
a  coward,  but  he  certainly  lost  his  head;  and  when  he 
lost  his  head,  he  lost  Custer.  His  indecision  was  pitiful. 
Although  he  had  suffered  practically  no  loss  and  had  no 
reason  to  be  unduly  alarmed,  he  was  in  a  state  of  pain- 
ful uncertainty  as  to  what  he  should  do  next.  The  sol- 
dier, like  the  woman,  who  hesitates  in  an  emergency 
which  demands  instant  decision,  is  lost. 

How  long  the  troops  stayed  under  the  trees  by  the 
river  bank  cannot  be  determined  accurately.  Some 
have  testified  that  it  was  a  few  moments,  others  an  hour. 
Personally  I  think  it  was  a  few  moments,  which  fear  and 
apprehension  lengthened  to  an  impossible  period.  There 
had  as  yet  been  no  panic,  and  under  a  different  officer 
there  would  have  been  none;  but  it  is  on  record  that 
Reno  at  last  gave  an  order  for  the  men  to  mount  and 
retreat  to  the  bluffs.  Before  he  could  be  obeyed,  he 
countermanded  this  order.  Then  the  order  was  repeated, 
but  in  such  a  way  that  nobody  save  those  immediately 
around  him  heard  it,  because  of  the  din  of  the  battle 


The  Last  of  Custer  241 

then  raging  in  a  sort  of  aimless  way  all  along  the  line,  and 
no  attempt  was  made  to  obey  it.  It  was  then  repeated 
for  the  third  time.  Finally,  as  those  farther  away  saw 
those  nearest  the  flurried  commander  mounting  and 
evidently  preparing  to  leave,  the  orders  were  gradually 
communicated  throughout  the  battalion,  and  nearly  the 
whole  mass  got  ready  to  leave.  Eventually  they  broke 
out  of  the  timber  in  a  disorderly  column  of  fours,  striv- 
ing to  return  to  the  ford  which  they  had  crossed  when 
they  had  entered  the  valley. 

Reno  calls  this  a  charge,  and  he  led  it.  He  was  so  ex- 
cited that,  after  firing  his  pistols  at  the  Indians  who  came 
valiantly  after  the  fleeing  soldiers,  he  threw  them  away.* 
The  pressure  of  the  Indians  upon  the  right  of  the  men 
inclined  them  to  the  left,  away  from  the  ford.  In  fact,  they 
were  swept  into  a  confused  mass  and  driven  toward  the 
river.  All  semblance  of  organization  was  lost  in  the  mad 
rush  for  safety.  The  troops  had  degenerated  into  a  mob. 

The  Indians  pressed  closely  upon  them,  firing  into  the 
huddle  almost  without  resistance.  Evidently  in  their 
excitement  the  Indians  fired  high,  or  the  troops  would 
have  been  annihilated.  The  Indians  supposed,  of 
course,  that  they  now  had  the  troops  corralled  between 
them  and  the  river,  and  that  all  they  needed  to  do 
was  to  drive  them  into  it.  Chief  Gall,  who  with  Crazy 
Horse  and  Crow  King  was  principally  responsible  for 
the  Indian  manceuvers,  seeing  the  retreat  of  Reno  to  the 
river,  summoned  a  large  body  of  warriors,  left  the  field 
and  crossed  the  river  farther  down,  intending  to  sweep 
down  upon  the  other  side  and  attack  Reno's  men  as  they 
struggled  up  the  steep  bank  in  case  any  of  them  suc- 
ceeded in  crossing.  This  was,  as  it  turned  out,  a  fortu- 
nate move  for  the  Indians. 

*  This  statement  is  elsewhere  denied. 


242        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

Meanwhile,  Reno's  men  providentially  found  a  pony 
trail  which  indicated  a  ford  of  the  river.  On  the  other 
side  the  trail  led  into  a  funnel-shaped  amphitheater, 
surrounded  by  high,  slippery  bluffs.  Into  this  cul-de- 
sac  the  whole  fleeing  body  plunged,  the  Indians  pressing 
the  rear  hard.  The  men  jumped  their  horses  from  the 
bank  into  the  water,  and  finding  that  the  trail  stopped  at 
the  bluff  on  the  other  side,  actually  urged  them  up  the 
steep  slopes  of  the  hill. 

There  is  no  denying  that  they  were  panic-stricken. 
Although  some  of  the  veterans  opened  fire  upon  the  sav- 
ages, the  bulk  of  the  troopers  did  nothing  but  run.  Dr. 
DeWolf  was  one  of  the  coolest  among  those  present.  He 
stopped  his  horse  deliberately,  and  fired  at  the  Indians 
until  he  was  shot  dead.  Lieutenant  Macintosh,  striv- 
ing to  rally  his  men,  was  shot  just  as  they  left  the  timber. 
Lieutenant  Hodgson,  reaching  the  river  bank,  had  his 
horse  shot.  In  his  agony  the  animal  stumbled  into  the 
river  and  fell  dead.  The  same  bullet  which  killed 
the  horse  broke  Hodgson's  leg.  He  cried  for  help,  and 
Sergeant  Criswell  rode  over  to  where  he  lay.  Hodg- 
son took  hold  of  the  sergeant's  stirrup,  and  under  a  heavy 
fire  was  dragged  out  on  the  bank,  which  he  had  scarcely 
reached  before  a  second  bullet  struck  him  in  the  head, 
killing  him  instantly.  Criswell  was  swept  on  by  his 
men,  but  so  soon  as  he  could  he  rode  back  under  a  furi- 
ous fire  and  brought  off  the  body,  as  well  as  all  the  am- 
munition in  the  saddle-bags  on  several  dead  horses.  He 
received  a  medal  of  honor  for  his  courage. 

If  Gall  had  completed  his  projected  movements, 
Reno's  men  would  have  been  annihilated  then  and  there. 
As  it  was,  they  reached  the  top  of  the  bluffs  without 
further  molestation.  They  had  lost  three  officers  and 
twenty-nine  men  and  scouts  killed;  seven  men  were 


The  Last  of  Custer  243 

badly  wounded,  and  one  officer,  Lieutenant  DeRudio, 
and  fifteen  men  were  missing.*  These  had  been  left 
behind  in  the  confusion  of  Reno's  "  charge. " 

It  was  now  somewhere  between  half  after  one  and  two 
o'clock  in  the  afternoon,  and  during  the  fighting  Reno 
was  joined  by  Benteen's  battalion.  The  Indians  kept 
up  a  desultory  fire  on  the  position,  but  they  seemed  to 
have  diminished  in  numbers.  Reno  occupied  the  next 
hour  in  reorganizing  his  force,  getting  the  men  into  their 
accustomed  troops,  and  taking  account  of  casualties. 

II.   With   Benteen's   Battalion 

In  accordance  with  his  orders,  Benteen  had  moved  off 
to  the  westward.  He  speedily  became  involved  in  al- 
most impassable  country,  full  of  deep  ravines,  in  which 
progress  was  slow  and  difficult.  Water  was  very  scarce 
in  the  country  over  which  the  regiment  had  marched 
until  it  reached  the  valley  of  the  Big  Horn.  What  water 
they  had  found  that  morning  was  so  alkaline  that  the 
horses  and  mules,  although  they  had  been  nearly  a  day 
without  water,  would  not  drink  it.  The  horses  were 
naturally  tired,  having  marched  over  fifty  miles  since  the 
morning  of  the  day  before ,  and  the  terrible  up-and-down 
hill  work  exhausted  them  still  more,  although  they  were 
by  no  means  played  out.  No  Indians  were  seen  by  Ben- 
teen,  and  the  condition  of  the  country  was  such  that  it 
was  evident  there  were  none  before  him. 

He  turned  to  the  right,  therefore,  and  struck  into  the 
valley  of  the  Big  Horn,  just  ahead  of  McDougall  and 
the  pack  train,  intending  to  cross  the  river  and  attack 
the  village  or  join  Reno,  as  the  case  might  be.  He  had 

*  DeRudio  and  one  other  man  joined  the  command  on  the  night  of  June  26th  ;  the 
others  succeeded  in  crossing  the  river  to  Reno's  position  late  in  the  afternoon. 


244        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

just  watered  his  horses  at  a  little  brook  following  out  a 
morass,  when  a  sergeant  from  Caster's  battalion  passed 
by  on  a  gallop,  with  a  message  for  the  supply  train  to 
come  at  once.  As  the  trooper  raced  along  the  line  he 
shouted  exultantly,  "We've  got 'em,  boys!"  Benteen's 
men  took  this  to  mean  that  Custer  had  captured  the 
village.  A  few  moments  after,  Trumpeter  Martini  gal- 
loped up  with  a  message  from  Custer  to  Benteen,  signed 
by  Cook,  the  adjutant,  which  read  as  follows: 

"  Benteen.  Come  on.  Big  village.  Be  quick.  Bring 
packs. 

"P.  S.     Bring  packs." 

The  need  for  the  spare  ammunition  with  the  pack- 
train  was  apparently  so  urgent  that  in  his  hurry  Cook  re- 
peated the  last  two  words.  At  the  same  time  the  sound 
of  distant  firing  was  heard  in  the  valley.  Making  ready 
for  instant  action,  Benteen  led  his  troopers  forward  at  a 
gallop  down  the  valley.  Tired  though  the  animals  were, 
they  responded  nobly  to  the  demands  of  their  riders,  and 
the  whole  party  swept  across  the  hills  in  the  direction 
whence  the  trumpeter  had  come  until  they  overlooked 
the  valley.  Every  one  supposed  that  Custer  had  entered 
the  valley  and  was  driving  the  Indians  before  him. 
That  he  expected  to  have  a  big  fight  on  his  hands  was 
indicated  by  the  reiteration  of  his  request  that  the 
pack  train  should  be  rushed  forward,  evidently  to  bring 
the  reserve  ammunition. 

The  valley  was  filled  with  dust  and  smoke;  the  day 
was  frightfully  hot  and  dry.  Bodies  of  men  could  be 
distinguished  galloping  up  and  down.  Benteen  would, 
perhaps,  have  crossed  the  river  and  charged  down  the 
valley  had  his  attention  not  been  called  to  a  body  of 
men  in  blue  on  the  bluff  on  the  same  side  of  the  river  to 
the  right.  They  were,  assuredly,  hotly  engaged,  but  there 


The  Last  of  Custer  245 

were  also  evidences  of  fierce  fighting  far  down  the  valley. 
What  was  happening  ?  What  should  he  do  ?  At  this 
junction  one  of  the  Crow  scouts  —  these  Indians  had  not 
fled  with  the  cowardly  Rees,  but  remained  with  the  com- 
mand, fighting  bravely  —  came  up  driving  a  small  bunch 
of  captured  ponies,  and  he  indicated  that  the  principal 
battle  was  on  the  bluff.  Benteen  accordingly  galloped 
around  the  bend  of  the  river,  and  joined  the  demoralized 
Reno  without  opposition. 

It  is  interesting  to  speculate  what  might  have  hap- 
pened if  Benteen  had  crossed  the  river  and  had  charged 
down  the  valley.  In  that  case,  if  Reno  had  recrossed 
the  river  and  again  attacked,  the  day  might  still  have 
been  won,  but  in  all  probability  Reno  would  not  have 
recrossed  and  Benteen  would  have  been  annihilated. 
At  any  rate,  Benteen  did  the  only  thing  possible  when 
Reno's  whereabouts  and  need  were  made  known  to  him 
by  the  scout. 

Reno  had  lost  his  hat  in  his  famous  "charge,"  and  had 
his  head  tied  up  in  a  handkerchief.  He  was  much  ex- 
cited, and  apparently  had  no  idea  as  to  what  he  should  do 
next.  The  officers  of  his  battalion  made  no  bones  about 
admitting  to  the  newcomers  that  they  had  been  badly 
beaten  and  were  in  a  critical  condition.  None  of  them 
could  tell  anything  about  Custer. 

III.    The  Battle  on  the  Bluffs 

Benteen's  men  were  ordered  to  divide  their  ammuni- 
tion with  Reno's.  A  line  of  skirmishers  was  thrown  out 
around  the  bluffs,  and  an  effort  to  get  water  from  the 
river  was  made,  the  supply  in  the  canteens  having  been 
long  ago  exhausted.  The  Indian  fire  prevented  this. 
There  was,  of  course,  not  a  drop  of  water  on  the  bluffs, 


246        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

and  the  wounded  suffered  greatly,  to  say  nothing  of  the 
thirsty  men.  The  officers  collected  in  groups  on  the 
edge  of  the  bluffs  overlooking  the  field,  and  discussed 
the  question.  They  were  not  molested  by  the  Indians 
at  this  time. 

The  general  impression  was  that  Custer  had  made  the 
mistake  of  his  life  in  not  taking  the  whole  regiment  in 
together.  Possibly  Reno's  men  took  that  view  because 
they  had  been  so  badly  mauled  themselves.  The  valley 
had  been  filled  with  Indians,  but,  about  three  o'clock 
or  a  little  after,  most  of  them  galloped  down  the  river 
and  were  soon  out  of  sight.  The  river  banks  were  still 
lined  with  Indians  under  cover,  who  kept  up  a  smart  fire 
on  Reno's  men  if  they  attempted  to  descend  the  bluffs 
and  approach  the  water;  but  the  main  force  had  evi- 
dently withdrawn. 

Firing  was  heard  far  away  to  the  northward.  It  was 
heavy  and  continuous.  There  could  be  but  one  expla- 
nation of  it.  Custer's  detachment  had  at  last  met  the 
Indians  and  was  engaged.  This  should  surely  have 
been  a  stimulus  to  Reno.  Custer  was  fighting  ;  Reno 
was  not  menaced  —  what  should  he  do?  Later  in  the 
afternoon  two  heavy  volleys  in  rapid  succession  were 
remarked.  This  was  so  unusual  under  the  circumstances 
that  it  was  finally  felt  to  be  a  signal  from  Custer.  He 
must  surely  be  in  grave  peril,  then,  and  calling  for  help. 
How,  in  the  name  of  all  that  was  soldierly,  could  such 
an  appeal  be  neglected  ?  Many  and  anxious  were  the 
questions  the  officers  and  men  put  among  themselves  as 
to  why  Reno  did  not  do  something.  It  was  felt  by  every- 
body that  Custer  was  in  grave  jeopardy,  and  that  Reno 
should  move  at  once.  He  had  about  three  hundred 
men  under  his  command,  one-half  of  whom  had  not 
been  engaged. 


The  Last  of  Custer 


247 


248        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

Captain  Weir,  of  D  Troop,  on  the  right  of  Reno's  com- 
mand, having  cleared  away  the  Indians  in  front  of  him, 
at  last  boldly  took  matters  in  his  own  hands.  After 
pleading  again  and  again  for  permission,*  he  started 
alone  without  it  toward  the  sound  of  the  firing  to  see 
what  he  could.  Lieutenant  Edgerly,  his  second,  sup- 
posed that  he  had  received  orders  to  advance,  and  he 
accordingly  put  the  troop  in  motion.  Weir  was  on  the 
bluff,  Edgerly  lower  down  in  a  small  ravine.  The  In- 
dians moved  to  attack  Edgerly,  when  Weir  signaled  him 
to  lead  his  men  up  the  bluff,  which  he  did  without  loss. 
The  troop,  unsupported  and  in  defiance  of  Reno's 
orders,  advanced  to  the  point  where  Custer  had  been 
last  seen  to  wave  his  hat,  and  there  stopped.  The  men 
could  overlook  the  ridges  and  valleys  beyond  them  for  a 
great  distance. 

A  mile  and  a  half  or  two  miles  away  they  could  see, 
through  the  defiles  in  the  ridges,  great  clouds  of  mounted 
Indians.  Reports  of  rifles  indicated  that  the  battle, 
whatever  it  was,  was  still  being  waged.  It  was  impos- 
sible for  Weir  and  Edgerly  to  do  anything  with  their 
single  troop.  Although  they  were  not  seriously  attacked 
in  their  bold  advance,  Reno  at  first  made  no  movement 
to  support  them. 

At  half  after  four  Captain  McDougall  and  the  pack 
train  joined  Reno.  They  had  not  been  molested  in  any 
way.  At  last,  about  five  o'clock,  Reno  yielded  to  the 
urgent  and  repeated  representations  of  the  angry  officers, 
and  marched  along  the  ridge  to  the  position  Weir  and 

*  "  The  splendid  officers  of  the  Seventh,  who  had  followed  Custer  so  faithfully,  begged 
Major  Reno  to  ht  them  try  to  join  the  general.  They  cried  like  women,  they  swore, 
they  showed  thiir  contempt  of  that  coward,  but  the  discipline  of  their  lives  as  soldiers 
prevented  them  disobeying  until  it  was  too  late.  You  know  Colonel  Weir  and  Lieu- 
tenant Edgerly  tried." — Private  letter  to  me  from  the  wife  of  an  officer  who  was  killed 
in  the  battle. 


CAPT.  THOS.  W.  CUSTER 
CAPT.   GEORGE  W.  YATES 


LIEUT.   JAMES   CALHOUN 
CAPT.  MILES   W.   KEOGH 


SOME    OF    CUSTER'S    TROOP    COMMANDERS 

All  killed  with  him  at  the  Little  Big  Horn 


The  Last  of  Custer  249 

Edgerly  had  reached.  He  came  up  to  this  point  at  half 
after  five.  The  firing  on  the  bluffs  far  ahead  was  prac- 
tically over.  The  Indians  could  still  be  seen  and  some 
shooting  was  going  on,  but  there  did  not  appear  to  be  a 
battle  raging.  They  learned  afterward  that  it  was  the 
Indians  shooting  into  the  bodies  of  the  dead. 

It  was  evident  to  every  one  that  whatever  might  have 
been  done  earlier  in  the  afternoon,  there  was  no  use  in 
advancing  now.  Indeed,  the  Indians  came  sweeping 
back  in  great  force  in  front  of  Reno,  and  at  once  attacked 
him.  There  was  nothing  for  him  to  do  but  retreat  to  the 
most  defensible  position  he  could  find,  and  endeavor  to 
hold  his  ground.  Custer  and  his  men,  if  they  still  sur- 
vived, must  be  left  to  face  as  best  they  could  whatever 
fate  had  in  store  for  them.  Reno  accordingly  retreated 
to  the  place  on  the  bluff  whence  he  had  just  come. 
Lieutenant  Godfrey,  of  K  Troop,  the  rear  guard,  with- 
out orders  deployed  and  dismounted  his  men,  and, 
ably  seconded  by  his  junior,  Lieutenant  Luther  R.  Hare, 
by  hard  fighting  kept  off  the  Indians  till  the  retreat  was 
safely  made  by  the  rest,  whom  he  and  his  troopers  suc- 
ceeded in  joining.  It  was  well  that  he  did  this,  for  his 
coolness  and  courage  saved  the  command. 

There  was  a  little  depression  back  of  a  ridge,  which 
afforded  some  cover  for  the  horses  and  pack  train.  Dur- 
ing the  retreat  an  incident  occurred  worthy  of  mention. 
One  of  the  pack  mules,  loaded  with  precious  ammuni- 
tion, broke  away  and  galloped  toward  the  Indian  line. 
Sergeant  Hanley,  of  C  Troop,  sprang  to  his  horse  and 
raced  after  it.  Officers  and  men  called  to  him  to  come 
back,  but  knowing  how  priceless  was  the  ammunition, 
he  persisted  in  his  course.  He  succeeded  in  heading 
off  the  animal,  which  turned  and  ran  parallel  to  the  In- 
dian line,  along  which  he  galloped  under  a  perfect 


250        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

shower  of  bullets,  none  of  which,  fortunately,  touched 
him.  He  captured  the  mule,  and  brought  it  back  with  the 
ammunition  intact.  For  this  exploit  he  received  a  medal 
of  honor. 

The  men  took  position  around  the  ridge,  across  the 
depression  and  on  a  hill  to  the  right,  so  as  to  protect 
the  packs  and  the  field  hospital  from  all  sides  except 
on  the  river  side,  where  the  height  of  the  bluffs  and  the 
distance  prevented  any  Indian  attack  from  that  direc- 
tion. Benteen's  Troop  H  was  placed  on  the  right.  They 
were  on  top  of  the  break  of  the  ridge  and  were  without 
cover,  the  ridges  being  entirely  bare  of  trees.  Farther 
off,  to  the  right,  Benteen's  position  was  commanded  by 
higher  ridges.  At  first  the  brunt  of  the  fighting  fell  on 
the  left,  but  the  Indians  soon  surrounded  the  position 
and  the  engagement  became  general.  The  men  threw 
themselves  on  the  ground,  and  dug  rifle-pits  with  their 
knives,  tin  pans  —  anything  they  could  get.  The  fighting 
soon  became  severe,  but  gradually  slackened  as  dark- 
ness approached,  and  stopped  at  about  nine  o'clock  at 
night.  The  village  in  the  valley  was  the  scene  of  tri- 
umphant revel  that  night,  and  the  shouting  of  the  In- 
dians could  plainly  be  heard  on  the  bluffs. 

The  early  part  of  the  night  was  full  of  wild  confusion, 
but  before  long  the  soldiers  recovered  their  equanimity 
and  set  to  work  strengthening  their  position.  They 
were  now  completely  surrounded;  but  most  of  them  were 
under  cover  except  Benteen's  men,  whose  position,  as 
has  been  stated,  was  overlooked  by  higher  ridges  within 
easy  range.  At  two  A.M.,  contrary  to  their  usual  hab- 
it, the  Indians  opened  fire,  but  no  attack  was  made. 
The  next  morning  the  battle  began  again  in  grim 
earnest. 

The  Indians  pressed  the  party  closer  and  closer.  Ben- 


The  Last  of  Custer  251 

teen's  exposed  line  suffered  more  than  any  other  position. 
That  experienced  fighter  saw  that  the  Indians  were 
massing  in  front  of  him,  evidently  intending  to  deliver  a 
charge.  If  it  fell  upon  his  single  troop  it  would  not  be 
possible  to  withstand  it,  and  the  whole  force  on  the  hill 
would  be  taken  in  reverse  and  annihilated.  His  men 
had  nearly  exhausted  their  ammunition,  several  had 
been  killed,  and  there  were  a  number  of  wounded  to  be 
attended  to. 

Ordering  Lieutenant  Gibson  to  hold  the  line  at  all 
hazards,  Benteen  ran  to  Reno,  explained  the  situation, 
and  begged  for  a  reinforcement.  After  much  urging 
he  succeeded  in  getting  Troop  M,  Captain  French,  sent 
over  to  the  hill.  Then  he  entreated  Reno  to  allow  the 
two  troops  to  charge.  Reno  hesitated.  Benteen  urged 
him  again  and  again,  pointing  out  that  if  something  were 
not  done  immediately,  the  position  would  be  rushed  and 
the  command  wiped  out.  At  last  he  wrung  a  reluctant 
permission  from  Reno.  He  ran  back  to  his  position  on 
the  hill,  and  not  a  moment  too  soon  formed  his  men  up 
for  the  charge,  putting  himself  at  their  head. 

"All  ready  now,  men!"  he  cried  gallantly.  "Now's 
your  time!  Give  'em  hell!  Hip!  Hip!  Here  we  go!" 

The  Indians  had  also  given  the  word  to  charge,  but 
Benteen  was  too  quick  for  them.  Leading  his  men  with 
splendid  bravery,  revolver  in  hand,  he  rushed  at  the  In- 
dians. There  was  a  brief  hand-to-hand  melee  and  the 
Indians  broke  and  fled.  Reno,  seeing  the  effect  of  Ben- 
teen's  gallant  dash,  actually  led  out  a  portion  of  his  com- 
mand on  the  other  side  of  the  hill  and  drove  back  the  In- 
dians in  that  direction.  Benteen's  magnificent  courage 
had  saved  the  day  for  the  present. 

The  fire  having  slackened  somewhat  about  eleven 
o'clock  in  the  morning,  volunteers  were  called  to  get 


Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

water  for  the  command,  especially  for  the  wounded. 
The  Indians  swept  the  banks  of  the  river  with  their  fire, 
and  the  attempt  was  hazardous  to  a  degree.  Nineteen 
men  offered  their  services.  Four  of  the  best  marks- 
men —  Geiger,  Windolph,  Voit,  and  Mechling,  of  Troop 
H — were  detailed  to  cover  the  others  by  taking  an  ex- 
posed position  on  the  brink  of  the  bluffs  overlooking  the 
river,  as  near  as  they  could  get  to  it.  The  other  fifteen, 
one  of  whom  has  told  me  about  the  attempt,  carrying 
canteens  and  camp-kettles,  but  without  arms,  crawled 
down  through  the  bushes  and  ravines  to  the  open  space 
on  the  bank  of  the  river,  and  then,  covered  by  the  rapid 
fire  of  the  four  men  stationed  above  them,  dashed  for 
the  stream.  The  Indians,  who  were  execrable  shots, 
opened  a  heavy  fire  upon  them,  but  the  men  succeeded 
in  filling  the  vessels  they  had  brought,  and  though  many 
of  these  vessels  were  hit  and  some  of  the  men  wounded, 
none  of  them  was  killed.  A  scanty  supply  of  water  it 
was,  but  it  was  a  godsend.  These  nineteen  also  re- 
ceived medals  of  honor. 

At  three  o'clock  in  the  afternoon  the  firing,  which 
had  been  maintained  intermittently  since  noon,  finally 
stopped,  and  later  the  men  on  the  hill  saw  the  Indians 
withdrawing  from  the  valley.  They  set  fire  to  the  grass 
to  screen  their  movements,  but  about  seven  o'clock  in 
the  evening  they  were  distinctly  seen  moving  out  with 
all  their  possessions  toward  the  mountains  of  the  Big 
Horn.  Eighteen  troopers  had  been  killed  on  the  hill, 
and  fifty-two  wounded. 

IV.   The  Last  of  Custer 

Now  let  us  turn  to  Custer. 

Nobody  knows  exactly  what  he  did.     The  testimony 


The  Last  of  Custer  253 

of  the  field  is  not  clear,  and  the  statements  of  the  Indians 
are  contradictory.  Dr.  Eastman,  an  educated  Sioux, 
has  investigated  the  subject  among  many  of  his  people, 
and  arrives  at  one  conclusion;  Colonel  Godfrey,  one 
of  the  troop  commanders  who  was  with  Benteen,  and 
who  has  subsequently  examined  the  field  in  company 
with  Benteen  and  other  officers,  taking  the  testimony 
of  Chief  Gall,  holds  another.  According  to  Eastman, 
whose  account  agrees  with  the  popular  understanding, 
Custer  attempted  to  ford  the  river  at  a  place  now  called 
Reno's  Creek,*  and  fall  on  what  he  supposed  to  be  the 
rear  of  the  village,  but  which  was  really  the  middle  of 
the  upper  half,  and  was  driven  back  to  the  hills,  where 
the  final  tragedy  took  place. 

Godfrey,  on  the  contrary,  says  that  Custer,  from  the 
point  where  he  was  last  seen  by  Reno's  men,  had  a  view 
of  the  village  for  several  miles,  although  not  for  its  whole 
length;  that  he  must  have  been  confident  that  he  had  it 
below  him  then,  and  that  he  made  a  wide  detour  in  or- 
der to  fall  on  the  rear  of  the  village.  It  was  from  this 
point  that  he  sent  the  hurry-up  message  to  Benteen. 
When  at  last,  having  gone  far  enough,  as  he  thought,  to 
take  the  village  in  the  rear,  or  what  he  supposed  was  the 
rear,  he  turned  toward  the  river,  and  was  at  once  met  by 
the  Indians  in  great  force. 

It  was  probably  about  half  after  two  in  the  afternoon. 
Reno  had  been  forced  back  and  driven  across  the  river. 
Chief  Gall,  it  will  be  recalled,  had  taken  a  large  body 
of  men  across  the  river  to  intercept  Reno  on  the  other 
side.  Before  he  could  move  down  to  the  right  for  this 
purpose,  Custer's  men  suddenly  appeared  on  the  hills. 

*  Not  the  Reno's  Creek  referred  to  above,  down  which  Reno  marched  to  the 
Little  Big  Horn.  This  Reno's  Creek  may  be  seen  in  the  largest  map  between  Reno's 
final  position  and  the  Custer  Hill,  where  the  general's  battalion  was  overwhelmed. 


254       Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

Ouster's  manoeuvering  had  been  fine,  and  his  appear- 
ance was  a  complete  surprise,  which  at  first  greatly 
alarmed  the  Indians.  Gall,  however,  did  not  lose  his 
head.  Rightly  judging  that  Reno  was  temporarily  elimi- 
nated from  the  game,  he  at  once  determined  to  attack 
Custer.  He  sent  word  of  the  situation  to  Crazy  Horse, 
who  was  pressing  Reno.  Leaving  just  enough  warriors 
to  make  a  demonstration  before  the  demoralized  Reno, 
Crazy  Horse  galloped  headlong  down  the  valley,  fol- 
lowed by  his  men  and  joined  by  others  from  the  far  end 
of  the  village,  who  had  as  yet  taken  no  part  in  the 
fighting.  They  too  crossed  the  river  at  the  point  where 
a  deep  ravine  concealed  their  movements  and  enabled 
them  to  obtain  a  position  on  Custer's  right  flank.  A 
similar  ravine  enabled  Gall  to  menace  the  left  flank. 
The  Indians  were  in  sufficient  force  completely  to  sur- 
round Custer.  In  the  twinkling  of  an  eye  he  found  him- 
self attacked  in  front  and  on  both  sides.  Instead  of  ad- 
vancing, he  was  forced  to  defend  himself  against  an  over- 
whelming attack.  The  troops  were  dismounted,  horses 
moved  to  the  rear,  and  Custer's  men  occupied  the 
ridges. 

Calhoun's  troop  was  posted  on  the  left,  followed  by 
those  of  Keogh,  Smith,  and  Yates,  with  Tom  Custer's 
on  the  extreme  right.  The  last  three  troops  happened 
to  have  the  best  defensive  position  upon  the  highest  hill. 
With  them  was  Custer.  The  Indians  attacked  at  once. 
Riding  at  full  gallop  along  the  front  of  the  line  on  their 
ponies,  they  poured  a  heavy  fire  from  their  long-range 
rifles  upon  the  soldiers,  to  which  the  latter  made  a  brave, 
steady,  but  not  very  effective  reply  with  their  inferior 
carbines.  Keogh's  and  Calhoun's  horses  were  stam- 
peded at  the  first  fire. 

The  force  menacing  them  was  so  great  that  Custer 


The  Last  of  Custer  255 

dared  not  leave  his  position  on  the  hills.  To  retreat  was 
hopeless,  to  advance  impossible.  They  must  stand  on  the 
defensive  and  pray  that  the  advance  of  Reno's  command 
up  the  valley,  which  they  probably  hoped  that  Benteen 
would  reinforce,  would  compel  the  withdrawal  of  the 
Indians  from  their  front.  They  fought  on,  therefore, 
coolly  and  resolutely,  husbanding  their  ammunition  and 
endeavoring  to  make  every  shot  tell  on  their  galloping, 
yelling  foemen.  They  were,  I  imagine,  by  no  means 
without  ultimate  hope  of  victory.  The  Indians  in  their 
accounts  speak  of  the  cool,  deliberate  courage  of  num- 
bers of  the  officers  and  men,  whom  they  singled  out  for 
their  bravery. 

Yet  the  troopers  suffered  great  loss  as  the  afternoon 
wore  on.  Their  ammunition  began  to  run  low,  and  the 
contracting,  whirling  circle  of  Indians  drove  them  closer 
and  closer  together.  The  remaining  horses  of  the  other 
three  troops  were  at  last  stampeded,  and  with  them 
went  all  of  the  reserve  ammunition.  The  situation  had 
evidently  become  so  serious  that  Custer,  in  the  vain 
hope  that  Reno  would  understand  his  peril  at  last, 
fired  the  two  volleys  which  have  been  referred  to.  It 
appears  at  this  time  that  he  must  have  endeavored  to 
send  a  message  to  Reno,  for  the  body  of  a  solitary 
soldier,  Sergeant  Butler,  was  found  after  the  battle  at  a 
point  half  way  between  Custer's  and  Reno's  commands. 
A  little  heap  of  cartridges  lay  near  his  body,  evidencing 
that  he  had  sold  his  life  dearly.  The  Indians  were 
acute  enough  —  so  they  say,  and  probably  with  truth 
—  to  pick  out  the  officers  with  Custer,  and  the  mortality 
among  them  was  fearful.  It  was  evident  to  all  on  the 
hill,  as  the  afternoon  drew  toward  its  close,  that  they 
were  doomed.  It  was  hardly  possible  that  a  counter- 
attack by  Reno  would  save  them  now,  and  there  were 


256        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

no  evidences  whatever  that  he  was  anywhere  in  the 
vicinity. 

"Where,  in  God's  name,"  they  must  have  asked 
themselves  in  their  despair,  "can  Reno  be  ?" 

One  of  the  Crow  scouts  has  said  —  although  his  ac- 
count is  generally  disbelieved  —  that  he  went  at  last  to 
Custer,  as  yet  unharmed,  and  told  him  that  he  thought 
he  could  get  him  away,  and  that  Custer,  of  course, 
refused  to  leave  the  field.  The  Crow  altered  his  ap- 
pearance by  draping  a  blanket  about  him  so  as  to  look 
as  much  like  a  Sioux  as  possible,  and  in  the  confusion  of 
the  fight  got  away  safely.*  He  was  the  only  human 
survivor  of  the  field. f  What  occurred  after  is  a  matter 
of  conjecture,  based  upon  the  contradictory  and  in- 
adequate testimony  of  the  Indians  themselves. 

Gall  and  Crazy  Horse  now  determined  to  end  the  af- 
fair. Massing  their  warriors  in  the  ravine,  they  fell  on 
both  flanks  at  the  same  time  that  Crow  King  and  Rain- 
in-the-Face  led  a  direct  charge  against  the  front  of  the 
thinned  and  weakened  line.  They  swept  over  the  little 
band  of  men,  probably  now  out  of  ammunition,  in  a  red 
wave  of  destruction.  There  was  a  fierce  hand-to-hand 
struggle  with  clubbed  guns,  war-clubs,  and  tomahawks, 
and  all  was  over.  Some  twenty  or  thirty  men,  without 
their  officers,  who  had  probably  all  been  killed  where 
they  stood,  for  their  bodies  were  found  grouped  around 
that  of  Custer  on  the  highest  hill,  endeavored  to  break 
through  on  the  right.  They  were  slaughtered  to  a  man 
before  they  reached  the  river.  A  few  scattered  bodies, 
here  and  there  in  different  parts  of  the  field,  indicated 

*  It  is  believed  that  this  man,  who  was  named  Curley,  secreted  himself  in  a  ravine. 
before  the  fighting  began,  and  stole  away  at  nightfall. 

f  Captain  Keogh's  horse  "Comanche,"  badly  wounded,  was  found  on  the  field  the 
second  day  after  the  battle.  His  life  was  saved,  and  for  many  years  he  was  the  particu- 
lar pet  of  the  regiment. 


The  Last  of  Custer  257 

that  separate  men  had  made  futile  dashes  for  freedom. 
But  the  bulk  of  the  command  was  found  just  where  it  had 
fought,  with  the  troopers  in  line,  their  officers  in  position  ! 
They  had  been  beaten  and  killed.  Not  an  officer  or  man 
lived  to  tell  the  story,  but  they  had  not  been  disgraced. 

There,  the  second  day  afterward,  Terry,  with  Gibbon, 
having  relieved  Reno's  men,  found  them  on  the  hills 
which  they  had  immortalized  by  their  desperate  valor. 
They  had  been  stripped  and  most  of  them  mutilated. 
Custer's  body  was  shot  in  two  places,  in  the  side  and  in 
the  temple.  It  was  not  scalped  or  mutilated.  Colonel 
Dodge,  an  authority  on  Indian  customs,  declares  that  if 
Custer's  body  was  neither  scalped  nor  mutilated,  he  is 
convinced  that  the  general  committed  suicide.  None 
of  the  officers  with  whom  I  have  communicated  who 
inspected  the  body  is  willing  to  indorse  this  statement; 
on  the  contrary.  Therefore,  I  am  sure  Colonel  Dodge 
must  be  in  error.  The  Indians  give  no  particular  in- 
formation as  to  Custer's  death.  All  that  is  known  is 
that  his  body  was  there  with  those  of  his  brave  men. 

With  Custer  in  that  fight  perished  many  gallant  souls. 
His  brother,  Captain  Tom  Custer,  was  the  only  man  in 
the  United  States  Army  who  held  two  medals  for  cap- 
turing two  flags  with  his  own  hands  in  the  Civil  War. 
Rain-in-the-Face  had  accomplished  his  terrible  revenge, 
for  after  the  battle  he  had  cut  open  the  breast  of  the 
brave  young  soldier  and  had  eaten  his  heart.  Calhoun, 
of  L  Troop,  was  Custer's  brother-in-law.  With  him 
was  young  Crittenden,  a  lieutenant  of  infantry,  who  had 
sought  an  assignment  with  Custer  for  this  campaign. 
Smith  was  the  captain  of  E,  the  Gray  Horse  Troop.  At 
the  storming  of  Fort  Fisher,  after  two  color-bearers  had 
been  killed,  he  had  led  his  regiment  to  the  attack,  colors 
in  hand.  His  shoulder  had  been  smashed  by  a  musket 


258        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

ball  in  that  attack.  He  could  never  afterward  put 
on  his  coat  without  assistance.  With  him  was  young 
Sturgis.  Yates,  a  veteran  of  the  Civil  War,  was  captain 
of  F,  the  Bandbox  Troop;  and  with  him  was  Riley,  the 
youngest  lieutenant  there.  Keogh,  of  I  Troop,  the  old- 
est soldier  of  them  all,  and  not  the  least  brave,  had  been 
an  officer  of  the  Papal  Zouaves  in  early  life.  He  had 
a  gallant  record  in  the  Civil  War,  too.  With  him  was 
Porter,  and  with  the  others  who  had  done  their  parts 
were  Cook,  the  adjutant,  and  Lord,  the  doctor. 

Others  worthy  of  note  fell  on  that  fatal  field :  Mark 
Kellogg,  a  newspaper  correspondent;  Charlie  Reynolds, 
the  famous  scout;  Boston  Custer,  the  General's  brother, 
who  was  civilian  forage-master  of  the  regiment,  and 
Autie  Reed,  the  General's  nephew  —  a  mere  boy,  who 
wanted  to  see  something  of  life  in  the  West  and  who 
had  welcomed  with  joy  his  opportunity  to  make  the  cam- 
paign. Well,  he  saw  it,  poor  fellow!  Indeed,  the  Custer 
family  was  almost  wiped  out  on  that  fatal  Sunday. 

Premonitions  of  disaster,  such  as  loving  women  may 
feel,  were  in  the  air  that  afternoon.  Back  at  Fort  Abra- 
ham Lincoln,  the  devoted  wife  tells  how  the  women  of 
the  garrison  assembled  in  her  quarters  in  an  agony  of 
apprehension.  There  were  words  of  prayer.  Some 
one  at  the  piano  started  "  Nearer  My  God  to  Thee, "  and 
the  women  tried  to  sing  it,  but  they  could  not  finish  it. 
It  was  not  until  the  5th  of  July  that  they  received  the 
news  that  at  that  very  hour  their  loved  ones  were  dying 
on  the  hill. 

V.   After  the  Battle 

On  the  morning  of  the  ayth  of  June  Terry  and  Gib- 
bon rescued  Reno.  The  next  day  the  surviving  troops 
of  the  regiment,  with  some  individuals  from  the  other 


LIEUT.  H.  M.  HARRINGTON 

LIEUT.  J.  E.  PORTER  * 
LIEUT.  W.  VAN  W.   RILEY  ! 


ADJ.  W.  W.   COOK 
LIEUT.  J.  STURGIS  : 


LIEUT.  J.  J.  CRITTENDEN  f 

LIEUT.   DONALD  McINTOSH  J 

LIEUT.  BENJ.   HODGSON  J 

OFFICERS   OF   THE    SEVENTH   CAVALRY 

All  killed  at  the  Little  Big  Horn 
*  Killed  with  Custer.   t  loth  Infantry,  attached  to  Custer's  command.    Killed,    I  Killed  with  Reno 


The  Last  of  Custer  259 

command,  marched  to  the  scene  of  Custer's  defeat  to 
identify  and  bury  the  dead.  The  bodies  upon  the  dry 
grass  had  all  been  stripped  and  left,  white  and  ghastly 
save  for  the  red  stains  of  wounds.  The  bodies  of 
Doctor  Lord,  Lieutenants  Porter,  Harrington,  and 
Sturgis,  with  those  of  a  number  of  men,  were  not  re- 
covered. What  became  of  them  is  not  known  to  thiy 
day.  They  may  have  been  captured  alive  and  taken  by 
the  Indians  to  the  village,  and  there  tortured  to  death 
and  their  bodies  disposed  of.  This,  however,  is  un- 
likely. The  Indians  positively  deny  that  they  took  any 
prisoners,  and  it  is  probable  that  they  did  not.  There 
are  quicksands  near  the  bed  of  the  Little  Big  Horn,  and 
possibly  those  bodies  were  engulfed  in  them.  But  all 
this  is  only  surmise.  No  one  can  tell  anything  about  it, 
except  that  they  were  undeniably  killed.  And  we  may 
be  certain  they  died  as  brave  men  should. 

They  buried  two  hundred  and  twelve  bodies  on  the 
hill,  and  the  total  losses  of  the  regiment  in  the  two  days  of 
fighting  were  two  hundred  and  sixty-five  killed  and  fifty- 
two  wounded  —  over  fifty  per  cent.  The  losses  of  the 
Indians  were  never  ascertained.  They  did  not,  however, 
begin  to  equal  those  of  the  soldiers.  It  is  grossly  un- 
fair to  speak  of  the  battle  as  the  "Custer  Massacre,"  as 
is  often  done.  Custer  attacked  the  Indians,  and  they 
fought  him  until  all  the  white  men  were  killed.  There 
was  no  massacre  about  it. 

The  cause  of  the  disaster  must,  first  of  all,  be  laid  to 
Custer's  disobedience  of  orders.  In  spite  of  that,  how- 
ever, I  think  it  is  probable  that  he  might  have  won  the 
battle,  or  at  least  made  good  his  defense  until  relieved  by 
Terry  and  Gibbon,  although  sustaining  heavy  loss,  had 
it  not  been  for  three  happenings.  The  first  was  the 
vastly  greater  number  of  Indians  in  the  field  than  any 


260        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

one  expected  to  encounter.  The  next,  and  to  me  this  is 
absolutely  decisive,  was  Reno's  failure  to  press  his  at- 
tack. If  he  had  gone  in  with  the  dashing  gallantry 
which  was  expected  of  him,  while  it  is  certain  that  he 
could  not  alone  have  whipped  the  Indians,  yet  he  could 
have  so  disorganized  them  as  to  have  maintained  his  po- 
sition in  the  valley  in  the  midst  of  the  village  without  the 
greatest  difficulty,  until  Custer  could  fall  upon  the  rear 
of  those  attacking  him,  and  Benteen,  with  the  pack  train, 
could  reinforce  them  both.  The  Indians  say  that  they 
were  demoralized  for  the  time  being  by  Reno's  sudden 
appearance,  and  that  the  squaws  were  packing  up  get- 
ting ready  for  flight  when  the  weakness  of  Reno's  ad- 
vance encouraged  them  to  try  to  overwhelm  him.  Cus- 
ter had  a  right  to  expect  that  Reno  would  do  his  duty  as 
a  soldier  and  take  a  bold  course  —  which  was,  as  usual, 
the  only  safe  course. 

Colonel  Godfrey,  in  his  account,  suggests  still  a  third 
cause.  The  carbines  of  the  troopers  did  not  work  well. 
When  they  became  clogged  and  dirty  from  rapid  firing, 
the  ejectors  would  not  throw  out  the  shells,  and  the  men 
frequently  had  to  stop  and  pick  out  the  shells  with  a 
knife.  The  chambers  of  the  carbines  at  that  time  were 
cylindrical,  and  the  easily  accumulated  dirt  on  the  car- 
tridges clogged  them  so  that  the  ejectors  would  not 
work  properly.  The  chambers  were  afterward  made 
conical,  with  good  results.  The  Indians  had  no  such 
trouble.  Their  weapons  were  newer  and  better  than 
those  of  the  soldiers.  If  the  indifferent  weapons  of  the 
troopers  failed  them,  their  annihilation  in  any  event 
would  have  been  certain.* 

*  It  is  possible  that  if  Custer  had  kept  the  regiment  together,  he  would  have  won  the 
battle;  but  this  is  by  no  means  certain,  and  authorities  differ.  I  think  he  would  have 
been  forced  eventually  on  the  defensive. 


The  Last  of  Custer  261 

I  have  censured  Custer  somewhat  severely  in  this  ar- 
ticle, and  it  is  a  pleasure  to  me  to  close  it  with  a  quota- 
tion from  Captain  Whittaker's  life  of  his  old  commander. 
In  this  quotation  Lawrence  Barrett,  the  eminent  actor, 
who  was  an  old  and  intimate  friend  of  Custer,  has  sum- 
marized the  character  of  the  brave  captain  in  exquisitely 
apposite  language;  and,  in  his  words,!  say  good-by  to  the 
gallant  soldier  whose  errors  were  atoned  for  by  an  heroic 
death  in  the  high  places  of  the  field: 

"His  career  may  be  thus  briefly  given:  He  was  born 
in  obscurity;  he  rose  to  eminence;  denied  social  advan- 
tages in  his  youth,  his  untiring  industry  supplied  them; 
the  obstacles  to  his  advancement  became  the  stepping- 
stones  to  his  fortunes;  free  to  choose  for  good  or  evil, 
he  chose  rightly;  truth  was  his  striking  characteristic 
.  his  acts  found  his  severest  critic  in  his  own 
breast;  he  was  a  good  son,  a  good  brother,  a  good  and 
affectionate  husband,  a  Christian  soldier,  a  steadfast 
friend.  Entering  the  army  a  cadet  in  early  youth,  he  be- 
came a  general  while  still  on  the  threshold  of  manhood; 
with  ability  undenied,  with  valor  proved  on  many  a 
hard-fought  field,  he  acquired  the  affection  of  the  nation; 
and  he  died  in  action  at  the  age  of  thirty-seven,  died  as 
he  would  have  wished  to  die,  no  lingering  disease  prey- 
ing upon  that  iron  frame.  At  the  head  of  his  command, 
the  messenger  of  death  awaited  him;  from  the  field  of 
battle  where  he  had  so  often  'directed  the  storm,'  his 
gallant  spirit  took  its  flight.  Cut  off  from  aid,  aban- 
doned in  the  midst  of  incredible  odds  .  .  .  the 
noble  Custer  fell,  bequeathing  to  the  nation  his  sword; 
to  his  comrades  an  example;  to  his  friends  a  memory, 
and  to  his  beloved  a  Hero's  name. " 

NOTE.  — The  question  concerning  Custer's  conduct  is 


262        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

so  important  a  one  that  I  have  included  in  Appendix  A 
the  opinions,  pro  and  con,  of  several  officers  with  whom 
I  have  corresponded;  and  in  which  I  have  indicated 
some  other  sources  of  information  by  which  the  reader 
may  settle  the  debatable  question  for  himself. 


CHAPTER   SIX 

One  of  the  Last  Men  to  See  Custer  Alive 

MR.  THEODORE  W.  GOLDIN,  of  Janes- 
ville,  Wisconsin,  formerly  a  trooper  of  the 
Seventh  Cavalry,  now  Chairman  of  the  Re- 
publican State  Central  Committee  of  Wis- 
consin, was  the  last,  or  perhaps  the  next  to  the  last,  man 
to  see  Custer  alive.     He  has  prepared  an  account  of  his 
personal    experiences   in   the    battle,  which  is  one    of 
the    most  interesting   of  the  contributions  that   have 
been    made   to   this   volume.     His    description   of  the 
death  of  Hodgson  is  splendidly  dramatic,  as  is  his  story 
of  the  brief  conversations  between  Custer  and  Keogh, 
Reno  and  Weir,  and  Benteen  and  Wallace. 

What  a  magnificent  picture  is  that  presented  by  Hodg- 
son, determined  to  retreat  no  longer,  facing  about, 
drawing  his  revolver,  and  dying  at  last,  face  to  the  foe, 
weapon  in  hand!  Mr.  Goldin  contradicts  the  popular 
impression,  as  repeated  by  Colonel  Godfrey  and  others, 
that  Reno  threw  away  his  pistols  in  his  "charge." 

Milwaukee,  Wis.,  August  n,   1904. 
My  Dear  Sir:— 

I  am  in  receipt  of  your  letters  of  July  28th  and  August 
2d,  asking  me  for  a  few  reminiscences  of  personal  ex- 

263 


264        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

periences  and  touching  on  my  acquaintance  and  knowl- 
edge of  Gen.  Custer  and  his  last  fight. 

The  years  that  have  elapsed  since  that  stirring  event 
may  have  somewhat  dimmed  my  recollections,  and  the 
time  at  my  disposal  at  this  time  is  so  very  limited,  that 
what  I  may  say  must,  of  necessity,  be  somewhat  frag- 
mentary. Your  articles  on  this  subject,  as  well  as  the 
entire  series,  have  been  read  with  great  interest,  and  I 
am  very  much  pleased  to  know  they  are  to  be  pub- 
lished in  book  form. 

In  reply  to  your  request,  I  will  say  that  I  had  known 
Gen.  Custer  from  the  time  I  joined  the  regiment  in 
1873  up  to  the  time  of  his  tragic  death,  and  had  cam- 
paigned with  him  and  with  the  regiment  with  the  ex- 
ception of  the  year  1875,  when  the  troop  to  which  I  was 
attached  was  stationed  in  the  South. 

Early  in  the  spring  of  '76,  we  received  word  that  an 
expedition  was  being  organized  against  the  Sioux,  and 
that  three  large  columns  were  to  take  the  field,  and  a  few 
weeks  later  our  marching  orders  came,  and  our  battalion 
changed  station  from  near  Shreveport,  La.,  to  Fort  Lin- 
coln, D.  T. 

At  the  time  of  our  arrival  Gen.  Custer  was  in 
Washington  before  some  investigating  committee,  and 
only  joined  the  regiment  a  few  days  before  our  column 
took  the  field,  he  having  been  ordered  under  arrest  at 
Chicago  while  en-route  from  Washington. 

I  will  not  take  the  time  or  space  to  touch  on  our  march 
from  Fort  Lincoln  to  the  Yellowstone,  which  we  struck 
near  the  mouth  of  the  Powder  River.  Here  we  re- 
mained a  few  days  while  outfitting  our  pack  train,  as 
it  had  been  determined  that  we  would  abandon  our 
wagons  here  and  establish  a  supply  camp.  Maj.  Reno 
had  left  us  a  few  days  before  on  a  scout,  expecting 


One  of  the  Last  to  See  Custer     265 

to  rejoin  us  near  the  mouth  of  the  Tongue  River  on 
June  i  yth. 

After  arranging  to  leave  our  wagon  train  and  some 
dismounted  recruits  and  the  regimental  band  at  the 
Powder  River,  we  moved  camp  to  the  mouth  of  the 
Tongue,  where  we  lay  on  the  iyth  of  June,  the  day  on 
which  Gen.  Crook  had  his  big  fight  with  the  Indians 
on  the  Rosebud.  During  the  day  we  watched  every 
distant  dust  cloud  that  whirled  across  the  river  bottom, 
hoping  that  it  meant  the  approach  of  Maj.  Reno's 
command,  but  as  nothing  was  heard  from  him,  we 
broke  camp  on  the  morning  of  the  i8th  and  moved  up 
the  valley,  where  we  effected  a  junction  with  Reno  soon 
after  noon.  During  the  previous  days  we  could  not 
help  but  note  the  fact  that  Gen.  Custer  seemed  moody 
and  discontented,  and,  entirely  different  from  his  usual 
habit,  appeared  nervous  and  excited  to  some  extent. 

When  Reno  came  in  with  his  report  he  became  a 
changed  man.  His  old-time  energy  and  snap  were  made 
apparent  by  the  manner  in  which  he  hustled  the  com- 
mand into  marching  order  and  took  the  trail  for  the 
Rosebud,  where  Gen.  Terry  on  our  supply  steamer 
the  "  Far  West "  had  already  preceded  us  in  the  hope 
of  striking  the  command  of  Gen.  Gibbon,  who  was 
known  to  be  somewhere  in  that  vicinity.  Our  march 
was  prolonged  far  into  the  night,  but  we  finally  struck 
the  Yellowstone  and  went  into  camp,  assured  that  if  the 
steamer  was  below  us  we  were  bound  to  intercept  it. 

The  following  morning  we  were  in  the  saddle  early, 
and  soon  after  noon  we  sighted  the  wagon  train  of 
Gen.  Gibbon's  command  moving  slowly  up  the  river 
and  a  few  moments  later  the  "Far  West"  steamed 
into  sight.  Couriers  were  sent  out  to  advise  them  of 
the  fact  that  Reno  had  discovered  the  trail  of  a  consid- 


266        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

erable  body  of  Indians,  and  in  a  short  time  we  were  in 
camp  near  the  mouth  of  the  Rosebud  and  a  council 
of  war  was  held  at  which  we  understood  that  Reno's 
report  was  discussed  in  detail. 

The  following  day  arrangements  were  made  for  a  vig- 
orous campaign.  A  final  council  was  held  on  the 
steamer  on  the  night  of  the  2ist,  as  I  now  recollect  it, 
at  which  time  Gen.  Custer  received  his  final  orders, 
substantially  as  you  have  stated  them.  At  this  council, 
and  just  about  the  time  it  was  breaking  up,  the  question 
was  asked  Gen.  Gibbon  as  to  what  time  he  could 
reach  the  mouth  of  the  Little  Big  Horn  River,  and  he 
replied, 

"Not  before  noon  of  the  26th." 

At  this  conference  it  was  reported  that  Custer  had 
been  offered  the  battalion  of  the  Second  Cavalry  and 
the  artillery  which  had  been  brought  up  on  the  steamer, 
but  declined  both,  claiming  that  he  knew  his  command 
so  well  that  he  preferred  to  trust  himself  with  them 
alone,  and  that  he  feared  the  artillery  might  delay  his 
march  when  nearly  in  presence  of  the  enemy.  Many 
of  the  officers  and  men  felt  that  it  was  but  a  part  of  a 
preconceived  scheme  to  secure  an  independent  com- 
mand, such  as  he  had  been  used  to  having  for  years, 
but  be  that  as  it  may  his  request  was  granted. 

On  the  afternoon  of  June  22d  we  passed  in  review 
before  Gen.  Terry  and  Gen.  Gibbon,  and  soon  struck 
the  trail  described  by  Maj.  Reno.  From  that  time 
until  Reno  struck  the  Indian  village  we  did  not 
deviate  from  it  except  when  it  became  necessary  to 
find  a  satisfactory  camping  ground.  No  attempt  was 
made  to  scout  the  country  as  we  had  been  directed  to 
do,  nor  was  any  attempt  made  to  send  a  courier  across 
to  Gen.  Gibbon,  although  a  man  named  Herndon, 


One  of  the  Last  to  See  Custer     267 

a  scout,  had  been  attached  to  our  command  for  that 
purpose. 

Our  marches  were  long  and  our  movements  very 
rapid  until  the  night  of  the  24th,  when  we  moved  off  the 
trail  some  distance  and  apparently  settled  down  for  the 
night.  But  this  was  only  a  ruse  to  mislead  the  Indians, 
as  we  had  received  orders  not  to  unpack  our  saddles  and 
to  be  prepared  for  a  night  march. 

From  the  hour  we  left  the  Rosebud  Gen.  Custer 
acted  in  many  respects  like  another  man,  his  old-time 
restless  energy  had  returned,  and  he  seemed  to  think  of 
nothing  but  to  reach  and  strike  the  Indians.  In  this 
connection  it  might  be  well  to  say  that  the  trail  we  were 
following  led  from  the  direction  of  the  Missouri  River 
and  indicated,  according  to  the  estimate  of  Bloody  Knife 
and  some  of  our  Crow  scouts,  a  band  of  from  a  thousand 
to  twelve  hundred  Indians,  whom  we  afterward  learned 
came  from  the  Missouri  River  agencies  and  consisted 
almost  entirely  of  warriors. 

About  eleven  o'clock  we  received  word  to  saddle  up 
and  lead  into  line.  In  the  meantime  a  scouting  party  of 
Crows  and  Rees,  with  some  of  our  officers,  Lieut. 
Varnum  and,  I  think,  Lieut.  Hare,  had  pushed  on 
ahead  of  us  to  scout  the  trail  across  the  divide  and  seek 
to  locate  the  Indians  if  possible.  Leaving  our  bivouac, 
we  again  struck  the  trail  and  pushed  forward,  seeking 
to  cross  the  divide  and  get  into  the  shelter  of  the  foot- 
hills along  the  Little  Big  Horn  before  daybreak  the  fol- 
lowing morning.  Owing  to  the  roughness  of  the  coun- 
try and  the  difficulty  in  scouting  the  trail,  we  were  un- 
able to  do  this,  and  daybreak  found  us  in  a  ravine  at  the 
foot  of  a  range  of  high  bluffs,  just  how  far  from  the  river 
we  did  not  know. 

Some  time  during  the  night  it  was  said  Gen.  Custer 


268        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

had  pushed  ahead  and  joined  the  scouts,  and  that 
just  after  daybreak  they  told  him  they  had  located 
the  village  in  the  valley  of  the  Little  Big  Horn,  but 
Gen.  Custer  replied  that  he  did  not  believe  them.  In 
the  meantime  it  became  apparent  that  our  presence  in 
the  country  was  known,  as,  during  the  night  a  box  of 
ammunition*  had  been  lost  and  a  detachment  sent  back 
to  recover  it  came  across  some  Indians  trying  to  open 
the  box.  On  this  being  reported  to  Gen.  Custer,  he 
seemed  to  decide  on  an  immediate  advance. 

In  the  talk,  just  about  the  time  the  division  was  made 
in  the  command,  Mitch  Bowyer,  a  half-breed  Crow 
interpreter,  said  to  Gen.  Custer  that  he  would  find 
more  Indians  in  that  valley  than  he  could  handle  with 
his  command.  Custer  replied  that  if  he  (Bowyer)  was 
afraid  to  go  he  could  stay  behind.  Bowyer  replied  that 
he  was  not  afraid  to  go  wherever  Custer  did,  or  some- 
thing to  that  effect,  but  that  if  they  went  in  there  neither 
of  them  would  come  out  alive. 

Just  before  the  advance  was  made  I  was  detailed  by 
Lieut.  Mclntosh  to  report  to  Gen.  Custer  for  duty  as 
orderly,  and  at  once  did  so.  The  general  directed 
me  to  ride  with  Lieut.  Cook,  our  regimental  adjutant, 
and  perform  any  duties  he  might  assign  to  me. 

During  our  brief  halt  the  men  had  thrown  themselves 
on  the  ground  and  were  most  of  them  asleep,  while  the 
horses  were  grazing  among  the  sage  brush.  Gen.  Cus- 
ter ordered  the  advance,  saying  that  the  company  in 
each  battalion  first  ready  should  have  the  right  of  the 
line,  and  in  a  few  minutes  we  were  all  in  the  saddle. 
During  the  halt  it  had  been  ordered  that  Benteen  with 

*  Mr.  Goldin's  recollection  is  in  error,  according  to  Colonel  Godfrey,  who  is 
positive  that  the  box  contained  hard  bread.  However,  the  difference  is  not  material 
—it  was  a  box,  anyway  !  —  C.  T.  B. 


Copyright  by   D    F.  Barry 


SITTING  BULL 

Chief  Medicine  Man  of  the  Sioux  Nation 


One  of  the  Last  to  See  Custer     269 

his  battalion  should  move  off  to  the  left,  scouting  the 
country  in  that  direction,  driving  before  him  any  Indians 
he  might  discover,  and  sending  word  to  the  command 
of  anything  he  might  find.  Reno  was  to  follow  the 
trail,  while  Gen.  Custer  with  the  five  troops  under 
him  struck  ofF  to  the  right,  leaving  McDougall  with  the 
pack  train  to  follow  as  best  he  could. 

We  immediately  took  up  the  line  of  march  in  accord- 
ance with  these  orders,  and  after  probably  a  half  hour's 
hard  ride  the  impassibility  of  some  of  the  hills  and  ra- 
vines forced  the  column  under  Gen.  Custer  to  veer 
off  to  the  left  and  we  soon  came  up  with  the  command 
of  Maj.  Reno,  which  was  pushing  ahead  on  the  trail 
as  fast  as  the  roughness  of  the  ascent  would  permit. 
After  a  hard  climb  we  reached  the  top  of  the  ridge, 
where  we  saw  before  us  a  rolling  plateau  sloping  off 
toward  the  foot-hills  of  the  river,  which  was  perhaps 
some  five  or  six  miles  away. 

As  our  command  dashed  over  the  divide  we  could 
see  Reno  some  distance  in  front  of  us,  moving  rapidly 
down  the  trail,  while  several  miles  to  our  left  was  the 
command  of  Col.  Benteen,  scouting  the  bluffs  as  he 
had  been  ordered.  For  some  distance  we  followed  the 
general  course  of  Reno's  advance,  but  were  some  dis- 
tance in  his  rear  and  to  his  right. 

O 

To  those  of  us  who  were  near  him  it  seemed  that  Cus- 
ter was  chafing  at  the  apparent  slowness  of  our  advance, 
as  he  would  at  times  dash  ahead  of  the  column  and 
then  rein  in  and  await  our  approach  and  again  off  he 
would  go.  Just  about  this  time  we  discovered  a  huge 
dust  cloud  moving  down  the  river  valley,  but  could  not 
determine  the  nature  of  it.  As  soon  as  this  was  dis- 
covered Custer  rode  over  toward  the  river  accompanied 
only  by  his  orderly  trumpeter,  and  stopped  for  a  mo- 


270        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

ment  on  the  top  of  a  high  pinnacle,  where  we  saw  him 
wave  his  hat,  apparently  in  salutation  to  some  one  in 
the  distance,  and  then  come  dashing  back  toward  the 
head  of  the  column  which  was  headed  by  Capt. 
Keogh  and  "I"  Troop,  veterans  of  a  dozen  fights. 
With  his  eyes  snapping  in  his  excitement,  Custer  rode 
up  to  Keogh  and  said,  somewhat  excitedly: 

"  Keogh,  those  Indians  are  running.  If  we  can  keep 
them  at  it  we  can  afford  to  sacrifice  half  the  horses  in 
the  command." 

Calmly  as  though  on  dress  parade,  Keogh  turned  in 
his  saddle  and  looked  back  at  the  long  line  of  eager, 
bronzed,  bearded  faces,  and  turned  to  Custer  with  the 
remark: 

"General,  we  will  do  all  that  man  and  horse  can  do." 

A  moment  later  the  bugles  blared  out  the  charge,  the 
first  bugle  note  we  had  heard  since  leaving  the  Rosebud, 
and  away  we  thundered  northward  down  the  river,  two 
or  three  times  seeking  to  find  a  place  where  we  could 
work  down  into  the  valley  below  us,  but  without  suc- 
cess. 

After  perhaps  the  third  unsuccessful  trial,  Gen.  Cus- 
ter talked  hurriedly  with  Capt.  Cook  for  a  moment,  and 
Cook  pulled  out  his  pad  and  dashed  off  a  line  or  two, 
which  he  folded  up,  at  the  same  time  calling  for  an 
orderly.  I  happened  to  be  the  first  one  to  reach  him, 
and  he  handed  me  the  paper  with  the  order. 

"Deliver  that  to  Maj.  Reno,  remain  with  him  until 
we  effect  a  junction,  then  report  to  me  at  once,"  and  he 
was  gone. 

An  instant  later  the  rear  of  the  column  dashed  past 
me  and  was  lost  to  sight  in  the  ravines.  For  an  instant 
I  looked  after  them,  and  then  realizing  that  I  was  in  a 
dangerous  country  and  alone,  I  lost  no  time  in  heading 


One  of  the  Last  to  See  Ouster      271 

in  the  direction  of  Reno's  command,  which  I  was  able 
to  locate  by  the  dust  cloud  that  hovered  over  them. 
Fortunately,  I  was  not  molested  to  any  great  extent.  A 
few  long-range  shots  were  fired  at  me,  which  only  served 
to  accelerate  my  speed  and  materially  added  to  my  de- 
sire to  be  among  friends. 

A  ride  of  some  five  or  six  miles  and  I  overtook  Reno 
just  as  he  was  dismounting  to  fight  on  foot.  I  delivered 
my  dispatch,  the  contents  of  which  I  did  not  know. 
Reno  glanced  at  it  somewhat  hurriedly  and  stuck  it  in 
his  pocket.  About  this  time  the  Ree  scouts  stampeded 
and,  as  we  afterward  learned,  did  not  recover  their  sand 
until  they  reached  the  Powder  River  and  the  shelter 
of  the  wagon  train.  It  soon  became  apparent  that  the 
Indians  were  passing  our  flank  and  coming  in  behind 
us,  and  we  were  forced  to  face  about  and  endeavor  to 
repel  their  advances  until  we  could  get  our  horses  into 
the  timber,  in  which  attempt  several  horses  were  shot 
and  two  or  three  stampeded.  Soon  after  this  we  re- 
tired into  the  timber,  where  we  had  better  protection 
and  resumed  the  fight.  Sheltered  by  the  timber  and 
the  river  bank,  we  were  able  to  make  a  much  better 
defense  for  a  short  time. 

Soon  after  this  we  noticed  that  Capt.  Moylan  was 
mounting  his  troop  and  Lieut.  Wallace,  who  stood  near 
me  on  the  skirmish  line,  called  to  Capt.  French,  who  was 
commanding  the  center  company,  and  asked  what  the 
orders  were.  French  replied  that  he  hadn't  received 
any  but  would  try  and  find  out,  and  in  a  few  minutes  he 
called  to  us  saying  he  understood  they  were  going  to 
charge,  that  he  had  not  received  any  orders,  but  we 
might  as  well  mount  and  support  them. 

We  were  ordered  to  get  to  our  horses,  and  while  doing 
this  we  found  that  some  fifteen  of  our  men  were  dis- 


272        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

mounted  either  because  of  the  shooting  or  stampeding 
of  their  horses.  Lieut.  Mclntosh  had  lost  his  horse 
and  took  one  belonging  to  a  trooper  named  McCormick, 
who  gave  him  up  with  the  remark  that  we  were  all 
dead  anyway,  and  he  might  as  well  die  dismounted  as 
mounted.  Swinging  into  the  saddle,  we  moved  out  of 
the  timber  and  to  our  surprise  discovered  that  instead  of 
"charging  the  Indians"  Reno  was  executing  a  masterly 
charge  on  the  bluffs  on  the  opposite  side  of  the  river. 

As  soon  as  the  Indians  discovered  this,  they  massed  on 
our  flanks  and  opened  a  heavy  fire  on  the  retreating 
column.  Fortunately,  they  were  poor  marksmen  mount- 
ed, and  our  loss  was  comparatively  small  at  this  stage 
of  the  stampede,  for  that  is  what  it  was. 

It  is  reported  that  Reno  became  so  excited  that  he 
emptied  his  revolver  at  the  Indians  and  then  threw  the 
weapon  from  him.  I  happen  to  know  this  was  not  so,  as 
the  revolver  is  now  in  the  possession  of  Gen.  Benteen 
or  his  family,  or  was  a  few  years  ago. 

During  the  progress  of  this  retreat  I  was  riding  on  the 
left  of  our  column  and  near  the  timber,  and  when  al- 
most in  sight  of  the  river  my  horse  fell,  throwing  me  into 
a  bunch  of  sage  brush,  but  without  doing  me  serious  in- 
jury save  to  exterior  cuticle.  As  I  scrambled  to  my  feet 
Lieut.  Wallace  passed  me,  shouting  for  me  to  run  for 
the  timber  as  my  horse  was  killed.  I  did  not  stop  to 
verify  his  report,  but  took  his  advice,  striking  only  one  or 
two  high  places  between  where  the  horse  fell  and  the 
timber,  which  I  presently  reached. 

From  where  I  was  concealed  I  could  see  our  men 
force  their  horses  into  the  river  and  urge  them  across  the 
boulder-strewn  stream.  I  saw  Lieut.  Hodgson's  horse 
leap  into  the  stream  and  saw  him  struggling  as  though 
wounded,  I  saw  the  lieutenant  disengage  himself  from 


One  of  the  Last  to  See  Custer     273 

the  stirrups  and  grab  the  stirrup  strap  of  a  passing 
trooper  and  with  that  aid  make  his  way  across  the 
stream.  No  sooner  had  he  reached  the  bank  than  it 
became  apparent  he  had  been  wounded,  but  he  pluck- 
ily  held  on,  and  the  trooper  seemed  to  be  trying  to  help 
him  up  behind  him  on  the  saddle,  but  without  daring 
to  stop  his  horse.  An  instant  later  Hodgson  seemed 
to  be  hit  again,  for  he  lost  his  hold,  fell  to  the  ground, 
staggered  to  his  feet  and  sought  to  reach  another  com- 
rade who  reined  in  to  aid  him,  and  just  as  it  seemed  that 
he  was  saved  I  saw  the  second  trooper  throw  up  his  arms, 
reel  in  the  saddle  and  fall  heavily  to  the  ground.  Hodg- 
son started  to  make  his  way  toward  the  ravine  up  which 
the  command  was  disappearing,  he  staggered  forward 
a  few  steps,  stumbled,  struggled  to  his  feet  again,  only 
to  fall  once  more.  He  apparently  decided  that  further 
effort  to  retreat  was  useless,  as  I  saw  him  turn  and  face 
the  Indians,  draw  his  revolver  and  open  fire.  An  in- 
stant later  three  or  four  shots  rang  out  from  my  side  of 
the  river,  and  I  saw  Hodgson  reel  and  fall  and  I  knew  it 
was  all  over. 

In  the  meantime  our  men  had  succeeded  in  crossing 
the  river  and  made  their  way  up  a  neighboring  ravine, 
all  save  those  who  had  met  their  fate  at  the  ford,  which 
was  one  of  the  worst  along  the  river  for  many  rods. 
Left  alone,  I  began  to  wonder  what  my  own  fate  was 
likely  to  be,  but  I  was  not  observed  and  therefore  not 
molested,  the  Indians  being  busy  stripping  and  mutilat- 
ing the  bodies  of  our  dead  along  the  banks  of  the  stream. 

About  this  time  I  could  hear  sounds  of  heavy  firing 
down  the  river,  and  made  up  my  mind  that  Custer  was 
engaging  the  Indians,  and  from  the  momentary  glimpses 
I  had  of  the  village  I  felt  that  he  was  as  badly  out- 
numbered as  we  were.  Most  of  the  Indians  in  our 


274        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

front  melted  away  and  I  could  see  them  lashing 
ponies  as  they  hurried  to  join  their  friends  at  the  K 
end  of  the  village. 

About  this  time  I  saw  the  scout,  Herndon,  some  lift* 
distance  from  me,  making  his  way  toward  the  river,  and 
called  to  him,  and  we  were  soon  together.  He  told  me 
that  the  fifteen  dismounted  men  of  our  outfit  had  made 
their  way  to  a  point  in  the  timber  about  a  couple  of  hun- 
dred yards  from  where  we  were,  but  that  in  order  to  get 
nearer  the  river  they  had  to  cross  an  open  space  and 
every  time  they  tried  it  the  Indians  fired  on  them.  Be- 
fore leaving  us  the  Indians  had  set  the  river  bottom  on 
fire,  evidently  with  a  design  of  concealing  their  move- 
ments, or  of  smoking  or  roasting  out  our  wounded. 
This  smoke  proved  to  be  our  salvation,  as  under  its 
cover  we  made  our  way  to  the  river,  forded  it  with  some 
difficulty,  and  stumbled  on  to  one  of  our  Crow  scouts, 
who  pointed  out  to  us  the  location  of  the  command, 
which  we  soon  joined. 

We  found  that  Benteen  and  his  battalion  had  reached 
it  and  that  nothing  was  known  of  the  location  of  Custer 
and  his  command.  We  reported  what  we  had  heard  and 
seen,  and  just  about  this  time  some  one  discovered  a 
white  flag  waving  from  a  point  in  the  river  bottom  near 
where  Herndon  and  myself  had  been  concealed.  Lieut. 
Hare,  at  the  risk  of  his  life,  crept  down  to  a  point  of  bluffs 
overlooking  the  valley,  and  after  considerable  signaling 
satisfied  the  party  we  were  friends  and  they  made  their 
way  across  the  river  and  soon  joined  us,  proving  to  be 
the  dismounted  men  who  had  been  left  to  their  fate 
when  Reno  made  his  retreat. 

I  omitted  to  state  that  when  we  started  on  our  retreat 
Lieut.  Mclntosh,  mounted  on  McCormick's  horse,  was 
several  rods  in  front  of  me  and  I  noticed  that  in  some 


One  of  the  Last  to  See  Ouster     275 

MJ  fis  lariat  had  become  loosened  and  was  dragging  on 
ground,  the  picket  pin  striking  sage  brush  and  other 
racles,  and  rendering  his  immediate  vicinity  very 
jkngerous.  Several  of  the  men  sought  to  call  his  atten- 
tion to  it,  but  evidently  he  did  not  hear  them.  A  mo- 
ment after  this  I  saw  his  horse  go  down,  but  whether 
he  was  shot  or  not  I  do  not  know.  All  I  could  see  as  I 
passed  was  that  the  lieutenant  was  lying  where  he  fell, 
and  was  either  dead  or  stunned,  probably  dead,  as  we 
found  him  in  the  same  place  the  day  after  the  Indians 
left  us. 

As  we  were  standing  on  the  bluffs  looking  down  into 
the  valley  I  heard  some  loud  talk  near  me,  and  turning 
in  that  direction,  I  heard  Capt.  Weir  say: 

"Well,  by  G — d,  if  you  won't  go,  I  will,  and  if  we  ever 
live  to  get  out  of  here  some  one  will  suffer  for  this." 

He  strode  away,  and  a  few  moments  later  I  saw  "  D  " 
Troop  mount  up  and  move  down  the  valley  in  the  direc- 
tion of  the  distant  firing.  Apparently  without  orders, 
the  entire  command  followed  them  in  no  sort  of  military 
order  with  the  exception  of  the  two  troops  under  Ben- 
teen  and  Godfrey.  In  this  way  we  pushed  down  the 
valley  some  distance,  when  we  discovered  Weir  and  his 
troop  falling  back  before  a  largely  superior  body  of 
Indians. 

Hastily  forming  a  line,  we  held  back  the  advancing 
horde  until  Weir  and  his  command  had  passed  our  lines 
and  formed  some  distance  in  our  rear,  where,  with  the 
support  of  some  of  our  men  who  were  near  them,  they 
formed  a  line  and  opened  fire,  permitting  us  to  fall  back 
and  re-form  again  in  their  rear.  In  this  way  we  fell  back 
some  little  distance,  when  Col.  Benteen,  who  seemed  to 
be  the  leader  in  our  section  of  the  field,  spoke  to  Lieut. 
Wallace,  saying: 


276        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

"Wallace,  there  is  no  use  falling  back  any  further. 
Form  your  troop,  your  right  resting  here,  and  we  will 
make  a  stand." 

Wallace  grinned  and  said, 

"  I  haven't  any  troop,  only  two  men." 

Benteen  laughed  grimly  and  answered, 

"  Form  yourself  and  your  two  there,  and  I  will  tell  you 
more  about  it  when  I  find  out  myself." 

That  was  the  nucleus  of  our  line  of  defense.  Others 
soon  joined  us  and  we  sheltered  ourselves  behind  sage 
brush  and  hurriedly  heaped  piles  of  dirt  and  opened  fire, 
keeping  the  Indians  at  a  respectable  distance  until  dark- 
ness came  to  our  relief.  During  the  night  we  changed 
our  position  a  trifle,  located  our  corral  and  hospital, 
and  put  in  the  night  intrenching  ourselves  as  best  we 
could.  At  daybreak  the  fight  opened  again  and  con- 
tinued without  intermission  until  about  three  in  the 
afternoon,  when  to  our  surprise  the  Indians  began 
to  take  down  their  tepees,  pack  their  travois,  and  in  a 
few  hours  were  moving  up  the  river  valley,  a  great  mass 
of  ponies,  travois  and  Indians,  unfortunately  just  out  of 
rifle  range. 

Twice  during  the  afternoon  volunteer  parties  had 
gone  for  water,  each  time  being  fired  upon  by  the  In- 
dians, but  it  was  only  on  the  second  trip  that  any  one 
was  hit.  Poor  Madden,  of  "K"  Troop,  was  the  un- 
fortunate, his  leg  being  shattered  three  times  between 
the  ankle  and  the  knee.  We  carried  him  back  to  the 
hospital,  where  his  leg  was  amputated  that  night. 

On  the  following  day  Gen.  Terry  and  Gen.  Gibbon 
came  to  our  relief,  and  through  them  we  received 
the  first  authentic  information  as  to  the  fate  of  our 
comrades  of  the  other  battalion.  On  the  28th,  after 
having  transported  our  wounded  across  the  river, 


One  of  the  Last  to  See  Custer     277 

we  visited  the  scene  of  the  battle  and  buried  such  of 
Ouster's  men  as  we  found.  Aside  from  General  Custer, 
we  found  hardly  a  body  on  the  field  that  had  not  been 
mutilated  in  some  manner  or  another,  but  as  I  recollect 
now,  we  found  no  marks  of  mutilation  on  our  dead 
leader. 

In  the  space  at  my  disposal  it  is  not  possible  to  deal 
in  incidents  of  the  fight  or  go  into  detailed  descriptions. 
In  fact,  those  have  been  well  covered  in  your  article 
already. 

Since  the  fight  I  have  discussed  it  with  many  officers 
of  the  army,  and  others  who  have  had  experience  on  the 
frontier,  and  the  general  opinion  seemed  to  be  that  there 
were  two,  possibly  three,  main  causes  for  this  disaster. 

First:  A  division  of  the  command  into  practically 
four  separate  columns  while  still  some  fifteen  miles  from 
the  battle-field,  and  without  accurate  knowledge  as  to  the 
exact  location  or  approximate  strength  of  the  enemy, 
and  the  separation  of  those  columns  so  that  at  a  critical 
period  of  the  fight  no  two  of  them  were  in  supporting 
distance  of  one  another. 

Second:  The  fact  that  Custer  came  into  the  pres- 
ence of  the  enemy  practically  twenty-four  hours  ahead 
of  time. 

Third:  The  loss  of  the  horses  and  with  them  much 
of  the  surplus  ammunition  of  Custer's  command. 

This  subject  has  been  so  often  discussed  by  men  much 
abler  than  myself  that  I  will  not  attempt  it  here. 

My  experiences  with  Gen.  Custer  always  led  me  to 
look  upon  him  as  somewhat  recklessly  brave,  disposed 
to  take  chances  without  fully  considering  the  odds 
against  him. 

I  have  always  felt  that  one  possible  reason  for  the 
course  he  followed,  in  the  face  of  the  orders  he  received, 


278        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

might  be  attributed  to  the  fact  that  he  was  feeling  keenly 
the  apparent  disgrace  of  the  treatment  accorded  him  by 
the  President,  and  that  he  thought  that  by  a  brilliant 
dash  and  a  decided  victory,  similar  to  his  Washita  fight, 
he  might  redeem  himself  and  once  more  stand  before 
the  people  as  a  leader  and  an  Indian  fighter  second  to 
none.  Whatever  may  have  been  his  motive,  we  must  all 
admit  that  he  made  a  most  gallant  fight  and  gave  his  life 
at  the  side  of  the  comrades  who  had  ridden  with  him  to 
victory  in  many  a  previous  battle. 

Very  truly  yours, 

THEO.  W.  GOLDIN. 


CHAPTER    SEVEN 
The  Personal  Story  of  Rain-in-the-Face 

BY 

W.  Kent  Thomas 

NOTE.  —  It  is  rare,  indeed,  to  get  the  Indian  side  of  a 
story  in  so  clear,  so  connected,  and  so  dramatic  a  form  as 
is  the  following  account  of  the  Battle  of  the  Little  Big 
Horn  from  one  who  played  a  great  part  in  it  and  in  the 
events  that  led  up  to  it.  This  is  a  unique  document  in 
our  records,  and  is  inserted  here  by  kind  permission  of 
Mr.  Thomas.  It  originally  appeared  in  Outdoor  Life, 
Vol.  XL,  No.  3,  for  March,  1903.  Its  accuracy  and 
fidelity  to  fact  are  so  attested  as  to  be  beyond 
question. — C.  T.  B. 


r    •    ^HE 

•  V  \ 

§       at  i 
I        Isla 

A    oft 


writer  saw  much  of  the  "Custer  Indians" 
at  the  World's  Fair  and  afterward  at  Coney 
Island,  and  had  a  good  chance  to  know  some 
of  them  well.  The  following  leaves  from  a 
diary  kept  at  that  time  show  how  the  Indians  regarded 
the  Custer  fight;  they  considered  that  the  white  men 
were  simply  outgeneraled  by  Sitting  Bull: 

Coney  Island,  N.  Y.,  Aug.  12,  1894. 
Rain-in-the-Face  (Itiomagaju)  hobbled  into  the  tent 
to-night,  as  McFadden  and  I  were  discussing  the  events 

279 


280        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

of  the  day,  and  seating  himself,  unbidden,  with  true  In- 
dian stoicism,  he  grunted  out  that  one  word  of  all  words 
so  dear  to  a  Lakota,  "Minnewaukan!"  which,  literally 
translated,  means  "Water  of  God,"  but  which  by  usage 
has  been  interpreted  as  "fire-water."  Since  the  other 
Indians  were  all  away  from  camp  on  a  visit  to  their 
friends,  the  Oglalas  at  Buffalo  Bill's  camp,  I  decided  to 
yield  for  once  to  Rain's  oft-repeated  demand,  which  had 
been  hitherto  as  regularly  denied. 

He  took  my  flask,  and  with  a  guttural  "  How! "  drained 
it  at  one  gulp,  without  straining  a  muscle  of  his  face. 
"Ugh!  good!  like  Rain's  heart,"  he  remarked,  as  he 
handed  the  empty  bottle  to  "Mac"  with  a  self-satisfied 
look.  Then,  after  a  long  pause,  he  joined  in  our  hearty 
laughter,  and  added:  "  Wechasa  Chischina  (Little  Man, 
as  he  always  calls  me)  good!  Potoshasha  (Red  Beard, 
his  name  for  McFadden)  good!  Minnewaukan  good! 
All  heap  good!" 

"Something's  come  over  the  old  man,"  laughed  Mac. 
"His  heart's  good  to-night.  Suppose  we  take  advan- 
tage of  it,  as  the  boys  are  all  over  at  the  Oglala  tepees, 
and  get  Rain  to  turn  his  heart  inside  out.  Here,  give  me 
my  hat  and  I'll  get  the  flask  refilled  and  bring  back 
Harry  with  me  to  interpret. "  Off  he  went  like  a  shot, 
leaving  me  to  entertain  Rain  as  best  I  could  with  my 
small  knowledge  of  the  Sioux  lingo  and  signs. 

McFadden  soon  returned,  bringing  Harry  McLaugh- 
lin,  our  interpreter.  It  didn't  take  long  to  get  Rain 
started;  after  he  had  had  another  pull  at  the  flask,  he 
said: 

"  If  you  want  a  story,  I  will  tell  a  true  one.  It's  about 
myself.  I  was  a  bad  man  and  dangerous  to  fool  with 
before  I  had  to  walk  with  crutches.  My  heart's  good 
now,  but  it  was  all  the  time  bad  when  I  was  a  fighter  and 


1 


RAIN-IN-THE-FACE 

From   a  sketch  from  life   made  in   1894  by  Edward  Esmonde 


The  Story  of  Rain-in-the-Face      281 

a  hunter.  The  maidens  admired  me,  but  the  bucks 
were  afraid  of  me.  I  would  rather  fight  than  eat.  The 
long  swords  (soldiers)  trembled  when  they  knew  I  was 
near,  and  the  Rees  and  Crows  always  felt  of  their  hair 
every  morning  to  see  if  their  scalps  were  still  on  when 
Rain  was  near  by." 

Here  Harry  headed  him  off,  for  it's  natural  for  an  In- 
dian to  boast,  and  if  any  one  will  listen  he  will  sing  his 
own  praises  for  hours  at  a  stretch. 

"Yes,  we  know  you  were  a  bad  man  and  a  fighter 
from  'way  back,"  said  Harry,  "but  we  want  to  hear 
about  the  time  Tom  Custer  made  you  take  water.  If 
you  were  such  a  brave  man,  how  did  it  happen  that  a 
little  man  like  Tom  Custer  got  the  best  of  you  ?" 

This  had  the  desired  effect,  and  Rain  winced  under 
such  a  reflection  on  his  bravery,  for  he  measured  forty- 
six  inches  around  his  chest,  stood  five  feet  nine  inches, 
and  weighed  about  195  pounds  at  that  time,  while 
Captain  Tom  Custer  was  under  the  average  weight  and 
height. 

With  great  deliberation  and  much  gesticulation,  Rain 
told  his  version  of  the  incident  in  question,  and  much  to 
our  surprise  he  continued  on  and  related  his  version  of 
the  "Custer  Massacre." 

Now,  since  nearly  all  the  officers  in  the  Regular  Army, 
as  well  as  all  the  agents  of  the  Interior  Department,  have 
failed  to  get  him  even  to  speak  of  this  fight  (their  trying, 
coaxing,  and  threatening  for  years  has  been  in  vain),  and 
since  Rain  gets  the  credit  of  being  the  slayer  of  Custer, 
and  has  been  immortalized  in  verse  by  Longfellow,  it  was 
a  pleasant  surprise  to  have  this  unexpected  revelation. 
I  am  writing  it  down  as  nearly  like  McLaughlin  inter- 
preted it  as  I  can. 

"Two  years  before  the  big  fight,"  he  said,  "Gall  and 


282        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

Sitting  Bull  had  their  camp  at  Standing  Rock.  All  were 
hostiles.  They  were  Unkpapa  Sioux  and  fighters  who 
never  feared  an  enemy  any  more  than  a  buffalo  calf.  The 
Yanktonais  (friendly  Indians)  were  coffee  coolers  (cow- 
ards) and  hung  around  the  agency  which  was  at  Lincoln 
then  (Fort  Abraham  Lincoln  on  the  upper  Missouri 
now).  We  used  to  have  great  times  in  the  hostile  camp, 
dancing,  running  races,  shooting  and  playing  games. 
Buffalo  and  deer  wTere  plenty,  and  we  had  many  ponies. 
I  was  a  great  fellow  with  the  girls.  They  used  to  tease 
me  to  get  me  mad  —  when  I  got  mad  I  knew  no  reason, 
I  wanted  to  fight.  One  night  a  girl  dared  me  to  go  up  to 
Fort  Lincoln  and  kill  a  white  man.  I  told  her  it  was  too 
risky,  as  the  long  swords  always  kept  watch.  Besides, 
the  Rees  (another  tribe  of  Indians,  employed  by  the  gov- 
ernment as  scouts)  had  their  lodges  on  the  hill  back  of 
the  fort.  The  wood-choppers  were  camped  between  the 
fort  and  the  river.  She  said: 

"'A  brave  man  fears  nothing.  If  you  are  a  coward, 
don't  go.  I'll  ask  some  other  young  man  who  isn't 
afraid,  if  he  hasn't  danced  in  the  Sun  Dance.'  (This 
was  a  torture  dance  in  which  Rain-in-the-Face  sub- 
sequently underwent  the  most  horrible  self-torture  ever 
inflicted.*) 

*  The  Sun  Dance  is  that  ceremonial  performance  in  which  the  young  Sioux  aspirant 
gives  that  final  proof  of  endurance  and  courage  which  entitles  him  to  the  toga  virilis  of  a 
full-fledged  warrior.  One  feature  of  it  is  the  suspension  in  air  of  the  candidate  by  a  raw- 
hide rope  passed  through  slits  cut  in  the  breast,  or  elsewhere,  until  the  flesh  tears  and  he 
falls  to  the  ground.  If  he  faints,  falters,  or  fails,  or  even  gives  way  momentarily  to  his 
anguish  during  the  period  of  suspension,  he  is  damned  forever  after,  and  is  called  and 
treated  as  a  squaw  for  the  rest  of  his  miserable  life. 

Rain-in-the-Face  was  lucky  when  he  was  so  tied  up.  The  tendons  gave  way  easily, 
and  he  was  released  after  so  short  a  suspension  that  it  was  felt  he  had  not  fairly  won  his 
spurs.  Sitting  Bull,  the  chief  medicine  man,  decided  that  the  test  was  unsatisfactory. 
Rain-in-the-Face  thereupon  defied  Sitting  Bull  to  do  his  worst,  declaring  there  was  no 
test  which  could  wring  a  murmur  of  pain  from  his  lips. 

Sitting  Bull  was  equal  to  the  occasion.  He  cut  deep  slits  in  the  back  over  the  kidneys 
—  the  hollows  remaining  were  big  enough  almost  to  take  in  a  closed  fist  years  after  — 


The  Story  of  Rain-in-the-Face      283 

"The  other  girls  laughed,  but  the  young  men  who 
heard  it  didn't.  They  feared  me.  I  would  have  killed 
them  for  laughing.  I  went  to  my  lodge  and  painted 
sapa  (black,  the  color  used  when  they  go  on  the  war- 
path), took  my  gun,  my  bow,  my  pony.  Sitting  Bull 
had  forbidden  any  one  to  leave  camp  without  his  permis- 
sion. I  skipped  off  under  cover  of  darkness  and  went  up 
to  Lincoln  (forty-five  miles  north,  opposite  the  present 
site  of  Bismarck,  North  Dakota).  I  hung  around  for 
two  days,  watching  for  a  chance  to  shoot  a  long  sword. 
I  had  plenty  of  chances  to  kill  a  Ree  squaw,  plenty  to 
kill  a  wood-chopper,  but  I  wanted  to  carry  back  the 
brass  buttons  of  a  long  sword  to  the  girl  who  laughed  at 
me.  I  did  so,  and  she  sewed  them  on  her  shawl.  One 
morning  I  saw  the  sutler  (store  keeper)  and  a  horse  medi- 
cine man  (U.  S.  Veterinary  Surgeon  Hontzinger)  go  out 
to  a  spring;  Long  Yellow  Hair  (General  Custer)  and  his 
men  were  riding  back  about  100  yards.  I  rushed  up 
and  shot  the  sutler  and  brained  the  horse  medicine  man 
with  my  war  club;  then  I  shot  them  full  of  arrows  and 
cut  off  some  buttons.  Long  Yellow  Hair  heard  the  shot 
and  his  troop  charged  back.  I  didn't  have  time  to  scalp 
the  men  I  got.  I  jumped  on  my  pony  and  yelled  at  them 

and  passed  the  rawhide  rope  through  them.  For  two  days  the  young  Indian  hung  sus- 
pended, taunting  his  torturers,  jeering  at  them,  defying  them  to  do  their  worst,  while 
singing  his  war  songs  and  boasting  of  his  deeds.  The  tough  flesh  muscles  and  tendons 
would  not  tear  loose,  although  he  kicked  and  struggled  violently  to  get  free.  Finally, 
Sitting  Bull,  satisfied  that  Rain-in-the-Face's  courage  and  endurance  were  above  proof, 
ordered  buffalo  skulls  to  be  tied  to  his  legs,  and  the  added  weight  with  some  more  vigor- 
ous kicking  enabled  the  Indian  stoic  to  break  free.  It  was  one  of  the  most  wonderful 
exhibitions  of  stoicism,  endurance,  and  courage  ever  witnessed  among  the  Sioux,  where 
these  qualities  were  not  infrequent.  Rain-in-the-Face  had  passed  the  test.  No  one 
thereafter  questioned  his  courage.  He  was  an  approved  warrior,  indeed.  It  was  while 
suspended  thus  that  he  boasted  of  the  murder  of  Dr.  Hontzinger,  and  was  overheard  by 
Charlie  Reynolds,  the  scout,  who  told  Custer  and  the  regiment. 

Mr.  Edward  Esmonde,  a  companion  of  Mr.  Thomas  during  the  season  he  had  Rain- 
in-the-Face  and  his  fellows  at  the  World's  Fair  in  Chicago  and  afterward  at  Coney  Island 
in  his  charge,  gave  me  the  information  in  this  note.  —  C.  T.  B. 


284        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

to  catch  me.  They  chased  me  to  the  Cannon  Ball  (a 
small  river  twenty-five  miles  south).  Charlie  Reynolds 
(a  scout)  knew  me  and  told  Long  Yellow  Hair  who  did 
this  brave  deed. 

"Next  winter  I  went  to  the  agency  store  at  Standing 
Rock.  I  drew  no  rations  —  I  hadn't  signed  the  paper. 
(All  the  Indians  who  signed  a  peace  treaty  and  con- 
sented to  live  on  the  reservation,  under  military  orders, 
were  furnished  with  rations  by  the  government  twice  a 
month.  The  hostiles  had  to  live  by  hunting.)  Istok- 
scha  (One  Arm,  the  Hon.  H.  S.  Parkin)  was  running  the 
store  then.  I  wasn't  afraid  of  any  of  them.  Little  Hair 
(Capt.  Tom  Custer)  had  thirty  long  swords  there.  He 
slipped  up  behind  me  like  a  squaw,  when  my  back  was 
turned.  They  all  piled  on  me  at  once;  they  threw  me 
in  a  sick  wagon  (ambulance)  and  held  me  down  till  they 
got  me  to  the  guard-room  at  Lincoln. 

"  I  was  treated  like  a  squaw,  not  a  chief.  They  put  me 
in  a  room,  chained  me,  gave  me  only  one  blanket.  The 
snow  blew  through  the  cracks  and  on  to  me  all  winter. 
It  was  cold.  Once  Little  Hair  let  me  out  and  the  long 
swords  told  me  to  run.  I  knew  they  wanted  to  shoot  me 
in  the  back.  I  told  Little  Hair  that  I  would  get  away 
some  time;  I  wasn't  ready  then;  when  I  did,  I  would 
cut  his  heart  out  and  eat  it.  I  was  chained  to  a  white 
man.  One  night  we  got  away.  They  fired  at  us,  but 
we  ran  and  hid  on  the  bank  of  Hart  river  in  the  brush. 
The  white  man  cut  the  chains  with  a  knife  (a  file).  They 
caught  him  next  day. 

"  I  rejoined  Sitting  Bull  and  Gall.  They  were  afraid  to 
come  and  get  me  there.  I  sent  Little  Hair  a  picture,  on 
a  piece  of  buffalo  skin,  of  a  bloody  heart.  He  knew  I 
didn't  forget  my  vow.  The  next  time  I  saw  Little  Hair, 
ugh!  I  got  his  heart.  I  have  said  all. " 


The  Story  of  Rain-in-the-Face      285 

And,  Indian-like,  he  stopped. 

We  all  knew  that  the  greater  part  of  this  was  true, 
since  it  tallied  with  the  government  account  of  the  death 
of  the  sutler  and  Surgeon  Hontzinger.  But  we  wanted 
to  hear  how  he  took  Tom  Ouster's  heart.  McFadden, 
who  is  quite  an  artist  as  well  as  an  actor  of  note,  had 
made  an  imaginary  sketch  of  "  Custer's  Last  Charge. " 
He  got  it  and  handed  it  to  Rain,  saying: 

"Does  that  look  anything  like  the  fight  ?" 

Rain  studied  it  a  long  time,  and  then  burst  out 
laughing. 

"No,"  he  said,  "this  picture  is  a  lie.  These  long 
swords  have  swords — they  never  fought  us  with  swords, 
but  with  guns  and  revolvers.  These  men  are  on  ponies 
—  they  fought  us  on  foot,  and  every  fourth  man  held  the 
others'  horses.  That's  always  their  way  of  fighting.  We 
tie  ourselves  onto  our  ponies  and  fight  in  a  circle.  These 
people  are  not  dressed  as  we  dress  in  a  fight.  They  look 
like  agency  Indians — we  strip  naked  and  have  ourselves 
and  our  ponies  painted.  This  picture  gives  us  bows  and 
arrows.  We  were  better  armed  than  the  long  swords. 
Their  guns  wouldn't  shoot  but  once — the  thing  wouldn't 
throw  out  the  empty  cartridge  shells.  (In  this  he  was 
historically  correct,  as  dozens  of  guns  were  picked  up  on 
the  battle-field  by  General  Gibbon's  command  two  days 
after  with  the  shells  still  sticking  in  them,  showing  that 
the  ejector  wouldn't  work.)  When  we  found  they  could 
not  shoot  we  saved  our  bullets  by  knocking  the  long 
swords  over  with  our  war  clubs  —  it  was  just  like  killing 
sheep.  Some  of  them  got  on  their  knees  and  begged  ; 
we  spared  none  —  ugh !  This  picture  is  like  all  the  white 
man's  pictures  of  Indians,  a  lie.  I  will  show  you  how  it 
looked." 

Then  turning  it  over,  he  pulled  out  a  stump  of  a  lead 


286        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

pencil  from  his  pouch  and  drew  a  large  shape  of  a  letter 
S,  turned  sideways.*  "Here,"  said  he,  is  the  Little  Big 
Horn  river;  we  had  our  lodges  along  the  banks  in  the 
shape  of  a  bent  bow." 

"How  many  lodges  did  you  have  ?"  asked  Harry. 

"Oh,  many,  many  times  ten.  We  were  like  blades  of 
grass.  (It  is  estimated  that  there  were  between  four  and 
six  thousand  Indians,  hence  there  must  have  been  at 
least  a  thousand  lodges.) 

"Sitting  Bull  had  made  big  medicine  way  off  on  a  hill. 
He  came  in  with  it;  he  had  it  in  a  bag  on  a  coup-stick. 
He  made  a  big  speech  and  said  that  Waukontonka  (the 
Great  Spirit)  has  come  to  him  riding  on  an  eagle.  Wau- 
kontonka had  told  him  that  the  long  swords  were  com- 
ing, but  the  Indians  would  wipe  them  off  the  face  of  the 
earth.  His  speech  made  our  hearts  glad.  Next  day 
our  runners  came  in  and  told  us  the  long  swords  were 
coming.  Sitting  Bull  had  the  squaws  put  up  empty 
death  lodges  along  the  bend  of  the  river  to  fool  the  Ree 
scouts  when  they  came  up  and  looked  down  over  the 
bluffs.  The  brush  and  the  bend  hid  our  lodges.  Then 
Sitting  Bull  went  away  to  make  more  medicine  and 
didn't  come  back  till  the  fight  was  over. 

"Gall  was  head  chief;  Crazy  Horse  led  the  Chey- 
ennes;  Goose  the  Bannocks.  I  was  not  a  head  chief - 
my  brother  Iron  Horn  was  —  but  I  had  a  band  of  the 
worst  Unkpapas;  all  of  them  had  killed  more  enemies 
than  they  had  fingers  and  toes.  When  the  long  swords 
came,  we  knew  their  ponies  were  tired  out;  we  knew  they 
were  fooled  by  the  death  lodges.  They  thought  we  were 
but  a  handful. 

*  Rain-in-the-Face  afterward  drew  a  picture  or  map  of  the  battle  of  the  Little  Big 
Horn,  on  the  back  of  a  handsome  buckskin  hunting-shirt.  A  cut  of  this  picture 
appears  on  the  following  page.  It  is  believed  to  be  the  only  map  of  the  battle  drawn 
by  one  of  the  Indian  participants  therein. — C.  T.  B. 


Key  to  map  of  Custer  battle-field.  Drawn  on  back  of  buckskin  coat 
by  Rain-in-the-Face  for  Edward  Esmonde.  Said  to  be  the  only  map 
of  the  battle-field  ever  made  by  an  Indian. 

A,  Camp  of  the  Indians ;  B,  Reno's  Skirmish  Line ;  C,  Timber  Where  Reno's 
Horses  Were;  D,  Reno's  Retreat;  E,  Reno  Joined  Benteen  ;  F,  Cutter's  Trail; 
G,  Custer' $  First  Stand ;  H,  Squaws  and  Children  Crossed  River  ;  I,  Where  Squaws 
Went  Into  Camp  After  Re-crossing  River;  J,  Where  Last  Stand  Was  Made  and  Custer 
Was  Killed. 


288        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

"We  knew  they  made  a  mistake  when  they  separated. 
Gall  took  most  of  the  Indians  up  the  river  to  come  in 
between  them  and  cut  them  off.  When  we  saw  the  Ree 
scouts  had  stayed  back  with  Long  Yellow  Hair,  we  were 
glad.  We  saw  them  trotting  along,  and  let  them  come 
in  over  the  bluffs.  Some  of  our  young  men  went  up  the 
gully  which  they  had  crossed  and  cut  them  off  from 
behind. 

"Then  we  showed  our  line  in  front,  and  the  long 
swords  charged.  They  reeled  under  our  fire  and  start- 
ed to  fall  back.  Our  young  men  behind  them  opened 
fire.  Then  we  saw  some  officers  talking  and  pointing. 
Don't  know  who  they  were,  for  they  all  looked  alike.  I 
didn't  see  Long  Yellow  Hair  then  or  afterward.  We 
heard  the  Rees  singing  their  death  song  —  they  knew  we 
had  them.  All  dismounted,  and  every  fourth  man  held 
the  others'  ponies.  Then  we  closed  all  around  them. 
We  rushed  like  a  wave  does  at  the  sand  out  there  (the 
ocean  beach)  and  shot  the  pony  holders  and  stampeded 
the  ponies  by  waving  our  blankets  in  their  faces.  Our 
squaws  caught  them,  for  they  were  tired  out. 

"I  had  sung  the  war  song,  I  had  smelt  the  powder 
smoke.  My  heart  was  bad  —  I  was  like  one  that  has  no 
mind.  I  rushed  in  and  took  their  flag;  my  pony  fell 
dead  as  I  took  it.  I  cut  the  thong  that  bound  me.  I 
jumped  up  and  brained  the  long  sword  flag-man  with 
my  war  club,  and  ran  back  to  our  line  with  the  flag. 

"The  long  sword's  blood  and  brains  splashed  in  my 
face.  It  felt  hot,  and  blood  ran  in  my  mouth.  I  could 
taste  it.  I  was  mad.  I  got  a  fresh  pony  and  rushed 
back,  shooting,  cutting,  and  slashing.  This  pony  was 
shot,  and  I  got  another. 

"This  time  I  saw  Little  Hair.  I  remembered  my 
vow.  I  was  crazy;  I  feared  nothing.  I  knew  nothing 


The  Story  of  Rain-in-the-Face     289 

would  hurt  me,  for  I  had  my  white  weasel-tail  charm  on.* 
(He  wears  the  charm  to  this  day.)  I  don't  know  how 
many  I  killed  trying  to  get  at  him.  He  knew  me.  I 
laughed  at  him  and  yelled  at  him.  I  saw  his  mouth 
move,  but  there  was  so  much  noise  I  couldn't  hear  his 
voice.  He  was  afraid.  When  I  got  near  enough  I 
shot  him  with  my  revolver.  My  gun  was  gone,  I  don't 
know  where.  I  leaped  from  my  pony  and  cut  out  his 
heart  and  bit  a  piece  out  of  it  and  spit  it  in  his  face.  I 
got  back  on  my  pony  and  rode  off  shaking  it.  I  was  sat- 
isfied and  sick  of  fighting;  I  didn't  scalp  him. 

"  I  didn't  go  back  on  the  field  after  that.  The  squaws 
came  up  afterward  and  killed  the  wounded,  cut  their 
boot  legs  off  for  moccasin  soles,  and  took  their  money, 
watches,  and  rings.  They  cut  their  fingers  off  to  get 
them  quicker.  They  hunted  for  Long  Yellow  Hair  to 
scalp  him,  but  could  not  find  him.  He  didn't  wear  his 
fort  clothes  (uniform),  his  hair  had  been  cut  off,  and  the 
Indians  didn't  know  him.  (This  corroborates  what  Mrs. 
Custer  says  about  her  husband's  having  his  long  yellow 

*  Notwithstanding  his  "white  weasel-tail  charm,"  Rain-in-the-Face  was  wounded 
in  this  battle.  A  bullet  pierced  his  right  leg  above  the  knee.  Among  the  plunder 
which  fell  to  him  after  the  action  was  over  was  a  razor  taken  from  the  person  of  some 
dead  soldier.  With  this  razor  the  wounded  man  essayed  some  home-made  surgery. 
First  he  cut  deeply  into  the  front  of  his  leg,  but  failed  to  reach  the  bullet.  Then  he 
reached  around  to  the  back  of  his  leg  and  chopped  recklessly  into  the  flesh  from  that 
quarter.  He  got  the  bullet,  also  several  tendons,  and  narrowly  missed  cutting  the  artery 
and  bleeding  to  death.  He  was  lame  and  had  to  walk  on  crutches  all  his  life  thereafter. 

— Statement  of  Mr.  Esmonde. 

Colonel  Godfrey,  in  his  Century  article,  relates  a  similar  instance  of  courage  and 
endurance  on  the  part  of  one  of  his  troopers: 

"Among  the  wounded  was  Saddler 'Mike  Madden,*  of  my  troop,  whom  I  promoted 
to  be  sergeant  on  the  field  for  gallantry.  Madden  was  very  fond  of  his  grog.  His  long 
abstinence  had  given  him  a  famous  thirst.  It  was  necessary  to  amputate  his  leg,  which 
was  done  without  administering  any  anaesthetic;  but  after  the  amputation,  the  surgeon 
gave  him  a  good  stiff  drink  of  brandy.  Madden  eagerly  gulped  it  down,  and  his  eyes 
fairly  danced  as  he  smacked  his  lips  and  said: 

" '  M-eh,  doctor,  cut  off  my  other  leg.'  "  —  C.  T.  B. 


290        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

curls  cut  at  St.  Paul  some  weeks  before  he  was 
killed.) 

"That  night  we  had  a  big  feast  and  the  scalp  dance. 
Then  Sitting  Bull  came  up  and  made  another  speech. 
He  said:  'I  told  you  how  it  would  be.  I  made  great 
medicine.  My  medicine  warmed  your  hearts  and  made 
you  brave/ 

"  He  talked  a  long  time.  All  the  Indians  gave  him 
the  credit  of  winning  the  fight  because  his  medicine 
won  it.  But  he  wasn't  in  the  fight.  Gall  got  mad 
at  Sitting  Bull  that  night.  Gall  said :  '  We  did  the  fight- 
ing, you  only  made  medicine.'  It  would  have  been 
the  same  anyway.  Their  hearts  were  bad  toward  each 
other  after  that,  always. 

"After  that  fight  we  could  have  killed  all  the  others 
on  the  hill  (Reno's  command)  but  for  the  quarrel  be- 
tween Gall  and  Sitting  Bull.  Both  wanted  to  be  head 
chief.  Some  of  the  Indians  said  Gall  was  right  and  went 
with  him.  Some  said  Sitting  Bull  was.  I  didn't  care,  I 
was  my  own  chief  and  had  my  bad  young  men;  we 
would  not  obey  either  of  them  unless  we  wanted  to,  and 
they  feared  us. 

"  I  was  sick  of  fighting  —  I  had  had  enough.  I  wanted 
to  dance.  We  heard  more  long  swords  were  coming 
with  wheel  guns  (artillery,  Catlings).  We  moved  camp 
north.  They  followed  many  days  till  we  crossed  the 
line.  I  stayed  over  there  till  Sitting  Bull  came  back, 
and  I  came  back  with  him.  That's  all  there  is  to  tell. 
I  never  told  it  to  white  men  before. " 

When  he  had  finished,  I  said  to  him:  "Rain,  if  you 
didn't  kill  Long  Yellow  Hair,  who  did  ?" 

"  I  don't  know.  No  one  knows.  It  was  like  running 
in  the  dark." 

"Well,"  asked  Mac,  "why  was  it  Long  Yellow  Hair 


The  Story  of  Rain-in-the-Face      291 

wasn't  scalped,  when  every  one  else  was  ?  Did  you  con- 
sider him  too  brave  to  be  scalped  ?" 

"No,  no  one  is  too  brave  to  be  scalped;  that  wouldn't 
make  any  difference.  The  squaws  wondered  afterward 
why  they  couldn't  find  him.  He  must  have  laid  under 
some  other  dead  bodies.  I  didn't  know,  till  I  heard  it 
long  afterward  from  the  whites,  that  he  wasn't  scalped." 

"How  many  Indians  were  killed  in  the  fight  ?" 

"  I  don't  remember,  but  about  ten  and  four  or  ten  and 
six." 

"How  about  Curley,  the  Crow  scout,  who  claims  to 
have  escaped  ?"  asked  Mac. 

"Ugh!  I  know  Curley.  He  is  a  liar.  He  never 
was  in  the  fight.  His  pony  stumbled  and  broke  some- 
thing. He  stayed  behind  to  fix  it.  When  he  heard  the 
firing,  he  ran  off  like  a  whipped  dog.  One  long  sword 
escaped,  though;  his  pony  ran  off  with  him  and  went 
past  our  lodges.  They  told  me  about  it  at  Chicago.  I 
saw  the  man  there,  and  I  remembered  hearing  the  squaws 
tell  about  it  after  the  fight." 

Rain-in-the-Face  (Itiomagaju)  is  about  sixty  years  of 
age  now,  and  is  the  only  chief  that  survives  to  tell  the 
tale  of  the  Custer  fight.  Gall  and  Sitting  Bull  have  both 
gone  to  hunt  the  white  buffalo  long  since.  Rain  can 
write  his  name  in  English.  I  taught  him  to  do  it  at 
the  World's  Fair  in  order  to  sell  Longfellow's  poem,  enti- 
tled "The  Revenge  of  Rain-in-the-Face."  He  doesn't 
know  the  significance  of  it  after  he  writes  it.  His  knowl- 
edge of  English  is  confined  to  about  thirty  words,  but  he 
can't  say  them  so  any  one  can  understand  him,  though 
he  can  understand  almost  anything  that  is  said  in  Eng- 
lish. Like  all  other  Indians,  his  gratitude  is  for  favors 
to  come  and  not  for  favors  already  shown.  He  is  utterly 
heartless  and  unprincipled,  physically  brave  but  morally 


292        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

a  coward.  His  redeeming  feature  lies  in  the  fact  that 
you  can  depend  upon  any  promise  he  makes,  but  it  takes 
a  world  of  patience  to  get  him  to  promise  anything.  Even 
at  the  age  of  sixty  he  is  still  a  Hercules.  In  form  and 
face  he  is  the  most  pronounced  type  of  the  ideal  Feni- 
more  Cooper,  dime  novel  Indian  in  America. 


CHAPTER   EIGHT 

Two  Interesting  Affairs 

I.    The  Fight  on  the  War  Bonnet 

BEFORE  entering  upon  a  detailed  description 
of  the  larger  events  of  the  campaign  after  the 
Battle  of  the  Rosebud  and  Little  Big  Horn,  two 
smaller  affairs  are  worthy  of  mention.     One, 
though  nothing  but  a  skirmish,  was  of  great  impor- 
tance in  determining  the  final  result.     The  other  well 
illustrates  something  of  the  adventurous  life  and  perilous 
duty  of  a  soldier  in  Indian  warfare. 

On  Saturday,  July  15,  1876,  the  Fifth  Cavalry,  under 
General  Wesley  Merritt,  was  marching  toward  Fort 
Laramie,  under  orders  to  join  Crook.  At  noon  word  was 
received  from  the  agency  that  a  body  of  Cheyennes,  num- 
bering, perhaps,  one  thousand  warriors,  who  had  here- 
tofore remained  quiet  on  the  reservation  at  the  Red 
Cloud  Agency,  on  the  White  River,  South  Dakota  —  the 
Pine  Ridge  Agency  —  was  about  to  break  away  and  join 
the  Indians  in  the  field.  Their  minds  had  been  in- 
flamed by  the  story  of  Crook's  defeat  and  the  account  of 
the  disaster  to  the  Seventh  Cavalry.  They  thought  they 
saw  unlimited  opportunities  for  plunder,  scalp-taking, 
and  successful  fighting  —  therefore  they  decided  to  go  on 
the  war-path  without  delay.  There  were  not  troops 

293 


294        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

enough  near  the  agency  to  prevent  this  action,  which  was 
entirely  unsuspected  anyway. 

The  orders  for  Merritt  to  join  Crook  were  imperative; 
but,  in  view  of  this  news,  the  general  decided  to  disregard 
them  for  the  present.  He  realized  that  he  could  per- 
form no  better  service  than  heading  off  this  body  of 
Cheyennes,  and  either  defeating  and  scattering  them  or, 
better  still,  forcing  them  back  to  the  agency. 

The  trail  they  would  have  to  take  would  cross  a  creek 
in  the  extreme  southeast  corner  of  South  Dakota,  called 
the  War  Bonnet,*  some  eighty-five  miles,  by  the  only 
practicable  route,  from  where  the  Fifth  Cavalry  then 
was.  The  Indians  were  a  much  shorter  distance  from  it. 
Merritt  would  have  had  to  march  around,  practically, 
three  sides  of  a  square,  owing  to  the  configuration  of  the 
country,  to  reach  that  point,  which  was  the  best  place  for 
miles  around,  within  the  knowledge  of  W.  F.  Cody  (Buf- 
falo Bill),  his  chief  scout,  to  intercept  the  flying  Chey- 
ennes. 

Merritt  did  not  hesitate  an  instant  after  learning  the 
news.  He  put  his  command  in  motion  immediately,  and 
by  a  forced  march  of  thirty-one  hours,  got  to  the  crossing 
in  good  time.  There  was  no  evidence  that  the  Chey- 
ennes had  passed.  The  troopers  concealed  themselves 
in  ravines  under  the  bluffs,  and  waited  for  the  Indians. 

Early  on  the  morning  of  July  iyth,  the  pickets,  com- 
manded by  Lieutenant  Charles  King,"]-  observed  the 
approach  of  the  Indians.  At  about  the  same  time  Mer- 
ritt's  wagon  train,  under  Lieutenant  Hall,  with  two  hun- 
dred infantrymen  spoiling  for  a  fight,  concealed  in  the 
wagons  as  a  guard,  was  observed  toiling  along,  some  four 

*The  frontiersmen  translate  this  to  "  Hat  Creek  ";  and  that  is  the  name  it  bears 
to-day  —  more's  the  pity  ! 

f  Afterward  brigadier-general  of  volunteers  in  the  Spanish-American  War,  and  the 
author  of  many  fascinating  romances  of  army  life. 


Two  Interesting  Affairs  295 

miles  to  the  southwest,  in  an  endeavor  to  reach  the  ren- 
dezvous on  the  War  Bonnet.  The  regiment  remained 
carefully  concealed,  and  the  Indians,  in  high  glee, 
thought  they  had  the  train  at  their  mercy. 

So  soon  as  he  sighted  the  Cheyennes,  Lieutenant  Hall 
despatched  two  troopers  of  his  small  cavalry  escort 
ahead  to  the  crossing  to  apprise  Merritt  that  the  In- 
dians were  at  hand.  An  advance  party  of  Cheyennes, 
superbly  mounted  and  led  by  a  gorgeous  young  chief, 
determined  to  intercept  these  troopers,  who  were  igno- 
rant of  their  peril.  The  two  soldiers  came  down  one 
trail  which  led  through  a  ravine,  the  Indians  came  up 
another  which  led  through  another  ravine.  The  troop- 
ers and  the  Cheyennes  were  hidden  from  each  other, 
but  both  were  in  plain  view  of  the  picket  on  the  hill.  The 
two  trails  joined  at  the  foot  of  the  hill.  The  plain  back 
of  the  wagon-train  was  black  —  or  red,  rather  —  with  In- 
dians coming  up  rapidly,  although  they  were  not  yet 
near  enough  to  attack. 

Merritt  and  one  or  two  other  officers,  with  Buffalo 
Bill  and  a  few  of  his  scouts  and  several  troopers,  joined 
King  on  the  hill.  The  main  body  of  the  Indians  was  too 
far  away  to  attack,  so  the  little  advance  party  determined 
to  wait  until  the  Cheyennes,  who  were  endeavoring  to 
cut  off  the  two  soldiers,  were  close  at  hand  and  then  fall 
upon  them.  Everybody  withdrew  from  the  crest  of  the 
hill  except  Lieutenant  King,  who  was  to  give  the  signal, 
when  the  party  below  should  sally  around  it  and  fall  on 
the  Cheyennes. 

King,  who  has  described  the  situation  with  masterly 
skill  in  his  "Campaigning  with  Crook,"  flattened  him- 
self out  on  the  brow  of  the  hill,  with  nothing  showing 
but  the  top  of  his  hatless  head  and  his  field  glass,  and 
watched  the  soldiers  rapidly  galloping  up  one  trail  and 


296        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

the  Indians  more  rapidly  rushing  down  the  other.  He 
waited  until  the  Indians  had  almost  reached  the  junc- 
tion. Then  he  gave  the  signal.  Merritt's  escort  and 
Cody's  scouts  raced  around  the  base  of  the  hill,  and 
dashed  slap  into  the  faces  of  the  astonished  Cheyennes. 
Two  Indian  saddles  were  emptied  in  the  twinkling  of 
an  eye.  Such  was  the  impetus  of  their  charge  that  the 
Indians  scarcely  had  time  to  rein  in  their  steeds  before 
the  white  men  were  upon  them. 

Buffalo  Bill  shot  the  leader  of  the  war  party,  a  famous 
young  chief  named  Yellow  Hand,  through  the  leg.  The 
bullet  also  pierced  the  heart  of  the  pony  Yellow  Hand 
was  riding.  Both  crashed  to  the  earth.  In  spite  of  his 
pain,  Yellow  Hand  dragged  himself  to  his  feet  and  fired 
at  the  scout,  killing  his  horse.  The  two,  not  twenty 
paces  apart,  exchanged  shots  the  next  instant.  The 
Indian  missed,  but  Buffalo  Bill  sent  a  bullet  through 
Yellow  Hand's  breast.  The  Indian  reeled,  but  before 
he  fell  Cody  leaped  upon  him  and  drove  his  knife  into 
his  gallant  enemy's  heart.  Yellow  Hand  was  a  dead  In- 
dian when  he  struck  the  ground.  "Jerking  the  war 
bonnet  off,"  he  says,  "I  scientifically  scalped  him  in 
about  five  seconds.  "* 

Yellow  Hand  had  recognized  Buffalo  Bill,  and  had 
virtually  challenged  him  to  this  duel.  "The  first  scalp 
for  Custer!"  shouted  Cody,  waving  his  trophy  in  the  air. 

Some  of  the  other  Indians  had  now  come  within  range. 
They  opened  fire  upon  the  little  party;  the  bullets  zipped 
around  them  in  every  direction,  one  narrowly  grazing 
General  Merritt.  They  nicked  a  horse  here  and  there, 
but,  as  usual,  their  marksmanship  was  execrable. 

As  the  little  party  charged  the  Indians,  Merritt  had 

*"  The  Adventures  of  Buff alo  Bill."  By  Colonel  William  F.  Cody.  Harper  & 
Brothers,  1904. 


Two  Interesting  Affairs          297 

directed  King  to  order  the  rest  of  the  regiment  to 
advance.  In  the  midst  of  the  firing,  the  splendid 
troops  of  the  dandy  Fifth  came  bursting  through  the 
ravines  and  over  the  hills,  making  for  the  Cheyennes 
on  the  gallop.  At  the  same  time  Lieutenant  Hall's 
infantrymen  scrambled  out  of  their  wagons  and  sent  a 
few  volleys  at  the  Cheyennes  at  long  range. 

A  more  astonished  body  of  Indians  the  United  States 
has  probably  never  contained.  They  hadn't  the  slight- 
est idea  that  there  was  a  soldier  within  five  hundred 
miles,  except  those  in  the  wagon  train  which  they  had 
expected  to  capture.  They  had  anticipated  no  trouble 
whatever  in  joining  Sitting  Bull,  and  now  they  found 
themselves  suddenly  face  to  face  with  one  of  the  finest 
cavalry  regiments  in  the  service.  What  were  they  to 
do  ?  They  hadn't  much  time  to  decide,  for  the  cavalry 
were  after  them  at  full  gallop.  They  turned  and  fled 
incontinently.  They  stood  not  on  the  order  of  their 
going,  but  went  at  once. 

If  they  could  get  back  to  the  reservation,  they  would 
be  free  from  attack.  They  fled  at  the  highest  possible 
speed  of  their  horses,  throwing  aside  everything  they 
possessed,  save  their  guns  and  ammunition,  in  their 
frantic  desire  to  get  away.  For  thirty  miles  Merritt  and 
his  men  pursued  them  with  the  best  will  in  the  world  to 
come  up  with  them;  but  the  horses  of  the  soldiers  were 
more  or  less  tired  from  their  long  march  of  the  day  be- 
fore, and  the  Indians,  lightly  equipped  and  on  fresh 
horses,  finally  succeeded  in  escaping.  By  nightfall  the 
whole  party  was  back  on  the  reservation.  Thereafter 
care  was  taken  that  they  found  no  further  opportunity 
to  go  on  the  war-path. 

The  cooperation  of  this  splendid  body  of  Indians 
with  that  under  the  command  of  Crazy  Horse  might 


298        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

possibly  have  turned  the  scale  in  some  of  the  hotly  con- 
tested battles,  and  Merritt's  promptness  was  greatly 
commended  by  the  authorities.  Buffalo  Bill  received 
the  chief  glory  of  the  little  adventure  from  his  dramatic 
duel  with  Yellow  Hand,  in  full  view  of  soldiers  and 
Indians. 

II.  The  Sibley  Scout 

The  other  event  is  known  in  army  records  as  The  Sib- 
ley  Scout.  While  General  Crook  was  waiting  for  re- 
inforcements and  additional  supplies  at  his  camp  on 
Goose  Creek,  near  the  Tongue  River,  he  decided  to 
send  out  a  scouting  party  to  see  what  had  become  of 
his  friend,  Crazy  Horse,  who  had  handled  him  so 
severely  at  the  Rosebud  a  few  weeks  before. 

Lieutenant  Frederick  W.  Sibley,  of  E  Troop,  of  the 
Third  Cavalry,  an  enterprising  but  cool-headed  young 
officer,  was  given  command  of  twenty-five  picked  men 
from  the  regiment.  With  him  went  scouts  Frank 
Gruard  and  Baptiste  Fourier,  commonly  known  as  "Big 
Bat,"  to  distinguish  him  from  another  scout,  Baptiste, 
a  smaller  man.  To  the  party  also  were  attached  John 
Becker,  mule  packer,  and  the  indefatigable  Finerty, 
the  war  correspondent  of  the  Chicago  Times,  making 
a  total  of  thirty  men. 

Each  man  carried  one  hundred  rounds  of  ammunition 
on  his  person,  and  a  few  days'  rations  in  his  saddle-bags. 
They  started  on  the  6th  of  July.  On  the  yth  they  had 
reached  the  Rosebud,  some  fifty  miles  away  from  Crook's 
camp.  There  they  came  across  the  Indians.  Gruard 
and  Fourier  observed  them  from  the  top  of  a  hill,  behind 
which  the  rest  of  the  expedition  halted.  There  were 
hundreds  of  them,  apparently,  and  the  scouts  rejoined 


Two  Interesting  Affairs  299 

the  command  immediately.  To  take  the  back  track 
was  impossible.  Therefore,  they  struck  westward  over 
the  mountains,  leading  their  horses.  The  Indians, 
marching  slowly  southward,  soon  came  upon  the  trail  of 
the  party,  and  followed  it  at  some  distance.  Urged  by 
the  imminence  of  their  peril,  the  men,  led  by  the  uner- 
ring Gruard,  who  was  familiar  with  all  the  ramifications 
of  the  Big  Horn  Range,  since  he  had  often  hunted  there 
during  his  captivity  with  the  Sioux,  did  some  rapid  moun- 
tain climbing,  and  finally  thought  they  had  escaped  pur- 
suit, especially  as  no  one  could  ride  up  the  trail  up  which 
they  had  climbed,  and  these  Indians  were  poor  trailers 
when  on  foot.  Having  progressed  some  five  miles  over 
terrific  trails,  they  halted  in  a  little  glade  under  the  shade 
of  some  trees,  unsaddled  their  horses,  made  coffee,  and 
ate  dinner.  Feeling  themselves  safe  from  pursuit,  they 
rested  for  several  hours,  and  it  was  not  until  late  in  the 
afternoon  that  they  took  up  their  march  again. 

The  going  here  was  easier  than  before,  and  they  could 
mount  their  horses  once  more.  Presently  they  trotted 
into  a  level,  thickly  wooded  valley.  The  trail  led  along 
the  right  side  of  the  mountain,  which  was  broken  and 
rugged.  There  were  woods  to  the  left  and  in  front  of 
them,  and  high  rocks  and  open  timber  on  the  right. 
John  Becker,  who  brought  up  the  rear,  suddenly  alarmed 
everybody  by  the  shout  of  "Indians,  Indians!" 

The  next  instant  the  timber  and  boulders  to  the  right 
were  alive  with  a  war  party  of  Sioux  and  Cheyennes,  not 
two  hundred  yards  away  —  not  the  same  party  they  had 
seen  in  the  valley,  by  the  way.  So  soon  as  the  Indians 
appeared  they  opened  fire.  Again  their  shooting  was 
bad.  Not  a  trooper  was  hurt,  although  a  number  of 
horses  were  hit,  some  seriously.  Sibley  acted  with 
prompt  decision.  A  word  with  Gruard  determined  him 


3OO        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

in  his  course.  Under  a  spattering  fire  from  the  Indians, 
the  party  turned  to  the  left  and  raced  for  the  thick  tim- 
ber as  fast  as  they  could  go.  They  threw  themselves  to 
the  ground  in  a  semi-circular  line  so  soon  as  they  reached 
the  woods,  tied  their  horses  to  the  trees  back  of  them, 
and  taking  advantage  of  fallen  logs  and  boulders  as  a 
breastwork,  opened  fire  upon  the  Indians,  who,  on  their 
part,  sought  concealment  and  commenced  firing  in  ear- 
nest. The  soldiers  were  well  protected  in  the  forest, 
however,  and  although  the  Indians  killed  many  of  the 
horses,  they  did  not  hit  any  of  the  troopers. 

The  party  was  now  overwhelmingly  outnumbered. 
There  were  already  several  hundred  Indians  engaged. 
Their  leader  was  a  magnificent  young  Cheyenne  chief, 
dressed  in  a  suit  of  white  buckskin.  It  was  afterward 
learned  that  his  name  was  White  Antelope.  Gruard 
was  recognized  by  the  Indians,  who  were  desirous  of 
taking  him  alive.  After  firing  for  perhaps  half  an  hour, 
White  Antelope  led  the  Indians  on  foot  in  a  direct 
charge  on  the  woods. 

Sibley  ordered  his  men  to  hold  their  fire  until  they 
could  make  every  shot  tell.  They  mowed  the  advanc- 
ing Indians  down  in  scores.  White  Antelope  was  seen 
to  leap  into  the  air  and  fall.  He  had  been  pierced,  it 
was  afterward  learned,  by  several  bullets,  and  started 
for  the  happy  hunting  grounds  then  and  there.  The 
charge  was  handsomely  repulsed,  and  the  Indians  re- 
tired in  confusion,  although  still  keeping  up  a  severe  fire. 

It  was  evident  to  every  one  that  the  Indians  would 
hold  the  soldiers  in  play  until  they  were  joined  by  other 
war  parties  —  indeed,  their  numbers  were  increased  al- 
ready —  when  Sibley's  detachment  would  be  surrounded 
and  exterminated.  Gruard,  therefore,  proposed  aban- 
doning the  horses  —  most  of  them  had  been  killed  any- 


CHILF    TWO 
NORTHERN     CHEYENN'E; 


CHIEF   TWO   MOON   OF  THE   NORTHERN   CHEYENNES 

Allies  of  the  Sioux  at  Little  Big  Horn 
Painted  from  life  by  F.  A    Burbank 


Two  Interesting  Affairs  301 

way  —  and  that  the  whole  party  should  steal  away 
through  the  timber  and  endeavor  to  escape  over  the 
mountains  on  foot.  Firing  two  or  three  volleys  and 
then  keeping  up  a  scattering  fire  for  a  short  time  to  make 
the  Indians  think  they  were  on  the  alert,  the  troopers, 
exercising  the  greatest  caution,  one  by  one  crawled 
through  the  underbrush  until  they  were  hidden  by  the 
forest  trees.  Then  everybody  got  up  on  his  feet  and 
ran  like  mad. 

Gruard,  whose  instincts  as  a  guide  were  of  the  highest 
order,  led  them  over  magnificent  mountains,  through 
gloomy  canons,  past  overhanging  cliffs,  along  impossi- 
ble trails  on  the  sides  of  tremendous  precipices,  one  of 
which  stretched  for  several  hundred  feet  below  them  and 
three  hundred  feet  above  them,  almost  sheer.  Not  being 
mountaineers,  they  would  have  been  utterly  unable  to 
have  followed  the  scout  had  it  not  been  for  the  Red  Ter- 
ror that  lurked  behind.  They  had  succeeded  in  getting, 
perhaps,  a  mile  away  from  and  some  distance  above  the 
valley,  when  they  heard  several  heavy  volleys,  followed 
by  a  series  of  wild  yells,  which  apprised  them  that  the 
Indians  had  at  last  rushed  their  camp.  They  were  so 
confident  of  escape  now  that  they  actually  burst  into 
roars  of  laughter  at  the  thought  of  the  Indian  disap- 
pointment when  the  attackers  found  their  victims  had 
decamped.  Those  Indians  were  not  accustomed  to 
hunt  on  foot.  An  Indian  off  a  horse  is  about  as  awk- 
ward as  a  sailor  on  one.  The  pursuit  was  soon  aban- 
doned, and  the  soldiers  left  to  follow  their  course  un- 
molested. Theirs  had  been  a  lucky  escape.  Without 
Gruard,  they  had  all  been  killed. 

The  day  was  frightfully  hot.  The  fast  going  caused 
by  the  exigencies  of  the  occasion  and  the  desperate 
nature  of  the  climbing  increased  their  discomfort.  The 


3O2        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

men  threw  away  everything  in  the  way  of  superfluous 
clothing  which  would  impede  their  progress  or  tire  them 
in  their  hurry,  save  their  weapons  and  ammunition. 
They  camped  that  night,  or  halted,  rather,  for  there  was 
nothing  with  which  to  camp,  on  the  crest  of  the  range. 
It  turned  very  cold,  a  terrible  storm  arose,  and  they 
suffered  severely.  They  had  nothing  to  eat;  their  pro- 
visions had  been  in  their  saddle-bags,  and  they  had  not 
dared  to  take  them  in  their  attempt  to  escape,  lest  the 
suspicions  of  the  Indians  should  be  excited  by  their 
efforts. 

The  next  day,  the  Qth  of  July,  they  started  down  the 
mountain.  Gruard's  instincts  were  not  at  fault.  He 
led  them  to  the  foot-hills  overlooking  Crook's  main  camp 
far  away.  In  order  to  reach  the  plain  they  had  to  cross 
a  rapid  mountain  brook,  the  water  of  which  came  al- 
most up  to  their  necks.  Two  men  who  could  not  swim 
and  who  were  in  a  very  nervous  condition  from  their  ex- 
citing adventures,  stubbornly  refused  to  try  to  cross  the 
stream,  even  with  the  assistance  of  their  comrades.  They 
chose  rather  to  hide  themselves  where  they  were,  and 
begged  that  help  might  be  sent  back  to  them.  The  rest 
of  the  party  managed  to  cross  and  started  for  the  camp, 
still  about  fifteen  miles  distant.  They  were  met  in  the 
evening  by  a  scouting  party  of  soldiers,  who  brought 
them  back  to  camp. 

Their  clothing  and  shoes  were  torn  to  ribbons,  and 
they  were  greatly  exhausted  from  the  terrible  strains  and 
hardships  to  which  they  had  been  subjected.  That  they 
escaped  at  all  was  a  miracle,  due  to  the  coolness  of  young 
Sibley  and  the  marvelous  skill  of  Gruard.  A  detach- 
ment went  back  for  the  two  men  who  had  remained 
behind  and  brought  them  back  to  the  camp. 

Lieutenant  Sibley  reported  to  General  Crook  that  he 


Two  Interesting  Affairs  303 

had  found  the  Indians,  but  whether  that  statement  is 
accurate  is  a  question.  It  would,  perhaps,  be  more  truth- 
ful to  say  that  the  Indians  had  found  him.  Sibley  and 
Gruard  were  highly  complimented  by  Crook;  and  Mr. 
Finerty,  who  had  displayed  great  courage,  wrote  a 
graphic  account  of  it,  from  which  this  brief  sketch  has 
been  abridged. 


CHAPTER   NINE 
The  First  Success 

I.   Crook  and  Mills  at  Slim  Buttes 

AFTER  the  defeat  of  General  Custer,  and  the 
successful  retreat  of  the  Sioux  and  Cheyennes 
from   the   Little  Big  Horn,  the  government 
hurried    reinforcements   into   the   field,   and 
ordered   Crook   and  Terry  to  press  the  pursuit  of  the 
Indians  with  the  greatest  vigor.    It  was  not,  however, 
until  nearly  a  year  after  the  disaster  on  the  Little  Big 
Horn  that  the  Sioux  war  was  concluded,  and  it  was  not 
until  after  the  Indians  had  met  with  several  crushing 
defeats  and  had  been  pursued  until  they  were  utterly 
exhausted  that  peace  was  declared. 

The  greatest  individual  factor  in  bringing  about  this 
much  desired  result  was  General  George  Crook,  a  cele- 
brated cavalryman  during  the  Civil  War,  and  a  more 
celebrated  Indian  fighter  after  its  close.  With  un- 
wearied tenacity  and  vigor  he  pursued  the  savages,  strik- 
ing them  through  his  subordinates  whenever  and  wher- 
ever they  could  be  found.  The  terrible  persistence  with 
which  he  urged  his  faint,  starving,  foot-sore,  tattered 
soldiers  along  the  trail,  to  which  he  clung  with  a  resolu- 
tion and  determination  that  nothing  could  shake,  entitles 
him  to  the  respect  and  admiration  of  his  countrymen — 

304 


The  First  Success  305 

a  respect  and  admiration,  by  the  way,  which  was  fully 
accorded  him  by  his  gallant  and  equally  desperate  foes. 

After  Crook,  the  men  who  brought  about  the  result 
were,  first  and  foremost,  Nelson  A.  Miles  —  singularly 
enough  not  a  cavalryman,  but  the  Colonel  of  the  Fifth 
Infantry;  and,  next  to  him,  Colonel  Ranald  S.  Macken- 
zie, of  the  Fourth  Cavalry,  and  Captain  Anson  Mills,  of 
the  Third,  whom  we  have  already  noted  doing  gallant 
service  at  the  Battle  of  the  Rosebud.  Miles  had  been 
ordered  into  the  field  to  reinforce  Terry's  shattered 
and  depleted  column. 

After  much  marching  and  scouting,  the  columns  of 
Terry  and  Crook  combined;  but  Terry's  forces  were  in 
bad  condition,  and  his  command  was  soon  withdrawn 
from  the  field.  What  was  left  of  the  Seventh  Cavalry 
was  sent  back  to  Fort  Lincoln,  whence  they  had  started 
out  with  such  bright  hopes  a  few  months  before.  Gib- 
bon's command  was  returned  to  Montana,  where  it  had 
been  made  up,  on  account  of  the  threatening  aspect  of 
things  in  that  quarter,  and  Terry  retired  from  active 
campaigning  to  resume  command  of  his  department. 
Miles,  as  we  shall  see,  was  sent  to  the  Yellowstone. 

Crook  was  left  alone  in  the  active  pursuit.  Space  and 
time  are  lacking  to  describe  the  details  of  the  wonderful 
marches  he  made  on  the  trails  of  the  Indians  —  now 
under  burning  suns,  which  parched  the  ground  until  it 
was  as  bare  as  the  palm  of  a  hand;  again  through  tor- 
rents of  drenching  rains,  which  succeeded  the  fierce 
heat;  and,  finally,  through  the  snows  and  cold  of  a 
winter  of  unexampled  severity.  During  the  summer 
there  was  no  forage  for  the  horses  of  the  cavalry  nor  for 
the  very  small  pack  train,  and  rations  for  the  men  be- 
came snorter  and  shorter.  Finally,  early  in  September, 
the  supply  of  provisions  was  reduced  to  two  and  a  half 


306        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

days'  rations.  Crook  calculated  that  they  could  march 
two  weeks  on  that  amount. 

They  supplemented  the  rations  by  living  on  horse 
and  mule  meat  and  a  few  wild  onions  which  they  could 
gather  from  time  to  time  in  spots  which  had  escaped  the 
universal  baking  of  the  summer.  At  last  the  command 
literally  reached  the  end  of  its  resources.  The  Indians 
were  in  bad  condition,  too,  but  their  situation  was  not 
nearly  so  desperate  as  was  that  of  Crook  and  his  men. 
The  Indians  were  worn  out  and  exhausted  by  the 
energetic  and  relentless  pursuit  which  had  been  hurled 
after  them  by  the  indomitable  commander,  but  they 
still  had  plenty  to  eat,  and  they  had  managed  to  keep 
ahead  of  him,  and  to  avoid  various  scouting  columns. 

On  the  7th  of  September,  1876,  Crook  realized  that 
his  men  had  reached  the  limit  of  their  endurance,  and 
that  forage  and  food  must  be  procured  or  they  would 
all  die  in  the  wilderness.  The  Indians  had  swept  the 
country  bare  of  game,  and  the  sun  had  swept  it  clean  of 
fodder.  One  hundred  and  fifty  of  the  best  men  —  that  is, 
those  who  showed  the  fewest  signs  of  the  hardships 
they  had  undergone  —  with  the  best  horses  and  the  last 
of  the  mules,  were  formed  into  an  advance  party  under 
Captain  Anson  Mills,  of  the  Third  Cavalry.  Mills  had 
instructions  to  push  on  to  Deadwood  City,  one  of  the 
new  towns  in  the  Black  Hills,  to  get  provisions,  "Any 
kind  of  provisions,  for  God's  sake!"  which  he  could  bring 
back  to  the  rest  of  the  army,  now  in  a  destitute  condition. 

Mills  was  not  expected  to  hunt  for,  or  to  fight,  In- 
dians —  primarily,  that  is.  He  was  to  go  for  food  in 
order  to  keep  the  army  from  starving  ;  but  as  he 
marched  southward,  his  scouts  discovered  a  large  village 
of  forty  or  fifty  lodges  at  a  place  called  Slim  Buttes,  in 
the  northwest  corner  of  South  Dakota.  The  tepees 


The  First  Success  307 

had  been  pitched  on  a  little  rising  from  the  banks  of  a 
small  stream  called  Rabbit  Creek.  The  place  was  in- 
closed on  three  sides  by  a  series  of  tall  cliffs,  whose 
broken  sides  seemed  here  and  there  to  have  been  cut 
in  half-formed  terraces,  making  the  ascent  easy.  Little 
ravines  and  small  canons  ran  through  the  buttes, 
gradually  ascending  until  they  met  the  plateau  on  top. 

Mills  instantly  determined  to  attack  the  camp  —  a  wise 
and  soldierly  action  on  his  part.  He  made  his  dispo- 
sitions with  care.  Reaching  the  vicinity  of  the  camp, 
he  halted  in  a  deep  gorge  on  the  night  of  September  8, 
and  prepared  for  battle  early  the  next  morning.  The 
night  was  dark,  cold,  and  very  rainy,  and  the  tired  men 
suffered  greatly.  Marching  out  at  dawn,  Mills  succeeded 
at  daybreak  in  surprising  the  camp,  which  proved  to 
be  that  of  a  band  of  Sioux  led  by  American  Horse, 
one  of  the  most  prominent  chiefs.  Leaving  Lieutenant 
Bubb  with  the  pack  train  and  the  lead  horses,  Mills 
directed  Lieutenant  Schwatka,  afterward  so  well  known 
from  his  Arctic  explorations,  to  charge  directly  into  the 
village  with  twenty-five  mounted  men.  The  remainder 
of  his  force  he  dismounted  and  divided  into  two  parties, 
under  Lieutenants  Von  Luettwitz  and  Crawford,  re- 
spectively, with  orders  to  move  on  the  camp  from  differ- 
ent sides. 

The  attack  was  a  complete  success.  The  village 
was  taken  with  but  little  loss.  Some  of  the  Sioux  were 
killed  and  others  captured,  but  most  escaped  through 
the  ravines  to  the  plateau  surrounding  the  valley.  One 
heroic  but  unfortunate  little  band,  consisting  of  Ameri- 
can Horse  and  four  warriors,  with  fifteen  women  and 
children,  was  driven  into  one  of  the  canons  which 
ended  in  a  cave.  One  or  two  of  the  soldiers  had  been 
wounded  in  the  attack.  Lieutenant  Von  Luettwitz, 


308        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

who  had  fought  all  through  the  Franco-Austrian  War 
in  Italy,  and  who  was  a  veteran  of  the  Civil  War,  was 
shot  in  the  knee  and  so  badly  wounded  that  his  leg  had 
to  be  amputated  on  the  field. 

Being  now  in  complete  command  of  the  village,  the 
pack  train  was  ordered  up  and  the  captured  village  was 
examined.  To  the  joy  of  Mills  and  his  soldiers,  an 
immense  quantity  of  provisions,  in  the  shape  of  meat, 
forage,  and  other  stores,  was  discovered. 

There  still  remained  the  little  band  of  savages  in  the 
ravine  to  be  dealt  with.  A  detachment  was  ordered  to 
drive  them  out.  The  Indians  had  been  busy  making 
rifle-pits,  and  as  the  soldiers  advanced  to  storm  the  cave, 
they  were  met  with  a  rapid  and  well-directed  fire.  Two 
of  them  were  shot  dead  and  others  wounded.*  The 
Indian  position  appeared  to  be  impregnable.  An  inter- 
preter crept  near  enough  under  cover  to  make  himself 
heard,  and  asked  their  surrender.  They  replied  to  his 
command  with  taunts  and  jeers.  They  incautiously 
informed  him,  however,  that  Crazy  Horse  with  his 
warriors  was  in  the  vicinity,  and  on  being  apprised  of 
their  situation  by  some  of  the  fugitives,  he  would  un- 
doubtedly come  to  their  rescue.  Crazy  Horse  could 
have  made  short  work  of  Mills  and  his  hundred  and 
fifty.  Meanwhile  the  survivors  of  the  village,  which 
had  contained  a  hundred  warriors,  formed  an  extended 
line  on  the  buttes  and  opened  fire  on  the  soldiers. 

*  One  of  the  scouts  killed  in  this  battle  was  a  great  admirer  of  Buffalo  Bill,  whose 
manners,  methods,  and  appearance  he  aped  as  well  as  he  could.  He  rejoiced  in  an  unfor- 
tunate sobriquet,  which  was  received  in  this  wise:  General  Sheridan,  seeking  Buffalo  Bill 
to  lead  a  hunting  expedition  on  one  occasion,  was  met  by  this  swaggerer,  with  the  remark 
that  Buffalo  Bill  was  gone  away,  and  when  Buffalo  Bill  was  gone  he  was  Buffalo  Bill 
himself.  "The  h — 1  you  are!"  said  Sheridan  contemptuously.  "Buffalo  Chip,  you 
mean!"  The  poor  braggart  never  got  away  from  the  name  of  "Buffalo  Chip  Charlie." 
He  was  a  brave  man  for  all  his  vanity,  and  the  soldiers  were  sorry  enough  for  their  mock- 
ery when  they  buried  him  that  night  at  the  foot  of  the  buttes,  where  he  had  fallen  in  the 
attack  on  the  cave. 


The  First  Success  309 

Mills  acted  promptly.  He  despatched  a  courier  to 
Crook  on  the  best  horse  in  the  command,  to  report  the 
situation  and  ask  him  for  reinforcements  at  once. 
Incidentally,  he  mentioned  that  a  great  quantity  of  pro- 
visions had  been  found.  Then  he  made  preparations  to 
hold  the  place,  and  at  the  same  time  to  prosecute  his 
attack  against  the  cave,  all  the  time  keeping  up  a  smart 
fight  with  the  men  on  the  buttes.  So  soon  as  Crook 
received  the  message,  he  started  forward,  intending  to 
take  with  him  a  select  body  of  men;  but  the  whole  army, 
spoiling  for  a  fight  and  hungry  for  a  square  meal,  in- 
sisted on  going  along.  They  made  a  forced  march,  and 
reached  Mills  about  half  after  eleven  in  the  morning. 

Crook  immediately  proceeded  to  dislodge  the  Indians 
in  the  cave.  The  men  were  led  forward  under  a  galling 
fire,  to  which  the  general,  in  spite  of  the  entreaties  of 
his  staff,  exposed  himself  with  indifference.  When  they 
got  in  a  position  to  command  the  cave,  Crook,  willing  to 
spare  his  brave  foemen,  again  asked  them  to  surrender. 
His  request  was  met  by  a  decided  negative.  The  men 
opened  fire,  and  searched  every  cranny  and  recess  of  the 
cave  with  a  storm  of  bullets.  Gruard,  one  of  the 
scouts,  taking  advantage  of  cover,  crept  to  the  very 
mouth  of  the  cave,  remained  there  unobserved,  watched 
his  opportunity,  seized  a  squaw  who  incautiously  ex- 
posed herself,  and  with  her  as  a  shield  dashed  forward 
and  shot  one  of  the  warriors,  escaping  in  safety  him- 
self. 

II.    The  Death  of  American  Horse 

After  two  hours  of  firing,  the  death-chants  of  the 
squaws  induced  Crook  to  order  a  cessation  for  another 
parley.  This  time  his  request  that  the  Indians  sur- 


3io        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

render  met  with  some  response;  for  the  squaws  and 
children,  to  the  number  of  thirteen,  came  reluctantly 
forth  on  his  positive  assurance  that  they  would  be  pro- 
tected. The  braves  refused  to  give  up.  They  were 
confident  that  Crazy  Horse  would  succor  them.  The 
engagement  at  once  began  again,  but  after  it  had  lasted 
some  little  time  the  fire  of  the  Indians  ceased. 

The  offer  of  mercy  was  made  a  fourth  time.  A  young 
Indian  stepped  out  and  received  additional  assurance 
that  no  harm  should  come  if  they  surrendered.  He 
went  back  into  the  cave  and  presently  reappeared  with 
another  young  warrior,  supporting  between  them  the 
tall,  splendid  figure  of  brave  old  American  Horse.  He 
had  been  shot  through  the  bowels,  and  his  intestines 
protruded  from  the  wound.  He  was  suffering  frightful 
agony,  and  was  biting  hard  upon  a  piece  of  wood  to 
control  himself.  He  handed  his  gun  to  Crook  and  gave 
up  the  contest.  The  surgeons  with  the  command  did 
everything  they  possibly  could  for  him,  but  his  wound 
was  beyond  human  skill.  That  night,  surrounded  by 
his  wives  and  children,  he  died,  as  stoically  and  as 
bravely  as  he  had  lived. 

Inside  the  cave  the  rocky  walls  were  cut  and  scored 
by  the  rain  of  bullets  which  had  been  poured  into  it, 
and  lying  on  the  floor  were  the  bodies  of  the  two  Indian 
warriors,  together  with  a  woman  and  a  child,  who  had 
been  killed.  The  soldiers  had  not  known,  until  the 
squaws  came  out,  that  there  were  any  women  or 
children  there.  The  little  band  had  sold  their  lives 
dearly.  Even  the  women  had  used  guns,  and  had  dis- 
played all  the  bravery  and  courage  of  the  Sioux. 

Too  late  Crazy  Horse,  with  some  six  hundred  war- 
riors, appeared  on  the  scene.  Imagining  he  had  only 
to  deal  with  Mills'  small  force,  he  galloped  gallantly  for- 


The  First  Success  311 

ward  to  the  attack  at  about  five  o'clock.  He  was  great- 
ly astonished  at  the  number  of  antagonists  developed 
thereby.  He  retired  to  the  top  of  the  buttes,  and  the 
soldiers  in  gallant  style  dashed  after  him.  They  scaled 
the  cliffs,  finally  gaining  the  level  plateau.  Crazy 
Horse  made  one  or  two  attempts  to  break  through  the 
line,  but  it  was  impossible,  and  seeing  himself  greatly 
outnumbered,  he  wisely  retired,  having  sustained  some 
loss. 

The  battle  was  one  of  the  most  picturesque  ever 
fought  in  the  West.  Crook  and  his  officers  stood  in  the 
camp,  the  center  of  a  vast  amphitheater  ringed  with  fire, 
up  the  sides  of  which  the  soldiers  steadily  climbed  to  get 
at  the  Indians,  silhouetted  in  all  their  war  finery  against 
the  sky.  The  loss  of  life  on  either  side  was  not  great, 
but  the  capture  of  the  village  and  the  provisions  which 
had  been  accumulated  for  the  winter  was  a  serious  one. 

In  the  camp  were  discovered  many  articles  that  had 
belonged  to  the  Seventh  Cavalry —  a  guidon,  money,  one 
of  Captain  Keogh's  gauntlets,  marked  with  his  name, 
orderly  books,  saddles,  etc.  Among  other  things,  were 
letters  written  by  officers  and  soldiers  to  friends  in  the 
East,  some  of  them  still  sealed  and  ready  for  mailing. 
They  must  have  come  like  voices  from  the  dead  when 
they  reached  those  to  whom  they  had  been  written. 


CHAPTER  TEN 
A  Decisive  Blow 

I.    Mackenzie's  Winter  Battle 

CROOK  now  gave  over  the  pursuit,  and  re- 
turned to  Fort  Fetterman  to  organize  a  winter 
campaign.     This  expedition  was  one  of  the 
best  equipped  that  ever  started  on  an  Indian 
campaign.      It    contained    all    arms    of   the   service, 
with    an    abundance  of  everything   necessary  to    suc- 
cess.   To  follow  its  marches  to  the  Big  Horn  Range 
would  reveal  little  of  interest;  but  late  in  November  it 
was  learned,  from  a  captured  Cheyenne,  that  the  prin- 
cipal Cheyenne  village  was  located  in  a  canon  through 
which  flowed  one  of  the  main  sources  of  Crazy  Woman's 
Fork  of  the  Powder  River.    Colonel  Ranald  S.  Macken- 
zie was  ordered,  with  the  Indian  scouts  and  ten  troops  of 
cavalry  from  the  Second,  Fourth,  and  Fifth  regiments, 
to  find  and  destroy  the  village. 

The  Cheyennes  were  not  so  numerous  as  the  Sioux, 
and  the  greater  number  of  their  allies  has  sometimes 
caused  people  to  minimize  the  quality  of  the  Cheyennes; 
but  no  braver,  more  magnificent  fighters  ever  lived  than 
this  same  tribe.  They  had  some  of  the  Homeric  qual- 
ities of  the  ancient  Greeks.  I  believe  it  will  generally 
be  admitted  that  they  were  the  finest  of  the  Plains  In- 

312 


A  Decisive  Blow  313 

dians.  They  were  foemen  worthy  Mackenzie's  or  any- 
body else's  steel.  The  battle  which  ensued  was  in  some 
respects  one  of  the  most  terrible  in  Western  history, 
and  in  its  results  exemplified,  as  few  others  have  done, 
the  horrible  character  of  the  war.  It  was,  perhaps,  as 
great  a  contribution  to  the  downfall  of  the  Sioux  as  any 
single  incident  that  occurred. 

Mackenzie's  men  left  the  main  encampment  on  the 
23d  of  November.  The  ground  was  covered  with  snow. 
The  weather  was  arctic  in  its  severity.  The  scouts 
and  friendly  Indians  —  Pawnees,  Crows,  Shoshones, 
the  hereditary  enemies  of  the  Cheyennes,  including  cer- 
tain Cheyennes  also  who  had  entered  the  service  of  the 
United  States*  —  had  located  the  camp  in  Willow 
Creek  Canon.  Some  of  the  Indians  had  kept  the  camp 
under  observation  while  Mackenzie  brought  up  his 
troops.  He  had  seven  hundred  and  fifty  cavalrymen  and 
three  hundred  and  fifty  Indians.  Halting  at  the  mouth 
of  the  canon,  which  he  reached  on  the  night  of  the  24th, 
he  resolved  to  await  the  still  hours  before  the  break  of 
day  the  next  morning  before  delivering  his  attack. 

The  canon  was  a  gloomy  gorge  in  the  Big  Horn  Moun- 
tains. A  swift,  ice-bound  river  rushed  over  the  rocks 
between  precipitous  walls,  which  soared  into  the  sky 
for  perhaps  a  thousand  feet  on  either  side.  Number- 
less icy  brooks  poured  their  contents  into  the  main 
stream  through  lateral  canons  scarcely  less  forbidding 
in  their  appearance  than  the  main  one,  and  which  made 
the  trail  of  the  creek  almost  impossible.  Here  and 
there  the  canon  widened,  and  in  one  of  these  open 

*  It  is  a  singular  thing  to  note  the  looseness  of  the  tie  with  which  the  members  of  the 
various  tribes  were  bound.  Frequently  we  find  bands  of  the  same  tribe  fighting  for  and 
against  the  United  States  on  the  same  field.  One  of  the  most  fruitful  causes  of  the  suc- 
cess of  our  arms  has  been  this  willingness  on  the  part  of  the  Indians  to  fight  against  their 
own  people,  of  which  the  government  has  been  quick  to  avail  itself. 


314        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

places  the  Cheyennes,  under  the  leadership  of  Dull 
Knife,  had  pitched  their  camp.  They  fondly  believed 
the  place  impregnable — as,  indeed,  with  careful  guard- 
ing it  would  have  been.  The  greatest  precaution  was 
taken  by  Mackenzie  to  prevent  his  men  from  making 
any  noise.  They  stood  in  ranks  by  their  horses  in  the 
snow  in  that  polar  cold,  waiting  for  the  order  for  the 
advance.  Presently  the  moon  rose,  flooding  the  recesses 
of  the  ravine  with  silvery  light,  which  sparkled  with 
dazzling  brilliancy  upon  patches  of  snow  here  and  there 
on  the  dark  walls. 

Mackenzie,  calculating  that  day  would  be  breaking 
just  about  the  time  he  would  reach  the  camp  from  his 
present  position,  at  last  gave  order  to  take  up  the  march. 
With  what  relief  the  benumbed  troopers  sprang  to 
their  saddles  and  urged  their  shivering  horses  forward, 
can  scarcely  be  imagined  by  dwellers  in  peaceful  lands 
around  warm  firesides.  As  they  struggled  up  the  canon 
they  could  hear  the  sound  of  dancing  and  revelry  in  the 
Indian  camp,  faintly  blown  back  to  them  by  the  night 
wind.  They  learned  afterward  that  the  Cheyennes  had 
just  returned  from  a  successful  raid  on  the  Shoshones, 
and  that  the  dance  was  in  celebration  of  an  important 
victory  they  had  gained.  They  halted  again,  therefore, 
until  all  was  silence,  before  they  once  more  advanced. 
Day  was  beginning  to  break  as  they  reached  the  village. 

The  sleeping  Indians  in  the  camp  had  not  the  slightest 
suspicion  that  the  enemy  was  within  a  hundred  miles. 
The  troops,  cheering  and  shouting,  burst  upon  them 
like  a  winter  storm.  Indians,  when  not  apprehensive 
of  attack,  invariably  sleep  naked.  The  Cheyennes  had 
just  time  to  seize  rifles  and  cartridge  belts,  while  the 
women  caught  hasty  blankets  about  the  children,  when 
the  soldiers  were  upon  them.  Indeed,  so  quick  and 


A  Decisive  Blow  315 

sudden  was  the  attack  that  some  of  the  warriors  could 
not  get  out  of  the  tepees.  With  their  knives  they 
slashed  the  wigwams,  and  from  these  openings  fired 
upon  the  soldiers  as  they  galloped  through  the  village. 
Many  were  shot  dead  where  a  few  moments  before 
they  had  slept  in  peace. 

Most  of  the  pony  herd  was  captured,  and  the  village 
in  a  short  time  was  in  possession  of  Mackenzie.  The 
Cheyennes,  though  overwhelmed,  were  undismayed. 
They  had  retreated  headlong  up  the  canon,  but  were 
soon  rallied  by  their  subchiefs.  Dull  Knife,  their  leader, 
was  found  in  the  village  with  half  a  dozen  bullets  in  him. 
He  had  fought  gallantly  in  the  open  until  he  died. 

Presently  the  Indians  came  swarming  back  along 
the  side  of  the  canon.  They  occupied  points  of  vantage, 
and,  naked  though  they  were  in  the  frightful  weather, 
with  the  thermometer  ranging  from  ten  to  twenty 
degrees  below  zero  during  this  campaign,  they  opened 
fire  upon  their  opponents.  Unless  they  could  be  dis- 
lodged, Mackenzie's  position  was  untenable.  He  sent 
his  Shoshone  and  other  Indian  scouts,  who,  animated 
with  bitter  hatred  of  the  Cheyennes,  were  eager  to  obey 
his  commands,  to  the  summits  of  the  cliffs  to  clear  the 
Indians  from  them. 

Meanwhile  he  directed  Lieutenant  John  A.  McKin- 
ney,  with  his  troop,  to  charge  and  drive  the  Indians 
from  a  rocky  eminence  where  they  were  concentrating 
and  from  which  they  were  pouring  a  hot  fire  upon  the 
soldiers.  McKinney's  charge  was  entirely  successful, 
for  he  drove  the  Cheyennes  back  until  he  was  stopped  by 
a  ravine.  Wheeling  his  men,  he  attempted  to  find  a 
crossing,  when  he  was  fired  upon  by  a  flanking  party 
of  Indians  and  instantly  killed,  being  hit  no  less  than 
six  times.  Six  of  his  troopers  were  wounded,  and  a 


316        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

number  of  horses  were  shot.  The  troop  was  thrown 
into  confusion,  and  some  of  the  men  started  to  retreat. 
Mackenzie,  observing  the  situation,  immediately  ordered 
Captain  John  M.  Hamilton  and  Major  G.  A.  Gordon 
to  charge  to  the  rescue.  The  charge  was  gallantly 
made  and  stubbornly  resisted. 

The  fighting  was  hand  to  hand,  of  the  fiercest  descrip- 
tion; and  the  Cheyennes,  while  keeping  the  rest  of  Mac- 
kenzie's forces  engaged,  began  concentrating  on  these 
two  troops,  which  had  been  joined  by  Captain  Davis, 
with  his  men.  There  was  no  reserve;  the  cavalry  were 
all  in,  and  this  detachment  might  have  been  wiped  out 
had  it  not  been  for  the  success  of  the  Shoshones  and 
other  Indians,  who  cleared  the  key  to  the  position  on 
the  summit  of  the  plateau  above  the  canon,  and  then 
came  to  the  assistance  of  the  sorely  beset  soldiers. 
Twenty  Cheyennes  were  killed  here  and  several  of  the 
soldiers. 

Relieved  in  a  measure  by  these  two  movements, 
although  not  altogether,  for  the  Cheyennes  with  their 
superior  knowledge  of  the  topography  of  the  country 
could  not  be  entirely  dislodged  from  their  position,  and 
kept  up  a  fierce  fire  upon  the  soldiers  all  day  long,  to 
which  he  could  make  little  reply,  Mackenzie  sent  back 
word  to  Crook  of  his  success,  and  meanwhile  began  the 
destruction  of  the  village.  All  the  winter  supplies  for 
over  a  thousand  Indians  were  there.  The  Cheyennes 
were  a  forehanded,  prosperous  tribe  of  Indians,  as  In- 
dians go,  and  the  property  destroyed  was  enormous. 

II.  The  Sufferings  of  the  Cheyennes 

What  must  have  been  the  despair  of  the  surprised 
warriors,  with  their  women  and  children,  naked,  shiver- 


A  Decisive  Blow  317 

ing  in  the  hills,  as  they  saw  their  belongings  consumed 
by  the  flames!  It  was  simply  impossible  for  them  to 
maintain  their  position  during  the  night.  They  had 
to  move  away  or  die  of  cold.  As  it  was,  twelve  little 
Indian  babies  froze  to  death  that  awful  night.  Many 
of  the  older  men  and  women  were  kept  alive  only  by 
having  their  hands  and  feet,  and  in  the  case  of  the  chil- 
dren, their  whole  bodies,  thrust  into  the  warm  bodies 
of  the  few  ponies  not  captured  by  the  soldiers,  which 
had  been  disemboweled  for  the'  purpose. 

There  was  no  fighting  on  the  26th.  The  Cheyennes 
took  up  a  strong  position  six  miles  farther  up  the  canon, 
from  which  Mackenzie  could  not  dislodge  them,  and  on 
the  zyth  he  started  on  his  return  to  the  camp.  Crook, 
who  made  a  forced  march  night  and  day,  with  Colonel 
Dodge  and  the  infantry,  who  came  forward  with  aston- 
ishing speed  in  spite  of  storm  and  cold,  met  Mackenzie 
retiring  just  after  he  left  the  canon,  and  the  whole  army 
returned  to  the  encampment. 

The  subsequent  sufferings  of  the  Indians  were  fright- 
ful. Naturally,  they  repaired  to  Crazy  Horse,  expect- 
ing that  he  would  succor  them,  feed  them,  and  clothe 
them.  The  Sioux  and  the  Cheyennes  had  been  warm 
friends  and  allies,  and  had  fought  together  on  many  a 
field.  Had  they  come  in  their  prosperity,  Crazy  Horse 
would  have  given  them  a  warm  welcome.  As  it  was, 
he  had  little  with  which  to  support  his  own  band  dur- 
ing the  winter,  owing  to  Crook's  pursuit  of  him,  and 
with  short-sighted,  yet  natural  —  from  an  Indian  point 
of  view  —  policy,  he  refused  to  receive  these  Cheyennes, 
or  to  share  anything  with  them. 

Exasperated  beyond  measure  by  their  treatment  by  the 
Sioux,  and  swearing  eternal  vengeance  uponCrazy  Horse, 
the  wretched  band  struggled  into  the  nearest  agency 


318        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

and  surrendered,  and  in  the  following  spring  moved 
out  with  the  soldiers  against  Crazy  Horse  and  his  men. 

It  is  appalling  to  think  of  that  night  attack  in  that  awful 
weather  upon  that  sleeping  camp — to  read  of  those  wret- 
ched women  and  children,  wandering  naked  in  that  bitter 
cold;  to  learn  of  those  little  ones  frozen  to  death;  of  the 
old  men  and  women  abandoned  by  the  road  to  die  —  yet 
there  is  another  side  to  the  picture,  scarcely  less  horrible. 

In  this  Indian  camp  also  were  found  many  relics  of 
the  Custer  battle.  So  far  as  that  is  in  question,  I  may 
say  that  I  consider  that  action  to  have  been  a  fair  and 
square  stand-up  fight,  in  which  one  side  was  defeated 
and  its  members  all  died  fighting.*  Naturally,  the  In- 
dians despoiled  the  slain  for  trophies.  White  soldiers 
have  done  the  same  when  conditions  have  been  reversed, 
as  has  been  noted  in  the  preceding  chapters  of  this  book. 
Of  course,  the  Indians  mutilated  the  dead  and  tortured 
the  living,  but  some  instances  of  both  practices  are 
found  among  white  men,  and  we  cannot  judge  the  In- 
dian by  our  standards,  anyway. 

But  in  the  camp  there  were  other  evidences  of  savage 
ferocity,  from  which  the  soul  shrinks  in  horror,  and  which 
showed  that  these  Indians  were  among  the  most  cruel 
and  ruthless  on  the  continent,  and  that  they  were  only 
getting  what  they  had  given.  Two  instances  will  suf- 
fice. The  troops  took  from  the  body  of  a  dead  warrior 
an  unique  necklace  of  human  forefingers,  which  had 
been  displayed  with  pride  upon  his  barbaric  breast;  "f 
and  a  bag  was  found  which  contained  the  right  hands  of 
twelve  little  Shoshone  babies  and  children,  which  had 
been  recently  cut  from  little  arms  to  give  some  ruthless 
warrior  a  ghastly  trophy. 

*  See  Preface  for  discussion  of  the  term  "Massacre." 

f  A  picture  of  a  similar  necklace  may  be  seen  in  Captain  J.  Lee  Humfreville's 
interesting  book,  "  Twenty  Years  Among  Our  Hostile  Indians." 


CHAPTER   ELEVEN 

Miles7  Great  Campaigning 

I.     Miles  and  His  Foot  Cavalry  Defeat  Sitting  Bull 

NOW  let  us  turn  to  Miles  and  his  men. 
General  Miles  was  ordered  to  march  his 
command  up  the  Yellowstone  to  the  mouth 
of  the  Tongue  River,  and  establish   a  tem- 
porary post  or  cantonment  there  for  the  winter.     He 
was  an  officer  in  whom  great  confidence  was  reposed, 
and  from  whom  much  was  to  be  expected.     He  had 
as  brilliant  a  record  in  the  Civil  War  as  Custer,  and 
had  practically  fought  one  decisive  battle  in  the  closing 
campaign  on  his  own   responsibility,  with  splendidly 
successful  results.     He  was  a  natural-born  soldier,  and 
he  never  showed  his  talents  to  better  advantage  than  in 
the  operations  which  followed.     His  career  before  and 
after  this  period  is  still  fresh  in  the  minds  of  a  grateful 
people. 

While  Crook  and  his  men  were  hammering  away  in 
one  portion  of  the  field,  Miles  was  doing  splendid  service 
in  the  other.  The  original  intention  had  been  to  place 
under  his  command  some  fifteen  hundred  men,  but  the 
force  he  really  received  amounted  only  to  about  five 
hundred.  With  these  he  was  not  expected  to  do  more 
than  maintain  his  position,  and  acquire  such  informa- 

3*9 


32O        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

tion  as  he  could  in  preparing  for  the  spring  and  sum- 
mer campaign  of  the  following  year.  That  was  not, 
from  his  point  of  view,  a  satisfactory  program. 

Veteran  Indian  fighters  in  the  Northwest  informed 
him  that  it  would  be  useless  to  try  to  reach  the  Indians 
in  the  winter;  but  Miles  was  not  that  kind  of  a  soldier. 
If  the  Indians  could  live  in  tepees  in  that  season,  he  saw 
no  reason  why  white  soldiers  should  not  move  against 
them  in  spite  of  the  weather.  He  had  one  of  the  finest 
regiments  of  infantry  in  the  service  —  the  Fifth.  Based 
upon  the  report  of  courts-martial,  discipline,  etc.,  no  regi- 
ment surpassed  or  even  equaled  its  record.  Miles  him- 
self proved  to  be  the  most  successful  commander  against 
Indians  that  the  war  produced,  and  his  success  was  not 
due  to  what  envious  people  called  good  luck.  It  was 
well  merited  and  thoroughly  earned. 

The  government,  upon  the  representations  of  Sheri- 
dan and  Sherman,  which  were  based  upon  Miles'  pre- 
vious successful  fighting  with  the  Southwestern  Indians, 
allowed  the  young  colonel  everything  he  asked  for.  If 
his  troops  were  not  completely  equipped  for  the  work  in 
which  their  commander  designed  to  employ  them,  it 
would  be  his  fault.  With  wise  forethought,  he  provided 
the  soldiers  as  if  for  an  arctic  expedition.  They  cut  up 
blankets  for  underwear.  They  were  furnished  with  fur 
boots  and  the  heaviest  kind  of  leggings  and  overshoes. 
Every  man  had  a  buffalo  overcoat  and  a  woolen  or  fur 
mask  to  go  over  his  face  under  his  fur  cap.  Their  hands 
were  protected  by  fur  gloves.  It  was  well  for  them  that 
they  were  thus  provided,  for  the  winter  of  1876-7  was  one 
of  the  most  severe  that  had  ever  visited  that  section  of  the 
country.  The  mercury  frequently  froze  in  the  thermom- 
eter, and  on  one  occasion  a  temperature  of  sixty  degrees 
below  zero  was  recorded  by  the  spirit  thermometer. 


Miles'  Great  Campaigning        321 

Busying  themselves  during  the  late  fall,  which  was,  in 
effect,  winter,  in  the  erection  of  the  cantonment  on  the 
Tongue  and  Yellowstone,  the  first  important  touch  they 
got  with  the  Indians  was  on  the  i8th  of  October,  when 
Lieutenant-Colonel  Elwell  S.  Otis,  commanding  a  bat- 
talion of  four  companies  of  the  Twenty-third  Infantry, 
escorting  a  wagon-load  of  supplies  from  Glendive,  Mon- 
tana, to  the  cantonment,  was  attacked  by  a  large  force  of 
hostiles.  The  attack  was  not  delivered  with  any  great 
degree  of  force  at  first,  but  it  grew  in  power  until  the 
troops  had  to  corral  the  train.  The  soldiers  had  a  hard 
fight  to  keep  the  animals  from  being  stampeded  and  the 
train  captured.  Having  beaten  off  the  Indians,  the 
train  advanced,  fighting,  until  Clear  Creek  was  reached. 
During  a  temporary  cessation  of  the  attacks  a  mes- 
senger rode  out  from  the  Indian  lines,  waving  a  paper, 
which  he  left  upon  a  hill  in  line  with  the  advance  of  the 
train.  When  it  was  picked  up,  Colonel  Otis  found  it  to 
be  an  imperious  message  —  probably  written  by  some 
half-breed  —  from  the  chief  whom  he  had  been  fighting. 
It  ran  as  follows: 

"  Yellowstone. 

"  I  want  to  know  what  you  are  doing  traveling  on  this 
road.  You  scare  all  the  buffalo  away.  I  want  to  hunt 
in  this  place.  I  want  you  to  turn  back  from  here.  If 
you  don't,  I'll  fight  you  again.  I  want  you  to  leave  what 
you  have  got  here,  and  turn  back  from  here. 

I  am  your  friend, 

SITTING  BULL. 

"  I  mean  all  the  rations  you  have  got  and  some  powder. 
Wish  you  would  write  me  as  soon  as  you  can. " 

I  consider  this  document  unique  in  the  history  of  In- 
dian warfare,  and  it  well  illustrates  not  only  the  spirit, 


322        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

but  the  naivete  of  the  great  chief.  Otis  despatched  a 
scout  to  Sitting  Bull  with  the  information  that  he  intend- 
ed to  take  the  train  through  to  the  cantonment  in  spite 
of  all  the  Indians  on  earth,  and  if  Sitting  Bull  wanted  to 
have  a  fight,  he  (Otis)  would  be  glad  to  accommodate  him 
at  any  time  and  on  any  terms.  The  train  thereupon 
moved  out,  and  the  Indians  promptly  recommenced  the 
fight.  But  the  engagement  was  soon  terminated  by  a 
flag  of  truce.  A  messenger  appeared,  who  stated  that  the 
Indians  were  tired  and  hungry  and  wanted  to  treat  for 
peace.  Otis  asked  Sitting  Bull  to  come  into  his  lines, 
but  that  wily  old  chief  refused,  although  he  sent  three 
chiefs  to  represent  him. 

Otis  had  no  authority  to  treat  for  peace  or  anything 
else,  but  he  gave  the  Indians  a  small  quantity  of  hard- 
tack and  a  couple  of  sides  of  bacon,  and  advised  them  to 
go  to  the  Tongue  River  and  communicate  with  General 
Miles.  The  train  then  moved  on,  and  after  following  a 
short  distance,  with  threatening  movements,  the  Indians 
withdrew. 

On  the  same  night  Otis  fell  in  with  Miles  and  his 
whole  force.  Miles,  being  alarmed  for  Otis'  safety,  had 
marched  out  to  meet  him.  The  train  was  sent  down  to  the 
cantonment,  and  the  troops,  numbering  three  hundred 
and  ninety-eight,  with  one  gun,  started  out  in  pursuit  of 
Sitting  Bull.  They  overtook  him  on  the  2 1st  of  Octo- 
ber at  Cedar  Creek.  With  Sitting  Bull  were  Gall  and 
other  celebrated  chiefs,  and  one  thousand  warriors  of 
the  Miniconjous,  San  Arcs,  Brules,  and  Unkpapas,  to- 
gether with  their  wives  and  children,  in  all  over  three 
thousand  Indians.  Crazy  Horse,  with  the  Oglalas 
and  Two  Moon's  band  of  the  Northern  Cheyennes,  were 
not  with  Sitting  Bull,  while  Dull  Knife's  band,  as  we 
have  seen,  had  gone  to  Wyoming  for  the  winter. 


Miles'  Great  Campaigning        323 

The  reason  for  this  separation  is  obvious.  They 
could  better  support  the  hardships  of  the  winter,  more 
easily  find  shelter,  and  with  less  difficulty  escape  from 
the  pursuing  soldiers,  if  they  were  broken  up  in  smaller 
parties. 

Sitting  Bull  asked  Miles  for  an  interview,  which  was 
arranged.  He  was  attended  by  a  subchief  and  six  war- 
riors, Miles  by  an  aide  and  six  troopers.  The  meeting 
took  place  between  the  lines,  all  parties  being  on  horse- 
back. 

Sitting  Bull  wanted  peace  on  the  old  basis.  The  In- 
dians demanded  permission  to  retain  their  arms,  with 
liberty  to  hunt  and  roam  at  will  over  the  plains  and 
through  the  mountains,  with  no  responsibility  to  any 
one,  while  the  government  required  them  to  surrender 
their  arms  and  come  into  the  agencies.  The  demands 
were  irreconcilable  therefore.  The  interview  was  an  in- 
teresting one,  and  although  it  began  calmly  enough,  it 
grew  exciting  toward  the  end. 

Sitting  Bull,  whom  Miles  describes  as  a  fine,  power- 
ful, intelligent,  determined  looking  man,  was  evidently 
full  of  bitter  and  persistent  animosity  toward  the  white 
race.  He  said  no  Indian  that  ever  lived  loved  the  white 
man,  and  that  no  white  man  that  ever  lived  loved  the  In- 
dian; that  God  Almighty  had  made  him  an  Indian, 
but  He  didn't  make  him  an  Agency  Indian,  and  he  didn't 
intend  to  be  one. 

The  manner  of  the  famous  chief  had  been  cold,  but 
dignified  and  courteous.  As  the  conversation  progressed, 
he  became  angry  —  so  enraged,  in  fact,  that  in  Miles' 
words  "he  finally  gave  an  exhibition  of  wild  frenzy. 
His  whole  manner  seemed  more  like  that  of  a  wild  beast 
than  a  human  being.  His  face  assumed  a  furious  ex- 
pression. His  jaws  were  tightly  closed,  his  lips  were 


324        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

compressed,  and  you  could  see  his  eyes  glisten  with  the 
fire  of  savage  hatred."* 

One  cannot  help  admiring  the  picture  presented  by 
the  splendid,  if  ferocious,  savage.  I  have  no  doubt  that 
General  Miles  himself  admired  him. 

At  the  height  of  the  conference  a  young  warrior  stole 
out  from  the  Indian  lines  and  slipped  a  carbine  under 
Sitting  Bull's  blanket.  He  was  followed  by  several 
other  Indians  to  the  number  of  a  dozen,  who  joined 
the  band,  evidently  meditating  treachery.  Miles,  who, 
with  his  aide,  was  armed  with  revolver  only,  promptly 
required  these  new  auxiliaries  to  retire,  else  the  confer- 
ence would  be  terminated  immediately.  His  demand 
was  reluctantly  obeyed.  After  some  further  talk,  a  sec- 
ond meeting  was  appointed  for  the  morrow,  and  the 
conference  broke  up. 

During  the  night  Miles  moved  his  command  in  posi- 
tion to  be  able  to  intercept  the  movement  of  the  Indians 
the  next  day.  There  was  another  interview  with  the 
picturesque  and  imperious  savage,  whose  conditions  of 
peace  were  found  to  be  absolutely  impossible,  since  they 
involved  the  abandonment  of  all  the  military  posts,  the 
withdrawal  of  all  settlers,  garrisons,  etc.,  from  the  coun- 
try. He  wanted  everything  and  would  give  nothing. 
He  spoke  like  a  conqueror,  and  he  looked  like  one,  al- 
though his  subsequent  actions  were  not  in  keeping  with 
the  part.  Miles,  seeing  the  futility  of  further  discussion, 
peremptorily  broke  up  the  conference.  He  told  Sitting 
Bull  that  he  would  take  no  advantage  of  the  flag  of  truce, 
but  that  he  would  give  him  just  fifteen  minutes  to  get 
back  to  his  people  to  prepare  for  fighting.  Shouting 
defiance,  the  chiefs  rode  back  to  the  Indian  lines. 

There  was  "  mounting  in  hot  haste"  surely,  and  hur- 

*  Personal  Recollections  of  General  Nelson  A.  Miles,  U.  S.  A. 


Miles7  Great  Campaigning        325 

ried  preparations  were  made  for  immediate  battle  on 
both  sides.  Watch  in  hand,  Miles  checked  off  the  min- 
utes, and  exactly  at  the  time  appointed  he  ordered  an 
advance.  The  Indians  set  fire  to  the  dry  grass,  which  was 
not  yet  covered  with  snow,  and  the  battle  was  joined 
amid  clouds  of  flame  and  smoke.  Although  outnumbered 
nearly  three  to  one,  the  attack  of  the  soldiers  was  pressed 
home  so  relentlessly  that  the  Indians  were  driven  back 
from  their  camp,  which  fell  into  the  possession  of  Miles. 

The  Sioux  were  not  beaten,  however,  for  the  discom- 
fited warriors  rallied  a  force  to  protect  their  flying  wom- 
en and  children,  under  the  leadership  of  Gall  and 
others,  Sitting  Bull  not  being  as  much  of  a  fighter  as  a 
talker.  They  were  led  to  the  attack  again  and  again  by 
their  intrepid  chiefs.  On  one  occasion,  so  impetuous 
was  their  gallantry  that  the  troops  were  forced  to  form 
square  to  repel  their  wild  charges.  Before  the  battle 
was  over  —  and  it  continued  into  the  next  day  —  the  In- 
dians had  been  driven  headlong  for  over  forty  miles. 

They  had  suffered  a  serious  loss  in  warriors,  but  a 
greater  in  the  destruction  of  their  camp  equipage,  winter 
supplies,  and  other  property.  Two  thousand  of  them 
came  in  on  the  third  day  and  surrendered,  under  prom- 
ises of  good  treatment.  Several  hundred  broke  into 
small  parties  and  scattered.  Miles'  little  force  was  too 
small  to  be  divided  to  form  a  guard  for  the  Indians  who 
had  been  captured;  and  besides,  he  had  other  things 
to  do,  so  he  detained  a  number  of  the  principal  chiefs  as 
hostages,  and  exacted  promises  from  the  rest  that  they 
would  surrender  at  the  Spotted  Tail  or  Red  Cloud  Agen- 
cy—  a  promise  which,  by  the  way,  the  great  majority  of 
them  kept.  Sitting  Bull,  Gall,  and  about  four  hundred 
others  refused  to  surrender,  and  made  for  the  boundary 
line,  escaping  pursuit  for  the  time  being. 


326        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

This  was  the  first  and  most  serious  defection  from  the 
Indian  Confederacy.  It  was  followed  by  others.  In  a 
subsequent  campaign,  in  the  depth  of  winter,  a  battalion 
under  Lieutenant  Baldwin  struck  Sitting  Bull's  depleted 
and  starving  camp  on  two  separate  occasions,  inflicting 
further  loss  upon  that  implacable  chieftain.* 

II.     Miles'  Crushing  Defeat  of  Crazy  Horse  at  Wolf 
Mountain 

Late  in  December  Miles,  having  practically  eliminat- 
ed Sitting  Bull  from  the  game,  moved  out  against  Crazy 
Horse.  He  had  with  him  five  companies  of  the  Fifth 
Infantry  and  two  of  the  Twenty-second,  in  all  four  hun- 
dred and  thirty-six  officers  and  men  and  two  Napoleon 
guns.  These  guns  were  fitted  with  canvas  wagon-tops, 
and  were  so  disguised  as  exactly  to  resemble  the  supply 
wagons  of  the  train.  The  men  left  the  cantonment  on 
the  29th  of  December,  1876.  It  had  been  learned  that 
Crazy  Horse  was  in  the  valley  of  the  Tongue  River, 
south  of  the  Yellowstone.  There  were  sharp  skirmishes 
on  the  first  and  third  of  January  between  the  advance 
and  war  parties  of  Indians,  who  were  moving  gradually 
up  the  Tongue  toward  the  mountains.  On  the  evening 
of  the  7th  of  January,  1877,  a  young  warrior  and  a  wom- 
an were  captured,  belonging  to  those  Cheyennes  who 
were  still  with  Crazy  Horse  and  the  Unkpapas,  and  were 

*As  an  instance  of  Miles' capacity  in  handling  men,  this  is  what  Baldwin  says  in  a 
private  letter,  afterward  made  public,  of  the  orders  he  received  :  "When  I  was  given 
command  of  this  battalion  opposite  the  mouth  of  Squaw  Creek,  and  the  General  took 
command  of  a  less  number  of  men,  it  was  a  question  as  to  which  would  find  the  hostile 
Indians,  and  with  the  only  order  or  suggestion  given  by  him  in  that  earnest  manner  char- 
acteristic of  him,  he  said,  'Now,  Baldwin,  do  thejbest  you  can.  I  am  responsible  for 
disaster,  success  will  be  to  your  credit;  you  know  what  my  plans  are,  and  what  we  are 
here  for.*  "  There  is  a  dashing,  manly  ring  about  such  words  which  I  rejoice  to  rec- 
ognize. It  is  a  great  soldier  who  can  first  choose  and  then  trust  his  subordinates. 


thl  collection  of  J.  Robert  Colter 

GEN.  JOHN   GIBBON 
GEN.  WESLEY   MERRITT 


GEN.  NELSON  A.  MILES 
GEN.  ALFRED   H.  TERRY 


SOME    FAMOUS    INDIAN    FIGHTERS 


Miles'  Great  Campaigning        327 

related  to  some  of  the  principal  members  of  the  band. 
From  them  much  was  learned  of  the  situation  of  the 
Indian  position. 

The  next  morning,  the  weather  being  bitterly  cold,  the 
men  moved  out  to  attack  the  Indian  camp.  Crazy 
Horse's  warriors  numbered  between  eight  and  nine  hun- 
dred. He  had  posted  his  men  on  the  cliffs  surmounting 
a  valley  in  the  Wolf  Mountains,  a  spur  of  the  Big  Horn 
Range,  not  far  from  Crook's  battle-ground  on  the  Rose- 
bud. The  troops  entered  the  valley  in  full  view  of  the 
Indians  occupying  the  heights.  The  position  was  well 
chosen;  for  in  order  to  make  the  attack,  the  soldiers 
would  have  to  climb  straight  up  the  walls  to  get  at  the 
Indians,  who  were  enabled,  by  the  configuration  of  the 
ground  and  by  their  numbers,  almost  to  surround  the 
soldiers.  One  reason  why  Crazy  Horse  was  willing  to 
fight  was  because  of  his  great  desire  to  get  possession  of 
the  Indians  recently  captured. 

Seeing  that  Crazy  Horse  was  willing  to  accept  battle, 
Miles  made  his  preparations  deliberately.  The  troops, 
out  of  range  of  the  Indians,  calmly  had  breakfast  and 
made  their  camp  secure.  Having  done  everything  at 
his  leisure,  Miles  moved  out  to  the  attack. 

The  Sioux  were  plainly  visible  on  the  cliffs.  They 
could  be  seen  shaking  their  fists  and  brandishing  their 
rifles  as  the  soldiers  slowly  advanced  through  the  deep 
snow  which  covered  the  ground.  The  Indians  seemed 
absolutely  confident  that  Miles  was  marching  into  a  trap, 
that  when  he  got  into  the  canon  he  would  be  unable  to 
scale  the  slopes,  and  they  would  have  him  at  their  mercy. 
There  was  no  ambush  about  it.  The  whole  thing  was 
open  and  plain.  They  had  chosen  their  position  and 
had  invited  the  soldiers  to  make  at  them.  There. was, 
indeed,  no  other  way  for  Miles  to  get  to  them,  so  cun- 


328        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

ningly  had  they  taken  advantage  of  the  ground,  except 
the  way  which  lay  open  before  them.  As  the  troops 
drew  nearer,  the  gestures  of  defiance  and  contempt  were 
accompanied  by  yells  and  jeers.  Among  the  things 
they  shouted  in  their  confident  assurance  of  success  were 
these  significant  words: 

"You  have  had  your  last  breakfast!" 

Indeed,  the  grim  prophecy  did  not  seem  unlikely  of 
fulfilment. 

It  might  have  been  supposed  that  men,  encumbered  as 
were  the  soldiers  with  their  heavy,  winter  clothing,  could 
never  have  scaled  those  heights,  especially  in  the  face  of 
such  opposition  as  the  redoubtable  warriors  of  Crazy 
Horse  would  offer.  If  they  did  not  succeed  in  clearing 
the  cliffs  of  the  Indians,  they  would  probably  be  shot 
down  in  scores  in  the  valley.  They  would  then  be  forced 
to  retreat  to  their  train,  if  any  of  them  were  left  alive  to  do 
so,  and  stand  a  siege;  and  as  they  were  three  or  four  hun- 
dred miles  from  any  possible  relieving  force,  and  in  the 
depth  of  a  Dakota  winter,  that  would  mean  a  speedy  an- 
nihilation. It  was  a  serious  risk  to  take,  but  no  battle 
was  ever  won  without  taking  risks,  and  the  nice  art  of  the 
soldier  consists  in  knowing  what  risks  to  take  and  when 
to  take  them.  Not  the  least  of  Miles'  claims  to  admi- 
ration as  a  commander  was  his  determination,  under  all 
circumstances,  to  fight  then  and  there. 

Undaunted  by  the  threatening  prospect  and  unmoved 
by  the  savage  shouts  and  jeers,  although  some  of  the 
scouts  who  knew  the  Sioux  language  retorted  in  kind, 
the  troops  deployed,  and  at  as  rapid  a  pace  as  they  could 
manage,  started  for  the  hills.  The  artillery  was  ex- 
posed and  unlimbered,  and  the  shells  thrown  into  the 
Indian  position  caused  great  surprise  and  consternation. 
The  key  to  the  position  was  a  high  elevation  upon  the 


Miles'  Great  Campaigning        329 

left.  The  Indians  who  held  it  were  led  by  Big  Crow, 
the  chief  medicine  man.  As  the  battle  began  he  exposed 
himself  freely  between  the  lines,  dressed  in  a  magnifi- 
cent Indian  war  shirt  and  bonnet,  running  up  and  down 
and  yelling  like  a  fiend. 

Miles  massed  a  little  column  against  Big  Crow  and 
the  warriors  defending  the  eminence.  At  the  same 
time  he  ordered  a  general  escalade  of  the  clifF  along  the 
whole  line.  Under  a  heavy  fire,  which,  however,  like 
most  plunging  fires  down  the  sides  of  mountains  or 
slopes,  did  but  little  damage,  the  troops  slowly  toiled  up 
the  icy,  snow-covered  bluffs.*  Led  by  Major  Casey 
and  Captains  McDonald  and  Baldwin,  the  charge  was 
delivered  with  the  utmost  resolution.  It  was  not  a  dash. 
No  men,  encumbered  as  were  those  soldiers,  could  move 
rapidly  up  icy  cliffs,  covered,  wherever  the  sharpness 
of  the  acclivity  permitted,  with  from  one  to  three  feet  of 
snow.  It  was  rather  a  slow,  dogged,  determined  crawl, 
with  a  stop  every  few  moments  to  fire  at  some  Indian 
silhouetted  above  them  on  the  gray  sky-line  of  that  winter 
morning. 

The  fighting  for  the  high  clifF  on  the  left  of  the  line 
was  spirited  and  desperate.  Finally,  the  men  came  to  a 
hand-to-hand  struggle.  The  Indians  clung  tenaciously 
to  the  post  until  Big  Crow  was  shot,  when  the  soldiers 
succeeded  in  dislodging  them.  This  bluff  commanded 
the  lines.  It  was  occupied  by  the  troops,  who  poured  an 
enfilading  fire  upon  the  army  of  Crazy  Horse.  The  In- 
dian position,  therefore,  became  untenable,  and  fighting 

*  At  the  battle  of  King's  Mountain,  in  the  American  Revolution,  the  small  loss  of  life 
among  the  Americans  was  due  to  the  fact  that  the  English,  trained  marksmen  though 
they  were,  firing  down  the  slopes  of  the  mountain,  overshot  their  opponents,  although 
they  had  them  in  full  view  all  the  way  up  the  slope;  and  it  is  the  tendency  of  troops 
always  to  do  the  same  thing.  Troops  on  a  level  usually  fire  too  low,  and  the  ground 
between  the  advancing  lines  of  soldiers  is  often  plowed  up  by  bullets  from  the  depressed 
muzzles,  which  should  have  gone  into  the  breasts  of  the  approaching  enemy. 


330        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

sullenly  and  stubbornly,  they  withdrew  in  good  order, 
though  closely  pursued  by  the  troops.  In  the  latter 
part  of  the  advance  snow  began  to  fall,  and  before  the 
battle  was  closed  the  combatants  were  fighting  in  the 
midst  of  a  blinding  storm.  Miles  says  that  the  moment 
at  which  the  Indians  turned  their  backs  and  began  the 
retreat  was  one  in  which  he  felt  relief  scarcely  to  be  ex- 
pressed, so  desperate  had  been  the  fighting,  so  difficult 
the  ascent,  and  so  doubtful  the  result. 

The  Indians  were  pursued  for  some  distance,  and  a 
large  portion  of  their  camp  equipage,  with  supplies,  was 
captured.  On  the  whole,  they  had  suffered  a  most  dis- 
heartening and  disorganizing  defeat.  Their  ammuni- 
tion was  about  gone,  their  confederates  in  other  tribes 
had  been  captured,  the  main  body  of  the  redoubtable 
Cheyennes  had  been  crushed  and  were  starving,  the 
Unkpapas,  the  Miniconjous,  the  Sans  Arcs,  and  the 
Brules  had  surrendered.  The  game  was  up.  There 
was  nothing  for  Crazy  Horse  and  the  exhausted  rem- 
nant which  remained  faithful  to  him  to  do  but  to  sur- 
render, which  they  accordingly  did  in  the  early  spring. 

III.     The  Capture  of  Lame  Deer's  Village 

There  remained,  then,  in  the  field  practically  but  one 
band  of  sixty  lodges,*  under  Lame  Deer  and  Iron  Star, 
who  refused  positively  to  surrender.  The  indefatigable 
and  brilliantly  successful  Miles  pursued  this  band,  over- 
took it,  surprised  it  one  morning  in  May,  captured  the 
village,  dispersed  the  greater  portion  of  the  Indians,  and 
succeeded  in  isolating  and  surrounding  Lame  Deer  and 
Iron  Star,  with  half  a  dozen  principal  warriors.  Miles 
was  very  desirous  of  taking  them  alive.  He  advanced 

*  Each  lodge  accounted  for  from  6ve  to  ten  persons. 


Miles'  Great  Campaigning        331 

with  some  of  his  officers  toward  the  desperate  little  body 
of  Indians  who  had  been  cut  off  from  the  fleeing  mass  of 
savages,  making  peace  signs  and  crying  peace  words. 

The  Indians  were  tremendously  excited  and  remained 
on  guard,  but  committed  no  act  of  hostility.  Miles  rode 
up,  and  leaning  over  the  saddle,  extended  his  hand  to 
Lame  Deer.  The  intrepid  chieftain,  who  was  quiver- 
ing with  emotion  under  his  Indian  stoicism,  grasped  the 
general's  hand  and  clung  to  it  tightly.  Iron  Star  took 
Baldwin's  hand.  The  other  Indians  came  forward, 
reluctantly,  with  hands  extended,  and  all  was  going 
well. 

At  this  juncture  one  of  the  white  scouts,  not  knowing 
what  was  going  on,  dashed  up  to  the  group,  and  pos- 
sibly under  a  misapprehension  that  the  life  of  the  com- 
manding officer  was  threatened,  covered  Lame  Deer 
with  his  rifle.  The  Indian,  probably  thinking  that  he 
was  to  be  killed  in  any  event,  resolved  to  die  fighting. 
Miles  strove  to  hold  him  and  to  reassure  him,  but  by  a 
powerful  wrench  he  freed  himself,  lifting  his  rifle  as  he 
did  so,  and  pointing  it  straight  at  the  general. 

Miles  had  been  in  many  battles,  but  he  was  never 
nearer  death  than  at  that  moment.  His  quickness  and 
resource  did  not  desert  him.  Just  as  the  Indian's  finger 
pressed  the  trigger  he  dug  his  spurs  into  his  horse  and 
swung  the  animal  aside  in  a  powerful  swerve.  Lame 
Deer's  bullet,  which  missed  him  by  a  hair's  breadth, 
struck  one  of  the  escort  and  instantly  killed  him.  Iron 
Star  also  drew  away  from  Baldwin  and  raised  his  rifle, 
as  the  other  Indian  had  done.  None  of  them  were  so 
quick,  however,  as  Lame  Deer  had  been.  The  soldiers 
closing  in  had  seen  Lame  Deer's  motion,  and  before  any 
further  damage  was  done  by  the  Indians  they  were  over- 
whelmed by  a  rapid  fire,  which  stretched  them  all  dead 


332        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

upon  the  ground.  The  fighting  had  been  short,  but 
exceedingly  sharp.  The  troops  lost  four  killed  and 
seven  wounded,  the  Sioux  fourteen  killed  and  a  large 
number  wounded.  The  band  was  completely  broken 
up,  and  most  of  the  Indians  surrendered  soon  after.* 

Of  all  the  Indians  who  had  borne  prominent  parts  in 
this  greatest  of  our  Indian  wars  with  the  savage  tribes, 
there  remained  at  large  only  the  indomitable  Sitting 
Bull,  and  he  had  escaped  capture  because,  with  a 
wretched  band  of  starving  but  resolute  followers,  he 
succeeded  in  crossing  the  British  Columbia  boundary 
line. 

Crook's  persistence,  Mills'  bold  stroke,  Mackenzie's 
desperate  dash  up  Willow  Creek  Canon,  Miles'  splendid 
campaigning,  his  hard  fighting  at  Cedar  Creek  and  Wolf 
Mountain,  his  pursuit  of  Lame  Deer,  his  policy  and  skill 
in  dealing  with  the  critical  situations  which  had  arisen, 
at  last  brought  peace  to  the  blood-drenched  land.  The 
most  important  work  ever  done  by  the  United  States 
Army  outside  of  the  greater  wars  of  the  nation  had  been 
successfully  and  brilliantly  accomplished. 

IV.     Farewell  to  a  Great  Chief  and  His  Hopes 

A  note  of  the  fate  of  the  two  chief  antagonists  of  the 
United  States  may  fittingly  close  this  chapter.  Sitting 
Bull  returned  to  the  United  States,  and  surrendered  to 
the  army  a  few  years  later.  Ever  a  malcontent,  he  was 
one  of  the  moving  spirits  in  the  Ghost  Dance  uprising, 
which  culminated  in  the  battle  of  Wounded  Knee  in 
1890,  and  he  was  killed  by  the  Indian  police  while  re- 
sisting arrest.  •)• 

*  See  close  of  this  chapter  for  another  account  of  the  Lame  Deer  Fight, 
t  These  affairs  are  to  be  discussed  at  length  in  a  forthcoming  volume. 


Miles'  Great  Campaigning        333 

The  end  of  Crazy  Horse  came  sooner,  in  a  melee  in  a 
guard-house  on  the  7th  of  September,  1877.  He  was 
stabbed  in  the  abdomen,  and  died  from  the  effects  of  the 
wound.  He  was  dissatisfied  always,  in  spite  of  his  sur- 
render, and  had  been  conspiring  to  take  the  war-path 
again.  Believing  that  his  intentions  had  become  known 
and  that  he  would  be  rigorously  dealt  with  on  account 
of  the  discovery,  he  started  to  run  amuck,  with  a  knife 
of  which  he  had  become  possessed  by  some  means,  in  the 
guard-house.  When  the  fracas  was  over,  he  was  found 
on  the  ground,  with  a  desperate  wound  in  the  abdomen. 
Whether  the  wound  was  given  by  the  bayonet  of  the  sen- 
try at  the  door,  whether  the  blow  was  delivered  by  some 
of  the  Indians  who  threw  themselves  upon  him,  and  with 
whom  he  struggled,  is  a  matter  which  cannot  be  deter- 
mined. However  it  was  come  by,  it  was  enough,  for 
from  the  effects  he  died  in  a  short  time. 

So  that  was  the  melancholy  end  of  Crazy  Horse,  the 
protagonist  of  these  tales,  and  one  of  the  most  famous 
Indians  that  ever  lived.  Captain  Bourke  *  thus  describes 
him: 

"  I  saw  before  me  a  man  who  looked  quite  young,  not 
over  thirty  years  old,  five  feet  eight  inches  high,  lithe  and 
sinewy,  with  a  scar  in  the  face.  The  expression  of  his 
countenance  was  one  of  quiet  dignity,  but  morose, 
dogged,  tenacious,  and  melancholy.  He  behaved  with 
stolidity,  like  a  man  who  realized  that  he  had  to  give  in 
to  Fate,  but  would  do  so  as  sullenly  as  possible.  .  .  . 
All  Indians  gave  him  a  high  reputation  for  courage  and 
generosity.  In  advancing  upon  an  enemy,  none  of  his 
warriors  were  allowed  to  pass  him.  He  had  made  him- 
self hundreds  of  friends  by  his  charity  toward  the  poor,  as 
it  was  a  point  of  honor  with  him  never  to  keep  anything 

*  "  On  the  Border  With  Crook,"  Captain  John  G.  Bourke,  U.  S.  A. 


334        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

for  himself,  excepting  weapons  of  war.  I  never  heard 
an  Indian  mention  his  name  save  in  terms  of  respect.  In 
the  Custer  Massacre,  the  attack  by  Reno  had  first  caused 
a  panic  among  the  women  and  children  and  some  of  the 
warriors,  who  started  to  flee;  but  Crazy  Horse,  throwing 
away  his  rifle,  brained  one  of  the  incoming  soldiers  with 
his  stone  war-club,  and  jumped  upon  his  horse." 

Crazy  Horse  was  a  born  soldier,  whose  talents  for  war- 
fare and  leadership  were  of  the  highest  order.  He  had 
repulsed  Reynolds  on  the  Powder  River,  wresting  a  vic- 
tory from  apparent  defeat.  He  had  thrown  himself  in 
succession  upon  the  columns  of  Crook  on  the  Rosebud 
and  of  Custer  on  the  Little  Big  Horn  ;  and  it  must  be  ad- 
mitted that  he  had  not  only  checked,  but  had  driven 
back,  Crook  by  a  crushing  attack  upon  him, while  he  had 
annihilated  half  of  Custer's  command.  He  had  fought 
a  desperate,  and,  from  a  military  point  of  view, 
highly  creditable,  action  with  Crook's  vastly  superior 
forces  at  Slim  Buttes.  The  only  man  who  had  fairly 
and  squarely  defeated  him  was  Miles  at  Wolf  Moun- 
tain, and  even  there  Crazy  Horse  managed  to  keep  his 
force  well  in  hand  as  he  withdrew  from  the  field. 

He  would  probably  never  have  surrendered,  had  it  not 
been  for  the  defections  around  him,  and  for  the  disas- 
trous defeat  of  the  Cheyennes  by  Mackenzie,  and  the 
destruction  of  so  much  of  his  camp  equipage  at  Wolf 
Mountain.  As  it  was,  he  might  have  continued  the 
fighting,  had  not  his  warriors  been  freezing  and  starving, 
and  almost  entirely  out  of  ammunition.  There  was 
nothing  left  for  the  Indians  but  surrender.  As  one  of 
them  said  to  Miles: 

"We  are  poor  compared  with  you  and  your  force.  We 
cannot  make  a  rifle,  a  round  of  ammunition,  or  a  knife. 
In  fact,  we  are  at  the  mercy  of  those  who  are  taking  pos- 


Miles'  Great  Campaigning        335 

session  of  our  country.  Your  terms  are  harsh  and 
cruel,  but  we  are  going  to  accept  them,  and  place  our- 
selves at  your  mercy. " 

That  summed  up  the  situation,  although  the  terms 
granted  the  Indians  were  very  far  from  being  harsh  or 
cruel. 

So  passed  out  of  history  the  great  war  chief  of  the 
Sioux,  one  of  the  bravest  of  the  brave,  and  one  of  the 
most  capable  and  sagacious  of  captains  in  spite  of  his 
absurd  name.  He  had  many  of  the  vices,  perhaps  all  the 
vices,  of  his  race;  but  he  had  all  their  rude  virtues,  too, 
and  great  abilities,  which  most  of  them  lacked.  Sitting 
Bull,  wise,  crafty,  indomitable  as  he  was,  was  not  to  be 
compared  with  him  for  a  moment. 

It  was  a  tragedy  any  way  you  look  at  it.  You  cannot 
but  feel  much  admiration  for  those  Sioux  and  Chey- 
ennes  —  cruel,  ruthless  though  they  were.  I  bid  good-by 
to  them  with  a  certain  regret. 

Some  one  has  said,  as  the  Rosebud  and  the  Little  Big 
Horn  marked  the  high-water  of  Indian  supremacy  in 
the  Northwest,  so  the  forgotten  grave  of  Crazy  Horse 
marks  an  ebb  from  which  no  tide  has  ever  risen. 

As  he  passes  to  the  happy  hunting-ground  in  the  land 
of  the  Great  Spirit,  I  stand  and  salute  him  with  a  feeling 
of  respect  which  I  have  gathered  not  only  from  a  study 
of  his  career,  but  from  the  statements  and  writings  of 
men  who  could  best  judge  of  his  qualities— for  they  were 
the  soldiers  who  fought  him. 

O 

NOTES  ON  THE  LAME  DEER  FIGHT 

By  Colonel  D.  L.  Brainard,  U.  S.  A.* 

The  command,  consisting  of  four  troops  of  the  Second  Cavalry, 
"F,"  "G,"  "H,"  and  "L,"  two  companies  of  the  Fifth  Infantry,  two 
*  Colonel  Brainard  won  his  commission  by  his  heroic  conduct  in  the  Greely  Arctic 
Expedition,  1881-4.  —  c-  T-  B- 


336        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

of  the  Twenty-second  Infantry,  and  a  company  of  mounted  scouts,  all 
under  command  of  Colonel  Nelson  A.  Miles,  left  the  cantonment  on 
Tongue  River  May  1, 1877,  and  marched  up  Tongue  River,  with  a 
view  of  intercepting  a  band  of  hostile  Indians,  under  Lame  Deer, 
known  to  be  at  or  near  the  head-waters  of  the  Rosebud  River.  The 
transportation  consisted  of  bull  teams,  mule  teams,  and  a  few  pack 
animals.  The  command  marched  up  Tongue  River  four  days,  when 
the  train  was  left  in  charge  of  a  small  guard,  the  main  command  push- 
ing on  with  pack  trains,  the  cavalry  leading  and  the  infantry  following 
more  slowly,  striking  across  country  toward  the  Rosebud  River, 
marching  day  and  night,  stopping  only  long  enough  to  make  coffee  for 
the  men,  and  to  rest  and  graze  the  animals. 

We  bivouacked  on  the  evening  of  the  6th  in  a  deep  valley  near  Little 
Muddy  Creek,  and  about  two  o'clock  the  following  morning  were 
again  in  the  saddle,  moving  silently  and  swiftly  down  the  valley  toward 
the  Indian  camp,  which  had  been  located  the  previous  evening  by 
White  Bull,  Brave  Wolf,  Bob  Jackson,  and  the  other  scouts.  The  scouts 
had  reported  that  the  camp  was  only  about  six  miles  distant,  but  it  was 
soon  discovered  that  it  was  much  farther  than  this,  and  at  early  dawn 
we  were  still  some  distance  away.  The  command  had  been  moving  at 
a  trot,  but  the  gallop  was  immediately  taken  up,  and  just  as  the  sun  ap- 
peared above  the  horizon,  we  rounded  a  bend  in  the  valley  and  came  in 
sight  of  the  Indian  camp,  which  was  located  on  the  right  side,  close  to 
the  hills. 

At  first  we  saw  no  Indians  except  a  few  boys  guarding  the  ponies, 
which  were  grazing  a  little  distance  beyond  the  camp,  but  they  came 
out  immediately,  and  dropping  in  the  grass,  began  to  fire  in  our  direc- 
tion, though  without  effect.  As  we  charged  down  on  the  camp,  these 
Indians,  together  with  squaws  and  children,  ran  for  the  hills,  driving 
with  them  the  few  horses  that  were  near  the  tepees.  "H  "  Company, 
under  command  of  Lieutenant  Lovell  H.  Jerome,  charged  through  the 
camp  and  beyond,  capturing  the  pony  herd.  The  other  companies,  all 
under  command  of  Captain  Ball,  charged  to  the  village,  formed  line  to 
the  right,  deployed  as  skirmishers,  and  pursued  the  Indians  up  the 
hill. 

The  hills  were  so  steep  at  this  point  that  it  was  necessary  to  dismount 
the  command  and  advance  on  foot,  the  horses  being  sent  around  by  an 
easier  route  to  join  us  later  near  the  summit  of  the  hill.  The  line  as 
formed  was  "F"  troop  (Tyler)  on  the  right,  "L"  troop  (Norwood) 
center,  and  "G"  troop  (Wheelan)  on  the  left.  The  Indians  were 
driven  up  over  the  hills,  where  they  scattered  like  quail.  Our  horses 


Miles'  Great  Campaigning        337 

were  brought  up,  and  mounting,  we  charged  across  the  country  for 
two  or  three  miles,  and  later  returned  to  the  village. 

As  my  recollections  serve  me,  four  soldiers  and  fourteen  Indians 
were  killed,  ten  soldiers  being  wounded,  myself  being  one  of  the  num- 
ber. About  four  hundred  ponies  were  captured,  which  were  after- 
ward used  for  mounting  a  batallion  of  Infantry,  which  later  performed 
much  effective  work  in  the  field.  There  were  over  sixty  tepees,  in 
which  we  found  tons  of  dried  buffalo  meat,  a  few  arms,  some  ammu- 
nition, and  a  great  many  buffalo  robes,  saddles,  and  an  assortment  of 
camp  property,  all  of  which  were  burned  that  afternoon,  thus  so  effect- 
ually crippling  the  band  that  the  remnant  came  in  and  surrendered  a 
few  weeks  later. 

We  camped  on  the  battle-ground  that  night,  the  following  day  mov- 
ing back  in  the  direction  of  our  wagon  train. 

One  of  the  most  interesting  incidents  of  the  fight  occurred  just  as  the 
troop  to  which  I  belonged  ("L")  charged  on  the  village.  I  saw  Gen- 
eral Miles  riding  toward  the  first  tepee,  near  which  were  two  Indians, 
followed  by  his  orderly.  He  called  out  something  to  these  Indians 
which  I  did  not  understand,  but  I  later  understood  he  had  called  on 
them  to  surrender.  One  of  these  was  evidently  the  Chief,  Lame  Deer, 
for  he  wore  a  long  head-dress  of  eagle  feathers,  the  head-dress  reaching 
to  the  ground.  As  Miles  approached  on  horseback,  the  Chief  walked 
rapidly  toward  him,  with  his  hand  extended,  as  though  to  shake  hands, 
but  when  within  ten  or  twelve  feet  of  him,  the  Indian  in  the  rear,  who 
was  said  to  be  Iron  Star,  a  son  of  Lame  Deer,  and  also  a  medicine  man 
of  the  tribe,  called  sharply  to  Lame  Deer,  presumably  warning  him  of 
the  approaching  troops,  and  urging  him  to  follow  the  other  Indians  to 
the  hills. 

Lame  Deer  stopped,  turned,  hesitated,  then  ran  back  a  few  steps, 
and  picking  up  a  loaded  carbine  from  the  ground,  fired  point  blank  at 
General  Miles,  who,  seeing  the  movement,  wheeled  his  horse  sharply 
and  bent  forward.  The  bullet  passed  over  him,  striking  his  orderly 
in  the  breast,  killing  him  instantly.  The  Chief  then  ran  up  the  steep 
hill,  accompanied  by  the  other  Indian.  The  head-dress  made  a  very 
conspicuous  mark,  and  many  shots  were  immediately  fired  in  that  di- 
rection. From  his  tottering  steps  we  saw  that  the  Chief  was  badly 
wounded,  and  at  this  point  his  companion,  instead  of  escaping  as  he 
could  have  done,  placed  his  arm  around  the  Chief's  waist,  and  sup- 
ported him  up  the  hill.  About  this  time  the  Chief  drew  a  revolver,  and 
without  turning  about,  held  it  in  rear  of  him  and  fired  in  our  direction, 
the  bullets  striking  the  ground  only  a  few  feet  in  his  rear.  This  act, 


338        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

we  assumed,  was  one  of  defiance  of  a  man  who  knew  he  could  not  es- 
cape, but  who  was  game  to  the  last.  Iron  Star  supported  the  Chief 
until  the  latter  fell,  when  he  escaped  over  the  hill,  only  to  be  killed  by 
"G"  troop,  which  had  been  pushing  up  on  that  side.  After  the  devo- 
tion and  bravery  he  had  displayed  in  supporting  Lame  Deer  up  the  hill, 
we  were  almost  sorry  he  had  not  escaped  alive. 

A  few  days  later  Bob  Jackson  told  me  that,  on  examining  Lame 
Deer's  body  after  the  fight,  he  had  found  that  he  had  been  hit  seven- 
teen times. 

Another  incident  which  illustrates  the  valor  of  the  United  States 
soldier  was  that  of  Private  Leonard,  Troop  "  L, "  Second  Cavalry,  who 
had  dropped  behind  to  readjust  his  saddle,  a  couple  of  miles  from  the 
Indian  camp.  The  command  was  moving  rapidly,  and  the  Indians 
slipped  in  between  the  rear  of  the  column  and  this  lone  soldier.  How- 
ever, when  he  saw  them  he  rode  to  the  top  of  a  hill,  and  lying  down 
behind  some  rocks,  held  these  Indians  at  bay  for  several  hours  until  re- 
lief came  to  him.  It  was  fortunate  that  relief  came  as  it  did,  for  he  had 
nearly  exhausted  his  ammunition  in  firing  at  these  Indians,  who  had 
several  times  charged  his  position. 


CHAPTER  TWELVE 

What  They  Are  There  For 
A  Sketch  of   General  Guy  V.  Henry,    a 
Typical  American  Soldier 

I.     Savage  Warfare 


r    "^HE 

taki 

sern 

A    littl 


most  thankless  task  that  can  be  under- 
taken by  a  nation  is  warfare  against  savage  or 
semi-civilized  peoples.  In  it  there  is  usually 
little  glory;  nor  is  there  any  reward,  save  the 
consciousness  of  disagreeable  duty  well  performed.  The 
risk  to  the  soldier  is  greater  than  in  ordinary  war,  since 
the  savages  usually  torture  the  wounded  and  the  cap- 
tured. Success  can  only  be  achieved  by  an  arduous, 
persistent,  wearing  down  process,  which  affords  little 
opportunity  for  scientific  fighting,  yet  which  demands 
military  talents  of  the  highest  order. 

Almost  anybody  can  understand  the  strategy  or  the 
tactics  of  a  pitched  battle  where  the  number  engaged 
is  large,  the  casualties  heavy,  and  the  results  decisive; 
but  very  few  non-professional  critics  appreciate  a  cam- 
paign of  relentless  pursuit  by  a  small  army  of  a  smaller 
body  of  mobile  hostiles,  here  and  there  capturing  a 
little  band,  now  and  then  killing  or  disabling  a  few, 

339 


340        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

until  in  the  final  round-up  the  enemy,  reduced  to  per- 
haps less  than  a  score,  surrenders.  There  is  nothing 
spectacular  about  the  performance,  and  everybody  won- 
der's why  it  took  so  long. 

And  as  injustice  and  wrong  have  not  been  infrequent 
in  the  preliminary  dealings  between  the  government 
and  the  savages,  the  soldier,  who  has  only  to  obey  his 
orders,  comes  in  for  much  unmerited  censure  from  those 
who  think  darkly  though  they  speak  bitterly.  Espe- 
cially is  he  criticized  if,  when  maddened  by  the  suffering, 
the  torture,  of  some  comrade,  the  soldier  sinks  to  the 
savage  level  in  his  treatment  of  his  ruthless  foeman. 
No  one  justifies  such  a  lapse,  of  course,  but  few  there  be 
who  even  try  to  understand  it.  The  incessant  cam- 
paigning in  the  Philippines,  with  its  resulting  scandals, 
is  an  instance  in  point. 

Long  before  the  Spanish-American  War  and  its 
Philippine  corollary,  however,  our  little  army  had  shown 
itself  capable  of  the  hardest  and  most  desperate  cam- 
paigning against  the  Indians  of  the  West  —  as  difficult 
and  dangerous  a  work  as  any  army  ever  undertook. 
There  was  so  much  of  it,  and  it  abounded  with  so  many 
thrilling  incidents,  that  volumes  could  be  written  upon 
it  without  exhausting  its  tragedy,  its  romance.  There 
were  few  soldiers  who  served  beyond  the  Mississippi 
from  1865  to  1890  who  did  not  participate  in  a  score 
of  engagements,  whose  lives  were  not  in  peril  more 
than  once  in  many  a  hard,  but  now  forgotten,  campaign. 

One  of  the  bravest  of  our  Indian  fighters  was  Guy 
V.  Henry.  Personally,  he  was  a  typical  representative 
of  the  knightly  American  soldier.  Officially,  it  was  his 
fortune  to  perform  conspicuous  services  in  at  least  three 
expeditions  subsequent  to  the  Civil  War.  He  was  a 
West  Pointer,  and  the  son  of  another,  born  in  the  service 


COL.   RANALD    S.   MACKENZIE 
CAPT.  ANSON  MILLS 


From  tht  colltction  of  J.  Robert  Costll 
GEN. GUY  V.   HENRY 

w.  F.  CODY  (BUFFALO  BILL) 


GROUP    OF    DISTINGUISHED   INDIAN   FIGHTERS 

All  except  General  Henry  from   contemporary  photographs 


What  They  Are  There  For        341 

at  Fort  Smith  in  the  Indian  Territory.  Graduating  in 
1861,  a  mere  boy,  he  participated  in  four  years  of  the 
hardest  fighting  in  the  Civil  War,  from  Bull  Run  to  Cold 
Harbor.  At  the  age  of  twenty-three,  his  merit  won  him 
the  appointment  of  Colonel  of  the  Fortieth  Massachu- 
setts Volunteers,  "a  regiment  that  was  never  whipped." 
The  tall,  brawny  Yankees  fairly  laughed  at  the  beardless 
stripling  who  was  appointed  to  command  them.  "  They 
laugh  best  who  laugh  last,"  and  Henry  had  the  last 
laugh.  He  mastered  them,  and  to  this  day  they  love 
his  memory. 

He  was  thrice  mentioned  in  despatches,  and  brevetted 
five  times  for  conspicuous  gallantry  in  action  during 
the  war,  out  of  which  he  came  with  the  rank  of  brigadier- 
general.  For  heroic  and  successful  fighting  at  Old 
Cold  Harbor,  he  received  the  highest  distinction  that 
can  come  to  a  soldier,  the  medal  of  honor.  Having 
two  horses  shot  from  under  him  in  the  attack  upon  the 
Confederate  lines,  he  seized  a  third  from  a  trooper, 
mounted  him  under  a  withering  fire,  and  led  his  soldiers 
forward  in  a  final  assault,  which  captured  the  enemy's 
intrenchments;  this  third  horse  was  shot  under  him 
just  as  he  leaped  the  breastworks. 

"Thin  as  a  shoestring  and  as  brave  as  a  lion,"  he  was 
a  past-master  of  military  tactics  and  a  severe  disci- 
plinarian. "  I  tell  you  he  is  a  martinet,"  cried  one  young 
officer  angrily,  smarting  under  a  well-deserved  reproof. 
"You  are  wrong,"  replied  a  wiser  officer,  who  knew 
Henry  better;  "he  is  trying  to  make  your  own  record 
better  than  you  could  ever  make  it  yourself."  Sudden 
as  a  thunderbolt  and  swift  as  a  hawk  when  he  struck  the 
red  Sioux,  in  his  family  and  social  relations  he  was  a 
kindly,  considerate,  Christian  gentleman.  He  could  kill 
Indians  —  but  never  cruelly,  mercilessly,  only  in  open 


342        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

warfare  —  and  teach  a  class  in  Sunday-school.  I've  seen 
him  do  the  latter,  and  no  man  did  it  better;  the  boys  of 
his  class  simply  idolized  him.  And  his  men  in  the  army 
did  the  same.  Cool  and  tactful,  a  statesman,  for  all  his 
fiery  energy,  he  was  perhaps  the  best  of  our  colonial 
governors.  When  he  died  the  people  of  Porto  Rico 
mourned  him  as  a  friend,  where  the  little  children  had 
loved  him  as  a  father. 

II.   A  March  in  a  Blizzard 

At  the  close  of  the  Civil  War  he  was  transferred  to 
the  Third  Cavalry,  a  regiment  with  which  he  was 
destined  to  win  lasting  renown.  It  must  have  been 
hard  for  men  who  had  exercised  high  command,  and 
who  had  proved  their  fitness  for  it,  to  come  down  from 
general  officers  to  subalterns;  but  Henry  accepted  the 
situation  cheerfully.  He  was  as  proud  of  his  troop  of 
cavalry  as  he  had  been  of  his  regiment  and  brigade  of 
volunteers.  His  new  detail  took  him  to  Arizona,  where 
for  two  years  he  commanded  a  battalion  engaged  in 
hard  scouting  among  the  Apaches.  The  winter  of  1874 
found  him  at  Fort  Robinson  in  the  Black  Hills.  While 
there  he  was  ordered  to  go  into  the  Bad  Lands  to  remove 
certain  miners  who  were  supposed  to  be  there  in  de- 
fiance of  treaty  stipulations. 

The  day  after  Christmas,  with  his  own  troop  and  fif- 
teen men  of  the  Ninth  Infantry  under  Lieutenant  Car- 
penter, with  wagons,  rations,  and  forage  for  thirty  days, 
the  men  set  forth.  The  expedition  involved  a  march 
of  three  hundred  miles,  over  the  worst  marching  coun- 
try on  the  face  of  the  globe,  and  in  weather  of  unimagin- 
able severity,  the  cold  continually  ranging  from  twenty 
to  forty  degrees  below  zero.  The  miners  were  not  found, 


What  They  Are  There  For        343 

and  on  the  return  journey  the  command,  which  had  suf- 
fered terrible  hardships,  was  overtaken  by  a  blizzard. 

When,  in  an  Eastern  city,  the  thermometer  gets  down 
to  the  zero  mark,  and  it  blows  hard,  with  a  heavy  snow 
for  twenty-four  hours,  people  who  are  not  familiar  with 
the  real  article  call  such  insignificant  weather  mani- 
festations a  blizzard.  Imagine  a  fierce  gale  sweeping 
down  from  the  north,  filled  with  icy  needles  which  draw 
blood  ere  they  freeze  the  naked  skin,  the  thermometer 
forty  degrees  below  zero,  a  rolling,  treeless  country  with- 
out shelter  of  any  sort  from  the  blinding  snow  and  the 
biting  wind,  and  you  have  the  situation  in  which  that 
expedition  found  itself.  The  storm  came  up  an  hour 
after  breaking  camp  on  what  was  hoped  to  be  the  last 
day  on  the  return  journey.  To  return  to  the  place  of 
the  camp  was  impossible.  To  keep  moving  was  the 
only  thing  to^be  done.  The  cold  was  so  intense  that 
it  was  at  first  deemed  safer  to  walk  than  ride.  The 
troops  dismounted  and  struggled  on.  Many  of  the  men 
gave  out  and  sank  exhausted,  but  were  lifted  to  their 
saddles  and  strapped  there,  Henry  himself  doing  this 
with  his  own  hands.  Finally,  the  whole  party  got  so 
weak  that  it  was  impossible  for  them  to  proceed.  In 
desperation,  they  mounted  the  exhausted  horses  and 
urged  them  forward.  Henry  had  no  knowledge  of 
direction,  but  trusted  to  the  instincts  of  his  horse.  He 
led  the  way.  Many  of  the  men  had  to  be  beaten  to 
keep  them  awake  and  alive  —  to  sleep  was  death. 

Finally,  when  hope  and  everything  else  was  aban- 
doned, they  came  to  a  solitary  ranch  under  the  curve  of 
a  hill,  occupied  by  a  white  man  and  his  Indian  wife. 
They  were  saved;  that  is,  they  had  escaped  with  their 
lives.  The  horses  were  put  in  shelter  in  the  corral,  the 
men  crowded  into  the  house,  and  the  painful  process  of 


344        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

thawing  out  was  begun.  The  ranch  was  fifteen  miles 
from  Fort  Robinson,  and  when  the  blizzard  abated  the 
next  day  wagons  and  ambulances  were  sent  out,  and  the 
helpless  soldiers  were  carried  back  to  the  post. 

Most  of  them  were  in  a  terrible  condition,  and  few 
had  escaped.  They  were  broken  from  the  hardships  they 
had  undergone,  especially  from  the  freezing,  which 
those  who  have  suffered  from  declare  causes  a  prostra- 
tion from  which  it  is  difficult  to  recover.  When  Henry 
entered  his  quarters  his  wife  did  not  recognize  him. 
His  face  was  black  and  swollen.  His  men  cut  the 
bridle  reins  to  free  his  hands,  and  then  slit  his  gloves 
into  strips,  each  strip  bringing  a  piece  of  flesh  as  it  was 
pulled  off.  All  his  fingers  were  frozen  to  the  second 
joint;  the  flesh  sloughed  off,  exposing  the  bones.  One 
finger  had  to  be  amputated,  and  to  the  day  of  his  death 
his  left  hand  was  so  stiff  that  he  was  unable  to  close 
his  fingers  again.  As  he  was  a  thin,  spare  man,  with  no 
superfluous  flesh,  he  had  suffered  more  than  the  rest. 
Yet  he  made  no  complaint,  and  it  was  only  due  to  his 
indomitable  persistence  that  the  men  were  not  frozen 
to  death  that  awful  day.  Henry's  winter  march  is  still 
remembered,  by  those  in  the  old  service,  as  one  of  the 
heroic  achievements  of  the  period. 

III.   A  Ghastly  Experience 

The  heroism  and  sufferings  of  the  young  soldier  were 
nothing,  however,  to  what  he  manifested  and  under- 
went two  years  later.  Just  before  the  Custer  Massacre, 
General  Crook,  with  some  eleven  hundred  men,  moved 
out  from  Fort  Fetterman,  Wyoming,  on  the  expedition 
that  culminated  in  the  battle  of  the  Rosebud.  Colonel 
W.  B.  Royall  had  command  of  the  cavalry  of  Crook's 


What  They  Are  There  For        345 

little  army.  One  morning  in  June  the  Sioux  and  the 
Cheyennes,  under  Crazy  Horse,  who  as  a  fighter  and 
general  was  probably  second  to  few  Indians  that  ever 
lived,  attacked  Crook's  men.  The  left  wing,  under 
Royall,  was  isolated  in  a  ravine  and  practically  sur- 
rounded by  a  foe  who  outnumbered  them  five  to  one. 
The  rest  of  the  army,  heavily  engaged,  could  give  them 
no  succor.  The  Indians  made  charge  after  charge 
upon  the  troops,  who  had  all  dismounted  except  the 
field  officers.  Henry  had  command  of  the  left  bat- 
talion of  Royall's  force.  Cool  as  an  iceberg,  he  rode 
up  and  down  the  thin  line,  steadying  and  holding  his 
men.  At  one  time,  by  a  daring  charge,  he  rescued  an 
imperiled  company  under  a  brother  officer. 

At  last,  in  one  of  the  furious  attacks  of  the  Sioux,  he 
was  shot  in  the  face.  A  rifle  bullet  struck  him  under 
the  left  eye,  passed  through  the  upper  part  of  his  mouth 
under  the  nose,  and  came  out  below  the  right  eye.  The 
shock  was  terrific.  His  face  was  instantly  covered 
with  blood,  his  mouth  filled  with  it.  He  remained  in  the 
saddle,  however,  and  strove  to  urge  the  troops  on.  In 
the  very  act  of  spurring  his  horse  forward  to  lead  a 
charge,  he  lost  consciousness,  and  fell  to  the  ground. 

At  that  instant  the  war-bonneted  Indians,  superbly 
mounted,  delivered  an  overwhelming  onslaught  on  the 
left  flank  of  the  line.  The  men,  deprived  of  their 
leader,  for  a  time  gave  back.  The  Indians  actually 
galloped  over  the  prostrate  figure  of  the  brave  soldier. 
Fortunately,  he  was  not  struck  by  the  hoofs  of  any  of  the 
horses.  A  determined  stand  by  Chief  Washakie,  of  the 
friendly  Shoshones,  our  Indian  allies  in  that  battle, 
who  with  two  or  three  of  his  braves  fought  desperately 
over  Henry's  body,  prevented  him  from  being  scalped 
and  killed. 


346        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

The  officers  of  the  Third  speedily  rallied  their  men, 
drove  back  the  Indians,  and  reoccupied  the  ground 
where  Henry  lay.  He  was  assisted  to  his  horse  and 
taken  to  the  rear  where  the  surgeons  were.  Such  was 
the  nature  of  his  wound  that  he  could  not  speak  above 
a  whisper;  he  could  not  see  at  all,  he  could  scarcely 
hear,  and  he  had  great  difficulty  in  breathing.  As  the 
doctor  bent  over  him  he  heard  the  wounded  man  mum- 
ble out,  "Fix  me  up  so  that  I  can  go  back! " 

There  was  no  going  back  for  him  that  day.  Through 
the  long  day  he  lay  on  the  ground  while  the  battle  raged 
about  him.  There  was  little  water  and  no  shelter; 
there  wasn't  a  tent  in  the  army.  Although  it  was 
bitter  cold  during  the  nights  in  that  country  at  that  sea- 
son, at  midday  it  was  fearfully  hot.  He  was  consumed 
with  thirst.  His  orderly  managed  to  give  him  a  little 
shade  by  holding  his  horse  so  that  the  shadow  of  the 
animal's  body  fell  upon  the  wounded  man.  His  wound 
was  dressed  temporarily  as  well  as  possible,  and  then 
he  was  practically  left  to  die. 

One  of  the  colonel's  comrades  came  back  to  him  dur- 
ing a  lull  in  the  fight.  There  he  lay  helpless  on  the 
bare  ground,  in  the  shadow  of  the  restive  horse,  which 
the  orderly  had  all  he  could  do  to  manage.  No  one 
else  could  be  spared  from  the  battle  line  to  attend  to 
Henry's  wants,  although,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  he  ex- 
pressed no  wants.  The  flies  had  settled  thickly  upon 
his  bandaged  face.  The  officer  bent  over  him  with  an 
expression  of  commiseration. 

"It's  all  right,  Jack,"  gurgled  out  from  the  bleeding 
lips;  "it's  what  we're  here  for."* 

*  John  F.  Finerty,  who  was  present  as  the  correspondent  of  the  Chicago  Times,  and 
who  relates  the  incident,  says  that  Henry,  immediately  after  this  remark,  advised  Finerty  to 
join  the  army.  Encouraging  circumstances  to  back  up  such  a  recommendation  ! 


What  They  Are  There  For        347 

Royall's  forces  were  finally  able  to  effect  a  junction 
with  the  main  body  by  withdrawing  fighting,  and  Henry 
was  carried  along  any  way  in  the  hurried  movement. 
The  Indians  at  last  withdrew  from  the  field  (the  bat- 
tle must  be  considered  a  drawn  one),  and  then  there 
was  time  to  consider  what  was  to  be  done  with  the 
wounded.  The  facilities  for  treatment  were  the  slender- 
est. The  column  had  been  stripped  of  its  baggage,  in 
order  to  increase  its  mobility,  to  enable  it  to  cope  with 
the  Indians.  All  they  had  they  carried  on  their  per- 
sons, and  that  included  little  but  the  barest  necessities. 

Nobody  expected  Henry  to  survive  the  night.  He 
didn't  expect  to  live  himself,  as  he  lay  there  through 
the  long  hours,  listening  to  the  men  digging  graves  for 
those  who  had  fallen,  and  wondering  whether  or  not 
he  was  to  be  one  of  the  occupants  thereof.  The  next 
day  they  sent  him  to  the  rear.  He  was  transported  in 
what  is  called  a  travois.  Two  saplings  were  cut  from 
the  river  bank;  two  army  mules,  one  at  each  end,  were 
placed  between  the  saplings,  which  were  slung  over  the 
backs  of  the  animals.  An  army  blanket,  or  piece  of 
canvas,  was  then  lashed  to  the  poles,  and  on  them 
the  sufferer  was  placed.  There  were  a  number  of 
wounded  —  none  of  them,  however,  so  seriously  as 
Henry.  It  was  some  two  hundred  miles  to  Fort  Fetter- 
man,  and  they  carried  him  all  that  distance  that  way. 

The  weather  at  night  was  bitterly  cold.  In  the  day- 
time it  was  burning  hot.  The  travois  was  so  short  — 
they  had  to  take  what  poles  they  could  get,  of  course  — 
that  several  times  the  head  of  the  rear  mule  hit  the 
wounded  officer's  head,  so  that  finally  they  turned  him 
about,  putting  his  head  behind  the  heels  of  the  foremost 
animal,  where  he  was  liable  to  be  kicked  to  death  at 
any  moment, 


348        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

On  one  occasion  one  of  the  mules  stumbled  and  fell 
and  pitched  Henry  out  upon  his  head.  The  officers  of 
the  little  escort  stood  aghast  as  they  saw  him  fall  out; 
but  it  is  a  matter  of  record,  solemnly  attested,  that  such 
was  Henry's  iron  self-control  that  he  made  no  sound, 
although  the  agony  was  excruciating.  In  fact,  on  the 
whole  journey  he  made  no  complaint  of  any  sort.  His 
only  food  was  broth,  which  was  made  from  birds  shot 
by  the  soldiers  as  they  came  upon  them,  and  he  got  this 
very  infrequently. 

Finally,  the  little  cortege  reached  Fort  Fetterman. 
The  last  mishap  awaited  them  there.  The  river  was 
crossed  by  a  ferryboat,  which  was  pulled  from  shore  to 
shore  by  ropes  and  tackles.  The  river  was  very  high 
and  the  current  running  swiftly,  and  as  they  prepared 
to  take  the  wounded  officer  across,  the  ropes  broke, 
and  the  whole  thing  went  to  pieces,  leaving  him  within 
sight,  but  not  within  reach,  of  clean  beds,  comforts, 
and  medical  attention  he  hoped  to  secure.  Some  of  the 
escort,  rough  soldiers  though  they  were,  broke  into 
tears  as  they  saw  the  predicament  of  their  beloved  offi- 
cer. He  himself,  however,  true  to  his  colors,  said 
nothing.  Finally,  they  offered  to  take  him  across  the 
raging  torrent  in  a  small  skiff  —  the  only  boat  avail- 
able —  if  he  were  willing  to  take  the  risk.  Of  course, 
if  the  skiff  were  overturned,  he  would  have  been 
drowned.  He  took  the  risk,  and  with  two  men  to 
paddle  and  an  officer  to  hold  him  in  his  arms,  the  pas- 
sage was  made. 

IV.    An  Army  Wife 

Three  hundred  miles  away,  at  Fort  D.  A.  Russell, 
his  wife  was  waiting  for  him.  Long  before  he  reached 


What  They  Are  There  For        349 

Fort  Fetterman,  she  heard  through  couriers  the  news 
of  his  wound,  which  was  reported  to  her  as  fatal,  al- 
though he  had  taken  care  to  cause  a  reassuring  message 
to  be  sent  her  with  the  first  messenger.  With  the 
heroism  of  the  army  wife,  although  she  was  in  delicate 
health  at  the  time,  she  immediately  made  preparations 
to  join  him.  The  railroad  at  that  time  ran  as  far  as 
Medicine  Bow.  Beyond  that  there  was  a  hundred- 
mile  ride  to  Fort  Fetterman.  All  the  troops  were  in  the 
field;  none  could  be  spared  from  the  nominal  garrisons 
for  an  escort.  Again  and  again  Mrs.  Henry  made 
preparations  to  go  forward,  several  times  actually  start- 
ing, and  again  and  again  she  was  forbidden  to  do  so  by 
the  officers  in  command  at  the  various  posts.  It  was 
not  safe  to  send  a  woman  across  the  country  with  a 
few  soldiers;  the  Indians  were  up  and  out  in  all  direc- 
tions. There  was  no  safety  anywhere  outside  the 
forts  or  larger  towns;  she  had  to  stay  at  home  and 
wait.  Sometimes  the  devoted  wife  got  word  from  her 
husband,  sometimes  she  did  not.  The  savages  were 
constantly  cutting  the  wires.  Her  suspense  was  agon- 
izing. 

Finally,  the  arrival  of  troops  at  Fort  Fetterman  en- 
abled a  stronger  escort  to  be  made  up,  and  Henry  was 
sent  down  to  Fort  D.  A.  Russell.  The  troops  arrived 
at  Medicine  Bow  on  the  third  of  July.  The  train  did 
not  leave  until  the  next  day.  They  were  forced  to  go 
into  camp.  The  cowboys  and  citizens  celebrated  the 
Fourth  in  the  usual  manner.  That  night  the  pain- 
racked  man  narrowly  escaped  being  killed  by  the  reck- 
less shooting  of  the  celebrators.  Two  bullets  passed 
through  the  tent  in  which  he  lay,  just  above  his  head. 
The  next  morning  found  him  on  the  train.  His  heart 
action  had  been  so  weakened  by  chloral  and  other  medi- 


35O        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

cines  which  they  had  given  him,  that  at  Sherman,  the 
highest  point  on  the  journey,  he  came  within  an  inch  of 
dying. 

His  thoughts  all  along  had  been  of  his  wife.  When 
he  got  to  the  station  he  refused  to  get  in  an  ambulance, 
in  order  to  spare  her  the  sight  of  his  being  brought  home 
in  that  way.  A  carriage  was  procured,  and  supported 
in  the  arms  of  the  physician  and  his  comrades,  he  was 
driven  back  to  the  fort.  With  superhuman  resolution, 
in  order  to  convince  his  wife  that  he  was  not  seriously 
hurt,  he  determined  to  walk  from  the  carriage  to  the 
door.  Mrs.  Henry  had  received  instructions  from  the 
doctor  to  control  herself,  and  stood  waiting  quietly  in 
the  entrance. 

"Well,"  whispered  the  shattered  man,  as  she  took 
him  tenderly  by  the  hand,  alluding  to  the  fact  that  it 
was  the  Fourth  of  July,  "this  is  a  fine  way  to  celebrate, 
isn't  it?" 

After  the  quietest  of  greetings  —  think  of  that  woman, 
what  her  feelings  must  have  been!  —  he  was  taken  into 
the  house  and  laid  on  the  sofa.  The  doctor  had  said 
that  he  might  have  one  look  at  his  wife.  The  bandages 
were  lifted  carefully  from  his  face,  so  that  he  might 
have  that  single  glance;  then  they  were  replaced,  and 
the  wife,  unable  to  bear  it  longer,  fled  from  the  room. 
The  chaplain's  wife  was  waiting  for  her  outside  the  door, 
and  when  she  got  into  the  shelter  of  that  good  woman's 
arms  she  gave  way  and  broke  down  completely. 

"You  know,"  said  the  chaplain's  wife,  alluding  to 
many  conversations  which  they  had  had,  "that  you 
asked  of  God  only  that  He  should  bring  him  back  to 
you,  and  God  has  heard  that  prayer." 

Everybody  expected  that  Henry  would  die,  but  die  he 
did  not;  perhaps  it  would  be  better  to  say  die  he  would 


What  They  Are  There  For        351 

not.  And  he  had  no  physique  to  back  his  efforts,  only 
an  indomitable  will.  He  never  completely  recovered 
from  that  experience.  He  lost  the  sight  of  one  eye  per- 
manently, and  to  the  day  of  his  death  was  liable  to  a 
hemorrhage  at  any  moment,  in  which  there  was  grave 
danger  of  his  bleeding  to  death. 

He  took  a  year's  leave  of  absence,  and  then  came  back 
to  duty.  In  1877,  when  his  troop  was  ordered  to  the 
front  in  another  campaign  under  Crook  against  the 
redoubtable  Sioux,  he  insisted  upon  accompanying 
them.  He  had  been  out  an  hour  or  so  when  he  fell 
fainting  from  the  saddle.  Did  they  bring  him  back  ? 
Oh,  no!  He  bade  them  lay  him  under  a  tree,  leave  two 
or  three  men  with  him  to  look  after  him,  and  go  ahead. 
He  would  rejoin  them  that  night,  when  it  became  cooler 
and  he  could  travel  with  more  ease!  What  he  said  he 
would  do  he  did.  A  trooper  rode  back  to  the  post  on  his 
own  account  and  told  of  his  condition.  An  order  was 
sent  him  by  the  post  commander  to  return.  Henry 
quietly  said  he  would  obey  the  first  order  and  go  on. 
He  remained  with  the  troop  for  six  weeks,  until  finally 
he  was  picked  up  bodily  and  carried  home,  vainly 
protesting,  the  doctor  refusing  to  answer  either  for 
his  eyesight  or  for  his  life  if  he  stayed  in  the  field 
any  longer. 

V.    The  Buffalos  and  Their  Famous  Ride 

Thirteen  years  after  that  Henry  was  commanding  the 
Ninth  Cavalry,  with  headquarters  at  Fort  McKinney. 
The  Ninth  Cavalry  was  a  regiment  of  negroes.  From 
the  overcoats  which  they  wore  in  Wyoming  in  the  winter 
they  were  called  the  "Buffalos,"  and  sometimes  they 
were  facetiously  referred  to  as  "Henry's  Brunettes," 


352        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

Whatever  they  were  called,  they  were  a  regiment  of 
which  to  be  proud. 

In  1890  occurred  the  last  outbreak  of  the  Sioux  under 
the  inspiration  of  the  Ghost  Dancers,  which  culminated 
in  the  battle  of  Wounded  Knee.  Troops  from  all  over 
the  United  States  were  hurried  to  the  Pine  Ridge 
Agency  as  the  trouble  began.  On  the  24th  of  Decem- 
ber Henry  and  the  "Brunettes"  were  ordered  out  to  the 
former's  old  stamping  ground  in  the  Black  Hills  on  a 
scouting  expedition.  It  was  bitter  cold  that  Christmas 
Eve,  but,  thank  God !  there  was  no  bli/zard.  Fifty  miles 
on  the  back  of  a  trotting  horse  was  the  dose  before  them. 
They  rested  at  four  A.M.  on  the  morning  of  Christmas 
Day.  Some  of  the  garments  the  men  wore  were  frozen 
stiff.  They  had  broken  through  the  ice  of  the  White 
River  in  crossing  it.  How  the  men  felt  inside  the 
frozen  clothing  may  be  imagined.  Eight  miles  farther 
they  made  their  camp.  They  did  not  have  much  of  a 
Christmas  celebration, for  as  soon  as  possible  after  estab- 
lishing their  base  at  Harney  Springs  they  went  on  the 
scout.  They  hunted  assiduously  for  several  days,  but 
found  no  Indians.  These  had  gone  south  to  join  their 
brethren  concentrated  about  the  agency.  One  day 
they  rode  forty-two  miles  in  a  vain  search.  They  got 
back  to  camp  about  seven  o'clock.  At  nine  a  courier 
from  the  agency  fifty  miles  away  informed  them  of  the 
battle  of  Wounded  Knee,  and  that  five  thousand  Og- 
lala  Sioux  were  mustering  to  attack  the  agency. 

"Boots  and  Saddles!"  instantly  rang  out,  and  the 
tired  troopers  mounted  their  jaded  horses  again.  This 
time  the  camp  was  broken  for  keeps,  and  tents  were 
struck,  wagons  packed  to  abandon  it.  It  was  a  bitter 
cold  night.  There  was  a  fierce  gale  sweeping  through 
the  valley,  blowing  a  light  snow  in  the  faces  of  the  men 


What  They  Are  There  For        353 

wrapped  to  the  eyes  in  their  buffalo  coats  and  fur 
caps.  They  pushed  steadily  on  in  spite  of  it,  for  it  was 
Henry's  intention  to  reach  the  agency  in  the  dark  in 
order  to  avoid  attack  by  the  Indians. 

It  was  thought  advisable,  therefore,  to  leave  the 
wagon  train  under  an  escort  of  one  company  and  press 
forward  with  the  rest.  The  men  arrived  at  the  agency 
at  daybreak,  completing  a  ride  of  over  ninety  miles  in 
less  than  twenty  hours.  Fires  were  kindled,  horses 
picketed,  and  the  exhausted  men  literally  threw  them- 
selves on  the  ground  for  rest.  They  had  been  there  but 
a  short  time  when  one  of  the  men  from  the  escort  came 
galloping  madly  in  with  the  news  that  the  wagon-train 
was  heavily  attacked,  and  that  succor  must  be  sent  at 
once.  Without  waiting  for  orders,  without  even  stop- 
ping to  saddle  the  horses,  Henry  and  his  men  galloped 
back  over  the  road  two  miles  away,  where  the  escort 
was  gallantly  covering  the  train.  A  short,  sharp  skir- 
mish, in  which  one  man  was  killed  and  several  wounded, 
drove  back  the  Indians,  and  the  regiment  brought  in 
the  train. 

It  was  ten  o'clock  now,  and  as  the  negro  troops  came 
into  the  agency,  word  was  brought  that  the  Drexel 
Mission,  seven  miles  up  the  valley,  was  being  attacked, 
and  help  must  be  sent  immediately.  There  were  two 
regiments  of  cavalry  available,  the  Seventh  and  the 
Ninth.  For  some  unexplained  reason,  the  Ninth  was 
ordered  out.  In  behalf  of  his  men,  Henry  made  pro- 
test. They  must  have  a  little  rest,  and  so  the  Seventh 
was  despatched,  and  was  soon  hotly  engaged.  Two 
hours  later  a  messenger  reported  that  the  Seventh,  in 
the  valley  where  the  mission  was  situated,  was  heavily 
attacked  by  the  Indians,  who  had  secured  commanding 
positions  on  the  surrounding  ridges.  Unless  they  could 


354        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

be  relieved,  they  would  probably  be  overwhelmed. 
Again  the  trumpet  call  rang  out,  and  the  tired  black 
troopers  once  more  climbed  into  their  saddles  and 
struck  spurs  into  their  more  tired  horses,  galloping  away 
to  the  rescue  of  their  hard-pushed  white  comrades. 
The  ridges  were  carried  in  most  gallant  style,  and  after 
some  sharp  fighting  the  Indians  were  driven  back.  The 
Seventh  was  extricated  and  the  day  was  saved. 

In  thirty-four  hours  of  elapsed  time,  the  Ninth  Caval- 
ry had  ridden  one  hundred  and  eight  miles  —  the  actual 
time  in  the  saddle  being  twenty-two  hours.  They  had 
fought  two  engagements  and  had  rested  only  two  hours. 
Marvelous  to  relate,  there  wasn't  a  sore-backed  horse  in 
the  whole  regiment.  One  horse  died  under  the  pressure, 
but  aside  from  that  and  their  fatigue,  horses  and  men 
were  in  excellent  condition. 

That  was  probably  the  most  famous  ride  ever  per- 
formed by  troops  in  the  United  States.  For  it  Henry 
was  recommended  for  a  further  brevet,  as  major-general 
-  the  sixth  he  had  received. 

The  Spanish-American  War  was  too  short  to  afford 
Henry  an  opportunity  to  distinguish  himself  in  the  field, 
but  in  Porto  Rico  he  showed  that  his  talents  were  not 
merely  of  the  military  order.  In  the  brief  period  his 
health  permitted  him  to  remain  there,  he  accomplished 
wonders,  and  did  it  all  in  such  a  way  as  to  gain  the 
respect  —  nay,  the  affection  —  of  the  people  over  whom, 
with  single-hearted  devotion  and  signal  capacity,  he 
ruled.  He  stayed  there  until  he  broke  down.  I,  sick 
with  typhoid  fever  on  a  transport  at  Ponce,  saw  him 
just  before  he  collapsed.  We  were  old  friends,  and  he 
came  off  to  the  ship  to  visit  me.  I  was  not  too  ill  then 
to  realize  that  his  own  time  was  coming.  He  would 
not  ask  to  be  relieved. 


What  They  Are  There  For        355 

"Here  I  was  sent,"  he  said;  "here  I  will  stay  until 
my  duty  is  done." 

He  was  the  knightliest  soldier  I  ever  met,  and  I  have 
met  many.  He  was  one  of  the  humblest  Christians  I 
ever  knew,  and  I  have  known  not  a  few.  It  was  his 
experience  at  Porto  Rico  which  finally  brought  about 
his  death;  for  it  is  literally  true  that  he  died,  as  a  soldier 
should,  in  his  harness.  In  those  trying  times  at  Ponce, 
when  life  and  health  were  at  a  low  ebb,  he  wrote,  in 
the  sacred  confidence  of  his  last  letter  to  his  faithful 
wife,  words  which  it  was  not  his  custom  to  speak,  but 
which  those  of  us  who  knew  him  felt  expressed  his 
constant  thought: 

"  I  am  here  alone.  One  by  one  my  staff  officers  have 
fallen  ill  and  gone  home.  Home!  —  let  us  not  speak  of 
it.  Jesus  is  here  with  me,  and  makes  even  this  deso- 
lation home  until  a  brighter  one  is  possible." 

So,  his  memory  enshrined  in  the  hearts  that  loved 
him,  his  heroic  deeds  the  inspiration  of  his  fellow- 
soldiers,  passed  to  his  brighter  home  Guy  V.  Henry, 
a  Captain  of  the  Strong 


APPENDICES 


APPENDIX  A. 

Being  a  Further  Discussion  of  General  Ouster's 
Course  in  the  Little  Big  Horn  Campaign.* 


I. 


WHETHER   General  Custer   did,  or  did  not,  obey  General 
Terry's  orders;  whether  these  orders  were,  or  were  not, 
well  considered,  and  such  as  could  be  carried  out;  whether, 
if  General  Custer  did  disobey  General  Terry's  orders  he  was  war- 
ranted in  so  doing  by  the  circumstances  in  which  he  found  himself, 
are  questions  of  the  deepest  interest  to  the  student  of  military  matters 
and  the  historian  thereof.     I  presume  the  problem  they  present  will 
never  be  authoritatively  settled,  and  that  men  will  continue  to  differ 
upon  these  questions  until  the  end  of  time. 

The  matter  has  been  discussed,  pro  and  con,  at  great  length  on 
many  occasions.  A  number  of  books  and  magazine  articles  have  been 
written  upon  different  phases  of  the  situation.  I  have  come  to  the 
conclusion  indicated  in  my  own  article,  as  I  said,  against  my  wish. 
In  view  of  his  heroic  death  in  the  high  places  of  the  field,  I  would  fain 
hold  General  Custer,  for  whom  I  have  long  cherished  an  admiration 
which  I  still  retain,  entirely  innocent.  I  have  only  come  to  this  con- 
clusion after  a  rigid  investigation  including  the  careful  weighing  of 
such  evidence  as  I  could  secure  upon  every  point  in  question. 

This  evidence  consists,  first,  of  a  great  variety  of  printed  matter; 
second,  of  personal  conversations  with  soldiers  and  military  critics, 
which,  as  any  record  of  it  would  necessarily  be  hearsay  and  second- 
hand, I  have  not  set  down  hereafter  save  in  one  instance;  third,  of  let- 

*  All  notes  in  this  appendix  are  signed  by  the  initials  of  their  writers  to  identify 
them. — C.  T.  B. 

359 


360        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

ters  which  have  been  written  me  by  officers  who,  from  their  participa- 
tion in  the  campaign,  or  from  unusual  opportunities  to  acquire  knowl- 
edge concerning  it  which  they  have  enjoyed,  have  become  possessed  of 
information  which  they  were  willing  to  give  to  me. 

The  object  of  this  appendix  is  to  set  down,  so  that  it  may  be  here 
preserved  in  permanent  and  available  form  for  future  reference,  such 
evidence  in  these  letters  as  may  be  pertinent  and  useful;  also  to  refer 
the  student,  who  desires  to  go  deeper  into  the  subject,  to  some  of  the 
more  valuable  printed  accounts  which  are  easily  accessible. 

I  am  glad  that  some  of  the  communications  I  have  received,  notably 
those  from  Colonel  Godfrey,  make  a  stout  defense  of  General  Custer. 
Perhaps  upon  consideration  of  Colonel  Godfrey's  points  and  argu- 
ments, which  are  not  only  strong  and  well  taken,  but  also  admirably 
put,  the  critic  may  be  inclined  to  differ  from  my  conclusion.  For  the 
sake  of  General  Custer's  fame,  I  sincerely  hope  so.  I  should  be  glad 
to  be  proved  to  be  mistaken. 

Without  specifically  noting  the  various  descriptions  of  the  campaign 
and  battle,  which  are  interesting,  but  irrelevant  to  my  purpose,*  Cus- 
ter's conduct  has  been  critically  considered  at  some  length — by  per- 
sons whose  standing  requires  that  their  opinions  should  be  respect- 
fully received  —  in  several  publications  which  I  note  in  such  order  as 
best  serves  the  purpose  of  this  discussion  without  regard  to  the  order 
in  which  they  appeared. 

Colonel  Edward  S.  Godfrey ,f  U.  S.  A.,  now  commanding  the  Ninth 
Cavalry,  who,  as  a  lieutenant,  commanded  K  Troop,  in  Benteen's  bat- 
talion, which  joined  that  of  Reno  in  the  battle  of  the  26th  of  June,  1876, 
wrote  a  most  interesting  account  of  the  battle,  containing  some  valua- 
ble reflections  upon  some  disputed  points,  which  was  published  in  the 
Century  Magazine,  Vol.  XLIII.,  No.  3,  January,  1892.  To  this  article, 
in  the  same  number,  were  appended  certain  comments  by  Major-Gen- 
eral  James  B.  Fry,  U.  S.  A.,  since  deceased. 

This  article  and  these  comments  came  to  the  notice  of  Major-Gen- 
eral Robert  P.  Hughes,  U.  S.  A.  (retired),  then  Colonel  and  Inspector- 
General.  General  Hughes  was  General  Terry's  aide-de-camp  during 
the  Little  Big  Horn  Campaign.  He  wrote  an  exhaustive  criticism  on 

*  Such  as  Congressman  Finerty's  graphic  account  in  his  book,  "  War-path  and 
Bivouac;"  Dr.  Charles  S.  Eastman's  paper  in  the  Chautauqua  Magazine,  Vol.  XXXI., 
No.  4, 1900;  and  Mr.  Hamlin  Garland's  report  of  Two  Moon's  account  of  the  battle  in 
McClure's  Magazine,  Vol.  XI.,  No.  5,  September,  1898.  —  C.  T.  B. 

t  General  G.  A.  Forsyth  writes  me  that  he  considers  Colonel  Godfrey  one  of  the 
ablest  officers  in  the  United  States  Army  —  in  which  opinion  I  concur.  —  C.  T.  B. 


Little  Big  Horn  Campaign        361 

Fry's  comments  to  Godfrey's  article,  which  was  in  effect  a  discussion  of 
the  main  proposition  that  Custer  disobeyed  his  orders  and  thereby 
precipitated  the  disaster,  for  which  he  was  therefore  responsible.  This 
campaign  was  also  considered  in  an  article  by  Dr.  E.  Benjamin  An- 
drews, president  of  the  University  of  Nebraska,  who  was  then  presi- 
dent of  Brown  University,  Providence,  Rhode  Island,  which  appeared 
in  Scribner's  Magazine  for  June,  1895.  A  fuller  reference  to  Dr.  An- 
drews' position  will  be  made  later. 

General  Hughes'  article  was  offered  to  the  Century,  but  was  not  ac- 
cepted, and  was  finally  published  in  the  Journal  of  the  Military  Service 
Institution,  Vol.  XVIII.,  No.  79,  January,  1896. 

Among  the  many  books  in  which  the  matter  has  been  discussed, 
three  only  call  for  attention. 

In  "  THE  STORY  OF  THE  SOLDIER,"  by  Brigadier-General  George 
A.  Forsyth,  U.  S.  A.  (retired),  the  following  comment  appears: 

(  "Under  the  peculiar  condition  of  affairs,  bearing  in  mind  the  only 
information  he  could  possibly  have  had  concerning  Sitting  Bull's 
forces,  was  Custer  justified,  in  a  military  sense  and  within  the  scope 
of  his  orders,  in  making  the  attack  ? 

"  In  the  opinion  of  the  writer  he  was  within  his  orders,  and  fully 
justified  from  a  military  standpoint  in  so  doing." 

General  Forsyth  gives  no  reason  for  his  decision,  but  it  is  to  be  pre- 
sumed that  he  did  not  arrive  at  that  decision  hastily  and  carelessly, 
and  as  he  is  a  very  able  and  distinguished  officer  and  military  critic, 
due  weight  should  be  accorded  his  views. 

In  "  THE  UNITED  STATES  IN  OUR  OWN  TIME,"  by  Dr.  E.  Benja- 
min Andrews,  published  by  Chas.  Scribner's  Sons,  edition  of  1903, 
pages  190-1-2-3,  there  is  a  concise  discussion  of  the  question,  based  on 
the  article  in  Scribner's  Magazine,  referred  to  above,  with  some  addi- 
tional reflections  on  General  Hughes'  paper. 

In  "PERSONAL  RECOLLECTIONS  OF  GENERAL  NELSON  A.  MILES, 
U.  S.  A.,"  chapter  xv.,  pages  198-210,  there  is  a  further  discussion  by 
the  Lieutenant-General,  lately  in  command  of  the  United  States  Army. 

In  order  clearly  to  understand  what  follows  the  student  should  refer 
to  each  of  the  sources  mentioned  and  examine  carefully  into  what  is 
therein  set  forth.  It  is  not  practicable  to  quote  all  these  authors  at 
length.  I  have  corresponded  with  every  one  of  the  authors  mentioned 
except  General  Fry.  I  print  their  letters  to  me,  having  made  no 
change  except  once  in  a  while  breaking  a  page  into  paragraphs  and 


362        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

supplying  a  missing  word  here  and  there  which  had  no  especial  bearing 
upon  the  point  at  issue.  Some  of  the  letters  were  written  in  pencil 
amid  press  of  duties.  Most  of  these  documents  I  print  without  com- 
ment. It  is  necessary,  however,  that  I  should  call  attention  to  some 
features  brought  out  by  the  correspondence. 

President  Andrews  says,  in  the  book  referred  to : 

"Much  turns  on  the  force  of  Custer's  written  orders,  which,  judged 
by  usual  military  documents  of  the  kind,  certainly  gave  Custer  a  much 
larger  liberty  than  Colonel  Hughes  supposed.  There  is  an  affidavit  of 
a  witness  who  heard  Terry's  and  Custer's  last  conversation  together  at 
the  mouth  of  the  Rosebud,  just  before  Custer  began  his  fatal  ride. 
Terry  said:  'Use  your  own  judgment  and  do  what  you  think  best  if 
you  strike  the  trail;  and  whatever  you  do,  Custer,  hold  on  to  your 
wounded."^ 

General  Miles  says,  in  his  book: 

"But  we  have  positive  evidence  in  the  form  of  an  affidavit  of  the 
last  witness  who  heard  the  two  officers  in  conversation  together  on  the 
night  before  their  commands  separated,  and  it  is  conclusive  on  the 
point  at  issue.  This  evidence  is  that  General  Terry  returned  to  Gen- 
eral Custer's  tent,*  after  giving  him  the  final  order,  to  say  to  him  that 
on  coming  up  to  the  Indians  he  would  have  to  use  his  own  discretion 
and  do  what  he  thought  best.  This  conversation  occurred  at  the 
mouth  of  the  Rosebud,  and  the  exact  words  of  General  Terry,  as  quoted 
by  the  witness,  are: 

"  '  Custer,  I  do  not  know  what  to  say  for  the  last.' 

"  Custer  replied :     'Say  what  you  want  to  say.' 

"Terry  then  said:  'Use  your  own  judgment,  and  do  what  you 
think  best  if  you  strike  the  trail;  and,  whatever  you  do,  Custer,  hold 
on  to  your  wounded.'  \ 

"  This  was  a  most  reasonable  conversation  for  the  two  officers  under 
the  circumstances.  One  had  won  great  distinction  as  a  general  in  the 

*  These  two  authorities  seem  to  differ  as  to  just  when  the  conversation  took  place. 
Andrews,  apparently  quoting  Miles,  says:  "Just  before  Custer  began  his  fatal  ride." 
Miles,  quoting  the  mysterious  and  unknown  affiant,  says  the  conversation  took  place 
the  night  before,  and  at  Custer's  tent.  The  difference  is  radical  and,  in  view  of  Colonel 
Godfrey's  suggestion  below,  is  material.  Besides,  the  regiment  marched  away  at  noon 
on  the  226,  and  that  is  the  date  of  the  order;  hence,  Custer  had  no  orders  the  night 
before.  The  regiment  passed  Generals  Terry,  Gibbon,  and  Custer  in  review  as  it 
marched  away.  When,  then,  was  the  precise  hour  at  which  this  alleged  conversation 
took  place  ?  —  C.  T.  B. 


Little  Big  Horn  Campaign        363 

Civil  War;  was  an  able  lawyer  and  department  commander,  yet  en- 
tirely without  experience  in  Indian  campaigns.  The  other  had  won 
great  distinction  as  one  of  the  most  gallant  and  skilful  division  com- 
manders of  cavalry  during  the  war,  commanding  one  of  the  most  suc- 
cessful divisions  of  mounted  troops;  he  had  years  of  experience  on  the 
plains  and  in  handling  troops  in  that  remote  country,  and  he  had 
fought  several  sharp  engagements  with  hostile  Indians." 

If  General  Terry  spoke  such  words  to  General  Custer  the  last  thing 
before  Custer's  departure,  those  remarks  have  a  very  important,  almost 
a  decisive,  bearing  on  the  matter  at  issue.  The  only  question  then  ex- 
isting would  be,  how  far  the  verbal  order  ought  to  be  considered  as 
superseding  the  written  one.  It  ts  my  opinion  that  the  charge  that  Cus- 
ter disobeyed  orders  would  fall  to  the  ground  if  the  truth  of  the  alleged 
remarks  could  be  established.  By  giving  him  this  verbal  order,  Terly 
would  make  Custer  an  absolutely  free  agent.  The  vital  importance  of 
establishing  this  affidavit  is  therefore  obvious. 

I  call  attention  to  the  fact  that  Terry  nowhere  refers  to  this  conver- 
sation, which  it  would  be  incumbent  upon  a  gentleman  to  declare  im- 
mediately Custer  was  charged  with  disobeying  Terry's  written  order, 
and  that  Terry,  in  that  portion  of  his  report  which  is  quoted  by  me  on 
page  225,  virtually  not  only  fails  to  exculpate  but  actually  charges 
that  Custer  did  disobey  his  order,  by  saying  he  did  the  very  thing  that 
he  was  not  expected  to  do. 

To  establish  this  affidavit,  I  wrote  to  President  Andrews,  asking  his 
authority  for  stating  that  such  an  affidavit  existed  and  requesting  a 
copy  of  it.  Here  is  his  reply.  I  insert  it  without  comment. 

The  University  of  Nebraska,  Chancellor's  Office, 

Lincoln,  November  22d,  '03. 
My  Dear  Sir: 

Replying  to  your  esteemed  favor  of  the  eleventh  inst.  I  regret  to 
say  that  I  have  no  means  of  recalling  with  certainty  the  source  of  my 
information  touching  the  Custer  affidavit.  My  impression  is,  how- 
ever, that  my  informant  was  Gen.  Miles,  with  whom  I  communicated 
on  the  subject  while  I  was  writing  my  account.  I  also  conversed  per- 
sonally with  Hughes  and  with  a  very  intimate  friend,  now  deceased,  of 
Gen.  Terry's. 

I  shall  be  extremely  pleased  to  read  your  views  upon  this  subject. 
Very  truly  yours, 

E.  BENJ.  ANDREWS. 


364        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

I  also  wrote  to  General  Miles  and  received  the  following  reply  from 
him: 

1 736  N  Street,  N.W., 

Washington,   D.   C.,  November  20,   1903. 
My  Dear  Sir: 

In  reply  to  your  two  letters,  you  will  find  in  my  book,  "  Personal 
Recollections,  or  from  New  England  to  the  Golden  Gate,"  published 
by  Werner  &  Co.,  Akron,  Ohio,  perhaps  all  the  information  you 
will  require.  I  can  not  give  the  time  now  to  going  over  the  cam- 
paign in  detail.  I  presume  you  will  find  the  book  in  most  libraries.* 
You  will  notice  in  it  a  chapter  on  the  Custer  campaign.  ( General 
Custer  did  not  disobey  orders.  When  General  Terry  divided  his  com- 
mand, taking  one  portion  of  it  with  him  up  the  Yellowstone,  and  send- 
ing General  Custer  with  the  other  portion  far  out  in  the  Indian  coun- 
try, it  necessarily  put  from  seventy-five  to  one  hundred  miles  between 
the  two  commands,  and  therefore  placed  upon  General  Custer  the  re- 
sponsibility of  acting  on  the  offensive  or  defensive,  for  he  could  have 
been  attacked  by  the  whole  body  of  the  combined  tribes,  and,  on  the 
other  hand,  if  he  allowed  them  to  escape  without  attacking  them,  he 
would  have  been  severely  censured.  It  would  be  silly  to  suppose 
that  Indian  chiefs  like  Sitting  Bull  and  Crazy  Horse  would  per- 
mit two  columns  to  march  around  over  the  country  with  infantry, 
cavalry,  wagon  trains,  etc.,f  and  wait  for  them  to  come  up  on  both 
sides  simultaneously,  and  one  must  believe  the  American  people  very 
gullible  if  they  thought  such  a  proposition  had  military  merit.  > 
4  Yours  very  truly, 

NELSON   A.   MILES. 

I  immediately  wrote  General  Miles  a  second  letter  asking  him  for 
the  name  of  the  affiant  and  any  statement  he  might  be  willing  to  make 
about  the  affidavit.  I  pointed  out  to  him  what  he  very  well  knew  — 
the  prominence  given  to  the  story  in  his  own  book  indicates  that  —  the 
importance  of  the  affidavit  in  establishing  General  Custer's  position 
and  defending  him  against  the  charge  of  disobedience.  I  received  no 
answer  to  this  letter. 

Meanwhile  the  question  of  the  affidavit  was  taken  up  by  General 
Hughes  in  his  several  communications  to  me  which  appear  below. 

In  order  not  to  break  the  thread  of  the  discourse  I  will  anticipate 

*  I  have  it  in  my  own  library,  of  course,  and  have  consulted  it  frequently.  —  C.  T.  B. 

f  This  is  overdrawn.     Custer  had  neither  infantry,  artillery  nor  wagons  with  him  ; 

Gibbon  had  cavalry,  infantry  and  artillery,  but  no  wagons,  be  it  remembered.  —  C .  T.  B. 


Little  Big  Horn  Campaign        365 

events  and  here  insert  a  third  letter  which  I  wrote  to  General 
Miles,  after  carefully  considering  General  Hughes'  remarks.  The 
letter  was  sent  to  General  Miles  by  registered  mail.  I  hold  the  regis- 
try receipt  showing  that  he  received  it.  To  this  inquiry  I  have  as  yet 
received  no  reply. 

455  East  iyth  Street,  Flatbush, 
Brooklyn,  N.  Y.,  March  3Oth,  1904. 
Lieutenant-General  NELSON  A.  MILES,  U.  S.  A., 

1736  N  Street,  N.  W.,  Washington,  D.  C. 
My  Dear  General  Miles: 

A  few  months  since  I  addressed  to  you  a  letter  asking  you  for 
the  name  of  the  person,  alluded  to  in  your  book,  who  made  the  affi- 
davit as  to  the  last  remark  of  General  Terry  to  General  Custer.  This 
letter  has  probably  never  reached  you  since  I  have  never  received  any 
answer  to  it. 

The  statement  is  questioned  by  a  number  of  officers,  and  in  the  in- 
terest of  historical  accuracy  and  for  the  sake  of  bringing  forward  every 
particle  of  evidence  tending  to  clear  General  Custer  of  the  charges 
which  are  made  against  him  in  that  campaign,  I  most  respectfully  ask 
you  to  give  me  the  name  of  the  affiant  together  with  such  other  state- 
ments concerning  the  affidavit  as  may  be  conclusive.  How  did  you 
become  possessed  of  the  affidavit,  for  instance  ?  Did  you  see  it  ?  Did 
you  know  the  affiant  ?  Was  he  a  person  whose  testimony  was  to  be 
implicitly  relied  upon  ?  Is  he  alive  now  ?  In  short,  any  information 
concerning  it  will  be  most  acceptable  as  well  as  most  useful. 
Very  sincerely  yours, 

CYRUS  TOWNSEND  BRADY. 

I  do  not  desire  to  comment  on  General  Miles'  refusal  further  than 
to  say  that  if  he  has  in  his  possession  the  affidavit  he  should  either  sub- 
mit it  to  the  inspection  of  impartial  observers,  give  it  to  historians, 
state  who  made  it,  where  it  was  made,  furnish  a  certified  copy  of  it  to 
the  public,  or  otherwise  establish  it.  If  he  is  not  willing  to  do  this  he 
should  at  least  say  why  he  is  not  willing.  I  submit  that  no  man,  what- 
ever his  rank  or  station,  ought  to  make  statements  which  affect  the 
fame  and  reputation  of  another  man  without  giving  the  fullest  publicity 
to  his  sources  of  information,  or  stating  why  the  public  must  be  content 
with  a  simple  reference  thereto. 

While  I  am  on  the  subject  of  the  affidavit,  I  call  the  student's  atten- 
tion to  a  possible  suggestion  in  Colonel  Godfrey's  second  communica- 
tion below. 


366        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

It  is  twenty-eight  years  since  the  Battle  of  the  Little  Big  Horn.  If 
the  alleged  affiant  is  now  alive,  what  reason  can  exist  to  prevent  him 
coming  out  and  acknowledging  his  affidavit  ?  If  he  is  dead,  why 
should  secrecy  about  it  longer  exist  ?  Why  does  not  General  Miles 
break  his  silence  ?  The  whole  matter  turns  on  the  production  of  this 
affidavit,  with  satisfactory  evidence  as  to  the  character  of  the  affiant. 

The  other  position  taken  in  General  Miles'  letter  above,  which  of 
course  is  a  summary  of  his  views  as  set  forth  in  his  book,  is  discussed 
later  on  by  General  Woodruff. 

II. 

I  now  refer  the  student  to  the  following  letter  in  answer  to  one  from 
me  asking  information  and  calling  General  Hughes'  attention  to  Presi- 
dent Andrews'  book,  which  has  just  been  reissued  in  a  new  and 
amplified  edition: 

New  Haven,  Conn., 

iSthNov.,  1903. 
Dear  Sir: 

Your  letter  of  the  I3th  was  duly  received.  I  had  not  heard  of 
Dr.  E.  Benjamin  Andrews'  book  prior  to  receipt  of  your  letter,  but 
have  looked  it  up  since. 

After  a  careful  examination  of  what  he  says  about  the  Sioux  cam- 
paign of  1876,  I  cannot  find  any  good  and  sufficient  reason  for  chang- 
ing aught  that  was  stated  in  the  article  published  in  the  Journal  of  the 
Military  Service  Institution,  in  January,  1896.  I  do  find,  however, 
that  something  could  be  added  to  the  statement  of  the  case  in  reply  to 
new  matter  which  he  has  injected  into  it  in  his  book.  These  items  are 
three  in  number,  to  wit: 

1st.  General  Miles  does  not  agree  with  the  views  therein  expressed. 

zd.  New  evidence  in  the  form  of  an  affidavit  made  by  some  indi- 
vidual, name  not  given. 

3rd.  The  writer  of  the  book  dissents  from  my  view  of  the  case. 

We  will  take  these  items  up  severally : 

First:  "General  Miles  is  strongly  of  the  opinion  that  Custer  was  not 
guilty  of  disobeying  any  orders." 

It  is  not  a  new  experience  to  learn  that  the  views  of  General  Miles 
and  myself  are  at  variance.  Indeed,  it  seems  that  they  are  seldom  in 
accord.  But,  in  this  instance,  my  views  are  supported  by  the  late 
General  P.  H.  Sheridan,  who  states  as  follows: 

"  General  Terry,  now  pretty  well  informed  of  the  locality  of  the  In- 


Little  Big  Horn  Campaign        367 

dians,  directed  Lieutenant-Colonel  George  A.  Custer  to  move  with  the 
Seventh  Cavalry  up  the  Rosebud,  until  he  struck  the  trail  discovered 
by  Major  Reno,  with  instructions  that  he  should  not  follow  it  directly  to 
the  Little  Big  Horn,  but  that  he  should  send  scouts  over  it  and  keep  his 
main  force  farther  south."  * 

General  Gibbon,  in  a  letter  to  General  Terry,  written  after  having 
reached  his  post,  Fort  Shaw,  Montana,  and  bearing  date  November 
5th,  1876,  writes  as  follows,  speaking  of  the  "  Conference": 

"We  both  impressed  upon  him  (Custer)  that  he  should  keep  con- 
stantly feeling  to  his  left,  and  even  should  the  trail  turn  toward  the 
Little  Big  Horn  that  he  should  continue  his  march  southward  along 
the  headwaters  of  the  Tongue,  and  strike  west  toward  the  Little  Big 
Horn.  So  strong  was  the  impression  upon  my  mind  and  great  my  fear 
that  Custer's  zeal  would  carry  him  forward  too  rapidly,  that  the  last 
thing  I  said  to  him  when  bidding  him  good-by,  after  his  regiment  had 
filed  past  you  when  starting  on  the  march,  was,  'Now,  Custer,  don't 
be  greedy,  but  wait  for  us.'  Poor  fellow!  Knowing  what  we  do  now, 
and  what  an  effect  a  fresh  Indian  trail  seemed  to  have  on  him,  perhaps 
we  were  expecting  too  much  to  anticipate  a  forbearance  on  his  part 
which  would  have  rendered  cooperation  between  the  two  columns 
practicable." 

The  foregoing  clearly  shows  that  no  doubt  existed  in  the  minds  of  the 
Division  Commanders  and  the  third  party  present  at  the  conference 
as  to  what  the  instructions  required  and  that  those  instructions  were 
not  complied  with.  1 

Second :  Dr.  Andrews  states  that  there  was  a  listener  at  the  last 
conversation  between  Terry  and  Custer  at  the  mouth  of  the  Rosebud, 
just  before  Custer  began  his  fatal  ride,  and  that  his  affidavit  sets  up 
that: 

"Terry  said:  'Use  your  own  judgment  and  do  what  you  think 
best  if  you  strike  the  trail  and,  whatever  you  do,  Custer,  hold  on  to 
your  wounded.'" 

It  is  quite  evident  that  this  is  the  same  affidavit  which  General  Miles 
refers  to  in  his  book.  My  attention  was  called  to  that  reference  in  the 
winter  of  1896,  and  in  behalf  of  the  family  and  friends  of  General 
Terry  I  asked  to  see  the  affidavit,  saying  that  I  might  wish  to  make 
a  copy  of  it.  My  request  was  refused  by  General  Miles,  with 

*  Report  of  Secretary  of  War,  Vol.  L,  1876,  page  443.  Italics  in  quotation  above 
are  mine.  —  C.  T.  B. 


368        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

the  further  information  that  it  had  been  in  his  possession  for  nineteen 
years,  which  carried  the  date  back  to  a  time  when  Colonel  Miles  was 
commanding  a  post  in  General  Terry's  Department.  The  value  of 
the  document  could  have  been  very  readily  determined  at  that  time 
by  General  Terry  himself,  and  I  am  thankful  to  say  its  worthlessness 
is  still  capable  of  proof. 

The  quotations  given  by  Dr.  Andrews  would  alone  be  sufficient  to 
condemn  the  paper  with  any  one  familiar  with  General  Terry  and  the 
situation. 

It  will  be  noticed  that  h£  is  represented  as  saying,  "  If  you  strike 
the  trail."  Terry  was  sending,  with  Custer,  Reno  and  six  troops  of 
cavalry,  who  had  followed  the  trail  for  many  weary  miles  only  three 
days  before,  and  there  was  no  "if"  in  the  case. 

The  other  quotation  is  equally  incredible.  General  Terry  had  an 
enviable  reputation  throughout  the  army  for  his  exceptional  courtesy 
on  all  occasions  and  under  all  circumstances,  to  all  those  serving  in  his 
command.  To  have  made  the  remarks  quoted,  "Whatever  you  do, 
hold  on  to  your  wounded,"  would  have  been  tantamount  to  saying 
to  one  of  his  Lieutenant-Colonels,  to  whom  he  was  confiding  the  finest 
command  in  his  department,  that  he  considered  it  necessary  to  caution 
him  on  the  elementary  principle  of  the  position  assigned  him.  To 
an  officer  of  General  Custer's  experience  and  gallantry  such  a  caution 
would  have  been  far  from  agreeable,  and  such  action  would  have  been 
entirely  foreign  to  the  life-long  conduct  of  General  Terry. 

But,  fortunately,  we  are  not  dependent  upon  deductive  evidence  in 
this  instance.  There  are  still  living  a  good  many  people  who  were  wit- 
nesses of  that  "march  past"  and  parting  of  Generals  Terry  and  Cus- 
ter. By  personal  observation  I  positively  know  that  any  one,  General 
Gibbon  excepted,  who  makes  affidavit  to  the  effect  that,  at  the  said 
parting  at  the  Rosebud,  there  was  a  conversation  between  Terry  and 
Custer  to  which  he  was  the  only  listener,  is  guilty  of  perjury. 
/  When  the  notice  came  that  the  command  was  ready  to  take  up  its 
march  I  was  sitting  with  Terry  and  Gibbon.  General  Terry  invited 
General  Gibbon  to  go  with  him  and  see  it.  They  walked  off  a  few 
yards  from  the  bank  of  the  stream  and  stood  together  when  Custer 
joined  them.  The  three  remained  together  until  the  command  had 
filed  past  and  the  final  good-by  was  said.  Custer  mounted  his  horse 
and  rode  off,  and  Terry  and  Gibbon  came  back  to  where  I  had  re- 
mained. The  last  remark  made  to  Custer  was  by  Gibbon.  If  any 
change  was  made  at  that  time  in  Custer's  orders  it  was  perforce  known 
to  Gibbon,  who  was  alongside  of  Terry,  and  the  only  one  who  was  with 


Little  Big  Horn  Campaign        369 

him  and  Custer.  j  Now  let  us  see  what  Gibbon  said  in  a  letter  written 
to  General  Terry  twenty-seven  years  ago,  when  he  could  not  foresee 
for  what  purpose  his  words  would  be  quoted : 

"Except  so  far  as  to  draw  profit  from  past  experience  it  is,  perhaps, 
useless  to  speculate  as  to  what  would  have  been  the  result  had  your 
plan  been  carried  out.  But  I  cannot  help  reflecting  that,  in  that  case, 
my  column,  supposing  the  Indian  camp  to  have  remained  where  it  was 
when  Custer  struck  it,  would  have  been  the  first  to  reach  it ;  that  with 
our  infantry  and  Catling  guns  we  should  have  been  able  to  take  care  of 
ourselves,  even  though  numbering  only  two-thirds  of  Custer's  force." 

The  only  person  actually  in  the  presence  of  Terry  and  Custer  at  that 
final  parting,  happened  to  be  the  third  member  of  the  conference,  who 
knew  the  "plan,"  and  on  the  fifth  of  the  November  following  he  writes 
as  above,  of  what  would  have  been  the  result  had  "your  plan"  (Ter- 
ry's conference  plan)  been  carried  out. 

It  so  happened  that(l  went  over  this  whole  subject  with  General  Gib- 
bon personally  only  a  short  time  before  his  death.  He  certainly  knew 
nothing  of  any  change  in  the  "conference  plan"  at  that  time^  Any 
historian  who  makes  use  of  the  affidavit  General  Miles  had  some  years 
ago,  would  do  well  to  look  carefully  into  the  facts. 

Third:  Andrews  states:  "He  (Hughes)  adduced  many  interesting 
considerations,  but  seemed  to  the  writer  not  at  all  to  justify  his 
views." 

I  am,  by  no  means,  sure  that  this  dissent  would  have  disturbed  me  if 
I  had  depended  on  my  own  judgment  alone  in  submitting  the  article* 
for  publication,  but  it  so  happened  that  I  did  not  do  so.  The  tragedy 
discussed  being  of  an  exceedingly  grave  character,  and  both  the  re- 
sponsible heads  having  passed  away,  rendered  it  unusually  important 
that  every  possible  precaution  should  be  taken  against  mistakes.  For 
this  reason,  after  the  "many  interesting  considerations"  were  pre- 
pared for  publication,  ft  submitted  the  article  to  different  competent 
military  men  with  the  simple  question,  "  Is  it  conclusive  ?" 

The  final  review  was  made  by  General  Henry  L.  Abbott,  U.  S.  Army, 
who  enjoys  a  world-wide  reputation  for  military  ability  and  scholarly 
attainments.  The  gentlemen  who  revised  the  article  were  unani- 
mously of  the  opinion  that  the  statement  was  absolutely  conclusive, 

*  The  reference  is  to  the  article  in  the  Journal  of  the  Military  Service  Institution 
mentioned  above. —  C.  T.  B. 


370        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

and  with  the  support  of  such  men  I  have  felt  little  anxiety  about  the 
criticisms  that  have  been  made  ji 

Very  truly  yours, 

R.  P.  HUGHES. 

Thereafter  I  wrote  again  to  General  Hughes  about  some  matters 
repeated  to  me  in  conversation  by  General  Carrington,  who  told  me 
that  Custer  actually  got  down  on  his  knees  to  Terry  and  begged  him, 
for  the  sake  of  Custer's  honor  and  fame  as  a  soldier,  to  get  the  orders 
detaining  him  at  Fort  Lincoln  revoked,  so  that  he  might  be  spared  the 
disgrace  of  seeing  his  regiment  march  to  the  front  leaving  him  behind. 
Carrington's  recollection  was  that  the  scene  took  place  in  Terry's  bed- 
room. 

Here  is  General  Hughes'  letter  on  that  point: 

New  Haven,  Conn., 

27th  Nov.,  1903. 
My  Dear  Sir: 

Yours  of  the  27th  at  hand.  Carrington  is  all  right  except  as  to 
location — the  incident  occurred  in  General  Terry's  office  in  St.  Paul, 
corner  Fourth  and  Wabashaw  Streets.  It  drew  from  Terry  a  request  to 
the  President  to  permit  Custer  to  go  with  him,  the  answer  being  through 
Sherman,  "If  Terry  wishes  Custer  let  him  take  him  along."  Just 
after  notifying  Custer  of  the  reply  and  telling  him  he  would  take  him 
along,  Custer  met  Ludlow  on  the  street  and  made  the  "swing  clear" 
remark  which  is  spoken  of  in  Andrews'  history  and  is  referred  to  in 
my  article  in  the  journal.  I  shall  have  to  apply  for  a  copy  of  the  Sec- 
retary of  War's  report  for  1876,  which  has  the  reports  of  Sheridan, 
Crook,  Terry,  Gibbon,  Reno,  etc.,  pages  439-487.* 
Yours  very  truly, 

R.    P.    HUGHES. 

III. 

Meanwhile  I  had  communicated  with  Colonel  Godfrey,  who  had 
already  furnished  me  with  much  data  in  addition  to  that  contained  in 
his  valuable  and  interesting  paper,  calling  particular  attention  to  some 
of  the  statements  made  by  General  Hughes  in  his  article  in  the  Journal 

*  I  have  had  them  before  me  constantly  for  the  past  six  months,  and  have  examined 
them  most  carefully  again  and  again,  verifying  quotations,  etc. —  C.  T.  B. 


Little  Big  Horn  Campaign        371 

of  the  Military  Service  Institution.  (  From  Colonel  Godfrey  I  received 
the  following  paper: 

MEMORANDA  FOR  REV.  C.  T.  BRADY 

A  semi-official  account  entitled  "Record  of  Engagements  with  Hos- 
tile Indians  in  the  Division  of  the  Missouri,  from  1868  to  1882,"  was 
published  by  the  Division  of  the  Missouri.  This  paper  is  now  being 
reprinted  in  the  United  States  Cavalry  Journal,  Fort  Leavenworth, 
Kansas.  The  part  relating  to  the  Little  Big  Horn,  is  in  the  October, 
1903,  number.  This  account  reads: 

]  About  two  o'clock  in  the  morning  of  July  25th,  the  column  halted 
for  about  three  hours,  made  coffee,  and  then  resumed  the  march, 
crossed  the  divide,  and  by  eight  o'clock  were  in  the  valley  of  one  of  the 
branches  of  the  Little  Big  Horn." 

This  is  misleading  and  not  altogether  true.  We  halted  about  two 
A.M.,  till  eight  A.M.,  then  marched  till  ten  A.M.,  halted,  and  it  was 
not  until  nearly  noon  that  we  crossed  the  divide.  We  were  in  a  nar- 
row valley.  The  march  is  correctly  described  in  my  article.  The 
inference  is  that  Custer  was  so  very  eager  that  he  crossed  the  divide 
into  the  valley  pf  the  Little  Big  Horn  and  put  himself  where  he  could 
be  discovered.  )  General  Hughes'  article  is  a  special  plea  to  clear  Gen- 
eral Terry  from  the  odium  that  he  and  his  family  seemed  to  think  was 
heaped  upon  him  for  failure  to  push  forward  with  the  information  they 
had  on  June  25th  and  26th,  and  that  General  Custer's  family  and 
friends  were  supposed  to  hold  him  (Terry)  responsible  for  the  disaster 
in  a  measure.  I  do  not  remember  a  charge  of  disobedience  as  having 
been  made  at  any  time  during  this  campaign;  nor,  on  the  other  hand, 
do  I  recall  that  much  was  said  that  Terry  and  Gibbon  did  not  do  as 
they  thought  best  on  June  25th  and  26th. 

The  marching  distance  from  the  Yellowstone,  where(Gibbon's  com- 
mand was  crossed,  to  the  Little  Big  Horn,  was  about  forty-six  miles. 
East  of  the  Big  Horn,  the  country  over  which  Gibbon's  forces  marched, 
was  rough — bad  lands.  Thet  Second  Cavalry  on  its  march  June  25th, 
saw  the  "  big  smoke  "  (from  the  fire  in  the  bottom  at  the  time  of  Reno's 
attack)  and  at  once  sent  word  to  General  Gibbon  (and  Terry)  that  they 
thought  a  fight  was  going  on,  or  something  to  that  effect.  I  don't 
know  when  they  saw  this  "big  smoke,"  but  my  recollection  is  that 
it  corresponded  or  tallied  very  well  with  the  time  of  Reno's  attack. 
The  Second  Cavalry  got  to  the  Little  Big  Horn,  four  or  five  miles 
above  the  mouth,  about  nine-thirty,  June  26th.  They  were  then  dis- 


; 


372        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

tant  from  the  battlefield  about  eight  or  ten  miles  —  an  infantry  officer 
says  six  miles.  They  arrived  in  the  vicinity  of  our  position  about 
eleven  A.M.,  June  27th,  nearly  two  days  after  the  "signs,"  the  "  big 
smoke  "  of  the  fight,  had  been  communicated.) 

(That  the  country  between  the  Yellowstone  and  the  Little  Big  Horn 
was  rough;  that  the  25th  of  June  was  hot;  that  the  water  was  scarce, 
we  all  know;  but  we  thought  it  strange  that,  after  they  learned  from 
the  Crow  scouts  —  say  at  ten-thirty,  June  26th,  on  the  Little  Big  Horn 
—  that  a  disaster  had  occurred,  it  took  them  so  long  to  get  a  move. 
Yet  none  of  us  blamed  them  for  being  cautious  at  that  time. ) 

General  Terry  was  not  an  Indian  fighter  and  would  never  have 
made  a  success  of  getting  Indians  on  the  plains.  /The  idea  is  prepos- 
terous *  that  a  force  can  march  through  the  open  country  (a  great  big 
country  like  we  had)  pass  by  the  Indians  fifty  or  sixty  miles  south, 
then  turn  round  and  find  them  in  the  same  place,  and  crush  them  be- 
tween that  force  and  another  from  the  opposite  direction.  They  don't 
linger  that  way.  Our  march  from  eleven  P.M.,  June  24th,  was  in  a 
close  country  and  not  exposed  —  was  in  a  close  valley,  a  branch  of 
the  Rosebud.  The  Indians  who  discovered  us  and  sent  word  to  the 
village  would  have  discovered  our  trail  and  consequently  informed 
them  of  our  movements.  ) 

General  Custer  did  not  intend  to  attack  until  June  26th,  the  date 
Terry  was  to  be  at  the  Little  Big  Horn.'j'  Herandeen  was  the  scout 
that  was  to  take  the  information  through  to  Terry,  but  developments 
made  it  necessary,  in  General  Custer's  opinion,  if  we  were  to  strike  the 
Indians  at  all,  that  we  should  do  it  at  once.  Even  then  he  expected 
only  a  running  fight.  Their  stand  and  concentration  were  unex- 
pected, because  the  chance  of  "surprise"  was  gone,  and  he  probably 
did  not  send  Herandeen,  as  was  intended,  to  communicate  with  Terry 
for  the  reason  that  he  did  not  think  he  could  get  through. 

Now,  suppose  the  Indians  had  been  located  on  the  headwaters  of 
the  Rosebud  or  Tongue,  or  Powder,  and  not  on  the  Little  Big  Horn, 
and  we  had  bumped  up  behind  them  on  the  north,  should  Custer  have 
backed  away,  sent  a  scout  through  to  Terry,  made  a  detour  so  as  to  get 

*  If  the  orders  were  preposterous,  or  involved  movements  that  were  profitless  and 
absurd,  why  did  not  Custer  point  out  these  patent  absurdities  to  Terry  and  Gibbon 
before  he  started?  There  had  been  no  change  in  conditions;  the  trail,  the  Indian 
position,  and  everything  else  were  just  as  the  orders  predicted. —  C.  T.  B. 

f  The  time  of  the  arrival  of  Terry  at  the  Little  Big  Horn  is  assumed  to  be  June 
26th.  What  authority  there  is  for  that  assumption  I  do  not  now  recall.  It  is  not 
embodied  in  the  "  instructions."  We  of  the  command  knew  nothing  of  it  till  after 
the  battle  ;  after  Terry's  arrival,  that  is. — E.  S.  GODFREY. 


Little  Big  Horn  Campaign        373 

to  the  south  side  ?  Terry's  instructions  had  fairly  located  the  Indians, 
but  it  was  a  mere  guess.*  On  the  I7th  they  had  fought  Crook  to  a 
retreat,  then  they  concentrated  upon  the  Little  Big  Horn. 
{ In  my  opinion,  if  our  attack  had  been  delayed  even  a  few  hours  we 
would  not  have  found  the  Indians  all  in  the  village.)  When  we  got  to 
the  divide  their  pony  herds  were  still  out  grazing;  when  the  attack  was 
made  all  herds  had  been  driven  into  the  village;  they  did  not  have  time 
to  strike  their  tepees  and  steal  away.  I  don't  believe  they  had  a  long 
warning  of  our  advance.  The  Indian  runners  had  the  same,  or  a 
greater,  distance  to  get  back  than  we  had  to  advance.  It  was  their 
evident  purpose  to  drop  out  of  sight  of  our  scouts  who  were  in  position 
for  observation  before  daylight,  and  did  not  see  them  returning  down 
the  valley  on  the  trail.  Therefore,  they  must  have  made  a  wide  de- 
tour. 

Again,  when  they  discovered  us  we  were  probably  in  bivouac  and, 
at  all  events,  an  ordinary  day's  march  distant  from  the  village.  The 
time  of  warning,  I  think,  could  be  safely  conjectured  as  the  time  of 
arrival  of  the  few  warriors  that  came  out  to  meet  the  advance  and  at- 
tack Reno.,-  All  those  warriors  that  had  their  ponies  handy,  I  believe, 
were  assembled  at  once  to  come  out  and  meet  the  troops.  The  rapid 
advance  didn't  give  the  Indians  a  chance  to  collect  their  belongings 
and  mature  any  plans  to  escape;  otherwise  I  believe  the  expected 
"scattering"  would  have  taken  place.  And  in  just  so  much  was  the 
attack  a  "surprise." 

(  That  General  Custer  deliberately  disobeyed  Terry's  orders  I  do  not 
believe.  Custer  was  intensely  in  earnest  and  fully  determined  to  find 
the  Indians  and,  when  found,  to  attack  them,  even  if  it  took  him  back 
to  the  agencies.  Suppose  Custer  had  asked  Terry  "If  I  find  these  In- 
dians shall  I  attack,  or  wait  for  you?"  Undoubtedly  Terry  would 
have  replied  "Attack!")  He  was  too  good  a  soldier  not  to  appreciate 
opportunity,  but  he  was  not  enough  of  a  cavalryman  or  Indian  fighter 
to  appreciate  the  flash-like  opportunities  for  hitting  the  Indians  on  the 
broad  prairies. 

Custer  was  what  in  these  modern  days  is  styled  a  "strenuous"  man. 
Terry  was  not.  He  was  the  personification  of  gentleness  and  deliber- 
ateness.  And(besides,  Terry's  instructions  gave  the  necessary  latitude. 
He  told  Custer  what  he  thought  should  be  done  but,  after  all,  left  it  to 
Custer's  judgment  and  discretion  when  so  nearly  in  contact  with  the 

*  Having  located  them,  guess  or  not,  the  conditions  were  exactly  those  contemplated 
in  the  orders. —  C.  T.  B. 


374        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

enemy.*}  If  Custer  had  passed  on  south  and  the  Indians  had  escaped, 
or  had  gone  forth  and  attacked  him,  as  they  had  Crook,  and  defeated 
him,  would  these  instructions  have  shielded  him  ?  Not  much.  He 
would  have  been  damned  as  cordially  for  the  failure  of  the  expedition 
as  he  is  now,  by  those  same  men,  for  courting  disaster,  f  I  have  no 
doubt  in  my  mind,  that  if  Custer  had  passed  south  even  one  more  day, 
the  Indians  would  have  attacked  us  as  they  had  General  Crook,  and 
upon  almost  the  same  ground,  just  one  week  before. f/ 
/Terry  says,  in  his  instructions,  "He  will  indicate  to  you  his  own 
views  of  what  your  action  should  be,  and  he  desires  that  you  should 
conform  to  them  unless  you  should  see  sufficient  reason  for  departing 
from  them."  |"\  Custer  was  an  experienced  war  soldier,  a  thorough 
cavalryman,  and  an  experienced  Indian  campaigner.  So  why  not  give 
him  the  benefit  of  "sufficient  reason  "?  Were  Terry's  instructions 
"definite  and  explicit"?  Terry  himself  says  in  his  order  that 
"  definite  instructions  "  were  "  impossible." 

There  was  not  an  officer  or  soldier  of  the  Seventh  Cavalry  but  that 
expected  a  fight  when  we  were  preparing  to  leave  the  mouth  of  the 
Rosebud.  Where  the  fight  would  take  place  we  knew  not,  but  I  ven- 
ture to  say  that  never  was  there  a  thought  that  the  Indians  would  take 
a  position  and  wait  there  for  us  to  go  through  a  lot  of  manoeuvers. 
Reno's  scout  had  not  brought  any  definite  information.  I  find  my 
notes  (June  aoth)  say  that  it  was  generally  thought  the  trail,  when  they 
left  it,  was  about  three  weeks  old  and  the  indications  showed  perhaps 
three  hundred  and  fifty  lodges.  I  don't  think  General  Terry  had  any 
later  information  than  Reno's  scout  on  which  to  guess  the  location  of 
the  Indians  on  the  Little  Big  Horn.  ^General  Custer's  statement  that 
he  would  follow  the  trail  until  he  found  the  Indians,  even  if  it  took  us 
to  the  agencies  on  the  Missouri  or  in  Nebraska,  does  not  indicate  that 
he  expected  them  to  wait  in  position  on  the  Little  Big  Horn  or  else- 
where. This  statement  was  made  after  it  had  been  decided  that  we 
should  go  over  the  trail,  June  2ist,  but  probably  before  the  general 
instructions  had  been  made  out.y 

As  it  turned  out(l  think  Custer  did  make  a  mistake  in  going  in  with 
a  divided  force,  not  that  the  division  of  itself  would  have  been  fatal, 
but  because  Reno  failed  to  hold  a  leg  even  if  he  couldn't  skin. 

If  Custer  had  followed  Reno  the  latter,  in  my  opinion,  would  never 

*  But  if  Custer  had  followed  his  orders,  he  would  not  have  been  nearly  in  contact 
Vith  the  enemy  —  there's  the  rub! — C.  T.  B.) 

f  This  I  consider  a  good  point  in  Custer's  favor. — C.  T.  B. 
j  Italics  mine. — E.  S.  GODFREY. 


Little  Big  Horn  Campaign        375 

have  dared  to  halt,  or  even  hesitate,  in  his  attack.  If  Reno  had  even 
held  to  the  bottom,  the  overwhelming  forces  would  have  been  divided. 
There  was  nothing  in  Reno's  past  career  that  would  indicate  con- 
fidence should  not  be  placed  in  his  courage./  Custer  could  not  have 
anticipated  a  faint-hearted  attack  or  that  Reno  would  get  stampeded| 

i I  believe  that  Reno  was  dismayed  when  he  saw  the  showing  in  front 
of  him,  and  when  he  failed  to  see  the  "support"  promised,  I  think  he 
lost  his  nerve,  and  then  when  his  Ree  scouts  stampeded  and  he  found 
his  force  being  surrounded  in  the  bottom,  I^believe  he  abandoned  him- 
self to  his  fears,  then  stampeded  to  the  hills&nd  lost  his  reason,  throw- 
ing away  his  ivory  handled  pistols.  If  Reno  had  held  to  the  bottom, 
Custer's  left  flank  (Keogh  and  Calhoun)  would  not  have  been  so  quick- 
ly overwhelmed  (for  the  Indians  leaving  Reno  made  that  envelop- 
ment), and  it  is  reasonable  to  suppose  Custer  would  have  had  a  better 
show  to  withdraw  and  rejoin  other  forces. 

I  If  Custer  had  followed  up  Reno  he  would  have  taken  matters  in 
his  own  hands,  held  and  concentrated  his  men  in  such  manner  as 
to  control  the  situation  until  Benteen  and  the  packs  came  up.]  The 
Indians,  as  a  rule,  will  not  stand  punishment  unless  cornered.  (I 
went  over  the  ground  in  the  bottom  where  Reno  was  when  he  con- 
cluded to  go  to  the  hills,  and  I  believe  he  could  have  held  the  position.) 
I  talked  the  matter  over  with  General  Gibbon  and  he  practically 
agreed  with  me.  I  know  many  others  think  otherwise,  including 
some  who  were  in  that  part  of  the  fight. 

J  have  doubts  about  the  saving  of  Custer  if  Reno  had  advanced  after 
the  packs  joined  us,  for  I  think  the  fight  was  practically  over  then.^) 
To  have  advanced  before  then  might  possibly  have  done  something  in 
favor  of  Custer,  but  probably  not.  I  am  of  the  ^pinion  that  part  of 
the  fight  was  settled  quickly}  (Custer's  battalion  had  practically  no 
shelter  and  no  time  to  make  any.  While  a  good  many  horses  were 
killed,  I  fear  that  most  of  those  getting  away  carried  their  reserve  am- 
munition, and  it  didn't  take  long  to  get  away  with  fifty  rounds  in  a 
fight,  i  With  a  different  commander  than  Reno  we  might  have  created 
a  diversion  by  advancing  as  soon  as  the  ammunition  packs  came  up. 
which  was  some  little  time  before  McDougall  arrived  with  all  the  packs^ 
Reno  was  apparently  too  busy  waiting  for  further  orders  from  Custer 
to  take  any  initiative.  (Weir  asked  permission  to  take  his  troop  to  re- 
connoiter  in  the  direction  of  the  firing  on  Custer,  and  Reno  would  not 
give  it.  >  Weir  started  on  his  own  hook,  and  Edgerly  (Weir's  Lieu- 
tenant) supposing  permission  had  been  given  for  the  troop,  followed 
Weir  with  the  troop.  I  think  Reno  subsequently  tried  to  make  it  ap- 


376        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

pear  that  this  advance  of  Weir  was  by  authority.  I  don't  think  Reno 
was  drunk,  for  I  don't  believe  there  was  enough  whiskey  in  the  com- 
mand to  make  a  "drunk."  J 

(  At  the  Reno  Court  of  Inquiry  I  was  asked  if  I  thought  Reno  had 
done  all  he  could  as  a  commanding  officer,  and  I  replied  "No."  That 
was  about  the  effect  of  the  question  and  answer.  The  testimony  and 
proceedings  were  reported  in  full  in  the  Chicago  Times.  The  New 
York  Herald  had  an  able  correspondent,  Mr.  Kelly,  that  joined  our 
forces  on  the  Yellowstone  in  July  or  August,  and  wrote,  giving  all  the 
information  he  could  gather  from  all  sources  that  pervaded  the  com- 
mand, that  he  could  get  at.  There  were  a  "whole  lot"  of  correspond- 
ents in  the  field  after  the  fight,  but  Mr.  Kelly  was  considered  one  of 
the  ablest.  Being  in  the  field  till  September  a6th,  we  saw  but  few 
newspapers  from  the  east. 

E.  S.  GODFREY. 

On  the  receipt  of  this  memoranda  I  sent  Colonel  Godfrey  all  the 
papers  printed  above,  and  asked  him  further  to  discuss  these  papers. 
They  were  returned  to  me  with  the  following  letter,  accompanied  by 
these  additional  notes; 

Headquarters,  Ninth  United  States  Cavalry, 

Fort  Walla  Walla,  Washington, 

February  12th,  1904. 
My  Dear  Doctor: 

I  return  to-day  the  letters  sent  to  me  by  registered  mail.  I  am  very 
sorry  to  have  kept  them  so  long  from  you,  but  I  have  been  suffering 
from  a  sprained  knee  which  has  laid  me  up,  and  have  been  otherwise 
under  the  weather. 

•^  I  feel  that  I  have  not  in  my  memoranda  done  justice  to  the  subject. 
It  is  largely  one  of  sentiment,  and  the  best  rule  is  to  put  yourself  in  his 
place  and  act  under  the  lights  then  exposed  to  view.     That  Custer 
may  have  been  actuated  by  other  motives  I  do  not  doubt.     The  main 
question  to  me  was  whether  he  was  justified  from  a  military  point,  in  a 
campaign  against  Indians,  in  his  conduct  of  the  march  and  battle.  J 
If  we  could  have  foreseen  as  we  now  look  back  and  see! 
Sincerely  yours, 

E.  S.  GODFREY. 

J  Colonel  Godfrey  made  this  statement  in  answer  to  a  question  from  me.  On  this 
point  see  Appendix  B. — C.  T.  B. 


Little  Big  Horn  Campaign        377 

/  ADDITIONAL  NOTES  BY  COLONEL  GODFREY.  ) 

The  statement  of  General  Sheridan,  quoted  by  Hughes,  was 
made  in  his  annual  report  for  1876,  and  of  course  from  data 
furnished  by  General  Terry.  It  is  but  natural  that  he  should 
reflect  more  or  less  the  views  of  Terry.  He  could  have  had  only 
the  newspaper  and  other  unofficial  accounts.  Of  course  I  recognize 
that  "unofficial  accounts"  very  often  give  more  inside  information 
than  the  official  report. 

[A  word  as  to  that  affidavit.  I  don't  know  anything  about  it  and  am 
ready  to  take  Hughes'  say-so  as  to  what  officers  were  present,  but  I 
suggest  a  possible  solution :  When  Custer  dismounted  he  had  his  or- 
derly and  generally  his  flags  with  him;  naturally  the  orderly  would  be 
somewhat  retired,  and  when  Custer  went  to  mount  his  horse  Terry 
may  have  gone  aside  to  accompany  him  and  spoken  the  caution  to  him 
in  a  subdued  voice  so  that  Gibbon  would  not  have  heard  him,  but  the 
orderly  might  have  heard.*) 

;In  going  over  a  lot  of  letters  relating  to  the  campaign,  etc.,  I  find  one 
from  General  J.  S.  Brisbin  (now  dead),  then  Major,  commanding 
Second  Cavalry  Battalion.)  It  is  dated  January  1st,  1892,  just  two 
weeks  before  his  death.  In  it  he  is  very  bitter  against  Custer.  He 
says  that  Custer  disobeyed : 

"If  not  in  letter,  then  in  spirit,  and  I  think  and  have  ever  thought,  in 
letter  as  well  as  spirit.  Terry  intended,  if  he  intended  anything,  that 
we  should  be  in  the  battle  with  you.  I  was  on  the  boat,  Creamer  Far 
West,  Captain  Grant  Marsh,  the  night  of  the  aist,  when  the  confer- 
ence took  place  between  Gibbon,  Custer  and  Terry,  to  which  you  re- 
fer, and  I  heard  what  passed.  .Terry  had  a  map  and  Custer's  line  of 
march  up  the  Rosebud  was  blocked  out  on  it  by  pins  stuck  in  the  table 
through  the  paper.  Terry  showed  Custer  his  line  of  march  and,  being 
somewhat  near-sighted  as  you  know,  Terry  asked  me  to  mark  the  line, 
and  I  did  so  with  a  blue  pencil.  Custer  turned  off  that  line  of  march 
from  the  Rosebud,  just  twenty  miles  short  of  the  end  of  the  pins  and 
blue  line."/ 

Just  how  much  dependence  can  be  placed  on  Brisbin's  statements  I 
don't  know.  He  may  have  been  present  at  this  conference,  but  Hughes 

*  Again  I  ask  General  Miles  if  this  is  the  explanation  of  the  affidavit  ?  If  so,  how 
does  it  accord  with  the  statement  that  the  conversation  occurred  the  night  before  the 
command  separated  ?  Or,  has  General  Miles  written  carelessly  "  the  night  before," 
and  does  he  mean  just  before  the  final  march  past  ?  —  C.  T.  B. 


378        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

makes  no  mention  of  him;  in  fact,  entirely  ignores  him  and  may  have 
forgotten  him.     I  will  make  another  quotation  from  Brisbin  : 

"I  read  the  order  you  print  as  being  the  one  given  by  Terry  to  Cus- 
ter  for  this  march.  If  that  is  the  order  Custer  got  it  is  not  the  order 
copied  in  Terry's  books  at  Department  Headquarters.  You  will  re- 
member that  after  Custer  fell  Terry  appointed  me  chief  of  cavalry.  I 
looked  over  all  the  papers  affecting  the  march  and  battle  of  Little  Big 
Horn  and  took  a  copy  of  the  order  sending  you  up  the  Rosebud.  The 
order  now  lies  before  me  and  it  says  'you  should  proceed  up  the  Rose- 
bud until  you  ascertain  definitely  the  direction  in  which  the  trail  above 
spoken  of  leads  (Terry  had  already  referred  to  the  trail  Reno  followed). 
Should  it  be  found,  as  it  appears  almost  certain  that  it  should  be  found, 
to  turn  toward  the  Little  Big  Horn,  he  thinks  (that  is,  the  Department 
Commander  thinks)  that  you  should  still  proceed  southward,  perhaps 
as  far  as  the  headwaters  of  the  Tongue  River,  and  then  ('then'  under- 
scored in  order)  turn  toward  Little  Big  Horn,  feeling  constantly,  how- 
ever, to  your  left,  so  as  to  preclude  the  possibility  of  the  escape  of  the 
Indians  to  the  south  or  southeast  by  passing  around  your  left  flank. 
It  is  desired  that  you  conform  as  nearly  as  possible  to  those  instruc- 
tions and  that  you  do  not  depart  from  them  unless  you  shall  see 
absolute  necessity  for  doing  so.'  " 

That  part  of  the  quotation  from  "It  is  desired  "  to  "necessity  for 
doing  so,"  is  omitted  in  the  order  as  printed  in  the  report  of  General 
Terry.  Not  having  seen  the  original  order  I  cannot  vouch  for  either 
being  the  true  copy,  but  the  omission  looks  peculiar  to  say  the  least, 
if  omission  there  was.* 

1 1  do  not  know  that  I  can  add  very  much  to  what  I  have  already  sent 
to  you  on  the  question  of  disobedience.  Here  is  a  commander  who  has 
had  experience  in  war,  civilized  and  Indian,  sent  in  command  of  his 
regiment  against  an  unnumbered  foe,  located  we  know  not  where 
(although  well  conjectured  in  the  instructions,  as  it  turned  out);  given 
instructions  to  preclude  their  escape;  to  cooperate  with  another  column 
separated  from  fifty  to  one  hundred  miles,  having  infantry  and  artil- 
lery, marching  over  a  rough,  untried  country.  Now  if  that  command- 
er thought  that  to  go  on  farther  south  before  he  had  located  the  foe 
(when  he  was  on  the  trail)  was  to  leave  an  opening  and  an  almost  cer- 

*  Personally  I  do  not  believe  that  the  sentence  in  question  was  in  the  order  given  to 
Custer.  For  if  it  was,  why  should  Terry  suppress  it,  since  it  only  confirms  his  own 
claims  ?  Besides  I  should  be  loath  to  believe  that  Terry  would  suppress  anything. 
The  sentence  may  have  been  in  a  rough  draft  of  the  orders,  and  not  in  the  final 
copy.— C.T.B. 


Little  Big  Horn  Campaign        379 

tainty  of  their  escape,  if  they  wanted  to  do  so,  is  it  reasonable  to  expect 
him  to  leave  the  trail  and  go  on  "in  the  air  "  ?  The  commander  who 
gives  him  his  instructions  cannot  be  communicated  with.  Is  this  iso- 
lated commander  not  allowed  to  act  on  his  own  responsibility,  if  he 
thinks  he  cannot  preclude  the  escape  by  leaving  the  very  trail  that  will 
locate  the  enemy  ?  ) 

Hughes  in  his  article,  and  the  official  reports,  make  it  appear  that 
we  were  at  or  near  the  "Crow's  Nest"  at  daylight  and  crossed  the 
divide  at  eight  A.M.  The  scouts  were  at  the  "Crow's  Nest,"  but  at 
eight  A.M.  we  took  up  the  march  to  near  the  divide  and  "Crow's 
Nest,"arriving  at  ten  o'clock,  A.M.;  that  is,  we  were  in  the  Rosebud 
Valley,  one  mile  from  the  divide.  We  did  not  cross  the  divide  till 
nearly  noon.  Hughes  seems  to  pooh-pooh  the  idea  that  we  were  not 
to  attack  till  the  morning  of  the  26th.  We  had  Custer's  own  statement 
as  to  that.  He  said  so  himself  when  he  called  the  officers  together 
on  the  night  of  June  24th  and  again  reiterated  the  statement  before 
crossing  the  divide. 

During  the  second  or  third  day  (23rd  or  24th)  up  the  Rosebud,  sev- 
eral times  we  thought  we  (I  mean  some  of  us)  saw  smoke  in  the  direc- 
tion of  the  Tullock,  and  finally  we  spoke  of  it  to  the  General  (Custer) 
at  one  of  the  halts.  He  said  it  could  not  be,  that  he  had  scouts  over 
on  that  side  and  they  most  certainly  would  have  seen  any  such  "signs" 
and  report  to  him,  and  he  reiterated  that  there  were  scouts  out  looking 
toward  Tullock's  Valley.  After  this  assurance  we  made  it  a  point 
to  watch  this  "smoke  business"  and  we  discovered  the  illusion  was 
due  to  fleecy  clouds  on  the  horizon  and  the  mirage,  or  heated  air,  ris- 
ing from  the  hills  on  that  side.  The  air  was  full  of  dust  from  our 
marching  columns,  which  helped  the  illusion. 

With  reference  to  my  slip  that  "about  eighteen  hundred  had  gone 
from  one  agency  alone."  I  took  that  from  my  diary,  as  I  had  been  in- 
formed by  some  one  who  got  the  information  from  Department  Head- 
quarters. I  had  never  seen  the  despatch  and  put  down  the  item  as  it 
came  to  me.  It  was  a  matter  of  common  report  in  the  camp. 

Another  point  occurs  to  me:  "For  Custer  to  be  in  cooperating 
distance  on  the  only  line  of  retreat  if  the  Indians  should  run  away." 
(Hughes'  magazine  article,  page  36.)  (Hughes  intimates  that  there 
was  only  one  line  of  retreat,  presumably  up  the  valley  of  the  Little  Big 
Horn.  The  Indians  certainly  could  have  retreated  over  their  trav- 
eled route,  or  could  have  cut  across  the  headwaters  of  the  Tullock  for 
the  Yellowstone  had  Custer  gone  south.  Hughes  seems  to  forget  that 
an  almost  impassably  rough  country  —  the  Wolf  Mountains  —  would 


380        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

lie  between  Custer  and  those  lines  of  retreat.  :  Yet  he  would  insist 
that  it  was  good  generalship  to  leave  these  routes  open  to  close  up 
one  other.  The  Indians  were  in  light  marching  order  and  could  travel 
faster  than  Gibbon  over  the  Tullock  Divide,  and  there  would  have 
been  a  long-distance,  "tail-end  "  pursuit  for  Custer  when  he  descended 
the  Little  Big  Horn  (by  following  the  "plan")  and  found  the  enemy 
had  escaped  over  the  very  trail  he  had  left  behind  him,  or  had  struck 
for  the  Yellowstone,  passing  Gibbon's  left. 

It  has  been  the  criticism  almost  ever  since  Indian  fighting  began  that 
commanders  were  too  prone  to  follow  some  strategic  theory  and  fail  to 
bring  the  Indians  to  battle  —  give  them  a  chance  to  escape.  It  was 
Custer's  practice  to  take  the  trail  and  follow  it,  locate  the  enemy  and 
then  strike  home  by  a  surprise  attack.  Custer  knew  the  ridicule  and 
contempt  heaped  on  commanders  who  had  failed  to  strike  when  near 
the  enemy;  or  who  had  given  the  enemy  opportunity  to  escape  when 
nearly  in  contact  with  them.  Whatever  may  be  the  academic  discus- 
sions as  to  his  disobedience,  I  hold  that  he  was  justified  by  sound 
military  judgment  in  making  his  line  of  march  on  the  trail.* 

IV. 

General  Hughes  and  Colonel  Godfrey  may  be  considered  fairly 
enough  as  representatives  of  the  opposing  views  on  the  question.  I 
thought  it  would  be  well  to  have  the  papers  discussed  by  an  officer  who 
might  be  considered  as  taking  an  impartial  view  of  the  matter.  ( I 
therefore  sent  them  to  Brigadier-General  Charles  A.  Woodruff,  U.  S.  A. 
(retired),  and  his  review  of  the  whole  question  is  as  follows : 

103  Market  Street, 
San  Francisco,  May  3,  1904. 
My  Dear  Dr.  Brady: 

I  have  read  with  a  great  deal  of  pleasure,  your  three  articles  on 
"War  with  the  Sioux,"  and  I  have  taken  the  liberty  of  making  various 
marginal  notes  and  corrections  on  the  manuscript.  I  have  also  read 
the  letters  from  General  Miles,  Professor  Andrews,  General  Hughes, 
and  Colonel  Godfrey. 

General  Miles,  in  his  letter  of  November  20,  1903,  dismisses  the 
matter  very  curtly.  He  says  "Custer  did  not  disobey  orders,"  and  he 

*  This  also  is  very  interesting  and  seems  to  point  to  the  order  as  a  "preposterous" 
one  under  the  circumstances.  It  may  be  so;  but  if  so,  I  wish  Custer  had  pointed  it  out 
to  Terry  before  he  started.  —  C.  T.  B. 


Little  Big  Horn  Campaign        381 

states  as  military  dictum  that,  in  sending  General  Custer  seventy-five 
or  one  hundred  miles  away,  Terry  could  not  indicate  what  Custer 
should  do,  and  that,  practically,  Custer  was  not  under  any  obligations 
to  execute  Terry's  orders,  even  when  he  found  conditions  as  Terry  had 
expected  and  indicated.* 

The  order  states  explicitly  "Should  it  —  the  trail  up  the  Rosebud  — 
be  found  (as  it  appears  almost  certain  it  will  be  found)  to  turn  toward 
the  Little  Big  Horn,  then  you  should  still  proceed  southward."  Now, 
when  he  found  that  it  turned  toward  the  Little  Big  Horn,  instead  of 
going  south  or  stopping  where  he  was  and  scouting  south  or  southwest 
and  west  and  try  to  locate  the  village,  or  examining  Tullock  Creek,  or 
sending  scouts  to  Gibbon,  he  made  that  fatal  night  march  with  the 
deliberate  intention  of  trying  to  locate  and  strike  the  village  before 
Gibbon  could  possibly  get  up.) 

Gibbon  says  (page  473,  Vol.  I.,  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  War  for 
1876),  "The  Department  Commander  (Terry)  strongly  impressed 
upon  him  (Custer)  the  propriety  of  not  pressing  his  march  too  rapidly." 
(  Whether  Custer's  written  instructions  were  based  upon  a  "guess"  of 
the  actual  condition,  as  Colonel  Godfrey  suggests,  or  had  no  "military 
merit,"  as  General  Miles  states,  the  facts  remain  :  First :  That  they 
were  based  upon  a  "foresight"  as  good  as  the  present  "hindsight," 
which  is  often  not  the  case.  Second :  That  Custer  accepted  them  with- 
out demur.  Third:  No  further  information  was  gained  to  suggest  a 
modification,  or,  to  use  the  words  of  the  letter:  "unless  you  see  suffi- 
cient reason  for  departing  from  them."  On  the  contrary,  the  sup- 
posed turn  of  the  trail  was  found  to  be  an  actual  fact.) 
I  Therefore,  Custer  did  not  obey  his  written  instructions,  in  letter  or 
spirit,  and  had  no  proper  military  justification  for  not  doing  so,  unless 
General  Terry  afterwards  told  him,  "Use  your  own  judgment  and 
do  what  you  think  best,"  which,  in  my  opinion,  would  have  made  the 
instructions  advisory  rather  than  positive  orders.  If  these  facts  (I  ig- 
nore the  unproduced  affidavit)  do  not  constitute  disobedience  of  orders, 
I  do  not  see  how  it  is  possible  for  the  charge  of  disobedience  of  orders 
to  hold  against  any  man,  under  any  circumstances,  when  away  from 
his  superior.  * 

Here  is  a  trifling  sidelight  on  the  matter.  On  the  night  of  June  23d, 
General  Gibbon,  in  reply  to  an  optimistic  remark  of  mine,  told  me  in 
effect,  "I  am  satisfied  that  if  Custer  can  prevent  it  we  will  not  get  into 
the  fight."  The  meaning  I  gathered  was  that  Gibbon  thought  that 

*  Would  General  Miles  excuse  subordinates  for  such  obedience  ( ?)  of  his  orders 
for  a  combined  movement  ?  —  C.  A.  WOODRUFF. 


382         Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

Custer  was  so  eager  to  retrieve  the  good  opinion  that  he  might  have 
lost  owing  to  his  controversy  over  post  traderships,  that  he  would 
strike  when  and  where  he  could. 

While  Terry,  with  Gibbon's  command,  was  camped  at  Tullock's 
Creek.  Saturday  night  and  Sunday  morning,  June  24th  and  25th,  he 
was  looking  for  a  message  from  Custer  very  anxiously,  so  I  was  told 
at  the  time. 

Colonel  Godfrey  speaks  of  the  odium  Terry's  family  seemed  to 
think  was  "heaped  upon  him  for  the  failure  to  push  forward  on  the 
information  they  had  on  June  25th  and  26th."  Now  let  me  say  a  few 
words  with  reference  to  that. 

The  smoke  that  is  spoken  of  as  having  been  seen  by  Terry's  com- 
mand —  and  I  saw  it  myself—  was  on  the  afternoon  of  June  25th.  It 
was  occasioned,  I  understood,  by  attempts  to  drive  some  of  Reno's 
stragglers  out  of  the  brush,  and  must  have  been  somewhere  from  two  to 
four  o'clock  in  the  afternoon.  Nov/let  me  quote  from  a  telegram  of 
General  Terry,  dated  June  27,}and  found  on  page  463,  Vol.  I.,  Report 
of  the  Secretary  of  War  of  1876,  to  show  that  Gibbon's  command  did 
not;  linger  by  the  wayside: 

f  Starting  soon  after  five  o'clock  in  the  morning  of  the  25th,  the  in- 
fantry made  a  march  of  twenty-two  miles  over  the  most  difficult  coun- 
try which  I  have  ever  seen.  In  order  that  the  scouts  might  be  sent  into 
the  valley  of  the  Little  Big  Horn,  the  cavalry,  with  the  battery,  was 
then  pushed  on  thirteen  or  fourteen  miles  farther,  reaching  camp  at 
midnight.)  The  scouts  were  sent  out  at  half-past  four  in  the  morning 
of  the  z6th.  They  soon  discovered  three  Indians,  who  were  at  first 
supposed  to  be  Sioux;  but,  when  overtaken,  they  proved  to  be  Crows, 
who  had  been  with  General  Custer.  They  brought  the  first  intelli- 
gence of  the  battle.  Their  story  was  not  credited.  It  was  supposed 
that  some  fighting,  perhaps  severe  fighting,  had  taken  place;  but  it  was 
not  believed  that  disaster  could  have  overtaken  so  large  a  force  as 
twelve  companies  of  cavalry.  The  infantry,  which  had  broken  camp 
very  early,  soon  came  up,  and  the  whole  column  entered  and  moved  up 
the  valley  of  the  Little  Big  Horn." 

I  want  to  say  thatfthe  infantry  broke  camp  about  four  o'clock  on  the 
morning  of  the  26th.  It  had  rained  that  preceding  night  and  the  lash 
ropes  of  the  packs  were  soaked  with  water  and,  as  we  moved,  they 
stretched  continuously  and  we  were  stopping  constantly  to  replace  the 
packs,  and  besides  that,  mind  you,  traveling  in  adobe  mud  was  very 
trying.  I  continue  the  quotation  as  follows : 

"During  the  afternoon  efforts  were  made  to  send  scouts  through  to 


Little  Big  Horn  Campaign        383 

what  was  supposed  to  be  General  Custer's  position,  to  obtain  infor- 
mation of  the  condition  of  affairs;  but  those  who  were  sent  out  were 
driven  back  by  parties  of  Indians,  who,  in  increasing  numbers,  were 
seen  hovering  in  General  Gibbon's  front.)  (At  twenty  minutes  before 
nine  o'clock  in  the  evening,  the  infantry  had  marched  between  twenty- 
nine  and  thirty  miles.  The  men  were  very  weary  and  daylight  was 
fading.  The  column  was  therefore  halted  for  the  night,  at  a  point 
about  eleven  miles  in  a  straight  line  from  the  mouth  of  the  stream. 
This  morning  the  movement  was  resumed,  and,  after  a  march  of  nine 
miles,  Major  Reno's  intrenched  position  was  reached.'*} 

It  was  the  general  opinion  from  indications  found  next  day  just  be- 
yond where  we  halted  for  the  night,  that  had  we  proceeded  five  hun- 
dred yards  more,  we  would  have  been  in  the  midst  of  a  night  attack 
from  the  Sioux  Indians,  who  came  to  meet  us  as  a  means  of  guarding 
their  fleeing  village. 

In  reference  to  the  number  of  Indians,  the  same  telegram  of  General 
Terry's  says:  "Major  Reno  and  Captain  Benteen,  both  of  whom  are 
officers  of  great  experience,  accustomed  to  seeing  large  masses  of 
mounted  men,  estimate  the  number  of  Indians  engaged  at  not  less 
than  twenty-four  hundred.  Other  officers  think  that  the  number  was 
greater  than  this.  The  village  in  the  valley  was  about  three  miles  in 
length  and  about  a  mile  in  width.  Besides  the  lodges  proper,  a  great 
number  of  temporary  brushwood  shelters  were  found  in  it,  indicating 
that  many  men,  besides  its  proper  inhabitants,  had  gathered  together 
there." 

I  am  under  the  impression  now  that  we  counted  positions  occupied 
by  twelve  hundred  lodges. 

I  I  coincide  with  your  view  that  had  Reno  proceeded  in  his  attack,  with 
the  audacity  that  should  characterize,  and  usually  does  characterize,  a 
cavalry  charge,  there  would  have  been  a  different  story  to  tell;  perhaps 
as  many  men  would  have  been  killed,  but  they  would  have  been  divid- 
ed among  at  least  eight,  if  not  eleven,  troops  of  cavalry  rather  than 
concentrated  in  five,  which  meant  annihilation  for  those.  J 

I  have  been  told,  or  was  told  at  the  time,  that  it  was  thought  that 
about  sixty  lodges  were  a  few  miles  up  the  Little  Big  Horn  above  the 
main  village,  and  that,  in  the  early  morning,  when  Custer's  proximity 
was  discovered,  that  this  small  village,  knowing  that  they  were  but  a 
mouthful  for  Custer's  command,  hurriedly  packed  up  and  dashed  down 
the  valley.  It  can  readily  be  understood  that  sixty  lodges,  with  the 
horses  and  paraphernalia,  moving  rapidly  down  the  valley,  might  well 
create  the  impression  that  a  very  large  force  was  in  retreat. 


384        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

Now,  if  the  Indian  village  was  in  retreat,  Custer's  division  of  his 
forces  was  not  altogether  bad.  One  command  to  hurry  them  up  and 
continue  the  stampede,  his  main  force  to  attack  them  in  the  right  flank 
if  they  turned  that  way,  which  was  most  probable,  Benteen's  to  attack 
them  if  they  turned  to  the  left,  which  was  possible  but  not  as  probable. 

Unfortunately  for  Custer  they  were  not  fleeing.  J  Colonel  Godfrey 
rather  dwells  upon  the  fact  that  Custer  had  to  attack  these  Indians  or 
they  would  have  gotten  away  from  him.  The  fact  is,  as  I  have  stated 
above,  when  he  left  the  Rosebud  he  did  not  know  where  they  were, 
had  not  located  them,  was  not  in  visual  contact  even  with  them,  and 
a  glance  at  the  map  will  show  that,  standing  on  the  Rosebud,  where  the 
trail  left  it  to  go  over  to  the  Little  Big  Horn,  Custer  was  in  the  best 
possible  position  for  intercepting  these  Indians  on  three  of  their  four 
lines  of  retreat.)  For  having  passed  into  the  Little  Big  Horn  Valley, 
there  were  only  four  practicable  routes  of  flight  for  the  Indians,  north, 
toward  Gibbon,  or  east,  northeast,  or  southeast.  From  the  point 
where  he  left  the  Rosebud,  Custer  was  in  a  position  to  strike  either  one 
of  the  three  last  lines  of  flight,  whereas,  if,  after  making  the  forced 
night  march  with  his  fatigued  animals,  he  had  struck  the  Little  Big 
Horn,  and  a  reconnaissance  had  shown  that  the  village  had  left  the  Lit- 
tle Big  Horn,  going  northeast,  on  the  24th  of  June,  he  would  have  been 
two  days'  march  behind  them. 

,  Had  he  sent  a  scout,  on  the  night  of  the  24th,  to  Gibbon,  whose 
exact  whereabouts  was  almost  known  to  him,  that  scout  would  have 
reached  Terry  or  Gibbon,  on  Tullock's  Fork,  a  few  miles  from  the 
Yellowstone,  on  the  morning  of  Sunday,  and  by  Sunday  night  Gibbon's 
command  would  have  been  within  less  than  ten  miles  of  what  is  desig- 
nated as  Custer  Peak,  the  hill  on  which  Custer  perished.  Then,  with 
Custer  moving  on  the  morning  of  the  26th,  Gibbon's  infantry  and 
Catling  guns  could  have  forced  those  Sioux  out  of  the  village  on  to  the 
open  ground,  extending  from  the  Little  Big  Horn  to  the  Big  Horn,  and 
Custer's  twelve  troops  of  cavalry  and  Gibbon's  four,  sixteen  troops  in 
all,  between  them  would  have  made  the  biggest  killing  of  Indians  who 
needed  killing  ever  made  on  the  American  continent  since  Cortez  in- 
vaded Mexico.  While  this  is  a  speculation,  and  an  idle  one,  it  is  to  my 
mind  a  rather  interesting  one. 

I  think  myself  that  General  Hughes  makes  out  his  case  in  reference 
to  that  affidavit  that  General  Miles  has  so  carefully  treasured  for  so 
many  years.  It  would  be  a  very  interesting  historical  document,  but  it 
would  have  been  more  satisfactory  if  it  had  been  produced  while  Terry 
or  General  Gibbon  or  both  were  alive.  I  doubt  very  much  whether 


Little  Big  Horn  Campaign        385 

Major  Brisbin's  supposed  copy  of  the  order  book  at  Terry's  head- 
quarters was  compared  with  the  original  after  Brisbin  had 
made  it. 

I  regret  to  say  that  my  paper  upon  this  campaign  was  lost,  and  I  have 
not  even  the  notes  from  which  it  was  written.  I  found  one  brief  page, 
which  I  quote  merely  as  indication  of  my  reasons  for  believing  that 
there  were  more  than  two  thousand  Indian  warriors  in  the  battle  of 
June  25th:  "Before  May  loth  of  '77  more  than  one  thousand  war- 
riors came  in  and  surrendered,  not  including  the  warriors  killed  in  that 
battle  or  the  half  dozen  other  engagements,  nor  the  individual  war- 
riors by  the  hundreds  that  sneaked  back  to  the  agencies  and  those  who 
went  to  British  America  under  Sitting  Bull,  numbering,  it  was  under- 
stood, over  two  thousand  warriors." 

I  do  not  think  you  are  too  severe  upon  Major  Reno.  I  conversed 
with  most  of  the  officers  of  that  command  at  one  time  or  another, 
while  in  the  field,  and  nearly  all  were  very  pronounced  in  their  severe 
criticism  of  Reno.)  The  testimony  at  the  Reno  court  of  inquiry  was  less 
severe  than  the  sentiments  expressed  within  a  few  days,  weeks,  and 
months  after  the  occurrence.  That  was  perhaps  natural.  It  is  barely 
possible  that  some  of  it  was  due  to  the  fact  that  Captain  Weir,  one 
of  General  Custer's  most  pronounced  friends  and  one  of  Major  Reno's 
most  bitter  critics,  died  before  the  court  of  inquiry  met. 

I  do  not  think  that  Sturgis,  Porter,  etc.,  were  captured  and  tortured. 
I  found  most  of  the  lining  of  Porter's  coat  in  the  camp,  which  showed 
that  the  bullet  that  struck  him  must  have  broken  the  back  and  passed 
in  or  out  at  the  navel.  (My  theory  has  been,  with  reference  to  those 
whose  bodies  could  not  be  found,  that  most  of  them  made  a  dash  into 
the  Bad  Lands  in  the  direction  of  the  mouth  of  the  Rosebud,  where 
they  had  last  seen  General  Gibbon's  command.  It  would  have  been 
easy  for  them  to  have  perished  from  thirst  in  the  condition  they  were 
in,  and  if  they  reached  the  Yellowstone  and  undertook  to  swim  it,  the 
chances  were  decidedly  against  their  succeeding, 

Very  sincerely, 

C.  A.  WOODRUFF, 
Brigadier-General,  United  States  Army,  Retired. 

V. 

So  soon  as  this  appendix  as  above  was  in  type,  I  sent  printed  proofs 
of  it  to  Generals  Hughes,  Woodruff,  and  Carrington,  and  to  Colonel 
Godfrey  for  final  revision  and  correction  before  the  matter  was  plated. 


386        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

In  returning  the  proof,  General  Carrington  and  Colonel  Godfrey  both 
add  further  communications,  which  I  insert  below. 

I  also  sent  the  same  proof  to  Mrs.  Elizabeth  B.  Custer,  widow  of 
General  Custer,  and  to  Mrs.  John  H.  Maugham,  his  sister,  with  an 
expression  of  my  willingness  —  nay,  my  earnest  desire  —  to  print  any 
comment  they  or  either  of  them  might  wish  to  make  upon  the  ques- 
tion under  discussion. 

At  Mrs.  Custer's  request  I  sent  the  appendix  to  Lieutenant-Colonel 
Jacob  L.  Greene,  U.  S.  V.,  now  president  of  the  Connecticut  Mutual 
Life  Insurance  Company,  who  was  Custer's  adjutant-general  during 
the  war  and  his  life-long  friend  thereafter.  His  able  defense  of  his  old 
commander  is  printed  as  the  last  of  this  interesting  series  of  historic 
documents. 

Desiring  that  Custer,  through  his  friends,  may  have  the  final  word, 
I  print  it  without  comment,  save  to  say  that  I  fully  join  Colonel  Greene 
in  his  admiration  for  the  many  brilliant  qualities  and  achievements  of 
his  old  commander. 

GENERAL  CARRINGTON'S  LETTER 

Hyde  Park,  Mass.,  Sept.  25,  1904. 
Dear  Dr.  Brady: 

I  appreciate  the  favor  of  reading  the  proof-sheets  of  the  appendix 
to  your  papers  upon  the  Custer  massacre.  When  it  occurred  I  was 
greatly  shocked  by  an  event  so  similar  in  its  horrors  to  that  of  the  Phil 
Kearney  massacre,  in  1866.  A  previous  interview  with  General  Custer 
came  to  mind,  and  I  attended  the  sessions  of  the  court  of  inquiry 
at  Chicago,  taking  with  me,  for  reference,  a  map  which  I  had  carefully 
prepared  of  that  country,  with  the  assistance  of  James  Bridger,  my 
chief  guide,  and  his  associates. 

The  evidence  indicated  that  when  Custer  reached  the  "Little  Big 
Horn"  (so  known  upon  that  map)  and  sent  Benteen  up  stream,  with 
orders  that,  "if  he  saw  any  Indians,  to  give  them  hell,"  ordering  Reno 
to  follow  the  trail  across  the  river  and  move  down  toward  the  Indian 
camps,  while  he  moved  down  the  right  bank,  detaching  himself  from 
the  other  commands,  he  practically  cut  the  Indians  off  from  retreat  to 
the  mountains,  which  was  part  of  his  special  mission;  but,  in  the  flush 
of  immediate  battle,  lost  thought  of  the  combined  movement  from 
the  Big  Horn,  which  had  for  its  purpose  the  destruction  of  the  entire 
Indian  force  by  overwhelming  and  concentrated  numbers. 

Indeed,  the  court  of  inquiry  did  not  so  much  discredit  the  conduct 


Little  Big  Horn  Campaign        387 

of  Reno  as  reveal  the  fact  that  he  faced  a  vastly  superior  force  with  no 
assurance  that  he  could  have  immediate  support  from  the  other  bat- 
talions, so  vital  in  a  sudden  collision  with  desperate  and  hard-pressed 
enemies,  j  The  succeeding  fight,  on  the  defensive,  protracted  as  it  was, 
with  no  information  of  Custer's  position,  or  possible  support  from  him, 
was  a  grave  commentary  upon  the  whole  affair. 

The. interview  with  General  Custerj  referred  to  was  in  1876,  when, 
upon  leaving  the  lecture  platform  of  the  Historical  Society  in  New  York, 
he  made  the  remark,  on  our  way  to  his  hotel,  '/It  will  take  another 
Phil  Kearney  massacre  to  bring  Congress  up  to  a  generous  support  of 
the  army."  We  spent  several  hours  together,  while/he  discussed  his 
troubles  with  the  authorities  at  Washington.  He  recalled  the  events  of 
1867,  and  felt  that  General  Sherman  had  severely  judged  his  operations 
on  the  Republican,  but  that  the  time  was  near  when  he  might  have  an 
opportunity  to  vindicate  himself,  and  that,  "if  he  again  had  a  chance 
he  would  accomplish  it  or  die  in  the  attempt."}  He  was  practically  on  a 
leave  of  absence,  and  its  extension  was  not  his  choice.  Colonel  Smith 
was  sick,  and  he  claimed  the  right  to  command  his  regiment,  since  it 
had  been  ordered  to  report  as  part  of  General  Terry's  command. 

The  famous  sutlership  scandal  was  fully  discussed/and  here  there 
has  been  confusion  as  to  Custer's  position.  /He  had  nothing  to  do  with 
the  popular  complaint  that  Belknap  was  farming  out  sutlerships  for 
personal  emolument.  Neither  is  it  technically  correct  that  the  Secre- 
tary of  War  could  make  original  appointments  of  the  kind  complained 
of.  Post  commanders,  with  their  councils  of  officers,  had  both  the 
selection  of  their  sutler,  and  fixed  the  prices  of  articles  to  be  sold. 
The  Secretary  simply  issued  the  appointment  thus  designated,  unless 
for  good  reasons  declined,  thereby  requiring  another  selection  by  the 
officers.  In  cases  of  troops  in  campaign,  or  detached,  or  on  distant  ser- 
vice, the  commanding  General  confirmed  the  officer's  choice.  Cus- 
ter's position  was  manly,  legal,  and  just;  but  his  assertion  of  this  right, 
so  far  as  made,  offended  Belknap,  at  the  expense  of  officers  whose 
rights  were  overruled  by  non-military  influence. 

Custer  was  not  under  charges  that  would  militate  against  his  assign- 
ment to  the  rightful  command  of  his  regiment  when  ordered  into  field 
service.  I  did  not  hesitate  to  urge  him  to  press  his  claim,  but  could 
not  entertain  the  idea  that  he  would  go  to  Bismarck,  or  otherwise  to 
make  his  claim  in  person,  except  through  Washington  Headquarters. 

If  ever  a  man  had  an  incentive  to  dare  odds  with  his  regiment,  this 
fearless  fighter  and  rider,  whose  spirit  reached  the  verge  of  frenzy  in 
battle,  was  the  man  for  the  occasion. 


388        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

(Through  all  the  papers  cited  by  you,  there  runs  the  same  subtle 
suggestion  that  he  who,  as  an  independent  commander  of  aggressive 
cavalry  in  the  Civil  War,  was  almost  expected  to  take  into  the  field  a 
large  discretion  as  to  his  actions  (whereby  he  had  formerly  achieved 
success)  when  confronted  by  the  enemy,  within  striking  distance  in  the 
Little  Big  Horn  Valley,  lost  all  sense  of  danger  and  all  thought  of 
prescribed  details  of  action  in  the  confidence  that,  somehow,  the  old 
Seventh  could  not  be  whipped  by  any  savage  force  whatsoever  J } 

I  I  have  always  regarded  Terry's  general  plan  as  well  conceived,  for 
Reno's  prior  scouting  had  almost  assured  the  inevitable  course  of  thek 
Indian  trail  westward,  and  events  confirmed  Terry's  judgment./ 
General  Hughes  had  served  upon  Terry's  staff  during  the  Civil  War 
with  credit,  as  well  as  captain  in  the  1 8th  Infantry  on  the  frontier, 
and  his  assurances  that  General  Terry  fully  explained  to  Custer 
the  reasons  why  Washington  authorities  distrusted  his  discretion  and 
was  more  precise  in  giving  him  this  detached  command,  cannot  be  im- 
peached by  an  asserted  affidavit  that  whispered  hints,  unheard  by 
officers  by  his  side,  allowed  him  to  be  his  own  master  in  a  matter  where 
a  combined  movement  of  three  commands  was  the  prime  factor  in 
complete  success. 

(Neither  is  there  any  doubt  whatever  that  Custer's  earnest  plea,  that 
he  be  trusted  to  fulfil  the  exact  duties  assigned  to  his  command, 
secured  not  only  the  sympathy  and  confidence  of  Terry  in  his  behalf, 
but  that  on  that  condition  only  did  the  Washington  authorities  author- 
ize General  Terry  to  vacate  the  order  for  his  arrest  because  of  going 
to  his  command  without  orders.] 

As  already  stated,  Custer's  confidence  in  the  Seventh  Cavalry  was 
well  deserved.  It,  with  him,  was  a  veritable  thunderbolt  in  action; 
but  it  was  not  omnipotent.  That  over-confidence  which  dissolved  its 
unity  at  the  supreme  crisis  was  fatal.  Even  then,  a  realized  success 
of  which  Custer  had  no  doubt,  would  have  minimized  the  rashness  of 
his  dash  and  have  largely  condoned  his  fault. 
Yours  sincerely, 

HENRY  B.  CARRINGTON. 

COLONEL  GODFREY'S  FINAL  REMARKS 

I  have  no  desire  to  pose  as  the  special  champion  of  General  Custer, 
and  it  is  still  further  from  my  desire  to  pose  as  inimical  to  General 
Terry.  /  My  only  purpose  is  to  demonstrate  the  truth,  not  only  for  this 
discussion,  but  for  history. 


Little  Big  Horn  Campaign        389 

This  subject  surely  has  gotten  to  the  stage  of  academic  discussion. 
I  am  not  willing  to  admit  that  the  phrase  "he  desires  that  you  should 
conform  to  them  (his  views)  unless,"  etc.,  conveys  a  direct,  positive 
command  which  could  not  be  more  explicit.  Nor  do  I  admit  that 
orders  given  by  a  commander,  in  which  he  uses  the  words  "desires," 
"wishes,"  and  equivalents,  convey  positive  commands  under  all  cir- 
cumstances. In  personal  or  social  matters,  such  words  convey  the  idea 
of  what  is  wanted  and  what  is  expected;  and  in  such  matters  the 
expressed  wishes  and  desires  are  usually  conveyed  to  personal  friends, 
who  loyally  conform  thereto,  if  not  in  letter,  in  spirit  and  in  results. 
In  such  relations  a  commander  does  not  want  to  use  language  that 
would  appear  dogmatic.  I  further  admit  that  in  personally  giving 
orders  a  commander  may  accentuate  the  expression  of  his  desires, 
wishes,  etc.,  so  as  to  leave  no  doubt  about  his  intentions,  and  to  convey 
positiveness  thus  expressed  to  his  commands.  When  a  commander 
gives  written  orders  through  official  channels,  the  words  "commands," 
"orders,"  and  "directs,"  or  the  use  of  the  imperative,  leave  little  ambi- 
guity or  doubt  as  to  what  is  ordered  or  intended. 

(Developments  subsequent  to  the  campaign  or  battle  leave  little 
doubt  that  General  Terry  had  about  him  men  or  influences  that  were 
suspicious,  inimical,  or  hostile  to  General  Custer.  I  sincerely  believe 
General  Terry  was  too  high  minded  knowingly  to  allow  himself  to 
be  influenced  by  any  sinister  motive] 

j  That  the  "instructions"  give  rise  to  this  discussion  shows  they  were 
vague.]  Was  this  vagueness  intentional  ?  General  Terry  was  a  law- 
yer. He  was  a  soldier.  As  lawyer  and  soldier  his  trained  mind 
should  have  weighed  the  words  embodied  in  these  instructions.  Now 
read  them:  t  "It  is  of  course  impossible*  to  give  you  any  definite  in- 
structions in  regard  to  this  movement,  and  were  it  not  impossible  to 
do  so,  the  Department  Commander  places  too  much  confidence  in  your 
zeal,  energy,  and  ability  to  wish  to  impose  upon  you  precise  orders  which 
might  hamper  your  action  when  nearly  in  contact  with  the  enemy," 
and  then  goes  on  to  indicate  what  he  thinks  should  be  done;  or,  in  other 
words,  indicates  what  he  (Terry)  himself  would  do  if  he  found  condi- 
tions as  expressed.)  |  Custer  evidently  saw  "sufficient  reasons  for  de- 
parting from  them'*  and  did  what  a  reasonable  interpretation  of  the 
instructions  contemplated,  made  his  own  plans.*  I  interpret  the  phrase 
"when  so  nearly  in  contact  with  the  enemy"  to  refer  to  the  immediate 
time  or  place  (June  21,  mouth  of  Rosebud)  of  writing  it.f] 

*  No  italics  in  original.  —  E.  S.  GODFREY. 

t  This  is  interesting,  and  is  the  first  suggestion  I  have  met  with  that  the  phrase  refers 


3QO        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

(  As  to  the  location  of  the  Indians.  Terry  believed  they  were  on  the 
Little  Big  Horn; —  we  found  them  on  that  river  about  15  miles  above 
its  forks  with  the  Big  Horn.  Had  the  village  been  at  the  forks,  the 
attack  would  have  been  delivered  on  the  25th  of  June,  as  the  village 
would  not  have  been  located  by  Custer  from  the  divide.  It  is  possible 
the  two  columns  might  have  joined  in  the  attack.  Now,  suppose  the 
village  had  been  located  50  or  60  miles  farther  south,  it  would  have 
still  been  within  Terry's  guess,  but  it  would  have  been  a  far  cry  to  Gib- 
bons' column  which,  under  the  instructions,  would  have  remained  at 
the  forks.  It  must  be  remembered  that  Custer  would  have  had  the 
Wolf  Mountains  (Rosebud  Mountains  on  later  maps)  between  him 
and  the  Little  Big  Horn  had  he  ignored  the  trail  and  gone  on 
southward  up  the  Rosebud,  as  Custer's  critics  would  have  us  believe 
were  the  intentions  of  the  instructions. 

General  Woodruff  would  have  him  stop  at  the  camp  of  June  24 
and  scout  to  locate  the  village,  etc.  Would  that  have  complied  with 
Woodruff's  interpretation  of  the  instructions  ?  And  from  that  position 
he  says:  "Custer  was  in  a  position  to  strike  either  one  of  the  three 
last  lines  of  flight  (east,  northeast  or  southeast),  whereas  if,  after  mak- 
ing the  forced  *  night  march  with  his  fatigued  animals,  he  had  struck 
the  Little  Big  Horn,  and  a  reconnaissance  had  shown  that  the  village 
had  left  the  Little  Big  Horn  going  northeast,  on  June  24  he  would 
have  been  two  days'  march  behind  them.  That  "  forced  "  night  march 
was  about  eight  miles,  and  every  mile  made  was  in  the  direction  to 
place  us  in  the  best  position  to  intercept  any  flight  to  the  northeast  and 
east.  Instead  of  being  two  days  behind  them,  we  would  have  met 
them  almost  "head  on." 

Of  what  practical  use  to  send  scouts  through  to  Gibbon  June  24? 

There  was  no  fresh  or  new  positive  information  to  send  to  him; 
Terry  had  "guessed"  it  all. 

Now  let  us  repeat  the  marches  made:  June  22,  twelve  miles; 
Jitine  23,  thirty-three  miles;  June  24,  twenty-eight  miles  ;  June  25, 
eight  miles  to  the  bivouac;  and  ten  miles  to  the  divide,  and  then  say 
fifteen  miles  to  the  village.  That  is  to  say,  ninety-one  miles  up  to  noon 
June  25,  when  it  was  decided  to  attack,  and  one  hundred  and  six  miles 
in  all  four  days.  That  doesn't  indicate  that  we  made  forced  marches.) 

to  the  position  of  Terry  and  Custer  when  the  orders  were  prepared  or  delivered,  and  not 
to  the  time  anticipated  when  Custer  should  meet  the   Sioux.     I  regret  that  I  cannot 
agree  with  this  interpretation.     Still,  it  is  possible  that  such  an  interpretation  is  cer- 
tainly a  point  for  Custer.  —  C.  T.  B. 
*  Italics  mine.  —  E.  S.  GODFREY. 


Little  Big  Horn  Campaign        391 

i 

Woodruff  further  states  that  "he  made  that  fatal  night  march  with 
the  deliberate^  ?)  intention  of  trying  to  locate  and  strike  the  village  be- 
fore Gibbon  could  possibly  get  up."  I  say  that  statement  is  deliberately 
unfair,  and  contradicts  the  twice-told  statement  by  Custer,  that  he  did 
not  intend  to  attack  the  village  until  the  a6th,  once  before  he  knew  the 
location  of  the  village,  the  night  of  the  24th,  and  again  when  he  called 
the  officers  together  after  the  discovery  at  the  divide. 

Reno's  position  in  the  bottom,  in  the  old  river  bed,  was  sheltered 
from  fire  from  the  hills  by  heavy  timber,  and  was  nearly  a  mile  from 
the  hills.  I  have  never  before  heard  that  he  was  fired  upon  from  those 
hills;  but  he  was  fired  upon  from  the  woods  on  the  opposite  side  of  the 
river.  General  Gibbon  and  I  both  thought  the  hills  were  too  far  away 
to  give  any  effective  fire.  It  must  be  remembered  that  the  river  bot- 
tom was  heavily  timbered  for  some  distance  above  and  below  this 
position.  This  timber  subsequently  was  cut  for  the  construction  of 
Fort  Custer. 

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL  GREENE'S   DEFENSE   OF  CUSTER 

Hartford,  Conn.,  September  I,  1904. 

My  Dear  Sir  : 

I  have  read  with  great  interest  your  discussion  of  the  question  of 
General  Custer's  alleged  disobedience  of  orders,  both  in  the  narrative 
of  the  Battle  on  the  Little  Big  Horn  and  in  the  appendix  to  the  volume, 
and  upon  which  you  have  asked  my  comment. 

For  whatever  bearing  it  may  have  upon  the  propriety  of  any  com- 
ment of  mine,  let  me  say  that  General  Custer  was  my  intimate  friend, 
and  that  his  first  act  after  receiving  his  appointment  in  the  Civil  War 
as  a  brigadier-general  was  to  secure  my  appointment  and  detail  to  him 
as  adjutant-general,  which  relation  I  held  until  his  muster  out  of  the 
volunteer  service  in  1866.  I  think  no  one  knows  better  his  quality  as 
a  soldier  and  as  a  man.  I  know  his  virtues  and  his  defects,  which  were 
the  defects  of  his  virtues.  He  was  a  fborn  soldier,  and  specifically  a 
born  cavalry  man.  The  true  end  of  warfare  was  to  him  not  only  a 
professional  theory  —  it  was  an  instinct.  When  he  was  set  to  destroy  an 
enemy,  he  laid  his  hand  on  him  as  soon  as  possible,  and  never  took  it 
off.  He  knew  the  whole  art  of  war.  But  its  arts  and  its  instruments 
and  their  correct  professional  handling  were  not  in  his  eyes  the  end  all  of 
a  soldier's  career,  to  be  satisfied  with  a  technical  performance.  They 
were  the  means  and  the  tools  in  the  terms  of  which  and  by  the  use  of 
which  his  distinct  military  genius  apprehended  and  solved  its  practical 


392        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

and  fateful  problems.  When  he  grappled  his  task  it  was  to  do  it,  not 
to  go  correctly  through  the  proper  motions  to  their  technical  limit,  and 
then  hold  himself  excused. 

(  He  was  remarkable  for  his  keenness  and  accuracy  in  observation, 
for  his  swift  divination  of  the  military  significance  of  every  element  of 
a  situation,  for  his  ability  to  make  an  instant  and  sound  decision,  and 
then,  for  the  instant,  exhaustless  energy  with  which  he  everlastingly 
drove  home  his  attack.  And  the  swiftness  and  relentless  power  of  his 
stroke  were  great  elements  in  the  correctness  of  his  decisions  as  well  as 
in  the  success  of  his  operations.  He  was  wise  and  safe  in  undertaking 
that  in  which  a  man  slower  in  observation,  insight  and  decision,  and 
slower  and  less  insistent  in  action,  would  have  judged  wrongly  and 
failed.) 

I  knew  Custer  as  a  soldier  when  he  was  a  brigade  and  division  com- 
mander under  Pleasanton  and  Sheridan,  the  successive  commanders 
of  the  Cavalry  Corps  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  Those  who  knew  the 
estimate  in  which  those  great  commanders  held  him  —  the  tasks  they 
committed  to  his  soldierly  intelligence  and  comprehension,  his  fidelity 
and  skill  —  need  no  reminder  that  in  nothing  of  all  their  dependence 
upon  and  confidence  in  him  did  he  ever  fail  in  letter  or  spirit.  \l  know 
how  absolutely  loyal  he  was  under  the  conflicting  conditions  which 
sometimes  confront  every  subordinate  charged  with  grave  responsi- 
bilities, and  which  test  the  sense  of  duty  to  the  utmost.  He  was  true 
as  steel.  He  was  depended  upon  for  great  things  because  he  was 
dependable.) 

In  temperament  he  was  sanguine  and  ardent.  He  loved  his  friends; 
he  was  impatient  of  every  form  of  inefficiency  and  of  pretense;  he  did 
not  highly  esteem  mere  professionalism;  he  was  impulsive  and  some- 
times abrupt  in  manner,  but  kind  of  heart;  he  was  sensitive  only  to 
unjust  criticism;  he  despised  intrigue,  chicane  and  all  meanness;  he 
was  independent  in  opinion  and  judgment,  and  frank  in  their  expres- 
sion; he  was  open  in  opposition,  and  fair  to  an  enemy./ 

And  it  goes  without  saying  that  such  a  man  had  enemies  —  men  who 
were  envious  of  his  abilities,  his  achievements  and  his  fame;  men  whom 
he  never  sought  to  placate,  and  who  sought  envy's  balm  in  detraction 
and  hatred;  men  who  could  not  measure  him  or  be  fair  to  him,  but 
men  who  in  a  pinch  would  have  turned  to  him  with  unhesitating  trust, 
whether  in  his  ability  or  his  soldierly  faith. 

Did  this  man,  this  soldier,  whose  service  throughout  the  Civil  War 
and  a  long  career  of  frontier  warfare  was  for  eighteen  years  unequaled 
for  efficiency  and  brilliancy  within  the  range  of  its  opportunities  and 


Little  Big  Horn  Campaign        393 

responsibilities,  who  never  failed  his  commanders,  who  never  disobeyed 
an  order,  nor  disappointed  an  expectation,  nor  deceived  a  friend  -£  did 
this  man,  at  the  last,  deny  his  whole  life  history,  his  whole  mental  and 
moral  habit,  his  whole  character,  and  wilfully  disobey  an  understood 
order,  or  fail  of  its  right  execution  according  to  his  best  judgment, 
within  the  limits  of  his  ability  under  the  conditions  of  the  event;  and, 
what  is  worse  —  and  this  is  what  his  detractors  charge  — (did  he  not 
only  disobey,  but  did  he  from  the  inception  of  the  enterprise  plan 
to  disobey  —  to  deceive  his  commander  who  trusted  him,  in  order  that 
he  might  get  the  opportunity  to  disobey  ?  ; 

To  any  man  who  knew  Custer,  except  those  who  for  any  reason  hold 
a  brief  against  him,  not  only  is  the  charge  of  premeditated,  deliberate 
disobedience  absurd,  but  it  is  a  foul  outrage  on  one  of  the  memories 
that  will  never  fail  of  inspiration  while  an  American  army  carries  and 
defends  an  American  flag.J 

In  one  of  Mrs.  Custer  s  letters  to  me,  narrating  what  took  place 
during  the  days  of  preparation  for  the  General's  departure,  she  wrote: 

"A  day  before  the  expedition  started,  General  Terry  was  in  our 
house  alone  with  Autie  (the  General's  pet  name).  A.'s  thoughts  were 
calm,  deliberate,  and  solemn.  He  had  been  terribly  hurt  in  Washing- 
ton. General  Terry  had  applied  for  him  to  command  the  expedition. 
He  was  returned  to  his  regiment  because  General  Terry  had  applied 
for  him.  I  know  that  he  (Custer)  felt  tenderly  and  affectionately 
toward  him.  On  that  day  he  hunted  me  out  in  the  house  and  brought 
me  into  the  living-room,  not  telling  me  why.  He  shut  the  door,  and 
very  seriously  and  impressively  said:  'General  Terry,  a  man  usually 
means  what  he  says  when  he  brings  his  wife  to  listen  to  his  statements. 
I  want  to  say  that  reports  are  circulating  that  I  do  not  want  to  go  out 
to  the  campaign  under  you.'  (I  supposed  that  he  meant,  having  been 
given  the  command  before,  he  was  unwilling  to  be  a  subordinate.) 
'  But  I  want  you  to  know  that  I  do  want  to  go  and  serve  under  you,  not 
only  that  I  value  you  as  a  soldier,  but  as  a  friend  and  a  man.'  The 
exact  words  were  the  strongest  kind  of  a  declaration  that  he  wished 
him  to  know  he  wanted  to  serve  under  him." 

That  was  Custer  all  over.  And  to  any  one  who  knew  him  —  to  any 
one  who  can  form  a  reasonable  conception  of  the  kind  of  a  man  he 
must  needs  have  been  to  have  done  for  eighteen  years  what  he  had 
done  and  as  he  had  done  it,  and  won  the  place  and  fame  he  had  won  — 
that  statement  ends  debate.  Whatever  of  chagrin,  disappointment, 
or  irritation  he  may  have  felt  before,  however  unadvisedly  the  sore- 
hearted,  high-spirited  man  may  have  spoken  with  his  lips  when  all  was 


394        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

undetermined,  and  his  part  and  responsibility  had  not  been  assigned, 
this  true  soldier,  knowing  the  gossip  of  the  camp,  conscious  possibly  it 
was  not  wholly  without  cause,  however  exaggerated,  but  facing  now 
his  known  duty  and  touched  by  the  confidence  of  his  superior  as  Cus- 
ter  never  failed  to  be  touched,  could  not  part  from  his  commander  with 
a  possible  shadow  resting  between  them.  He  knew  the  speech  of  men 
might  have  carried  to  Terry's  mind  the  suggestion  of  a  doubt.  And 
yet  Terry  had  trusted  him.  He  could  not  bear  to  part  without  letting 
General  Terry  know  that  he  was  right  to  trust  him.  That  statement  to 
Terry  was  a  recognition  of  whatever  folly  of  words  he  might  before 
have  committed  in  his  grief  and  anger;  it  was  an  open  purging  of  an 
upright  soldier's  soul  as  an  act  honorably  due  alike  to  superior  and 
subordinate;  it  was,  under  the  circumstances,  the  instinctive  response 
of  a  true  man  to  the  confidence  of  one  who  had  committed  to  him  a 
trust  involving  the  honor  and  fame  of  both.  Disobedience,  whether 
basely  premeditated,  or  with  equal  baseness  undertaken  upon  after- 
deliberation,  is  inconceivable,  unless  one  imputes  to  Custer  a  charac- 
ter void  of  every  soldierly  and  manly  quality.  With  such  an  one  discus- 
sion would  be  useless. 

Upon  the  discussion  itself,  which  is  presented  in  the  narrative  and  in 
the  appendix,  I  have  little  to  say.  In  the  opening  paragraph  of  the 
appendix,  you  say:  "I  presume  the  problem  .  .  .  will  never 
be  authoritatively  settled,  and  that  men  will  continue  to  differ  upon 
these  questions  until  the  end  of  time." 

I  In  other  words,  the  charge  of  disobedience  can  never  be  proved. 
The  proof  does  not  exist.  The  evidence  in  the  case  forever  lacks  the 
principal  witness  whose  one  and  only  definite  order  was  to  take  his 
regiment  and  go  "in  pursuit  of  the  Indians  whose  trail  was  discovered 
by  Major  Reno  a  few  days  since." j  They  were  the  objective;  they 
were  to  be  located  and  their  escape  prevented.  That  was  Custer's 
task.  All  the  details  were  left,  and  necessarily  left,  to  his  discretion. 
All  else  in  the  order  of  June  22d  conveys  merely  the  "views"  of  the 
commander  to  be  followed  "unless  you  should  see  sufficient  reasons 
for  departing  from  them."  [The  argument  that  Custer  disobeyed  this 
order  seems  to  resolve  itself"  into  two  main  forms.  One  is  trying  to 
read  into  the  order  a  precision  and  a  peremptory  character  which  are 
not  there  and  which  no  ingenuity  can  put  there,  and  to  empty  it  of  a  dis- 
cretion which  is  there  and  is  absolute  ;  the  other  is  in  assuming  or 
asserting  that  Custer  departed  from  General  Terry's  views  without 
"sufficient  reasons."  And  this  line  of  argument  rests  in  part  upon  the 
imputation  to  Custer  of  a  motive  and  intent  which  was  evil  throughout. 


Little  Big  Horn  Campaign        395 

and  in  part  upon  what  his  critic,  in  the  light  of  later  knowledge  and  the 
vain  regrets  of  hindsight,  thinks  he  ought  to  have  done,  and  all  in  utter 
ignorance  of  Custer's  own  views  of  the  conditions  in  which,  when  he 
met  them,  he  was  to  find  his  own  reasons  for  whatever  he  did  or  did 
not  do.  Under  that  order,  it  was  Custer's  views  of  the  conditions 
when  they  confronted  him  that  were  to  govern  his  actions,  whether  they 
contravened  General  Terry's  views  or  not.  If  in  the  presence  of  the 
actual  conditions,  in  the  light  of  his  great  experience  and  knowledge  in 
handling  Indians,  he  deemed  it  wise  to  follow  the  trail,  knowing  it 
would  reach  them,  and  deeming  that  so  to  locate  them  would  be  the 
best  way  to  prevent  their  escape,  then  he  obeyed  that  order  just  as 
exactly  as  if,  thinking  otherwise,  he  had  gone  scouting  south- 
ward where  they  were  not,  and  neither  Terry  nor  he  expected 
them  to  be. 

To  charge  disobedience  is  to  say  that  he  wilfully  and  with  a  wrong 
motive  and  intent  did  that  which  his  own  military  judgment  forbade; 
for  it  was  his  own  military  judgment,  right  or  wrong,  that  was  to  gov- 
ern his  own  actions  under  the  terms  of  that  order.  The  quality  of  his 
judgment  does  not  touch  the  question  of  obedience.  If  he  disobeyed 
that  order,  it  was  by  going  contrary  to  his  own  judgment.  That  was 
the  only  way  he  could  disobey  it.  If  men  differ  as  to  whether  he  did 
that,  they  will  differ. 

Respectfully  yours, 

JACOB    L.   GREENE. 

VI. 

To  sum  up,  I  suggest  this  as  a  possible  line  of  investigations  by  which 
the  student  may  determine  the  question  for  himself: 

First.     Were  Terry's  written  orders  definite  and  explicit  ? 

Second.     Were  they  intelligent  orders  capable  of  execution  ? 

Third.     Did  these  orders  admit  of  more  than  one  meaning  ? 

Fourth.     What  are  the  various  meanings,  if  more  than  one  ? 

Fifth.     Did  Custer  carry  them  out  in  any  of  their  meanings  ? 

Sixth.     Did  Custer  depart  from  them  ? 

Seventh.     If  so,  how  far  ? 

Eighth.  Such  being  the  case,  was  he  justified  in  so  departing  by  the 
exigencies  of  the  situation  ? 

Ninth.     Were  the  consequences  of  such  a  departure  serious  ? 

Tenth.  Did  Custer  receive  verbal  orders  from  Terry  at  the  last 
moment  ? 


396        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

Eleventh.     If  so,  when  f 

Twelfth.     Did  these  verbal  orders  supersede  the  written  orders  ? 

In  closing,  I  repeat  that  I  should  be  glad  to  be  convinced  that  I  have 
erred  in  my  conclusions;  and  that  if  any  one  can  convince  me  that 
Custer  did  not  disobey,  or  that  in  doing  so  he  was  justified  in  his  dis- 
obedience, I  shall  make  the  fullest  public  amends  for  my  expression 
of  opinion  that  he  did  and  that  he  was  not.* 

*  At  the  risk  of  tiring  the  reader,  but  because  I  am  sensitive  in  the  matter  and  anx- 
ious not  to  be  misunderstood,  I  append  here  a/letter  written  by  me  to  a  sister  of 
General  Custer,  who  had  expressed  the  hope  that  I  would  not  take  the  position  that  he 
disobeyed  his  orders , 

July  1 3th,  1904. 
My  Dear  Madam: 

I  have  received  and  read  and  reread  your  letter  of  the  izth  inst.  That  letter  and 
the  thought  of  Mrs.  Custer,  whose  character,  in  common  with  all  Americans,  I  respect 
and  admire,  taken  in  connection  with  the  position  which  my  conscience,  much  against 
my  will,  has  compelled  me  to  assume,  has  filled  me  with  deep  regret. 

Having  read  thus  far,  you  will  undoubtedly  divine  that  ft  am  compelled  to  say  that  I 
believe  General  Custer  did  disobey  his  orders.  I  have  nowhere  stated  that  I  consider 
him  guilty  of  rashness.  I  have  also  made  it  plain,  I  think,  that  even  though  he  did  dis- 
obey his  orders,  the  ultimate  annihilation  of  his  battalion  was  due  to  the  cowardice  or 
incapacity  of  Major  Reno. 

I  remember  to  have  seen  General  Custer  when  I  was  a  boy  in  Kansas.  My  father, 
who  was  a  veteran  of  the  Civil  War,  had  a  great  admiration  for  him.  I  was  present 
when  the  bodies  of  the  officers  of  the  Seventh  Cavalry  were  brought  back  for  reinter- 
ment at  Fort  Leavenworth.  My  wife,  a  Southern  woman,  is  a  cousin  of  the  late 
General  Dod  Ramseur,  who  was  General  Custer 's  intimate  friend.  The  family  have 
never  forgotten  General  Custer's  kindness  when  Ramseur  was  killed. 

I  did,  and  still  have,  a  warm  admiration  for  the  brilliant  and  soldierly  qualities  of 
General  Custer.  He  was,  and  is,  my  beau  ideal  of  a  cavalry  soldier.  When  I  began  to 
write  these  articles,  I  would  not  hear  the  charge  that  he  had  disobeyed  orders.  But  I 
have  been  compelled  by  my  investigations  to  take  that  position.  I  cannot  tell  you  how 
painful  it  has  been  to  me,  and  it  is,  to  come  to  this  conclusion.  I  have  thought  long 
and  deeply  over  the  matter. 

t  Of  course  I  read  General  Hughes'  now  famous  article.  I  did  not,  however,  allow 
that  article  alone  to  determine  me;  but  I  carefully  considered  every  account.  I  exam- 
ined every  discussion  which  I  could  find.  J  Not  only  that,  I  corresponded  with  a  num- 
ber of  officers,  among  them  being  Lieutenant-General  Miles,  Major-General  Hughes, 
Brigadier-General  C.  A.  Woodruff,  Brigadier-General  Carrington,  and  Colonel  God- 
frey. The  remarks  of  these  officers  were  submitted  to  one  another.  Their  statements 
were  weighed  and  digested  with  the  utmost  care  by  me.  I  could  come  to  no  other 
conclusion  than  that  I  have  arrived  at. 

As  an  Appendix  I  have  inserted  in  full  my  correspondence  with  different  officers  con- 
cerning the  matter.  I  have  been  glad  to  print  all  that  Colonel  Godfrey,  who  has  in- 
deed been  a  powerful  advocate  in  opposition  to  my  views,  has  written.  1 1  have  called 
attention  to  one  significant  fact  which,  in  my  opinion,  would  fully  clear  General  Custer 


Little  Big  Horn  Campaign        397 

from  the  charge  of  disobedience.    That  is  the  affidavit  of  an  alleged  witness  to  the  last 
conversation  between  Terry  and  General  Custer.  ) 

General  Miles  refers  to  this  affidavit  in  his  book,  "Personal  Recollections  of  General 
Nelson  A.  Miles."  President  E.  Benjamin  Andrews  also  refers  to  it  in  his  book,  "The 
United  States  in  our  Own  Time."  I  wrote  to  President  Andrews,  who  gave  Miles  as 
his  authority.  I  wrote  to  General  Miles  three  times,  registering  the  last  letter,  asking 
him  to  substantiate  the  affidavit,  the  existence  of  which  was  doubted  by  many  army 
officers.  General  Miles  has  made  no  reply.  I  take  it  for  granted,  therefore,  that  he 
cannot  substantiate  the  affidavit. 

I  have  said  frankly  that  if  he  can  prove  this  affidavit  and  establish  the  credibility  of 
the  affiant,  I  will  make  public  amends  in  the  most  ample  manner  for  having  said 
General  Custer  disobeyed  his  orders.  I  have  said  that  if  anybody  can  convince  me 
that  I  have  been  wrong  in  my  concluison  ;  if  any  evidence  can  be  produced  which 
will  establish  the  contrary,  I  shall  be  most  happy  to  retract  what  I  have  said  in  any 
possible  way  that  may  be  suggested  to  me. 

I  beg  you  to  believe  that  I  have  written  in  no  spirit  of  animosity  to  General  Custer. 
My  real  feelings  for  General  Custer  can  easily  be  seen  from  my  article  on  the  Battle  of 
the  Washita,  to  which  you  have  referred.  It  would  be  most  agreeable  to  me  if  you 
would  forward  this  letter  to  Mrs.  Custer. 

Again  deploring  the  unfortunate  conclusion  I  am  conscientiously  compelled  to  ar- 
rive at,  and  regretting  more  than  I  can  express  that  I  must  give  pain  to  Mrs.  Custer,  to 
you,  and  to  the  friends  of  General  Custer,  I  am, 

Yours  sincerely, 

CYRUS  TOWNSEND  BRADY. 

If  this  Appendix  shall  cause  any  light  to  be  thrown  on  the  affidavit 
so  often  referred  to,  it  will  serve  an  excellent  purpose;  for,  I  say  again, 
I  shall  consider  the  establishment  of  that  affidavit  as  settling  the 
question. 

The  subject  is  now  left  with  the  student.  Perhaps  I  cannot  more 
fitly  close  the  discussion  than  by  this  quotation  from  the  confidential 
report  of  General  Terry  by  General  Sheridan,  dated  July  2,  1875: 

"I  do  not  tell  you  this  to  cast  any  reflection  on  Custer,  for  whatever 
errors  he  may  have  committed  he  has  paid  the  penalty,  and  you  cannot 
regret  his  loss  more  than  I  do;  but  I  felt  that  our  plan  must  have  been 
successful  had  it  been  carried  out,  and  I  desire  you  to  know  the  facts." 


APPENDIX  B 

Further  Light  on  the  Conduct  of   Major   Reno 

AFTER  the  publication  of  the  Custer  article  censuring  Reno, 
my    attention    was    called    to    the    following    editorial,  which 
appeared    in   the   Northwestern    Christian    Advocate,   of  Sep- 
tember 7,  1904: 

WHY  GENERAL  CUSTER  PERISHED 

General  George  A.  Custer  was  and  will  always  be  regarded  as  one  of 
the  most  brilliant  officers  of  the  United  States  Army.  His  career 
abounds  in  romantic  interest;  and  his  death,  together  with  that  of 
every  officer  and  soldier  fighting  with  him,  was  one  of  the  most  tragic 
and  memorable  incidents  in  Indian  warfare.  The  story  of  Custer's 
last  fight  with  the  Indians,  which  took  place  on  the  Little  Big  ^Horn 
River  in  the  summer  of  1876,  is  graphically  described  by  Cyrus  Town- 
send  Brady.  It  is  not  our  purpose  to  relate  the  story  of  the  battle,  but 
to  call  attention  to  the  real  cause  of  Major  Reno's  conduct,  which 
resulted  in  Custer's  defeat  and  death. 

After  describing  the  movements  by  which  Custer  distributed  his 
force,  and  the  task  assigned  to  Major  Reno,  who  displayed  remarkable 
indecision  and  errors  of  judgment,  which  would  have  been  inexcusable 
even  in  an  inexperienced  young  officer,  and  caused  Reno  to  retreat 
instead  of  vigorously  attacking  the  Indians,  Mr.  Brady  says: 

"  His  [Reno's]  second  position  was  admirable  for  defense.  Sheltered  by  the 
trees,  with  his  flanks  and  rear  protected  by  the  river,  he  could  have  held  the  place 
indefinitely.  He  had  not,  however,  been  detailed  to  defend  or  hold  any  position, 
but  to  make  a  swift,  dashing  attack  ;  and  after  a  few  moments  of  the  feeblest  kind 
of  advance,  he  found  himself  thrown  upon  the  defensive.  Such  a  result  would  break 
up  the  most  promising  plan.  It  certainly  broke  up  Custer's. 

"  It  is  a  painful  thing  to  accuse  an  army  officer  of  misconduct,  but  I  have  taken 

398 


The  Conduct  of  Major  Reno      399 

the  opinion  of  a  number  of  army  officers  on  the  subject,  and  every  one  of  them  con- 
siders Reno  culpable  in  a  high  degree.  One,  at  least,  has  not  hesitated  to  make 
known  his  opinion  in  the  most  public  way.  I  am  loath  to  believe  that  Major  Reno 
was  a  coward  ;  but  he  certainly  lost  his  head,  and  when  he  lost  his  head  he  lost  Ouster. 
His  indecision  was  pitiful.  Although  he  had  suffered  practically  no  loss  and  had  no 
reason  to  be  alarmed,  he  was  in  a  state  of  painful  uncertainty  as  to  what  he  should 
do  next.  The  soldier  —  like  the  woman  —  who  hesitates  in  an  emergency  which 
demands  instant  decision  is  lost. 

"  There  had,  as  yet,  been  no  panic,  and  under  a  different  officer  there  would  have 
been  none;  but  it  is  on  record  that  Reno  gave  an  order  for  the  men  to  mount  and 
retreat  to  the  bluffs.  Before  he  could  be  obeyed  he  countermanded  this  order. 
Then  the  order  was  given  again,  but  in  such  a  way  that  nobody,  save  those  imme- 
diately around  him,  heard  it  because  of  the  din  of  the  battle  then  raging  in  a  sort  of 
aimless  way  all  along  the  line,  and  no  attempt  was  made  to  obey  it.  It  was  then 
repeated  for  the  third  time.  Finally,  as  those  farthest  away  saw  those  nearest  the 
flurried  commander  mounting  and  evidently  preparing  to  leave,  the  orders  were 
gradually  communicated  throughout  the  battalion  and  nearly  the  whole  mass  got 
ready  to  leave.  Eventually  they  broke  out  of  the  timber  in  a  disorderly  column  of 
fours,  striving  to  return  to  the  ford  they  had  crobsed  when  they  had  entered  the 
valley. 

"  Reno  calls  this  a  charge,  and  he  led  it !  He  was  so  excited  that,  after  firing 
his  pistols  at  the  Indians,  who  came  valiantly  after  the  fleeing  soldiers,  he  threw 
them  away.  The  pressure  of  the  Indians  upon  the  right  of  the  men  inclined  them 
to  the  left,  away  from  the  ford.  In  fact,  they  were  swept  into  a  confused  mass  and 
driven  toward  the  river.  All  semblance  of  organization  was  lost  in  the  mad  rush 
for  safety.  The  troops  had  degenerated  into  a  mob." 

Major  Reno  was  not  a  coward,  as  many  believe.  His  career  in  the 
army  during  the  Civil  War  and  his  promotion  for  gallant  and  meritori- 
ous services  at  Kelley's  Ford,  March  17,  1863,  and  at  the  battle  of 
Cedar  Creek,  October  19,  1864,  are  evidence  of  his  courage.  What, 
then,  was  the  explanation  of  his  conduct  at  the  Battle  of  the  Little  Big 
Horn  ?  Dr.  Brady  does  not  give  it.  Perhaps  he  does  not  know.  But 
Major  Reno  himself  told  the  late  Rev.  Dr.  Arthur  Edwards,  then  edi- 
tor of  the  Northwestern,  that  his  strange  actions  were  due  to  the  fact 
that  HE  WAS  DRUNK.  Reno's  conduct  in  that  battle  lost  him  many 
of  his  military  friends.  To  Arthur  Edwards,  who  knew  him  well,  and 
continued  his  faithful  friend,  Major  Reno  often  unburdened  his  heart, 
and  on  one  occasion  in  deep  sorrow  said  that  his  strange  actions  were 
due  to  drink,  and  drink  ultimately  caused  his  downfall.  His  action  at 
the  Battle  of  the  Little  Big  Horn  was  cited  as  one  instance  of  the  result 
of  his  use  of  intoxicating  liquor.  Liquor  finally  caused  his  expulsion 
from  the  army  in  disgrace.  In  1880  he  was  found  guilty,  by  a  general 
court-martial,  of  conduct  unbecoming  an  officer  and  a  gentleman. 
While  in  an  intoxicated  condition  he  engaged  in  a  brawl  in  a  public 
billiard  saloon,  in  which  he  assaulted  another  officer,  destroying  prop- 


4OO        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

erty  and  otherwise  conducted  himself  disgracefully.     For  this  offense 
the  court  sentenced  him  to  be  dismissed  from  the  army. 

It  had  occurred  to  me  that  probably  the  explanation  of  Reno's  con- 
duct lay  in  the  fact  that  he  might  have  been  intoxicated.  I  asked 
Colonel  Godfrey  if  he  thought  so,  and  his  reply  has  been  noted  above 
in  Appendix  A. 

After  reading  the  article  in  the  Advocate,  I  wrote  to  the  editor,  Dr. 
David  D.  Thompson,  asking  for  further  evidence  of  the  statement 
quoted.  Here  follows  his  letter: 

Chicago,  September  30,  1904. 
My  Dear  Sir: 

Doctor  Arthur  Edwards,  the  former  editor  of  the  Northwestern 
Christian  Advocate,  was  chaplain  in  the  army  during  the  Civil 
War.  He  was  a  soldier  by  instinct,  and  kept  up  his  interest  in  military 
and  naval  affairs  and  his  acquaintance  with  army  and  naval  officers 
during  all  his  life.  In  the  army  he  won  the  confidence  of  his  fellow- 
officers  by  his  character  and  moral  courage. 

He  was  requested,  by  a  number  of  officers,  to  wait  upon  General 
Hooker,  then  in  command  of  the  army,  and  express  to  him  the 
great  anxiety  felt  by  the  officers  over  his  intemperate  habits. 
Doctor  Edwards  waited  upon  General  Hooker,  and  told  him 
what  the  officers  had  requested  him  to  say.  He  did  it  in  so  manly 
and  delicate  a  way  that  General  Hooker  thanked  him,  and  told  him 
the  army  would  not  again  have  occasion  to  fear  ill  results  because 
of  his  habits. 

The  story  of  this  incident  came  to  the  knowledge  of  Mr.  H.  I.  Cleve- 
land, an  editorial  writer  on  the  Chicago  Herald,  who  published  it  sev- 
eral years  ago  over  his  own  name  in  that  paper.  I  had  never  before 
heard  the  story  from  Doctor  Edwards,  and  when  I  saw  Mr.  Cleveland's 
article  I  asked  Doctor  Edwards  about  it.  He  related  the  story  to  me, 
and,  after  doing  so,  told  the  story  of  Reno  as  I  give  it  briefly  in  the 
Northwestern. 

From  all  that  I  can  learn  of  Reno,  the  feeling  in  the  army  against  him 
was  not  due  to  his  drinking  habits,  but  to  his  conduct  in  his  relations 
with  others.  Doctor  Edwards  told  me  that  Reno  told  him  that  all  of  his 
trouble  in  his  contact  with  his  fellow-officers  was  due,  primarily,  to  his 
drinking  habits,  which  had  undermined  his  moral  character.  Doctor 
Edwards  knew  Reno  very  well,  and  told  me  he  believed  that  drink- 
ing was,  as  Reno  himself  stated,  the  cause  of  all  his  trouble.  He  had 


The  Conduct  of  Major  Reno      401 

known  him  in  the  army  during  the  Civil  War,  and  spoke  highly  of  his 
character  as  a  soldier  at  that  time. 

Yours  sincerely, 

D.  D.  THOMPSON. 

P.  S. — Doctor  Edwards  intended  at  some  time  to  publish  this  story, 
but  died  in  April,  1901,  before  doing  so. 

II. 

As  I  have  always  been  most  willing  and  anxious  to  give  the  accused 
a  hearing  in  every  case,  it  gives  me  great  pleasure  to  insert  here  a  letter 
recently  received  from  Mr.  William  E.  Morris,  an  attorney,  who  is  also 
an  alderman  of  Greater  New  York.  In  this  letter  will  be  found  a 
spirited  defense  of  Major  Reno,  with  interesting  details  of  his  fight. 
Although  Mr.  Morris  dissents  from  many  of  my  conclusions,  and 
differs  radically  from  the  printed  accounts  of  Colonel  Godfrey  and 
others,  I  am  glad  to  place  the  other  side  before  my  readers.  I  only 
regret  that  this  paper  was  received  too  late  to  be  included  in  the  body 
of  the  book. 

Haven,  Maine, 
September  21, 1904. 
Dear  Sir: 

I  have  read  your  article  entitled  "War  with  the  Sioux,"  and  as  a 
survivor  of  Reno's  Battalion  desire  to  enter  an  earnest  protest  against 
the  many  incorrect  statements  of  alleged  facts. 

Col.  Reno  was  cruelly  libeled  while  he  was  alive,  and  took  his  medi- 
cine manfully,  knowing  that  he  had  the  respect  of  every  officer  and  enlist- 
ed man  who  served  under  him  on  the  25th  and  26th  days  of  June,  1876. 

The  7th  Cavalry  had  no  use  for  cowards,  and  had  Reno  showed  the 
white  feather,  he  would  have  been  damned  by  every  member  of  his 
command. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  we  revere  his  memory  as  that  of  a  brave  and  gal- 
lant officer,  who,  through  circumstances  over  which  he  had  no  control, 
was  blamed  by  the  public,  who  had  no  personal  knowledge  of  the  facts 
for  the  result  of  the  Battle  of  the  Little  Horn. 

It  is  quite  evident  to  me  that  you  have  never  interviewed-  a  single 
member  of  Reno's  Battalion,  to  wit:  Troops  "A,"  "G,"  and  "M," 
for  if  you  had  you  would  not  misstate  the  facts,  as  I  assume  that  you 
intend  to  be  fair,  and  would  not  intentionally  mislead  the  public  mind.* 

*  I  have  been  in  communication  with  a  number  of  persons  who  belonged  to  this 
battalion.— C.  T.  B. 


4O2        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

I  was  a  member  of  Capt.  Thomas  H.  French's  Troop  "M,"  7th 
U.  S.  Cavalry,  and  I  submit  the  following  as  a  concise  statement  of  the 
facts : 

We  lost  sight  of  Custer,  whose  command  was  on  our  right,  at  least 
thirty  minutes  before  we  crossed  the  Little  Horn  River. 

We  saw  a  party  of  about  one  hundred  Indians  before  we  reached  the 
river;  we  pursued  them  across  the  Little  Horn  and  down  the  valley. 
As  soon  as  we  forded,  Reno  gave  the  command,  "Left  into  line,  gallop 
—  forward,  guide,  center,"  and  away  we  went  faster  than  I  had  ever 
ridden  before.  The  Indians  rode  as  fast  as  they  could,  and  the  battalion 
in  line  of  battle  after  them.  A  body  of  at  least  two  thousand  came  up 
the  valley  to  meet  the  one  hundred  or  more  we  were  pursuing.  They 
immediately  made  a  flank  movement  to  our  left  and  a  stand,  opened  a 
galling  fire,  causing  some  of  our  horses  to  become  unmanageable.  John 
R.  Meyer's  horse  carried  him  down  the  valley  through  the  Indians, 
some  of  whom  chased  him  two  or  three  miles  over  the  hills  and  back  to 
ford.  He  escaped  with  a  gun-shot  wound  in  the  neck.  Rutten's  horse 
also  ran  away,  but  he  succeeded  in  making  a  circle  before  reaching 
the  Indians,  and  received  only  a  gun-shot  wound  in  the  shoulder.  We 
were  then  abreast  the  timber;  to  continue  the  charge  down  the  valley 
meant  (to  the  mind  of  every  one)  immediate  destruction  of  the  battal- 
ion, which  consisted  of  about  one  hundred  and  twenty  men  (the  old 
guard,  of  ten  men  from  each  troop,  being  with  the  packs). 

Reno,  very  properly,  gave  the  command  "Battalion  halt  —  prepare 
to  fight  on  foot  —  dismount!"  He  directed  French  to  send  ten  men 
from  the  right  of  his  troop  to  skirmish  the  woods,  before  the  "numbers 
four  "  proceeded  there  with  the  horses.  We  immediately  deployed  as 
skirmishers  and  opened  fire.  The  odds  were  at  least  thirty  to  one,  as 
our  line  with  the  fours  out  did  not  exceed  seven  officers  and  ninety  men. 
We  had,  however,  a  few  Indian  scouts  and  civilians.  We  had  entire 
confidence  in  our  officers  and  in  ourselves,  and  went  to  work  smiling 
and  as  cool  as  if  we  were  at  target  practice.  In  less  time  than  it  takes 
to  relate  it,  the  Indians  were  on  three  sides  of  us.  We  were  ordered  to 
lie  down,  and  every  man  that  I  could  see,  except  Reno  and  French, 
were  fighting  lying  down.  Reno  walked  along  the  line  giving  in- 
structions to  the  men,  while  French  was  calling  his  men's  attention  to 
his  own  marksmanship  with  an  infantry  long-torn  that  he  carried. 

While  in  this  position,  the  man  next  on  my  right,  Sergeant  O'Hara, 
was  killed.  The  smoke  obscured  the  line,  but  bullets  were  taking  effect 
all  along  it.  We  were  perfectly  cool,  determined,  and  doing  good  execu- 
tion and  expected  to  hear  Custer  attack.  We  had  been  fighting  lying 


The  Conduct  of  Major  Reno      403 

down  about  fifteen  minutes  when  one  of  our  men  came  from  the  timber 
and  reported  that  they  were  killing  our  horses  in  the  rear.  Every 
troop  had,  at  this  time,  suffered  loss  and  the  enemy  was  closing  in,  de- 
spite our  steady  and  deadly  fire.  Reno  then  made  his  only  error;  he 
gave  the  command,  "Retreat  to  your  horses,  men!"  French  immedi- 
ately corrected  the  mistake  with  the  command,  "Steady,  men  —  fall 
back,  slowly;  face  the  enemy,  and  continue  your  fire."  "M"  troop 
fell  back  slowly  and  in  perfect  order,  held  the  Indians  in  check  until 
"A"  and  "G"  had  mounted.  Several  of  their  horses  had  been  shot, 
and  their  riders,  consequently,  very  much  disturbed. 

"M"  Troop  left  Sergeant  O'Hara  and  Private  Smith  on  the  skir- 
mish line.  Isaiah,  the  colored  interpreter  of  Fort  Rice,  Bloody  Knife, 
the  Chief  of  the  Rees  Scouts,  and  a  civilian  also  remained.  Lawrence 
was  hit  in  the  stomach  when  about  to  mount.  I  went  to  his  relief, 
which  caused  me  to  be  the  last  man  to  leave  the  timber,  with  the  com- 
mand, with  the  exception  of  Lieutenant  Hare,  who  passed  me  in  the 
bottom.  Sergeant  Charles  White  was  wounded  in  the  arm  and  his 
horse  killed.  He  was  left  in  the  woods,  as  was  also  "  Big  Fritz, "  a  Nor- 
wegian, whose  surname  I  do  not  remember,  but  whose  horse  was 
killed.  "A"  and  "G"  had  men  left  in  the  timber  also,  and  they  all 
reached  the  command  on  the  hill  during  the  night  with  De  Rudio,  or 
about  the  same  time. 

I  give  more  details  in  regard  to  "  M  "  than  the  other  troops,  because 
of  a  personal  acquaintance  with  each  member.  Corporal  Scollen  and 
Private  Spmmers  fell  in  the  charge  from  the  timber  to  the  ford.  It  was 
a  charge  and  not  a  retreat,  and  it  was  led  by  Reno.  Every  man  that  I 
saw  used  his  revolver  at  close  range.  I  was  at  least  twenty  yards  be- 
hind the  rear  of  the  command.  The  Indians  closed  in,  so  I  was  com- 
pelled to  jump  my  horse  off  the  bank,  at  least  fifty  yards  below  the 
ford,  and  while  in  the  river  had  an  excellent  view  of  the  struggle.  It 
was  hand  to  hand,  and  Mclntosh  was  certainly  there  at  the  ford  and 
sold  his  life  as  dearly  as  he  possibly  could.  When  I  reached  the  cut  in 
bank,  I  found  Turley  and  Rye  mounted  and  Lieutenant  Hodgson 
wounded  and  dismounted.  He  was  waist-deep  in  the  water.  He 
grasped  my  off  stirrup  strap  with  both  hands.  Rye  let  Turley  go  ahead 
through  the  cut,  and  he  was  killed  as  he  reached  the  top;  Rye  followed 
without  receiving  a  scratch.  The  lieutenant  held  onto  my  stirrup  for 
two  or  three  seconds,  and  was  dragged  out  of  the  water.  He  was  hit 
again,  and  let  go  as  my  horse  plunged  up  the  cut.  Sergeant  Criswell 
may  have  assisted  him  out  of  the  water,  but  if  he  did  he  went  back  into 
it  again.  To  say  that  any  man  could  or  did  ride  back  down  that  cut  is 


404        Indian  Fights  and  Fighters 

to  suggest,  to  my  mind,  the  impossible.  Upon  reaching  the  level  above 
the  cut  I  dismounted  and  led  my  horse  as  fast  as  possible  up  the  bluff, 
and  overtook  Tinker,  Bill  Meyer  and  Gordon  about  half  way  up  the 
bluff.  We  stopped  a  moment  to  rest.  The  bodies  of  the  fallen  sol- 
diers were  plainly  visible.  They  marked  the  skirmish  line  and  the  line 
of  the  charge  from  the  timber  to  the  ford,  and  were  in  the  river  and  at 
the  top  of  the  cut.  At  this  instant  a  shower  of  lead  sent  Meyer  and 
Gordon  to  the  happy  hunting-ground,  and  a  fifty  caliber  passed 
through  the  left  breast  of  your  humble  servant.  Our  horses  were  also 
hit.  I  continued  up  the  hill  alone  and  joined  the  command  ;  was 
then  assisted  to  the  improvised  hospital. 

Reno  at  this  time  had  lost,  in  killed,  wounded,  and  left  dismounted 
in  the  woods,  over  30  per  cent,  of  his  battalion  (there  were  over  ten 
left  in  the  woods).  Lieutenant  Hare  was  particularly  conspicuous, 
and  distinguished  himself  by  his  cool  and  determined  manner  when  he 
ordered  the  men  to  fall  in  at  the  top  of  the  hill,  and  whatever  demoral- 
ization there  was,  was  immediately  dispelled  by  that  courageous 
young  Texan.  Benteen,  arriving  about  an  hour  later,  came  up  as 
slow  as  though  he  were  going  to  a  funeral.  By  this  statement  I  do  not 
desire  to  reflect  in  any  way  upon  him  ;  he  was  simply  in  no  hurry;  and 
Miiller,  of  his  troop,  who  occupied  an  adjoining  cot  to  mine  in  the  hos- 
pital at  Fort  Abraham  Lincoln,  told  me  that  they  walked  all  the 
way,  and  that  they  heard  the  heavy  firing  while  they  were  watering 
their  horses. 

Benteen  was,  unquestionably,  the  bravest  man  I  ever  met.  He  held 
the  Indians  in  absolute  contempt,  and  was  a  walking  target  from  the 
time  he  became  engaged  until  the  end  of  the  fight  at  sundown  on  the 
26th.  He  took  absolute  charge  of  one  side  of  the  hill,  and  you  may 
rest  assured  that  he  did  not  bother  Reno  for  permission  of  any  kind. 
He  was  in  supreme  command  of  that  side  of  the  hill,  and  seemed  to  en- 
joy walking  along  the  line  where  the  bullets  were  the  thickest.  His 
troop,  "H,"  did  not  dig  rifle-pits  during  the  night  of  the  25th,  as  the 
other  troops  did,  and  in  the  morning  their  casualties  were  increased 
on  that  account.  He  ordered  "M"  out  of  their  pits  to  reinforce  his 
troop.  There  was  some  dissatisfaction  at  the  order,  as  the  men 
believed  that  the  necessity  was  due  solely  to  the  neglect  of  "H,"  in 
digging  pits.  They  obeyed,  however,  and  assisted  Benteen  in  his 
famous  charge. 

It  was  rumored,  subsequently,  that  French  recommended  his  First 
Sergeant,  John  Ryan,  a  sharpshooter,  and  some  other  men  for  medals, 
and  that  Benteen  refused  to  indorse  the  recommendation  as  to  Ryan, 


The  Conduct  of  Major  Reno      405 

because  he  failed  immediately  to  order  the  men  out  of  their  pits  at  his 
end  of  the  line  at  his  (Benteen's)  order.  It  was  claimed  that  French 
thereupon  withdrew  his  list.  Ryan  was  in  charge  of  the  ten  men 
that  Reno  sent  to  skirmish  the  woods. 

I  was  very  much  amused  to  learn,  from  your  article,  that  Windolph 
received  a  medal.  I  remember  him  as  the  tailor  of  "H"  troop,  and 
have  a  distinct  recollection  of  his  coming  into  the  field-hospital,  bent 
almost  double  and  asking  for  treatment  for  a  wound  which,  his  ap- 
pearance would  suggest,  was  a  mortal  one,  but  which  the  surgeon 
found,  on  removing  his  trousers,  to  be  only  a  burn.  The  surgeon  or- 
dered him  back  to  the  line  amid  a  shout  of  laughter  from  the  wounded 
men.  Mike  Madden  of  "K  "  lost  his  leg,  and  Tanner  of  "M"  his 
life,  in  the  dash  for  the  water  for  the  wounded.  I  hope  Madden 
received  a  medal. 

In  view  of  the  conflict  between  the  foregoing  and  the  statements  con- 
tained in  your  article,  I  ask  you  to  investigate  the  matter  further,  with  a 
view  to  correcting  the  false  impression  that  your  readers  must  have 
concerning  Reno  and  his  command.  In  conclusion,  I  ask  you  "how, 
in  God's  name,"  you  could  expect  Reno,  with  one  hundred  and 
twenty  men,  to  ride  through  upwards  of  three  thousand  armed  Sioux, 
and  then  be  of  assistance  to  Custer  or  any  one  else  ?  I  say  we  were 
sent  into  that  valley  and  caught  in  an  ambush  like  rats  in  a  trap.  That 
if  we  had  remained  ten  minutes  longer,  there  would  not  have  been  one 
left  to  tell  the  tale.  That  the  much  abused  Reno  did  charge  out  of 
the  timber,  and  that  we  who  survive  owe  our  lives  to  that  identical 
charge  which  he  led.  We,  at  least,  give  him  credit  for  saving  what  he 
did  of  his  command.  I  am,  sir, 

Very  respectfully, 

WM.  E.  MORRIS, 
Late  private  Troop  "M,"  Seventh  U.  S.  Cavalry. 


TO 
.  SCHILLER,  Doniis 


INDEX 


INDEX 


AB-SA-RA-KA,  Land  of 
Massacre,"  book  written 
by  Mrs.  Carrington,  34 
note 

Allen  breech-loading  rifle,  45,  46 

American  Horse,  Sioux  chief,  sur- 
prised by  Capt.  Mills,  307; 
killed,  310 

Amick,  Lieut.,  124,  137;  sent  in 
search  of  Fifth  Cavalry,  125- 
127;  covers  Graham's  retreat, 
128,  138 

Andrews,  Dr.  E.  B.,  on  Custer's 
Little  Big  Horn  campaign,  361 

Apache  Indians,  cruelties  of,  73 

Arapahoe  Indians,  64 

Arikara  scouts  in  Reno's  com- 
mand flee  from  the  Sioux, 
238 

Arickaree  Fork,  Republican 
River,  72;  Gen.  Bankhead's 
march  to,  108,  in  note,  112 

Army  woman's  devotion  in  Ind- 
ian warfare,  n,  12 

B 

BAD   LANDS"  of  Dakota, 
of  volcanic  origin,  5,209,230 
Bailey,  Indian  guide,  15 


Baliran,  M.,  naturalist,  killed  by 
Rain-in-the-Face,  212,  213,  215 

Ball,  Capt.,  336 

Bankhead,  Col.,  Forsyth's  letter 
to,  from  Beecher's  Island,  93 

Banzhaf,  Lieut.,  assists  in  Col. 
Forsyth's  rescue,  100,  106,  124; 
repulses  Indians,  131 

Barnitz,  Capt.,  Seventh  Cavalry, 
killed,  161 

Barrett,  Lawrence,  actor,  his  eul- 
ogy on  Gen.  Custer,  261 

Battle  of  Beaver  Creek,  131-140; 
of  Big  Horn,  243-250;  of  Little 
Big  Horn,  216-236;  Battle  of 
Little  Big  Horn,  the  personal 
story  of,  by  Rain-in-the-Face, 
279-292;  Rosebud  River,  191- 
198,203-208;  Summit  Springs, 
170-179;  Washita,  146-169;  of 
Wounded  Knee,  352 

Beaver  Creek,  Captain  Carpen- 
ter's fight  on,  123-135;  map  of 
position  of  wagons  and  soldiers, 
130,  132  note;  further  discus- 
sion of  fight  on,  136-145 

Becker,  John,  mule  packer,  in  the 
Sibley  scout,  298,  299 

Beecher,  Lieut.  Frederick  H., 
second  in  command  to  Capt. 
Forsyth,  77;  killed,  88;  mona- 


409 


4io 


Index 


ment  to,  in;  attention  to,  be- 
fore dying,  120 

Beecher's  Island,  fight  of  Rough 
Riders  at,  72;  named,  88; 
siege  of,  90-96;  a  scout's  story 
of  the  defense  of,  113-122 

Belknap,  Gen.,  Secretary  of  War, 
his  relations  with  Gen.  Custer, 
216-218 

Bell,  Major,  Seventh  Cavalry, 
164,  1 66 

Benteen,  Cpl.,  in  battle  of  Wash- 
ita,  162;  'in  battle  of  Big  Horn, 
233»  235,  236,  243-246,  250;  his 
magnificent  courage,  251,  253, 
274-276;  Gen.  Terry  comes  to 
his  relief,  276 

Big  Crow,  Indian  chief,  defeated 
by  Gen.  Miles,  329,  330 

Big  Horn  Mountains,  controlled 
by  jealous  Indian  tribes,  5 

Big  Horn  Range,  streams  from,  5 

Big  Piney  Creek,  Gen.  Carring- 
ton  establishes  camp  on  banks 
of,  13,  64 

Bingham,  Lieut.,  under  Gen. 
Carrington,  20;  killed,  21 

Black  Hills,  209;  gold  discovered 
in,  209 

Black  Kettle  (Mo-ke-ta-va-ta), 
73;  head  chief  of  the  Cheyen- 
nes, brutality  of,  157;  killed, 162 

Blackfeet  Indians,  64 

Blizzard,  Gen.  Custer's  march  in 
a,  150-161 

Bloody  Knife,  Arikara  scout  with 
Custer,  210,  267 

Bourke,  Capt  John  G.,  his  books, 
"Campaigning  with  Crook," 
quoted,  186;  "On  the  Border 
with  Crook,"  191,  204,333 


Bowers,  Sergeant,  in  fight  with 
Indians,  20;  scalped,  21;  badge 
found  when  reinterred,  21  note 

Bowyer,  Mitch,  Crow  interpreter, 
warns  Gen.  Custer,  268 

Bozeman  trail,  4,  7,  9,  13,  60; 
army  post  on,  9,  189 

Brainard,  Col.  D.  L.,  notes  on  the 
Lame  Deer  fight,  335-338 

Brave  Wolf,  scout,  336 

Bridger,  James,  fur  trader  and 
scout,  adviser  of  Gen.  Carring- 
ton, 4,  61 

Bridger's  Ferry,  60 

Brown,  Capt.  Frederick,  rash- 
ness of,  23;  malcontent  con- 
duct of,  24;  joins  Capt.  Fet- 
terman,  26;  promotion  of,  26; 
death  of,  32 

Brule,  Sioux  Indians,  faithful  to 
whites,  8;  attack  Capt.  Powell's 
corral,  48 

"Brunette"  regiment,  see  Tenth 
Cavalry 

Brunettes,  Gen.  Henry's,  351-355 

Buffalo  Bill,  see  Cody,  Wm.  F. 

Buffalo  Chip,  scout,  killed,  308 
note 

Buffalo,  herds  of,  in  Montana 
valleys,  5 

"Buffaloes,"  Gen.  Henry's,  and 

^  their  rides,  351-353 

"Bull  teams,"  for  prairie 
schooners,  7 


/CALIFORNIA    JOE,    scout, 
vJ  155 

Camp  Supply,  Indian  Territory, 


Index 


411 


Canadian  River,  Gen.  Custer's 
march  on,  152 

Carpenter,  Captain  Louis  H., 
Tenth  Cavalry,  sent  to  rescue 
Gen.  Forsyth,  100;  the  story  of 
his  "brunettes,"  123-135;  pro- 
motion of,  135 

Carr,  Major-Gen.  Eugene  A.,  or- 
dered to  Fort  Wallace,  124;  in 
fight  on  Beaver  Creek,  131, 
132;  pursues  Indians  over  the 
Platte  River,  135;  his  account 
of  the  fight  on  Beaver  Creek, 
136-140;  Carr  and  Tall  Bull  at 
Summit  Springs,  170-179 

Carrington,  Gen.  Henry  B.,  in 
Central  Montana,  5;  effects 
treaty  with  Indians  at  Fort 
Laramie,  8;  romantic  expedi- 
tion of,  9-13;  sketch  of,  9; 
repairs  and  garrisons  Fort 
Reno,  12;  establishes  camp  on 
Big  Piney  Creek,  13;  in  desp- 
erate fight  at  LodgeTrail  Ridge, 
2O,  21;  inadequate  force  of, 
23,  24;  carries  out  Gen.  Sher- 
man's instructions,  24;  specific 
instructions  to  Capt.  Fetter- 
man,  26;  his  stern  resolution, 
32-37;  used  as  a  scapegoat,  37; 
acquitted  of  all  blame  by  a 
mixed  commission,  38;  also  by 
a  military  court  and  by  Gen. 
Sherman,  38;  his  views  on 
Custer's  Little  Big  Horn  cam- 
paign, 386-388 

Carrington  Powder  River  expe- 
dition, reminiscences  of,  59-71 

Central  Montana,  objective  of 
Gen.  Carrington's  expedition,  5 

Chambers.  Col..  188 


Cheyenne  Indians  dispute  ad- 
vance of  the  white  man,  5;  Har- 
ney-Sanborne  treaty  with,  7; 
attack  Capt.  Powell's  corral, 
48;  cruelty  of,  73;  break  away 
from  Red  Cloud  Agency,  293; 
Gen.  Merritt  heads  them  off, 
294;  bravery  of,  312,  313;  their 
winter  stores  destroyed,  316; 
sufferings  of,  316-318;  sur- 
render and  turn  against  Crazy 
Horse,  318;  savage  ferocity  of, 

3?1 

Civil  War,  soldiers  of  the,  emi- 
grate to  the  West,  6 

Civilization,  the  demands  of,  6; 
the  outpost  of,  13-18 

Clear  Creek,  Montana,  321 

Cloud  Peak,  13 

Clybor,  Jack,  adopted  by  Indians 
and  named  "Comanche,"  96 

Cody,  William  F.  (Buffalo  Bill), 
Gen.  Carr's  guide  at  Summit 
Springs,  170,  173,  174;  scout 
for  Gen.  Merritt,  294,  295; 
duel  with  Yellow  Hair,  296,  297 

Coffee  Coolers,  282 

Collins,  W.  R.  E.,  letter  of,  in  ref- 
erence to  Red  Cloud's  losses 
in  wagon-corral  attack,  58 

"Comanche,"  Capt.  Keogh's 
horse,  in  Custer's  last  fight,  256 
note 

Conestoga  wagons,  only  method 
of  transportation  before  rail- 
road, 7 

Conner,  Gen.,  establishes  Fort 
Reno,  60 

Contest  for  Indian  lands,  6 

Cook,  Adjutant,  Seventh  Cavalry, 
158,159;  killed  with  Custer,258 


412 


Index 


Cook,  Capt.,  268,  270 

Cooke,  Gen.,  relieves  Gen.  Car- 
rington  of  his  command,  37 

Corbin,  scout,  in  Gen.  Custer's 
command,  152,  154,  155 

Crawford,  Lieut.,  307 

Crazy  Horse,  an  Oglala  chief, 
184;  his  village  surprised  and 
taken,  186,  187;  warns  Gen. 
Crook,  189;  sketch  of,  189  note; 
begins  attack,  193;  plans  am- 
bush for  Crook,  194;  success- 
ful stand  against  Crook,  201, 
202;  opposed  to  Maj.  Reno, 
241,  254;  attacks  Custer,  256; 
defeated  by  Gen.  Crook  at 
Slim  Buttes,  310,  311;  refuses 
to  succor  Cheyennes,  317; 
meets  crushing  defeat  by  Gen. 
Miles,  326-330;  surrenders, 
330;  stabbed  in  guardhouse, 
333;  Captain  Bourke's  de- 
scription of,  333;  a  born  sol- 
dier, 334 

Crazy  Woman's  Fork,  61,  312 

Criswell,  Sergeant,  bravery  of,  in 
fight  with  Indians,  242 

Crittenden,  Lieut.,  Custer's 
brother-in-law,  killed,  257 

Crook,  Gen.  George,  opinion  of 
Apache  Indians,  74;  his  ad- 
vance against  Indians  in  the 
Northwest,  183-202;  assumes 
command  of  expedition,  188; 
Ex-Trooper  Towne's  account 
of  his  fight  on  the  Rosebud, 
203-208;  joined  by  Gen.  Mer- 
ritt  at  Fort  Laramie,  293;  at 
Slim  Buttes,  304-309;  his  de- 
plorable condition  for  want  of 
supplies,  305,  306;  defeats 


Crazy  Horse   at  Slim   Buttes, 

S10^1* 

Crow  Indians,  auxiliaries  in  Gen. 
Crook's  expedition,  190,  205 

Crow  King,  Indian  chief,  opposed 
to  Major  Reno,  241,  256 

Curley,  Crow  scout,  only  survivor 
of  Custer's  command,  256 

Custer,  Boston,  civilian  forage- 
master,  killed  with  Gen.  Cus- 
ter, 258 

Custer,  Gen.  George  Armstrong, 
in  command  of  Seventh  Cav- 
alry, 146-150;  record  of,  146, 
147;  selects  his  own  officers, 
147;  protects  Kansas  settlers, 
148;  his  march  in  a  blizzard, 
150-153;  has  command  under 
Gen.  Stanley,  210;  his  faculty 
for  scouting,  210;  loses  his  com- 
mand, 216-219;  his  relations 
with  Gen.  Belknap,  216;  ques- 
tion as  to  whether  he  obeyed 
Gen.  Terry's  orders,  219-228; 
Gen.  Terry's  letter  of  instruc- 
tions, 220, 221 ;  various  opinions 
about  Terry's  instructions  to 
Custer,  224-228;  account  of  his 
last  expedition,  229-236;  his 
officers  under  Reno  tried  to  join 
him,  248  note;  his  fine  manoeu- 
vering,  254;  signals  to  Reno, 
255;  killed,  256,  257;  Mr. 
Theodore  W.  Goldin's  remin- 
iscences of,  263-278;  a  further 
discussion  of  his  course  in  the 
Little  Big  Horn  campaign, 
359-397;  various  opinions  on 
Custer's  campaign  —  Col.  Ed- 
ward S.  Godfrey,  360,  371- 
380,  388-390;  Major -Gen. 


Index 


413 


James  B.  Fry,  360;  Major- 
Gen.  Robert  P.  Hodges,  360, 
366-370;  Brig.-Gen.  George 
A.  Forsyth,  361 ;  Dr.  C.  B.  An- 
drews, 361;  Gen.  Nelson  A. 
Miles,  361-365;  Gen.  Gibbon, 
367;  Brig.-Gen.  Charles  A. 
Woodruff,  380-385;  Gen.  Hen- 
ry B.  Carrington,  386-388; 
Lieut.-Col.  Jacob  L.  Gillore, 

391-395 
Custer,   Capt.   Tom,   brother  of 

Gen.    Custer,    210,    212,    213; 

captures  Rain-in-the-Face,  214; 

in  the   Big  Horn   Fight,  254; 

killed,  257;    called  Little  Hair 

by  Rain-in-the-Face,  284;  story 

of  his  killing,  289 
Custer  family,  disaster  to,  258 
"Custer  Massacre,"  259,  281 

D 

DANIELS,  Lieut.,  killed,  22 
Davis,  Capt.,  316 

Dead  Canon  of  the  Rosebud,  193, 
196,  198 

Denver,  Col.,  white  settlements 
at,  5 

DeRudis,  Lieut.,  243 

DeWolf,  Dr.,  killed  by  Indians, 
242 

Dodge,  Col.  R.  I.,  his  book, 
"Our  Wild  Indians,"  quoted, 
168;  claims  Gen.  Custer  com- 
mitted suicide,  257 

Dog  Soldiers,  163  note 

Donovan,  scout,  assists  in  Col. 
Forsyth's  rescue,  106 

Drexel  Mission  attacked  by  Ind- 
ians, 353 


Dry  Fork,  60 

Dull  Knife,  Cheyenne  chief,  at- 
tacked by  Mackenzie,  313-315; 
killed,  315 


T^ASTMAN,   Charles   A.,  M. 

•»—•'  D.,  a  full-blooded  Sioux,  his 
account  of  Reno's  fight  at  Lit- 
tle Big  Horn,  238;  with  Gen. 
Custer,  253 

Edgerly,  Lieut.,  248 

Eighteenth  Regular  Infantry  in 
the  Mountain  District,  9,  25; 
at  Fort  Kearney,  59 

Elliott,  Major,  Custer's  second 
in  command,  152;  in  battle  of 
the  Washita,  157;  fate  of,  166- 
169 

Emigrants,  protected  by  Fort 
Phil  Kearney,  4 

Evans,  Col.,  Third  Cavalry,  188 


FAR  WEST,"  Gen.  Terry's 
supply  steamer  on  the  Rose- 
bud, 265 

Farley,  scout,  wounded,  108; 
bravery  of,  109 

Fetterman,  Capt.,  fight  with  In- 
dians at  Lodge  Trail  Ridge, 
20;  rashness  of,  23;  annihila- 
tion of  his  command,  24-32; 
begs  command  of  expedition 
from  Gen.  Carrington,  25; 
map  of  massacre  of  his  com- 
mand, 27;  death  of,  32;  result 
of  his  disobeying  orders,  36,  39 

Fifth  Cavalry,  in  battle  of  Sum- 


414 


Index 


mit  Springs,  172;  other  en- 
gagements, 293,  294,  312 

Fifth  Infantry,  326,  335 

Finerty,  John  F.,  Chicago  Times 
correspondent,  joins  the  Sibley 
scout,  298,  303;  account  of 
Gen.  Henry's  ghastly  experi- 
ence, 346 

Fisher,  civilian  volunteer,  26; 
killed,  35 

Fitzgerald,  Dr.,  100 

Forsyth,  George  Alexander 
("Sandy"),  and  the  Rough 
Riders  of  '68,  description  of, 
72-96;  aide  to  Gen.  Sheridan, 
75;  sketch  of,  76;  desperate 
situation  of,  on  Beecher's  Is- 
land, 97;  adventures  of  Scouts 
Trudeau  and  Stillwell  to  res- 
cue, 97-112;  map  of  march  to 
relieve  Forsyth  and  escort 
Gen.  Carr,  103;  a  few  words 
about  Forsyth's  men,  109-112; 
his  battlefield  preserved,  in; 
letter  of,  on  the  relations  be- 
tween Gen.  Custer  and  Gen. 
Belknap,  216-218;  on  Custer's 
Little  Big  Horn  campaign, 
361 

Forsyth  Association,  in 

Fort  Abraham  Lincoln,  Seventh 
Cavalry  stationed  at,  213,  214; 
Rain-in-the-Face  imprisoned 
at,  215;  Gen.  Terry  at,  21 8; 
Mrs.  Custer  at,  258 

Fort  Caspar,  Gen  Crook's  head- 
quarters, 37 

Fort  C.  F.  Smith  established,  17, 
25,  62;  attacked,  46  note; 

Fort  D.  A.  Russell,  Gen.  Henry 
at,  349 


Fort  Ellsworth,  Indian  council 
held  at,  72 

Fort  Fetterman,  Wyoming,  es- 
tablished, 39;  actions  at,  188, 
202,  208,  312,  344,  348,  349 

Fort  Laramie,  Nebraska,  govern- 
ment commissioners  negotiate 
treaty  with  Indians  at,  7,  293 

Fort  Phil  Kearney,  establishment 
and  abandonment  of,  3,  209; 
constantly  surrounded  by  Ind- 
ians, 3;  Montana  emigrants 
protected  by,  4;  plan  of,  16; 
the  tragedy  of,  19-39;  working 
plan  of,  33;  troops  ordered  to 
relief  of,  37;  closely  invested,  40, 
41;  fort  completed,  41;  Red 
Cloud's  attack  on,  46;  burned 
by  Indians,  58;  Mr.  R.  J. 
Smyth's  personal  reminiscences 
of,  and  the  wagon-box  fight, 
59-71;  Gen. -Crook  at,  189; 

Fort  Reno,  removal  of  ordered,  9; 
repaired  and  garrisoned,  12; 
construction  of,  15-17;  plan  of, 
1 6;  established  by  Gen.  Con- 
ner, 60;  Gen.  Crook  at,  189 

Fort  Wallace,  Kansas,  temporary 
terminus  of  Kansas  Pacific 
Railroad,  78;  orders  issued 
from,  to  rescue  Col.  Forsyth, 
100;  Capt.  Carpenter  arrives 
at,  134 

Fourth  Cavalry,  312 

Fourth  Infantry,  1 88 

French,  Capt.,  251,  271 

Frontier,  protecting  the,  3-179 

Fry,  Gen.  James  B.,  his  book, 
"Army  Sacrifices,"  quoted,  72; 
on  Custer's  Little  Big  Horn 
campaign,  360 


Inde: 


415 


Furey,  Major,  with  Gen.  Crook, 
191 

G 

ALL,  Indian  chief,  opposed 
to    Reno,    241,    253,    254; 
attacks  Custer,    256,    286;    at 
big  feast  after  the  Custer  battle, 
290;  attacks  Gen.  Miles,  325 
"Galvanized  soldiers,"  60 
"Garry  Owen,"  played  in  battle 
of  the  Washita,  161;    at  Fort 
Lincoln,  218 

Ghost  Dancers,  Sioux,  352 
Gibbon,  Gen.  encamps  on  the 
Yellowstone,  218;  letter  to 
Gen.  Terry  regarding  Gen. 
Custer's  situation,  223,  224; 
relieves  Reno  and  finds  Cus- 
ter's body,  257;  his  conference 
with  Custer,  266;  goes  to  re- 
lief of  Col.  Benteen,  276;  his 
command  returned  to  Mon- 
tana, 305 

Gibson,  Lieut.,  251 
Godfrey,  Col.    Edward   S.,   249, 
his  article  in  Century  Magazine 
"Custer's  Last  Battle,"  quot- 
ed, 226,  227,  253;    his  account 
of  Custer's  defeat,  260;  on  Cus- 
ter's   Little    Big    Horn    Cam- 
paign, 360,  371-380,  388-390 
Gold    discovered    in    the    Black 

Hills,  209 

Goldin,  Mr.  Theodore  W.,  one  of 
the  last  to  see  Custer  alive,  his 
reminiscences  of  the  general, 
263-278 

Goose  Creek,  13,  192,  201,  209 
Gordon,  Major  G.  A.,  316 
Graham,  Capt.,  Tenth  Cavalry, 


124;  scouts  on  the  Beaver,  127; 
retreat  of,  128;  unmilitary 
action  of,  133  note 

Grant,  President  U.  S.,  indignant 
at  Gen.  Custer's  statements  re- 
garding Gen.  Belknap,  217 

Greene,  Lieut-Col.  Jacob  L.,  his 
views  on  Custer's  Little  Big 
Horn  campaign,  391-395 

Grover,  Sharp,  guide,  77;  his  ac- 
quaintance with  Indian  signs 
and  customs,  125-127,  139 

Gruard,  Frank,  celebrated  scout, 
with  Gen.  Crook,  191,  203; 
sketch  of,  191  note;  his  clever 
scouting,  298,  301,  302,  309 

Grummond,  Lieut.,  Eighteenth 
Infantry,  15,  20,  22;  in  charge 
of  cavalry  at  Fort  Phil.  Kear- 
ney, 25,  26;  killed;  35,  36 

H 

TTALL,  LIEUT.,  294,  295 
•^  -••   Hamilton,  Capt.  John  M., 
316 

Hamilton,  Capt.  Louis  McLane, 
in  Gen.  Custer's  winter  expe- 
dition, 153, 157, 159;  killed,  161 

Hanley,  Sergeant,  249 

Hare,  Lieut.  Luther  R.,  249,  267, 
274 

Harney-Sanborne  treaty  with  In- 
dians, 7 

Harrington,  Lieut.,  killed  with 
Custer,  259 

Hat  Creek,  see  War  Bonnet 

Hazen,  Gen.  W.  B.,  inspects  Fort 
Reno,  17  note 

Henry,  Gen.  Guy  V.,  Third  Cav- 
alry, 190,  193,  195,  196,  198; 


4i6 


Index 


wounded,  197;  in  Dead  Canon, 
200,  201;  sketch  of,  339-355; 
his  march  in  a  blizzard, 342-344; 
a  ghastly  experience,  344-348; 
bravery  of  his  wife,  348-351 ;  his 
"Buffaloes"  and  their  famous 
rides,  351-355;  in  the  Spanish- 
American  War,  354;  in  Porto 
Rico,  354;  dies  there,  355 

Henry  rifle,  breech-loading  rapid 
fire,  use  of,  26,  35 

Herndon,  scout,  266,  267,  274 

Hines,  Acting-Assistant  Surgeon, 
sent  to  join  Capt.  Fetterman,29 

Hodgson,  Lieut.,  killed  by  In- 
dians, 242;  account  of  his 
death,  263,  272,  273 

Honzinger,  Dr.,  veterinarian,  kill- 
ed by  Rain-in-the-Face,  12, 
213,  215,  283  note,  285 

Horse  Creek,  60 

Horton,  Surgeon,  on  wagon- 
beds,  44  note,  50,  56,  69 

Howitzers,  Indian  fear  of,  29 

Hughes,  Major-Gen.  Robert  P., 
his  book,  "The  Campaign 
Against  the  Sioux,"  quoted, 
224;  Little  Big  Horn  cam- 
paign, 360,  366-370 

Humfreville,Capt.J.Lee,his  book 
"Twenty  Years  Among  Our 
Hostile  Indians"  quoted,  318 

Hunting  ground,  Indian  title  to,  6 

Hunting  parties  forbidden  at  Fort 
Phil  Kearney,  4 


TNDIAN  attacks  on  Fort  Phil 

A  Kearney,  4,  37-71 

Indian   fights   at   Beaver  Creek, 


123-140;  on  Beecher's  Island, 
97;  at  Fort  C.  F.  Smith,  46 
note;  at  Fort  Phil  Kearney, 
40-56;  at  Glendive,  Mont., 
321;  at  Lodge  Trail  Ridge, 
20,  21;  on  the  Rosebud  River, 
191-198;  203-208;  at  Slim 
Buttes,  304-309;  at  Summit 
Springs,  170-179 
Indian  fighters  and  their  field, 

3:8 

Indian    police   kill    Sitting    Bull, 

332 
Indian  skulls,  scientific  study  of, 

69 
Indian  traders,  their  mercenary 

policy,  184 
Indian  wars,  cause  of,  4;    seiges 

in,  3 

Indian's  dread  of  scalping,  91-92 
note 

Indians,  annihilate  Capt.  Fetter- 
man's  command  outside  Fort 
Phil  Kearney,  30-32 

Indians  as  patriots,  74,  185; 
looseness  of  tie  binding  tribes, 
313  note 

Indians,  Montana,  jealous  of  in- 
trusion by  whites,  5 

Iron  Star,  Indian  chief,  attacked 
by  Gen.  Miles  and  killed,  330- 
332 

Island  of  Death,  the,  78-85 

Itiomagaju,  see  Rain  -  in  -  the- 
Face 


JACKSON,    Bob,    scout,   336, 
338 
Jenness,  Lieut.  John  C.,  detailed 


Index 


417 


under  Capt.  Powell  to  protect 
woodcutters,  43;  killed,  51,  67 

Jerome,  Lieut.  Lovell  H.,  336 

Jewish  boy's  bravery  in  Gen. 
Forsyth's  fight,  no;  Gen. 
Fry's  poem  on,  no  note 

Johnson,  Hugh,  Adjutant,  sends 
Captain  Carpenter  to  succor 
Col.  Forsyth,  100,  101;  prompt 
action  of,  in,  112 

Johnson,  President  Andrew,  con- 
gratulates Congress  on  peace 
with  Indians,  22 

Julesberg,  59 

K 

KANE,  Capt.,  Fifth  Cavalry, 
in  Beaver  Creek  fight,  137, 

138 

Kansas  Pacific  Railroad,  build- 
ing of,  resisted  by  Indians,  7-72 

Kansas  trail,  7 

Kansas,  Western,  swept  and  de- 
vastated by  Cheyennes,  75 

Kellogg,  Mark,  newspaper  cor- 
respondent, killed  with  Custer, 

258 
Kennedy,    Sergeant-Major,    7th 

Cavalry,  brave  death  of,  168 
Keogh,  Capt.,  killed  with  Custer, 

258,  259 
Kidder,  Lieut.,  Second  Cavalry, 

slaughtered,  149 

King,  Gen.,  his  book,  "Cam- 
paigning with  Crook,"  quoted, 

1 88 
King,  Lieut.  Charles,  fighter  and 

author,  294 
Kinney,  Capt.,  sent  to  establish 

FortC.F.  Smith,  17 


LAME  DEER,  Indian  chief, 
attacked  by  Gen.  Miles  and 
killed,  330-332;  notes  on   the 
fight,  335-338 

Laramie  Commission,  announce- 
ment of,  15  note 
Leighton,    Al.,    sutler,    Indians 

stampede  stock  of,  60 
Little  Beaver,  Indian  scout,  155 
Little  Big  Horn, battle  of, the  story 
of  by  Rain-in-the-Face,  279-292 
Little  Big  Horn  Campaign,  the, 

216-236;    map  of,  234 
Little  Big  Horn  Valley,  233 
Little  Crow,  Indian,wounded,l4O 
Little  Hair  (Tom  Custer),  284 
Little  Muddy  Creek,  336 
Little   Raven,  Arapahoe   Indian 

chief,  164 
Little  Rock,  Indian  chief,  killed, 

164 

LodgeTrail  Ridge,  1 3, 20,26,29-31 
Longfellow's    poem,    "The    Re- 
venge   of    Rain-in-the-Face," 
sold  by  the  Indian  himself  at 
the  World's  Fair,  291 
Long  Hair,  Gen.  Custer's  Indian 

name,  146 
Lord,    Dr.,   killed   with   Custer, 

258,  259 
Luettwitz,     Lieut.     Von,     307; 

wounded,  308 
Lummis,    Charles    F.,    on    the 

Apache  Indians,  74  note 

M 

MACKENZIE,    Ranald    S., 
Col.  Fourth  Cavalry,  305; 
his  winter  battle,  312-316;  at- 


4i8 


Index 


tacks  Indians  at  Willow  Creek 

Canon,  313- 
Maclntosh,     Lieut.,     killed     by 

Indians,  242,  268,  272,  274 
Mahapiya-luta,  see  Red  Cloud 
Mah-wis-sa,  Black  Kettle's  sister, 

endeavors  to  marry  Gen.  Cus- 

ter  to  an  Indian  girl,  167 
"Mauvaises   Terres,"    or    "bad 

lands,"  5 
McCall,  Sergeant  W.  H.  H.,  77, 

78 

McDougall,  Capt.,  joins  Maj. 
Reno  with  pack  train,  248; 
serves  under  Custer  at  the  Little 
Big  Horn,  233 

McKinney,  Lieut.  John  A., 
charges  Cheyennes  at  Willow 
Creek  Canon,  315;  shot,  315 

Medicine  Man,  daring  of  a,  133 

Merritt,  Gen.  Wesley,  ordered  to 
join  Gen.  Crook  at  Fort  Lara- 
mie,  293;  his  fight  with  Chey- 
ennes, 295-297 

Miles,  Gen.  Nelson  A.,  his  "Per- 
sonal Recollections"  quoted, 
189;  his  Indian  campaigning, 
305;  his  great  campaigning, 
319-338;  his  foot  cavalry  de- 
feat Sitting  Bull,  319-326;  in- 
terview with  Sitting  Bull,  323, 
324;  his  crushing  defeat  of 
Crazy  Horse,  326-330;  his  ca- 
pacity for  handling  men,  326; 
attacks  and  captures  Lame 
Deer's  village,  330-332;  his 
views  on  Custer's  Little  Big 
Horn  campaign,  361-365 

Mills,  Capt.  Anson,  Third  Cav- 
alry, 190,  193,  195,  196;  his  ad- 
vance down  Dead  Canon,  199- 


202;    sent  on  foraging  expedi- 
tion, 305,  306 
Mimiconjou  Indians  attack  Capt. 

Powell,  48 

Montana,  emigrants  and  wagon- 
trains   to,   annihilated    by   In- 
dians, 4;  white  settlements  at,  5 
Mooers,  Dr.  John  H.,  77;   killed, 

84 

Moore,  Tom,  veteran,  192,  196 
Morris,  William  E.,  on  the  con- 
duct of  Major  Reno,  401-405 
Mountain  District,armypostsin,9 
Mountain     game     in     Montana 

ranges,  6 

Mountain  standard  time,  5 
Mo-ke-ta-va-ta,  see  Black  Kettle 
Moylan,  Capt.,  with  Custer,  211, 

212,  271 

Mussa  ranch,  60 

Myers,  Capt.,  Seventh  Cavalry, 
'57,  '59 

N 

XJAPOLEON  guns,  326 

»  ^    Nickerson,Capt.,in  Crook's 

command,  200 

Nineteenth      Kansas     Volunteer 
Cavalry,  in  Sheridan's  winter 
campaign  against  Indians,  150 
Ninth  Cavalry,  351-355 
Ninth  Infantry,  188,  342 
North,  Col.  Francis,  in  Summit 

Springs  battle,  173 
North  Platte,  5,  59,  60 
Northern   Pacific   Railroad,  sur- 
vey of,  209 

Northwestern     Christian     Advo- 
cate on   the   conduct    of    Major 
Reno,  398-400 


Inde: 


419 


Noyes,  Major,  Second  Cavalry, 
188,  193,  196 

0 

/"\GLALA  IndiansattackCapt. 

^-^   Powell's  corral,  48 

Oregon  trail,  7 

Orleman,  Lieut.,  assists  in  Col. 
Forsyth's  rescue,  100,  124;  in 
expedition  to  Beaver  Creek, 
127;  covers  Graham's  retreat, 
128;  repulses  Indians,  131 

Osage  Indians,  with  Custer  in 
battle  of  the  Washita,  159,  160 

Otis,  Lieut.-Col.  Elwell  S.,  at- 
tacked by  Indians  at  Glendive, 
Mont.,  321;  Sitting  Bull's 
letter  to,  321 


PAWNEE  scouts  at  battle  of 
Summit  Springs,  173-177 

Peno  Creek,  13,  20,  64 

Peno  Valley,  28,  31,  36 

Phil  Kearney  Garrison,  post  re- 
turn of,  30  note 

Pilot  Hill,  13,  14,  19 

Pine  Ridge  Agency,  293 

Piney  Island,  logging  camp  on, 
14;  the  improvised  corral  on, 
40-46;  wood-cutting  on,  43; 
wagon-box  corral  illustrated, 

45 
Porter,  Lieut.,  killed  with  Custer, 

258,  259 
Pourier,  Baptiste  (Big  Bat)  scout 

with  Gen.  Crook,  298 
Powder  River,  Indians  encamped 

on,  23;    Sitting    Bull    at,  184; 


Gen.  Reynolds  captures  Crazy 
Horse's  village  on  the,  186; 
Gen.  Terry  at,  218,  265,  312 

Powder  River  Expedition,  the, 
3-18;  reminiscences  of,  59-71 

Powell,  Capt.  James,  22;  report 
of,  to  Gen.  Carrington,  23; 
command  of  relief  party  given 
10,25;  detailed  to  guard  wood- 
cutting party,  42;  sketch  of, 
42;  his  gallant  fight  in  the 
wagon-corral  against  Red 
Cloud,  48-55;  promotion  of, 

57. 

Prairie  schooners,  early  use  of,  7 
Pretty     Bear,    Cheyenne     chief, 

killed,  176,  177 
Pumpkin  Buttes,  61 

R 

"D  ABBIT  Creek,  307 

-*-*-  Rain-in-the-Face  (Itioma- 
gaju),  Indian  chief,  his  griev- 
ance, 209-215;  capture  of,  213- 
215;  escapes,  215;  attacks  Cus- 
ter, 256;  his  revenge,  257;  his 
personal  story  of  the  fight, 
279-292;  boasts  of  murdering 
Dr.  Honzinger,  283;  his  map 
of  Custer's  battlefield,  287; 
wounded,  289  note 

Red  Cloud  (Mahapiya-Iuta), 
Sioux  chief,  opposes  treaty  with 
Gen.  Carrington,  7,8;  revenge 
on,  for  massacre  at  Fort  Phil 
Kearney,  39;  becomes  leading 
war  chief,  40;  surprised  and 
disarmed  by  Gen.  Mackenzie, 
40  note;  his  most  thrilling  ad- 
venture, 40,  41,  note;  deter- 


420 


Index 


mines  to  capture  Fort  Phil 
Kearney,  41;  his  attack,  46; 
his  baptism  of  fire,  51-56;  his 
losses  in  the  attack  on  Capt. 
Powell's  wagon-corral,  58 

Red  Cloud  Agency,  293 

Rees,  Indian  auxiliaries,  238,  240, 
267 

Religious  belief  of  Indians  in  re- 
gard to  scalping,  91-92  note 

Reno,  Major  Marcus  A.,  in  the 
Big  Horn  country,  218;  Cus- 
ter  gives  command  to,  232; 
record  of,  232  note;  his  ad- 
vance, 234-236;  his  failure  at 
the  Little  Big  Horn,  237-243; 
plan  of  his  defence  on  the  bluff, 
247;  his  failure  to  press  his  at- 
tack, 260;  his  report  to  Custer, 
265;  further  light  on  the  con- 
duct of  Major  Reno,  398-405 

Reno's  Creek,  233,  253 

Reynolds,  Charlie,  famous  scout, 
killed  with  Custer,  258 

Reynolds,  Gen.  Joseph  J.,  sur- 
prises and  takes  Crazy  Horse's 
village,  1 86 

Riley,  Lieut.,  killed,  258 

Rodenbough,  Gen.,  his  "Sabre 
and  Bayonet"  quoted,  43,  44 

Roman  Nose,  Indian  chief,  inso- 
lent speech  of,  72,  73;  attacks 
Capt.  Forsyth,  83-85;  charge 
of  his  five  hundred  warriors, 
85-88;  killed,  87;  his  tepee 
discovered  by  Capt.  Carpenter, 
105,  108,  109 

Romero,  Indian  interpreter,  155, 
167 

Rosebud  River,  Crook's  advance 
against  Indians  on  the,  189, 


191-193;  battle  of  the,  193- 
198;  map  of  battle,  197;  Ex- 
Trooper  Towne's  account  of 
the  battle  on,  203-208 
Rough  Riders  of  '68,  the,  72-96 
Royall,  Col.  William  B.,  Fifth 
Cavalry,  ordered  to  attack  In- 
dians on  Beaver  Creek,  124; 
given  command  under  Gen. 
Crook,  1 88;  anecdote  of,  188 
note;  charges  Indians  at  the 
Rosebud,  195,  196,  198 


SALT  LAKE,  white  settle- 
ments at,  5 

Salt  Lake  trail,  59 

Sample,  Gen.  Carrington's  order- 
ly, reports  on  Fetterman's 
command,  30 

Sand  Creek,  60 

Sans  Arc  Indians  attack  Capt. 
Powell's  corral,  48 

Santa  Fe  trail,  7 

Satanta,  Kiowa  Indian  chief, 
164;  captured  by  Custer.  169 

Savage  warfare,  339-344 

Savagery,  the  rights  of,  6 

Scalping,  Indian  belief  in,  91-92 
note 

Schlesinger,  Sigmund,  his  brav- 
ery in  Gen.  Forsyth's  fight,  1 10; 
Gen.  Fry's  poem  on,  no  note; 
his  story  of  the  defense  of 
Beecher's  Island,  113-122 

Schwatka,  Lieut.,  Arctic  explorer, 
successful  attack  on  Sioux  by, 

307 

Second  Cavalry,  in  tragedy  of 
Fort  Phil  Kearney,  25,  60.: 


Index 


other  engagements,   188,   195, 
196,  312,  335 

Settlers  on  Indian  lands,  6-7 
Seventh  Cavalry,  Gen.  Custer  in 
command  of,  146;  formation  of 
regiment,  147;  protects  Kan- 
sas settlers,  148;  in  Sheridan's 
winter  campaign,  150;  other 
engagements,  213,  218,  229, 

293»  305,  355 

Sheridan,  Gen.  Philip,  attacks 
the  Cheyenne  Indians,  75;  in- 
augurates winter  campaign 
against  Indians,  150 

Sheridan  City,  terminus  of  Union 
Pacific  Railroad,  134 

Sherman,  Gen.,  advises  ladies  to 
join  Gen.  Carrington's  ex- 
pedition, n;  boy's  challenge 
to,  12;  acquits  Gen.  Carring- 
ton  of  all  blame  for  disaster  at 
Fort  Phil  Kearney,  38 

Short  Nose  Creek,  125,  127 

Shoshone  Indians,  auxiliaries  in 
Gen.  Crook's  expedition,  190, 
205 

Sibley,  Lieut.  Frederick  W., 
Third  Cavalry,  his  scouting 
after  Crazy  Horse,  298-303 

Sioux  Indians  dispute  the  ad- 
vance of  the  white  man,  5; 
Harney-Sanborne  treaty  with, 
7;  accept  valuable  gifts  from 
Gen.  Carrington,  8;  invest 
Fort  Phil  Kearney  under  Red 
Cloud,  40-42;  wild  charge  of 
46-51 

Slim  Buttes,  South  Dakota,  Gen. 
Crook  and  Capt.  Mills  at, 

304-309 
Sitting    Bull,    Unkpapa    Indian 


chief,  his  character,  183,  184; 
outgenerals  Custer,  279;  in  the 
sun  dance,  282  note;  strategy 
of,  286;  at  big  feast  after  the 
Custer  fight,  290;  sends  letter 
to  Col.  Otis,  321;  interview 
with  Gen.  Miles,  323,  324;  at- 
tacked by  Lieut.  Baldwin,  326; 
escapes  to  British  Columbia, 
332;  surrenders  to  United 
States  army,  332;  a  moving 
spirit  in  ghost  dance  uprising, 
332;  killed  by  Indian  police, 

332 
Smith,  Capt.  Gray  Horse  Troop, 

killed  with  Custer,  257 
Smith,  Captain  E.  W.,  Eighteenth 

Infantry,   sends   Gen.   Terry's 

instructions    to    Gen.    Custer, 

220,  221 
Smith,     Major     rescues      Capt. 

Powell  in  wagon-corral  fight, 

56 

Smyth,  R.  J.,  reminiscences  of 
the  Carrington  Powder  River 
Expedition,  59-71 

Snow,  Bugler,  shot,  206 

South  Pass,  5 

South  Platte  River,  59 

Spencer  breech-loading  carbine, 
10,  25,  41,  67,  76 

Spencer  rifle,  132,  140,  159 

Spotted  Tail,  Brule  Sioux  chief,  8 

Springfield  muzzle-loading  mus- 
kets, 10,  61,  64;  breech-loading 
rifles,  modification  of,  45 

Standing  Elk,  Brule  Sioux  chief, 
8 

Standing  Rock,  282 

Standing  Rock  Agency,  Rain-in- 
the-Face  captured  at,  213 


422 


Index 


Stanley,   Gen.,   sent   on   expedi- 
tion to  the  Black  Hills,  210 
Stillwell,   John,    scout,    90;     ad- 
ventures   of,    to    rescue    Gen. 
Forsyth,  97-112;   volunteers  to 
go  to  Fort  Wallace,  1 2 1 ;  studied 
law  and  became  a  judge,  122 
note;  death  of,  122 
Sturgis,  Lieut.,  killed,  258,    259 
Sullivant  Hills,  13,  14,  19,  24,  25 
Summit     Springs,     Col.,     Gen. 
Carr's  fight  with  Tall  Bull  at, 
170-179;    account  of  battle  of, 
173-179 

Sun  Dance,  the,  description  of, 
282    note 


TALL  BULL,  Indian  chief, 
Gen.  Carr's  fight  with  at 
Summit  Springs,  170-179; 
killed,  172,  177 

Ten  Eyck,  Capt.,  sent  to  Capt. 
Fetterman's  relief,  29;  returns 
with  tidings  of  disaster,  31 

Tenth  Cavalry  (negro  regiment), 
sent  to  the  rescue  of  Gen.  For- 
syth, 100 

Terry,  Major-Gen.  Alfred  H., 
takes  command  of  Custer's 
column,  216;  did  Custer  obey 
orders  ?  219-228;  text  of  his 
letter  to  Custer,  220,  221;  his 
report  to  the  Secretary  of  War 
on  his  orders  to  Custer,  225 
note;  relieves  Maj.  Reno,  257; 
finds  Custer's  body,  257;  goes 
to  relief  of  Col.  Benteen,  276; 
a  discussion  on  his  orders  to 
Gen.  Custer,  359-397 


Third  Cavalry,  188,  190,  193, 
198,  205,  342 

Thomas,  W.  Kent,  the  personal 
story  of  Rain-in-the  Face  by, 
279-292 

Thompson,  Capt.,  Seventh  Cav- 
alry, 157 

Thompson,  David  D.,  editor 
Northwestern  Christian  Ad- 
vocate, on  the  conduct  of  Ma- 
jor Reno,  398-400 

Tongue  River,  a  fork  of  the  Yel- 
lowstone, 13,  20,  221,  265,  298, 
319,  326,  336;  Gen.  Crook's 
march  to,  187-190,  192 

Towne,  Phineas,  Ex-Trooper,  on 
the  Rosebud  fight,  203-208 

Trudeau,  scout,  90;  adventures 
of,  to  rescue  Gen.  Forsyth,  97- 
112 

Tullock's  Creek,  221,  226 

Twenty-second  Infantry,  326,336 

Twenty-seventh  Regular  Infan- 
try in  the  Mountain  District,  9; 
detailed  to  protect  wood-cutting 
party,  42 

Twenty-third  Infantry,  attacked 
at  Glendive,  Montana,  321 

u 

TTNION     PACIFIC    RAIL- 
*-'    Road,  building  of,  7;  mili- 
tary posts  along,  184 
Unkpapa   Indians   attack   Capt. 
Powell's  corral,  48 


VAN  VLIET,  Capt.,  Third 
Cavalry,  190,  193,  195,  196 


Index 


423 


Varnum,    Lieut., 

211,  267 
Vroom, 


198,  201 


with    Custer, 
Third  Cavalry, 


W 


"  WAGON  GUNS'"  69 

»   *      Wagons    made    for   de- 
fence in  Indian  wars,  43 

Wallace,  Lieut.,  271,  272,  276 

War  Bonnet,  (creek  in  South  Da- 
kota), the  fight  on  the,  293-298 

War  Department  censures  Gen. 
Carrington  unjustly,  70 

Warfare    against    savages,    339- 

344 
Washakie,  Shoshone  Indian  chief, 

198 

Washita,  battle  of  the,  146-169 
Weir,  Capt.  of  D  troop,  under 

Major  Reno,  248,  275 
Welch,  J.  E.,  letter  of,  to  Col.  H. 

O.  Clark  on  battle  of  Summit 

Springs,  173-179 
West,    Capt.,    Seventh    Cavalry, 

157,  159  . 
Wheatley,  civilian  volunteer,  26; 

killed,  35 
White  Antelope,  Cheyenne  chief, 

killed  by  Lieut.,  Sibley,  300 
White  Bull,  scout,  336 
"White  Eagle,"  name  given  to 

Gen.  Carrington  by  Indians,  8 
Whittaker,  Capt.  Frederick,  his 

"Complete    Life    of    General 


George   A.    Custer,"   quoted, 

146;    extract  from,  261 
Willow  Creek  Canon,  Big  Horn 

Mountains,  Mackenzie  attacks 

Cheyennes  at,  313 
Winchester   rifles,   Sioux   armed 

with,  41 
Wolf    Creek,     Custer's     march 

down,  151 
Wolf     Mountains,     Big     Horn 

Range,  327 

Women,  in  Gen.  Carrington's  ex- 
pedition, n;  fate  of,  in  Indian 

warfare,  II 
Woodruff,  Brig.-Gen.  Charles  A., 

on   Custer's   Little   Big   Horn 

campaign,  380-385 
Wounded  Knee,  battle  of,  352 


,  282 

Yates,  Capt.  assists  in  cap- 
ture of  Rain-in-the-Face,  214; 
killed,  258 

Yellow  Hand,  Indian  chief,  shot 
by  Buffalo  Bill,  296 

Yellowstone  expedition  of  1873, 
209-213 

Yellowstone  River,  threaded  with 
streams  from  the  Big  Horn 
Range,  5;  army  post  estab- 
lished on,  9 

Yuma  County,  Col., 

syth's  battlefield  preseired  in 
national  park  there,  in 


THE  MOCLURE   PRESS,   NEW  YORK 


DR.  M. 


^A.^     «t  ~* 


UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA  LIBRARY 

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